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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, policymakers in Saudi Arabia continue to face enormous challenges in 
meeting the increasing demand for housing, particularly affordable housing. A review of the 
literature revealed that inefficiencies associated with state institutions and housing policies are 
constraining the private sector’s ability to sufficiently engage in the production of housing. 
This study focuses on how the state’s institutional framework in the housing system affects the 
performance and capacity of the market to deliver housing for the low- and moderate-income 
segments. The main objective is to uncover the state-market relations in order to understand 
the processes that shape housing outcomes. 
The thesis begins by describing the current operation of the Saudi housing system using the 
capital city of Riyadh as a single case study. Relevant literature on housing research was 
reviewed to build a platform for this investigation and to drill deeply into existing theoretical 
frameworks. Multiple institutional theoretical concepts drawn from the literature were adopted 
and synthesised to create a conceptual framework. This was then used to unpack institutional 
dynamics in the housing system and to illuminate the contemporary network of state-market 
relations. An exploratory qualitative research design was undertaken to facilitate insights into 
the institutional arrangements that shape the actual operation of key actors in the housing 
system. In-depth interviews conducted over two stages allowed this study to closely examine 
the complexities of Riyadh’s housing system in its distinctive context.  
The study found that state-market relations were marked by acute tension that seems to be 
embedded in the broader institutional context of the housing system. By illuminating and 
analysing the results of the fieldwork, it was revealed that many issues in the housing market 
are driven by a number of fundamental factors that amplify the tension between actors in the 
system and cause the many housing challenges in Riyadh. The implications of the findings for 
future housing policy are also presented. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Research Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Despite being one of the wealthiest nations in the world, Saudi Arabia is still struggling to 
provide housing for its population. The home ownership rate in the country was 47% in 2016 
according to the National Transformation Program (NTP) which is well below the global 
average of 64% (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [KSA], 2016a). Saudi Arabia faces enormous 
challenges in meeting the demand for housing, more particularly for low- to moderate-income 
groups. Housing demand has risen tremendously in the past decade due to several factors 
including rapid population growth characterised by a large segment of young citizens combined 
with urbanisation in a few metropolises caused mostly by rural migration. Despite government 
initiatives to control this swelling demand, a growing gap between supply and demand 
continues to cause housing problems. The 10th National Economic Development Plan 2015-
2019 (the core economic plan for Saudi Arabia released every five years) estimates that 1.25 
million housing units are required throughout Saudi Arabia, and of these, 700,000 have been 
allocated to private sector delivery (Ministry of Economy and Planning [MEP], 2015). Several 
problems are identified in the housing system that constrain the private sector’s ability to 
deliver such a high volume of housing (Alskait, 2003; Sidawi & Meeran, 2011; Siry, 2011; 
Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011; Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012; Aleid, 2017). The necessity and 
importance of engaging the private sector in delivering housing is prevalent in the literature 
and the general consensus is that the private sector plays a significant role in delivering 
housing.  
In Saudi Arabia, the private sector appears to not be engaging in the adequate production of 
housing and a review of the literature reveals that inefficiencies in state institutions are 
constraining the private sector’s ability to deliver the high volume of housing required to meet 
demand for housing in Riyadh. Ghosheh (2012) states that: “A central issue to the housing 
sector stems from the fact that the public sector has not enabled the private sector and develops 
policies that do not encourage efficient use of resources” (p. 48). Saudi Arabia appears to have 
neither a land problem (where in Riyadh, for instance, only 18.6% of urban residential land is 
used for housing and 39.1% of allocated residential land remains vacant or undeveloped [High 
Commission for the development of Riyadh [HCDR], 2013b]); nor a lack of capital (in 2011, 
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USD66.6 billion1 was allocated by the King to solve the housing crisis). This suggests that 
something else is going on and that solutions to Saudi Arabia’s housing problem can best be 
found by focusing on improving its institutional framework in the housing system to better 
manage resources and enable the provision of an efficient housing market. Thus, the central 
focus of this study is to examine the state’s institutional framework in the housing system to 
enable the private sector to meet the rapid increase in demand for housing, more particularly 
for low- and moderate-income groups.   
1.2 State-market relations in the housing system 
The housing system is defined as a composition of several elements that function in time and 
place (Van der Heijden, Dol & Oxley, 2011). Each of these elements has a set of actors/agents 
that represent it, such as the households on the demand side, the private developers on the 
supply side, and the rules, norms and regulations as the institutions in which the system 
operates. These core components meet in the market to generate the outcomes of the housing 
system. Many researchers, such as Ball (1986), Oxley (1991), Ambrose (1992), Kemeny 
(1995), Jenkins and Smith (2001), Pugh (2001), Milligan (2003), Burke and Hulse (2010), Van 
der Heijden et al (2011) and Stephens (2011) have drawn attention to the importance of the 
interrelationships between the actors within the housing system and with the system in the 
wider economic, social, political and demographic context. Karn and Wolman (1992) argue 
that housing systems are anchored in specific structural contexts in each country and that the 
production and management of local housing is based on the institutional framework and the 
interactions of the market and state. These contextual factors are attributable to the 
distinctiveness of housing system performance in each setting. Burke and Hulse (2010) assert 
that the embedment of the whole housing system in a broader institutional context, which 
includes economic, social, political and demographic forces, influences its distinct parts and 
outcomes. Kemeny (1995) supports this notion by arguing that the institutional arrangements 
continuously impact the structure of a housing system and, equally, the broader context can be 
impacted by the housing outcomes. Adequate understanding of the processes of social 
interaction between actors in the system, and the system embeddedness in the institutional 
context, lead to better informed solutions to housing problems.  
                                                     
1 United States Dollar (USD) is used throughout since the Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR) is officially pegged to the 
USD at a rate of 3.75 
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State-market relations in housing have been extensively analysed from mainstream economics 
assumptions. However, the simplified assumptions of mainstream economics in its deductive 
modelling have limitations as they only focus on market outcomes rather than the processes 
that lead to such outcomes (Whitehead & Yates, 2009; Jones & Watkins, 2009). According to 
Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005), the understanding of state policy intervention and market 
operations extends beyond the concentration on policy effects on supply and demand. The 
emergence of the institutional approach in examining the property market arose from the 
negligence of mainstream economics in acknowledging the importance of institutions and their 
social relations (Ball, 1998). Adams, Dunse and White (2005) suggest that state-market 
relationships in land and property research are better understood by adopting an appropriate 
institutional framework. Similarly, D’Arcy and Keogh (2002) argue that to understand market 
outcomes, an exploration and explanation of market processes through their institutional form 
must be undertaken. Therefore, this study is framed by an institutional theoretical perspective 
to uncover the complexity of state-market relations and interactions in the Saudi housing 
system. The institutional approach is derived from a political economy theoretical framework, 
which perceives institutions as a social construct focusing on ‘context’, ‘process’ and ‘social 
relations’ (Adams et al, 2005).  
In the field of housing studies, Milligan (2003) posits that there is still no well-developed theory 
with “only some broad ideas and directions” (p. 55) emerging; and proposes a more open 
research approach that combines different approaches when needed. This study adopts 
Milligan’s direction by synthesising several theoretical institutional concepts to analyse state-
market relations in the housing system in Riyadh. The purpose is to focus the criterion on the 
institutional framework in ‘allowing’ (i.e. supporting, non-constraining) the delivery of 
housing. The Structure of Housing Provision by Ball (1983, 1986, 1998) was chosen as the 
main framework and integrated with multiple institutional concepts to design a conceptual 
framework that gives structure to and guides the investigation for this study. This synthesis of 
approaches offers invaluable insights into identifying institutional constraints and gaining a 
more informed understanding of the type of policy responses needed to enable better delivery 
of housing in Saudi Arabia.  
1.3 Research problem 
Despite the continuous efforts by the government to alleviate the housing problem in Saudi 
Arabia, several real and difficult challenges still exist in the housing system. The fact that more 
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than half of Saudi citizens still do not own housing suggests that the government’s approach in 
dealing with the housing problem is not working. While emerging demographic factors and 
weaknesses in the state’s regulatory framework may have contributed to the many difficulties 
now evident in the housing system, previous studies tended to overlook the importance of the 
institutional context and the social interactions of actors in the housing system. Property and 
housing markets have been widely examined from an institutional paradigm in the literature 
(Adams et al, 2005), however, in Saudi Arabia little is known about how the wider institutional 
arrangements including social, political and economic forces have impacted the processes of 
social relations which shape the current housing outcomes. Such an institutional analysis 
provides a platform for deep examination of the system dynamics and an unpacking of a ‘black 
box’ of processes to gain rich insights into the unique housing context of Saudi Arabia and, 
thus, connecting the analysis of the housing problem to the bigger picture of complex social 
relations. 
1.4 Research aim   
By uncovering insights from an institutional approach, this study aims to address the current 
gap in housing research in Saudi Arabia by unpacking the ‘black box’ of processes that 
determine actors’ strategies and shape housing outcomes. While little is known about how the 
wider institutional arrangements have impacted the delivery of affordable housing in Riyadh, 
this study provides a detailed and authentic account of the dynamics of state-market relations 
in the housing system to fill the research gap (arising from the research problem), provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the housing problem, extend the current body of knowledge 
on diagnosing housing market issues, and present the policy implications of the research 
findings.  
1.5 Research questions 
The following central research question and sub-questions have arisen out of the problems in 
the Saudi housing system as identified in the literature and from this researcher’s observations2. 
                                                     
2 This researcher was born and raised in Saudi Arabia and draws from his personal, professional and academic 
experience. He has lived in the capital city of Riyadh for over 15 years and completed his undergraduate degree 
in Planning and Urban Design at King Saud University (KSU), Riyadh. Upon graduation he was employed as a 
teaching assistant and more recently as a lecturer (on research leave) in the Department of Urban Planning at 
KSU. Relevant experience includes completion of the Master of Real Estate Development at Arizona State 
University (USA) and involvement in several local housing conferences, symposiums and workshops to broaden 
knowledge in the housing issues in Saudi Arabia and developing expertise in this field before commencing PhD 
research in Australia.   
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While the central question frames the research, the sub-questions have been formulated to 
unpack the bigger question and provide a systematic approach in carrying out this investigation. 
This illuminates a complex situation by providing significant insights and knowledge about the 
institutional framework and the interrelationships of actors in the housing system in Riyadh.  
Central question: 
How can the state’s institutional framework in the housing system be improved to better 
enable the market to meet the demand for housing, particularly affordable housing, in 
Riyadh? 
Sub-questions: 
1. What are the existing roles and relationships of key actors within the housing system? 
2. What are the key issues in the housing system that influence the private sector in 
delivering affordable housing? 
3. How do these issues affect the private sector’s ability to deliver affordable housing? 
4. What mechanisms can be provided by state institutions to enable better affordable 
housing delivery? 
The term ‘affordable housing’ is used throughout this thesis, thus requiring a clear definition. 
Affordable housing has no single universal definition and according to Gabriel, Jacobs, 
Arthurson, Burke and Yates (2005): “housing affordability can never be defined in any 
objective sense; it will always be subject to reinterpretation and critical analysis” (p. 6). 
Additionally, Milligan, Phibbs, Gurran and Fagan (2007) recommend that such definitions are, 
“usually specific to the policy and program context in which they are used” (p. 26).  Therefore, 
in the Saudi context as investigated in this study, affordable housing is broadly defined as 
housing that is delivered through direct and/or indirect government intervention strategies in 
order to provide adequate housing that meets the needs of a range of targeted groups. This 
definition is further explained below. 
First, the focus of ‘government intervention strategies’ in this study is not on government 
housing subsidies per se (i.e. demand side subsidies that assist households to purchase housing) 
but housing that is delivered by private market actors in a strategic regulatory environment that 
potentially facilitates and enables efficient and cost-effective production of housing. Second, 
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‘adequate housing’ used in the definition follows criteria proposed by the United Nations in 
The Right to Adequate Housing, including security of tenure, availability of services and 
infrastructure, at a cost that does not compromise enjoyment of other basic needs, habitability 
in terms of quality and space as well as cultural adequacy which takes into consideration 
cultural aspects (UN-Habitat, 2009). Finally, the ‘targeted groups’ refer to households with 
low- to moderate-incomes who earn at or below the average Saudi household income (as shown 
in Chapter 2). It is important to note that this study focuses on the affordability of home 
ownership as opposed to affordable rental housing due to the domination of ownership as a 
more socially accepted concept in Saudi Arabia (as explained in Chapter 2).  
1.6 Research approach 
A single case study design adopting multiple methods of qualitative inquiry was found to be 
the most suitable method for investigating the research questions. Given the nature of the 
central research question (a ‘how’ question), Yin (2003) considers this as the preferred strategy, 
achieving the combined goals of exploration and explanation. The capital city of Riyadh is 
used for the case study in analysing the state-market relations in the housing system to allow 
this study to drill deep into the complexities of the system and its institutional context and to 
facilitate manageable data collection and analysis. Qualitative research, as an interpretive and 
naturalistic approach, supports a more detailed and flexible way of understanding “how social 
experience is created and given meaning” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8). Therefore, the 
interaction and interrelationships between actors in the Saudi housing system can be better 
understood from a qualitative epistemological position. The flexibility provided in using the 
method of in-depth interviews as a primary source of data collection resulted in a deeper 
understanding of the participants’ experiences, perspectives, and interpretations on their roles 
and relations in the housing system. Such fullness cannot be captured by quantifiable methods.  
The research plan followed two stages of data collection and analysis over a two-year period. 
The first stage of data collection was undertaken to assess the functionality and operation of 
the housing market in Riyadh focusing on key private sector actors to obtain multiple 
perspectives and explanations of the housing issues they face. The issues that emerged in the 
first stage analysis were used to identify the significant issues hindering housing producers 
from delivering affordable housing in Riyadh. As housing is a complex and multifaceted 
discipline, the ability to investigate the whole housing system (as identified in the Stage 1 
analysis) in detail was considered beyond the scope of this research. Hence, due to time and 
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resource limitations, it was decided to further investigate only the most pressing and significant 
issues revealed in the Stage 1 analysis. Thus, Stage 2 proceeded with a focus on the planning 
system and government housing policies. The subsequent analysis and reporting of the results 
of the empirical examination of these two stages provided a “thick description” (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985, p. 359) of state-market relations in Riyadh’s housing system by revealing the 
multiple realities and perspectives of participants. This facilitated the accumulation of 
sufficient knowledge and understanding of state-market relations in Riyadh culminating in the 
development of a framework for improving the delivery of affordable housing in Riyadh.  
1.7 Significance of the research 
The process and product of this study will hopefully make several valuable contributions to the 
existing knowledge in housing research and practice. Firstly, significant information is offered 
to policymakers in Riyadh, which is of value at the national level as well as for other growing 
cities in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, given the general lack of housing research in the Middle East 
region, and particularly in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this research 
is of much value to researchers and policymakers in these areas currently facing similar 
demographic issues, housing challenges and institutional conditions. Thirdly, the examination 
of state-market relations in the housing system through an institutional approach has never 
been explored within the Saudi Arabian housing context. Hence, this study draws much needed 
attention to an important subject and shines some much-needed light on unexamined housing 
issues thus providing a pathway for future research. Fourthly, this research presents an original 
method of synthesising theoretical approaches into a robust conceptual framework that 
provides a structure for investigating state-market relations in housing systems. This original 
conceptual framework allowed the analysis of the research to further evolve, culminating in a 
distinctive contribution to housing research by developing a conceptual model that presents an 
improved holistic method for diagnosing housing market issues. Such a model has the potential 
for application in any housing context. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 1: This current chapter provides a brief introduction to the study by illustrating the 
research background, problem, aim, questions, methodology, significance and structure of the 
thesis.  
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Chapter 2: This chapter is aimed at familiarising the reader with the housing context in Saudi 
Arabia as well as the capital city of Riyadh. It commences by highlighting the broader 
demographic, political, economic and social conditions. A brief history of housing policy in 
the country since the 1970s is presented, followed by a detailed description of Riyadh’s housing 
market conditions and regulatory framework.  
Chapter 3: Relevant literature on housing and property research is presented and synthesised 
in this chapter to develop a theoretical framework most appropriate for this study. The chapter 
reviews the evolution of housing theories in developing countries highlighting the recent shift 
in the global housing policy debate. Such a shift provides a focus on reviewing relevant 
empirical literature on the impact of planning regulations on housing. Attention is then drawn 
to discussing the dynamics of state-market relations in housing systems in which an 
institutional approach is synthesised from several theoretical concepts to provide a conceptual 
framework for this study.  
Chapter 4: The methodological approach used in this study is presented in this chapter. 
Qualitative research inquiry in the context of a single case study design is utilised. The chapter 
explains the rationale for choosing the research approach, the selection of Riyadh as a case 
study, the stages of the research and the techniques used in collecting and analysing the data. 
Issues surrounding study rigour and quality of the research is also addressed following 
trustworthiness assessment criteria.  
Chapter 5: This chapter reports the results of 20 semi-structured interviews with key private 
sector actors in Riyadh and captures their experiences and perceptions through multiple 
perspectives and explanations of the housing issues they face, how they interact and function 
in the system and how they have been influenced by the existing regulatory framework. The 
reported findings and results are presented under four main themes devised from the study’s 
conceptual framework.   
Chapter 6: This chapter further investigates the most significant and pressing issues uncovered 
in Chapter 5. The impact of planning and development controls on housing and government 
intervention in housing are examined. The results presented in this chapter are based on 10 
semi-structured interviews conducted with planners and housing officials in Riyadh. The 
analysis follows two main themes derived from this study’s conceptual framework where 
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government actors’ perspectives and views on issues raised by the private developers in the 
previous chapter are uncovered. 
Chapter 7: An analytical discussion of the findings presented in chapters 5 and 6 is undertaken 
in this chapter to critically assess the state-market relations in the delivery of housing in Riyadh. 
The discussion reveals the embeddedness of the issues in the wider institutional arrangements 
where fundamental driving forces are found to be behind most of the issues in the housing 
system. The chapter synthesises and conceptualises these driving forces into a model that could 
be used to diagnose housing market issues. Finally, several policy implications that are aligned 
with the model are outlined.  
Chapter 8: This last chapter presents answers to the research questions and the conclusion of 
this study. The chapter also highlights the study’s limitations and identifies several propositions 
for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Housing in Saudi Arabia and Riyadh 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the housing context in Saudi Arabia with a special focus 
on the capital city Riyadh. The main objective is to describe the housing system taking into 
account its embeddedness in the broader institutional context that includes demographic, 
political, economic, social and cultural conditions as well as the current and past housing 
regulatory environment. The description of the system presented in this chapter is aligned with 
this study’s theoretical position (see Chapter 3 – Section 2.5) suggesting that it is vital to 
examine the interactions of actors in the wider context to have a better understanding of how 
they operate and function. Thus, the broader context will provide the base for examining the 
state-market relations in the housing system.   
The chapter commences with a general explanation of the demographic, political, economic, 
and social/cultural conditions that have influenced the Saudi housing system both positively 
and negatively (Section 2.2). The next section of this chapter (2.3) briefly describes the history 
of housing policy and its evolution in Saudi Arabia since the 1970s. Section 2.4 aims to shed 
more light on the current housing situation in Riyadh by providing a brief background of the 
city and moving to a more detailed account of the land and housing market features, followed 
by a description of the planning system and its impact on housing. Several primary areas 
directly related to housing are discussed in detail in order to identify the current trends and 
issues inherent in the housing system. A summary of the main challenges is included at the end 
of the chapter highlighting the role of the state and its impact in shaping the contemporary 
housing system in Saudi Arabia.  
2.2 Background of Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest Arab country in the Middle East in terms of area 
with a total land size of 2,149,690 sq. km (ranked 14th in the world, a little more than a third 
the size of Australia). The country is also the largest in the Arabian Peninsula and is bordered 
by the Red Sea on the west, the Persian Gulf on the east (sharing with other neighbouring 
countries), Iraq and Jordan to the north and Yemen and Oman in the south. Saudi Arabia’s 
terrain can be described as varied, including areas of coastland, sand, seas and mountains; with 
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the bulk of the country consisting of flat, rocky and sandy plateaus and plains. Saudi Arabia is 
famously associated with a desert environment as nearly 50% of its area is covered by sand. 
Coastal plains run through the western and eastern sides of the country while a range of 
mountains run parallel to the western coastal plain from the north to the south of the country. 
With its strategic location linking three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe), Saudi Arabia’s 
economy has benefited greatly from the opportunities of providing the transit of goods and 
commodities through its ports.     
Riyadh is the capital and the largest city in Saudi Arabia with a population of over six million. 
The holy city of Makkah and the city of Jeddah in the west side of the country form the second 
largest urban centre followed by the greater Dammam/Khobar area on the east side. Other 
important cities in the country include Madinah (the second holy city of Islam), Abha, Najran 
and Jizan in the south, and Tabouk in the north. Saudi Arabia is divided into 13 provinces and 
each has a principal city for administrative purposes (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Source: Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs [MOMRA], 2015 
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Most cities in Saudi Arabia have undergone dramatic demographic, political, social and 
economic changes in the past four decades. The country transformed from an economy 
dependent on small scale traditional agriculture and trade activities before the 1970s to a 
modern developing economy that plays a key role in the global economy (Mubarak, 1999). The 
increase in oil prices in the mid-1970s, triggered by the high world demand and followed by 
the steady rise in the years following, catapulted this transformation bringing wealth and 
stability to the economy and providing a comfortable standard of living. Changes in 
demographic, economic, political, and social conditions in the country are explained in more 
detail below. 
2.2.1 Demographic conditions 
The demographic conditions of Saudi Arabia, where the population structure determines 
government expenditure and potential economic growth, have a major impact on the country’s 
economic and social development (Mahrad, 2010). Saudi Arabia has witnessed unprecedented 
population growth over the past few decades: from some 17 million in 1992 to about 22 million 
in 2004; reaching 27.2 million in 2010; and more recently 31.7 million in 2016 (General 
Authority for Statistics [GAS], 2016). Saudi Arabia’s population structure is characterised by 
a large and rapidly growing sector of young citizens. According to the Demography Survey 
2016 (GAS, 2016) nearly 50% of the Saudi population is under the age of 25 (24.8% is below 
the age of 15 [see Figure 2.2]).  
 
Figure 2.2: Saudi Population Pyramid  
Source: GAS, 2016  
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The population growth rate in Saudi Arabia was 2.54% per annum between 2010 and 2016, 
which is considered high compared to other countries (Figure 2.3). This population growth is 
mainly generated by two factors: 1) the high fertility rate of 2.5 children per woman (Figure 
2.4); and 2) immigration that accounts for a third of the total population (ibid). The average 
household size in Saudi Arabia was 5.98 in 2016 (ibid).   
 
Figure 2.3: Population Growth - An International Comparison (2016) 
Source: World Bank Data, n.d. and GAS, 2016 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Fertility Rate - An International Comparison (2015) 
Source: World Bank Data, n.d.  
  14 
 
The government’s early efforts to modernise the country in the seventies and eighties by 
focusing on investment in infrastructure projects (such as integrated transportation networks, 
water, electricity, sewerage and other services in major cities) has led to a high level of 
urbanisation. Rural to urban migration by citizens seeking better living standards has created a 
demographic shift and trend towards urbanisation that has continued in the new millennium. 
As a result of the accelerated urban development in the past four decades, 82% of Saudi 
Arabia’s population live in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2015a), while 65% of the total population 
lives in the three major agglomerated centres: Riyadh, Makkah and the Eastern Province 
(Ghosheh, 2011). The growth of urban population varies between cities (as shown in Figure 
2.5) where Riyadh has the highest share of population, followed by Jeddah, Makkah and 
Dammam respectively. The problem of the early government spatial distribution policies had 
created inequalities in physical and social infrastructure that, as Abdul Salam, Elsegaey, Khraif 
and Al-Mutairi (2014) suggest, resulted in the failure of the rural economy to retain its 
population. Providing equitable delivery of public services to all parts of this vast country is 
still a major challenge for the government. The United Nations Common Country Strategic 
Framework 2012-2016 (UNCCSF, 2012) for Saudi Arabia reported that: 
… significant disparities exist between regions and between rural and urban areas, even 
as the capacity of local governments to deliver services and provide the necessary 
infrastructure is limited. (p. 16) 
 
Figure 2.5: Share of Population by Cities in Saudi Arabia 
Source: GAS, 2014 as cited in UN-Habitat, 2015a 
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According to the UN-Habitat report (2015a), the urbanisation trend in Saudi Arabia is predicted 
to reach 97% by 2030. This acceleration in urban development, including building 
infrastructure projects and the development of industrial and agricultural sectors has resulted 
in more demand for foreign labour. Nearly 11.6 million residents of the current population are 
immigrants from various parts of the world (GAS, 2016). This large migration of foreign 
workers to Saudi cities created very rapid levels of urbanisation adding more pressure on public 
services. The concentration of the foreign worker population remains very high (about 90%) 
in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2015a). Besides the bulge in the young population and the high 
growth rate, the considerable number of expatriates in Saudi Arabia further accounts for the 
demographic shifts. These demographic forces are putting additional pressure on the Saudi 
Arabian housing market where the prospective annual output of housing units will have to 
increase to keep pace with the growing number of households. However, it is important to note 
that while providing housing for foreign workers is important, this study is focused on the 
delivery of affordable housing for Saudi nationals only. A study of relevant housing needs for 
foreign workers and appropriate policies is a voluminous issue to tackle and is best addressed 
in a separate study.  
2.2.2 Political structure 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formally declared by King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in 1932 
after his campaign of unifying the various isolated parts of the Arabian Peninsula. This Islamic 
country is an absolute monarchy ruled by the Al-Saud family (the royal family), who control 
the political climate in Saudi Arabia by ensuring that most of the important positions in the 
government are held by male descendants of King Abdul-Aziz. The country’s constitution is 
based on traditional principles and practices rooted in Islam. The Islamic legal system, or what 
is called Islamic Shariah law, is the Basic Law promulgated by a royal decree in 1992. The 
Basic Law sets the features of the political system, although without a legally binding written 
constitution. The Islamic Shariah laws stem from the holy book of Quran and Sunna (the 
traditional teaching of the Prophet Mohammad). However, both the Quran and Sunna remain 
subject to interpretation and the council of religious leaders led by the Mufti (the highest 
religious figure) performs this function.  
The King is the highest judicial and legislative authority in Saudi Arabia as he leads the 
government and supervises and monitors government programs. The King also coordinates the 
matter of issues to be decided and rules by issuing royal decrees as laws. The Consultative 
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Council (Majlis Al-Shoura in Arabic) was established in 2000 to provide the King and Council 
of Ministers with advice regarding important issues relevant to government policies. The 
Consultative Council resembles in its function the character of a parliament; however, its 
members are not democratically elected by society but are appointed by the King for a four-
year term. Laws and legislation that are issued by the Consultative Council are first reviewed 
by the Council of Ministers and finally by the King who, before issuing, has the power of final 
approval and the right to amend as the absolute leader.  
The Saudi Council of Ministers is headed by the King and 23 ministers who represent 23 
government ministries. Ministers oversee preparing and presenting administrative plans and 
discussing issues relevant to their domain. The main function of the council is to lay down the 
public policy framework of the state by holding regulatory, executive and administrative 
authority (Alghamdi, 1995). The Council of Ministers plays a significant role in the political 
climate of Saudi Arabia by functioning as the source of knowledge that guides and drives the 
improvement of the legislative framework of the nation. In 1993, the government went through 
a course of administrative reforms including the establishment of Regional/Provincial 
Councils. The country was divided into 13 provinces in order to promote regional economic, 
political and social development growth within various territories in the kingdom. The Council 
consists of government branches where every ministry and government authority is charged 
with servicing the population of that province. Each province has a governor, appointed by the 
King, to retain law and order and each Provincial Council has a duty of determining the need 
and priority of development projects in the province to be considered in the national 
development plan. It is also charged with following up on the implementation of current 
development projects in the various provincial cities and towns. 
Civil society participation in political and social matters has a very limited place in Saudi 
Arabia as such issues might conflict with the political identity of the state. In Saudi Arabia, 
there are no democratic elections and political participation does not exist at the national level. 
In 2005, municipal elections were introduced to the Saudi society for the first time where 
candidates competed for municipal seats to represent citizens’ needs and demands. The 
elections were stopped after 2005 and resumed in 2011. However, the popularity of these 
elections is very low among Saudi nationals according to a report by Bertelsmann Stiftung 
[BTI] (2014) who found that in the election of 2011 no more than 300,000 votes were cast out 
of the total Saudi population who were eligible to vote. More recently, municipal councils are 
gaining some popularity where women are allowed to vote and run for seats (UN-Habitat, 
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2015a). Any other political elections at national or local levels are prohibited in Saudi Arabia, 
including political parties and unions, unless approved by the government. Mubarak (1999) 
argued that the economic prosperity of the country has taken the pressure off the leadership to 
promote democratic processes. 
The political development model in Saudi Arabia is similar to what Huntington and Nelson 
describe as an autocratic model of development (Mubarak, 1992). According to Mubarak 
(1992), this model exists as one in which:  
… power is concentrated, formal political participation is nullified, economic growth 
is enhanced, and socioeconomic equality is promoted as a way of securing appeal to 
legitimacy among the governed masses. (p. 60) 
Mubarak (1992) argued that the Saudi government uses the country’s wealth generated by oil 
revenues to modernise the country and improve the lifestyle of citizens without disturbing the 
balance of the various social groups. He explained that the accelerated level of development 
and modernisation in the country provided the government with legitimacy over the “rising 
expectations of the growing urban middle class” (p. 61). The legitimacy of the Saudi political 
system, however, is not only supported by the economic prosperity and development but also 
derives its fundamentals from the religious ideology of Islam. Alghamdi (1995) asserts that: 
“Islam is the main source of the legitimacy of the political system in Saudi Arabia” (p. 135). 
The supremacy of Islamic Shariah law which emphasises good relationships between the 
governor and the governed is considered paramount. Allah (God) in the Quran asks Muslims 
to obey their leader within the rules of Islam and ask those in power to consult the people they 
serve (ibid). Therefore, the Saudi ruling system derives its legitimacy by applying Islamic law 
as its foundation. 
One of the key issues with the Saudi political model is related to the centralisation of public 
policy and the decision-making process, which has led to bureaucratic inefficiency. The top-
down approach in Saudi Arabia weakens the governance and administrative mechanisms of 
accountability, transparency and responsiveness and evades any institutional debate in public 
policies (Jreisat, 2012; Helmi, 2015). The implications of the political system and its impact 
on housing provision in Saudi Arabia will be elucidated throughout this thesis.  
2.2.3 Economic conditions 
The economic development of Saudi Arabia has undertaken a vast transformation in the last 
fifty years. Starting as a small-scale agricultural and trade economy at the establishment of the 
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country in 1932 (Al-Rushaid, 2010), Saudi Arabia has developed into the world’s largest oil 
producer and exporter (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2013). The discovery of oil in 
Saudi Arabia and the escalation in world demand for oil, and the steady rise in oil prices has 
brought incredible wealth to the economy. The oil boom in the 1970s dramatically changed the 
economy of the country. Rising from USD0.22 per barrel of oil in 1948 to reach USD30 by 
1982 (Sohail, 2012) peaking at USD110 in 2011 (McKinsey Global Institute [MGI], 2015). 
Saudi Arabia is now the largest economy in the Middle East and owns around 25% of the 
world’s oil reserves. Globally, Saudi Arabia is a member of the G-20 (ranked 19th largest 
economy) where it plays an important role in global market stability through its significant oil 
holdings (MGI, 2015).  
The Saudi economy has been growing at a robust pace, with real GDP growth averaging 6.25% 
per annum during 2008-2012 (IMF, 2013). In recent years, however, economic indicators show 
a sharp drop in real GDP from 10% in 2011 to 1.4% in 2016 due to the decline in oil prices 
(MEP, 2017). Despite steady falls in oil revenue, the economy remains dominated by oil, which 
in 2016 provided 62% of budget revenues (oil revenues accounted for about 90% of the total 
budget between 2011-2014) (ibid).   
Saudi Arabia’s economic structure is based on a dual system of a market-oriented economy 
and a main course of government economic policy (Mahrad, 2010). Since the 1970s, the Saudi 
government has been drafting and implementing economic policies through its National 
Economic Development Plans (NEDP) aiming to guide the national goals of development and 
the allocation of resources. The NEDP is a comprehensive medium-term plan (5 years) used as 
an overarching economic policy that guides yearly fiscal budgets in assigning a share of oil 
revenues for investment in physical and social infrastructure, creating a robust environment for 
market operation. Thus, in a country where the economy is mainly dependent on its oil 
revenues, the private sector relies on public expenditure to function; a dependence considered 
unsustainable in the future (Sohail, 2012).  
The recognition of the Saudi government that the resource-based economy is no longer a 
sustainable option, especially with the recent decline in oil prices, was recently reflected in 
Saudi Vision 2030, which is an economic reform plan that places a high priority on diversifying 
the economy, giving a greater role to the private sector. Among several ambitious objectives, 
the plan aims to increase the long-term contribution of the private sector in the economy (from 
currently less than 40% of GDP to 65%). This is envisioned through a set of regulatory reforms 
to “facilitate investment, encourage innovation and competition and remove all obstacles 
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preventing the private sector from playing a larger role in development” (KSA, 2016b, p. 45). 
To achieve these goals, the government launched The National Transformation Program 2020 
(NTP) to set interim targets for its vision to be implemented in phases. The NTP has assigned 
a government budget of USD72 billion over the first five-year period between 2016-2020 to 
implement its economic initiatives across 24 government bodies. Housing was given the 
priority with the highest budget allocation of over USD15.7 billion. An important strategic 
objective is to improve the performance of the real estate sector and increase its contribution 
to GDP from currently 5% to 10% by 2020 (KSA, 2016a). The role of private residential 
developers in delivering housing is also planned to increase from 10% to 30% by 2020 (ibid).  
The economic growth caused by the rising oil prices, particularly in the last decade, has been 
positively reflected on households’ prosperity where average income has risen by about 75% 
from 2003 to 2013 (MGI, 2015). According to the Household Expenditure and Income Survey 
(GAS, 2013), the average Saudi household income is USD3,629 per month. Although Saudi 
Arabia is a high-income country, poverty still exists, especially in less developed regions of 
the nation (UNCCSF, 2012). The government initiated several anti-poverty measures in 2011, 
such as an increase in social security expenditure and one-year unemployment assistance, yet 
the impact of these measures has been modest. According to the latest statistics, the 
unemployment rate of 12.3% (IMF, 2017) remains high among Saudi citizens. 
2.2.4 Social and cultural conditions  
Social and cultural traditions in Saudi Arabia struggle with the tension created by the wave of 
western modernisation on one hand, and maintaining a conservative society that follows 
Islamic values and family-based orientation on the other (Bechtold, 2012). The evolution of 
the social and cultural context in the country stems from the Islamic ideology and norms where 
a community of participation is strengthened resulting in a highly collective society that values 
family tradition (ibid). However, the rapid economic growth and development gained from the 
country’s oil wealth has led to a change in lifestyle that is influenced by the individualism of 
western modernisation. According to Atiyyah (1993): “At the socio-cultural level, the gradual 
erosion of the traditional social system and its long-established values and norms controlling 
behaviour and interpersonal relationships continues” (p. 4). These changes in social and 
cultural values have translated into seeking material wealth and political power (ibid). 
Urbanisation, technological advancement and the rise in imports have accounted for the 
modernisation of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the historical conservative identity in the 
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country has been witnessing a shift from a collectivist society to a more individualist 
westernised one (Bechtold, 2012).  
Social and cultural values play a significant role in the context of housing as they shape and 
guide the way housing is perceived and valued. For example, individualist societies based on 
market liberalisation, such as Australia, have a dominant social value that is manifested in its 
tendencies towards home ownership (Burke & Hulse, 2010). Similarly, contemporary Saudi 
society, which is increasingly influenced by capitalist values (Helmi, 2015), has prevailing 
social values that are characterised by the preference for home ownership as reflected in its 
modern lifestyle. Opoku and Abdul-Muhmin (2010) indicated that most Saudi households 
prefer buying a house over renting. In Saudi Arabia, owning a home is a desired 
accomplishment that symbolises personal and social identity (Al-Gabbani, 1984). As depicted 
by the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP, 2010), government housing policies has been 
supporting home ownership: “The long-term strategy of the Saudi economy aims to raise the 
rate of home ownership among the citizens to about 80% by 2024” (p. 358).  
An interesting feature of the home ownership model in Saudi Arabia, however, is related to its 
form, particularly the type of preferred dwelling. Several studies point out that single family 
homes (villas) are the most favoured type of dwelling (Al-Hathlout, 1992; Al-Saif, 1994; 
Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2010; Khan, 2013). These studies argue that the main reason behind 
the preference for single family homes is related to the culture of privacy in Saudi society. 
Despite the erosion of traditions and customs in contemporary Saudi society, fundamental 
social principles, such as the concept of privacy still exist (Helmi, 2015). Privacy has a 
significant importance in Saudi Arabia where it is rooted in religious and cultural values and 
beliefs. Privacy has a unique interpretation in Saudi society. The strict separation between 
females and non-family male members makes privacy an utmost necessity both inside and 
outside the building and must be adhered to in design and planning considerations (Salama, 
2006; Al-Surf, Trigunarsyah & Susilawati, 2013). Privacy in gender segregation has become a 
socio-cultural obligation and a socially acceptable convention (Helmi, 2015). 
As oil wealth has improved the society’s living standards in Saudi Arabia, it has also impacted 
on other socio-cultural practices. The state does not impose any income or property taxes on 
citizens. The welfare system in Saudi Arabia is unique as several public services, such as 
education and health, are provided by the state at no cost. Housing subsidies are also available 
for all groups of Saudi nationals regardless of their socio-economic situation. Access to health, 
education and government housing subsidies is considered by citizens to be a fundamental right 
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of the social welfare state (Mahrad, 2010). In Saudi Arabia, citizens have high expectations of 
the government as they perceive it to be endlessly wealthy and thus obliged to provide 
free/subsidised services which has created a ‘culture of entitlements’ (Mahrad, 2010; Sidawi 
& Meeran, 2011; Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2013). “Saudis increasingly relied on the state, 
adapted their expectations of what they were entitled to, and often became tied to specific 
institutions through thick social bond” (Hertog, 2010, p 18). These expectations and perception 
of entitlement to the country’s wealth has grown to become a cultural norm that is embedded 
in the whole society, creating much pressure on the government as a growing mismatch 
between expectations and actual delivery of services leads to a level of dissatisfaction among 
citizens.  
2.3 History of housing policy development in Saudi Arabia  
The development of housing policies in Saudi Arabia has been shaped and directed by rapid 
changes in demographic, social, political and economic forces. The country has undergone a 
remarkable transformation from a traditional tribal society into a modern state that functions 
within defined structures and operational institutions. The public sector in particular has 
expanded enormously since the 1970s. Nowadays, 23 ministries are established in areas such 
as services, security, education, and health. Housing in Saudi Arabia has been managed under 
several regulatory governmental bodies to guide its policy. This section reviews the history and 
development of housing polices in Saudi Arabia since 1970. Three distinct phases are presented 
below with each having unique characteristics.   
2.3.1 Housing in the oil-boom era 1970-1990 
Saudi Arabia experienced its golden economic era in the 1970s and 1980s when oil prices 
dramatically increased. The vast revenues resulting from the oil-boom funded massive 
development projects to build basic infrastructure such as airports, major roads, hospitals, and 
school projects in the main cities. Sohail (2012) estimated that, “By the mid-1980s, investments 
in these projects totalled a massive USD500 billion” (p. 148). Despite the remarkable success 
of the government in building basic infrastructure in different parts of the country in the first 
development plan (1970-1975), housing provision experienced a severe shortage (Al-Hathloul, 
1992). The government development policies and spending programs at the time vastly 
increased the demand for housing (Al-Saif, 1994). A huge influx of foreign labourers needed 
to work on the government projects coupled with urbanisation of a local population looking 
for a better lifestyle in the cities fuelled the housing problem. Riyadh’s population was growing 
  22 
at a high rate of 8% per year between 1970-1990 (Garba, 2004). 
The construction boom in the beginning of the 1970s driven by government spending, which 
actually caused the housing shortage, was in fact aiming to raise standards of living and 
improve the welfare of citizens. The government in its first National Economic Development 
Plan emphasised housing as a main priority in its agenda (Al-Hathloul, 1992). National 
governance structures were established to support the production of housing through the 
formation of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) in 1975. Moreover, the Real 
Estate Development Fund (REDF) was launched in 1974 to provide long-term loans to support 
citizens in obtaining housing. The focus in the first development plan was to build the base and 
framework for the housing policy in the country (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). The 
backlog of services and shortage of housing in the first half of the 1970s was tackled in the 
second half of that decade by another massive government investment. In the second 
development plan (1975-1980), the government allocated USD142 billion to invest in physical 
infrastructure projects including housing (compared to USD9.2 billion in the previous plan) 
and assigned USD24.5 billion to fund over 300,000 housing units on a national scale (Mubarak, 
1992).  
During this era, the state played both direct and indirect intervention roles in the provision of 
housing. Direct state intervention was characterised by the establishment of high-rise public 
housing projects. These public housing projects were launched by the MPWH in response to 
the housing shortage in the 1970s and early 1980s (Al-Hathloul, 1992). Three major cities 
witnessed what is called ‘rush public housing projects’ that were expeditiously designed and 
constructed (Al-Saif, 1994). According to Mubarak (1999): 
This approach was met with social apathy; due to the lack of cultural considerations 
such as the extended family structure, the relatively large number of persons per 
households and the stigma attached to living in public housing. (p. 7)  
Few public housing projects were built after this initial phase but they still encountered cultural 
resistance (ibid). The limited success of ‘rush’ public housing projects was attributed to several 
reasons including the lack of users’ participation in the design process and the preference of 
Saudi families at the time to live in detached homes (Al-Saif, 1994). The state direct 
intervention in such public housing programs, however, represented a relatively small 
percentage of housing supply (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). Besides public housing, 
several government agencies built housing projects for their employees. 
State indirect intervention in housing, on the other hand, has played a significant role in shaping 
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the contemporary housing sector in Saudi Arabia. Two aspects characterise this impact: (i) the 
state role in providing interest-free housing loans through the government funded Real Estate 
Development Fund (REDF); (ii) the distribution of free land through the land grant programs 
to Saudi nationals by the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). These two forms 
of government housing subsidies aimed at improving Saudi citizens’ standard of living by 
providing greater distribution of the oil wealth. The government’s REDF, as a state-owned 
financial agency, provided zero-interest housing loans of up to USD80,000 to citizens to build 
their own housing. In Riyadh, between 1975 and 1990, 440,000 housing units (about 67% of 
all housing units built in the same years) were financed through the REDF (Mubarak, 1999). 
The land grant program also contributed significantly in supporting home ownership. For 
example, by 1986 45 square kilometres (almost 50% of the total residential land area which at 
the time was 92 square kilometres)3 of Riyadh was granted for free to low-income Saudi 
nationals (ibid). According to Al-Mayouf and Al-Khayyal (2011), 375,972 land plots were 
distributed nationwide by 1990.  
These generous government subsidies in the 1970s and 1980s had enabled low and middle-
income households in the country to secure their homes. According to Mubarak (1999): 
“Lucrative subsidies with lax conditions resulted in the construction of 889,000 units between 
1970 and 1990. This resulted in vacancy rates in the Kingdom’s major cities” (p. 11). This era 
witnessed the greatest improvement in development intervention by the government (Garba, 
2004; Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011) and has continued to shape modern Saudi Arabia 
including the structure and state of its housing market.  
2.3.2 Housing in the post oil-boom era 1990-2010 
During the 1990s, the government’s role in subsidising several development programs, 
including maintenance of the generous housing subsidies of the 1970s and 1980s, diminished 
(Mubarak, 1999). Economic pressures caused by a substantial decline in oil revenues, such as 
the ‘Oil-Price Crash’ that occurred in the late 1980s, the depreciation of the US dollar coupled 
with the country’s involvement in the Gulf War in 1990-1991 led to cutting costs on 
government expenditure especially on infrastructure projects (Sohail, 2012). Besides these 
factors causing a national budget deficit, another important factor that contributed to the 
government’s diminishing role in supporting housing was the excessive housing supply 
                                                     
3 The exact number of land plots granted is unknown but given that the land grant policy at the time designates 
400 sq. meters per granted plot, then potentially about 112,500 land plots were granted in Riyadh.  
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accumulated during the 1970s and 1980s that was causing a high vacancy rate in major cities 
(i.e. 15% in Riyadh in 1991) (Mubarak, 1999).  
During this era, the nature of state intervention in housing provision was characterised by a 
limited indirect role. The government abandoned building public housing as part of its social 
housing programs in the 1980s and not a single project was built until 2009. The Ministry of 
Public Works and Housing (MPWH) was abolished in 2003, and its responsibilities were 
transferred to other ministries including the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning. In terms of the state’s indirect role, the land grant program 
was preserved but in a reduced capacity, with land granted during this phase located in distant 
locations from urban centres and not served by infrastructure (Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011). On 
the other hand, the REDF loans were minimised particularly between 1990-2005 (average of 
7,581 loans per year) which was significantly lower than the average in the 1970-80s (Figure 
2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6: Number of REDF Loans per National Economic Development Plans  
Source: MEP, 2010   
 
The decline in the government’s role in supporting the provision of housing did not have a 
major impact on the housing market during the 1990s due to the relatively modest population 
growth in urban areas (Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011). However, with the new millennium, 
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housing witnessed a significant shortage particularly in major cities instigated by a massive 
demographic shift causing a growing gap between supply and demand (ibid). Growing levels 
of urbanisation emerged in major cities due to several factors including huge rural-urban 
migration, an increase in foreign labour migration and centralisation of economic development 
activities in urban centres. Riyadh’s population, for example, more than doubled in size from 
about 2.1 million in 1991 to 5.3 million in 2010 (HCDR, 2016). The rapid growth in urban 
centres confirmed that services delivery, including housing, were not able to cope with the 
demand.  
The total retreat of the state direct role in delivering housing and its limited indirect role in 
providing subsidies forced households to find other means of obtaining housing. According to 
Mubarak (1999): 
At a time of government retrenchment from its previous commitment to ensure 
affordable housing, family financed and private banking has emerged, albeit hesitantly, 
to substitute for the diminishing role of government sponsored housing. (p. 18) 
Despite the introduction of private mortgage lending by commercial banks in 2000, the market 
for such mortgage lending remained marginal (Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011). Family savings 
and reduced access to government subsidies were the main channels for housing finance during 
the 2000s (ibid). The absence of mortgage laws and financial market regulations that are based 
on market profit and collateral value, constrained the role of private banking to efficiently 
participate in housing delivery (Ghosheh, 2011).  
According to Al-Mayouf and Al-Khayyal (2011), the accumulated demand for housing 
between 2005-2010 reached about 164,959 units per year. The pressing problems necessitated 
the government to intervene to address this huge demand for housing. Four years after 
dismantling the MPWH, the General Housing Authority (GHA) was created in late 2007 to 
take charge of the housing sector. In order to tackle the housing shortage in the country, the 
GHA initiated research to inform the future housing policy framework in the country and 
assumed a direct delivery approach launching its first project in 2009 to construct 1691 housing 
units for low-income groups (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011).  
2.3.3 The transition era 2010-2017 
While the government’s traditional housing policy had contributed to the improvement of the 
social standards of citizens in the 1980s and 1990s, the new millennium proved that such 
policies failed to keep up with the growing demand for housing. The 9th National Economic 
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Development Plan (NEDP) 2010-2014 estimated that 1.25 million housing units were required 
nationwide, and of these 775,000 had been allocated to private sector delivery (MEP, 2010). 
According to data available from the Ministry of Economy and Planning (Figure 2.7), since 
1995 the housing targets of development plans had never been met. The lack of a housing 
policy framework until 2007, coupled with emerging demographic and socio-economic factors 
fuelling robust housing demand, had a negative impact on the housing market. On the other 
hand, access to land was proving to be difficult as the land grant policies had contributed to an 
increase in vacant private land within urban centres (Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011), which 
became subject to hoarding or speculation as there was no property tax or other measures 
imposed to discourage this practice (ibid).   
 
 
Figure 2.7: NEDP’s Housing Targets and Actual Delivery  
Source: MEP, 2010, as cited in Khan, 2013 
 
The rapidly growing number of households facing housing affordability problems was an 
alarming indicator (IMF, 2011). The government realised that the housing policy schemes that 
had worked in the past were no longer effective and there was an urgent need for reforming the 
entire housing sector in Saudi Arabia (Ghosheh, 2011). The challenge was in devising a 
coherent and sustainable policy framework crucial to resolving the housing problem. The 
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General Housing Authority (GHA) started preparing a National Housing Strategy4 with an aim 
to: 
… address the situation at the national and regional levels in order to ensure an equitable 
access to the housing markets for all social groups and to establish a viable housing 
market. (Ghosheh, 2011, p. 18) 
The project was conducted between 2010-2012 and a recommended package of measures was 
provided to the government concluding that a successful housing strategy for Saudi Arabia is 
one that is characterised by balanced roles of the public and private sector.  
In 2011, the government announced several social reforms aimed at improving citizens’ living 
standards. Housing was one of the areas that needed urgent reform. The limited capacity and 
resources of the GHA to cope with the enormous housing issues called for action to be taken 
by the government to mediate the swelling housing demand (Aleid, 2017). The Ministry of 
Housing (MOH) was established in 2011 to replace the General Housing Authority (GHA) – 
Table 2.1 – to take a firmer and more effective charge of housing related responsibilities aiming 
to: 
Facilitate citizen’s access to an adequate quality housing at a suitable time in his/her 
life, increase the home ownership, encourage private sector’s involvement in 
supporting various housing activities and programs, and to raise the supply of various 
housing types. (Ghosheh, 2011, p. 63) 
 
 
Table 2.1: Changes in Housing Governance Arrangements in Saudi Arabia 
1975 - 2003 2003 - 2007 2007 – 2011 2011 - present 
Ministry of Public 
Works & Housing 
(MPWH) 
Small departments 
under several 
government 
agencies  
General Housing 
Authority (GHA) 
Ministry of Housing 
(MOH) 
Source: Researcher’s own analysis 
 
                                                     
4 The GHA appointed the German corporation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
to prepare the National Housing Strategy under its supervision.  
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Several other housing related reforms were also initiated to alleviate the increasing demand on 
housing. First, the long-awaited mortgage law had been enacted in 2012 to provide a new 
channel for housing finance in the Kingdom. Second, the government allocated USD66.6 
billion to the MOH for the construction of 500,000 new housing units between 2011 and 2020. 
In addition, the REDF was restructured and recapitalised (USD10.6 billion injection) aiming 
to improve its effectiveness and increase its capacity to reduce the waiting time for securing 
loans. The amount of interest free loans was also raised from USD80,000 to 133,000 and the 
condition of owning a plot of land in order to qualify for a loan was abolished5. Figure 2.8 
shows a significant increase in government spending on the REDF between 2010-2016 in 
comparison to the 1990s and early 2000s. The sharp drop from Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR) 
27.4 billion in 2015 (USD7.3 billion) to SAR11.8 billion (USD3.1 billion) billion in 2016 was 
due to the decline in oil prices at the time that led to a budget deficit in 2016. While it was not 
possible to obtain the number of loans distributed between 2010 and 2016, a recent report by 
the MOH (2017f) indicated that the number of distributed loans in 2017 was 85,000 nationwide 
while the number of eligible applicants remaining on the REDF waiting list was 503,431 
nationwide at the end of 2017. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Government Spending on REDF, 1990-2016 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 2016 
 
                                                     
5 This allowed citizens who had never obtained loans to apply for the REDF loan subsidy which opened a floodgate 
of new applicants added to the existing waiting list (Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012). 
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2.3.3.1 Recent changes in housing policy framework  
The final report of the National Housing Strategy (NHS) (Ghosheh, 2012) proposed a 
recommendation based on a ‘mixed method alternative’ where the public and private sectors 
must work together. This report has shed more light on the importance of providing a sound 
investment climate for the private sector to work efficiently towards the government vision of 
establishing equitable distribution and access to housing for all Saudi citizens. The NHS final 
report advises that the government undertake appropriate reforms in the institutional and 
regulatory frameworks in order to “facilitate, enable, and support the roles of the private sector” 
(p. 62). Despite such recommendations, the MOH resumed a direct delivery approach of 
housing that was originally started by the GHA to build housing for low-income segments. 
However, the mounting pressure on the MOH made it clear that there was a need to cooperate 
with the private sector to meet the required demand for affordable housing.  
A new form of state-market relations in housing took place where the MOH shifted its position 
to a facilitating and enabling role to expand housing supply. In 2014, the MOH announced the 
establishment of a new Public Private Partnership (PPP) between the MOH and private 
developers to build low cost housing and a new minister was appointed later that year. The PPP 
program was intended to be one of the MOH’s new housing programs called ‘Sakani’ that 
consisted of a mix of direct and indirect government support in housing which included (i) 
granting a ready built housing through its PPP program; (ii) granting a ready to build plot of 
developed land; or (iii) an interest-free housing loan. Housing subsidies in the form of a loan 
and land did exist before but were transferred from other government agencies to be 
administrated and operated under the authority of the MOH. The housing built and delivered 
by the PPP was planned to be distributed to eligible households where beneficiaries can choose 
the desired type of housing subsidy by applying on the MOH’s housing subsidy website. Such 
housing support programs are only provided for Saudi nationals and eligibility is subject to 
certain criteria, standards and priorities that were recently determined by the MOH,6 such as 
age, monthly income, and household size (see Appendix A for more detail). However, it is 
important to note that even with the new housing subsidy allocation system, support is not only 
targeted towards low-income groups but also extends to middle- and high-income segments.   
The MOH planned its first phase of the PPP in Riyadh. The first project of the PPP was to build 
                                                     
6 The MOH introduced a new housing subsidy allocation system in 2015 which differs from the old system that 
was based on a first come first serve basis.   
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5,000 housing units in the northwest side of Riyadh city on an area of 5 million sq. meters with 
a major construction company contracted to build the infrastructure for the site. This model 
used by the MOH was called Public Private Partnership on Government-Owned Land and was 
a direct government intervention in the form of land disposal and public subsidies. The MOH 
provided land that was connected to infrastructure at no cost to developers to build housing 
units. In addition, a direct government development grant of USD133,000 was provided to 
developers for each unit to be built. Developers were responsible for the design and 
construction of these units according to a set of guidelines that stated the criteria and 
requirements for building by the MOH. Furthermore, in 2016 the MOH introduced a second 
model of its partnership with the private sector in the form of deregulatory planning incentives 
as an indirect market stimulation tool. In this model, private developers were exempted from 
certain planning and development control regulations enabling them to achieve more 
development potential of their own land in return for allocating a percentage of the 
development as affordable housing sold at a lower market rate.  
The housing sector in Saudi Arabia has continued to experience major structural changes. 
However, since reforms were first introduced, changes have been moving slowly and few 
tangible results are yet to be seen (IMF, 2015). While there is no data available to show if the 
9th development plan housing delivery target was met in 20147, the 10th development plan 
2015-2019 indicated that 1.25 million housing units are required to be built throughout the 
country to meet 85% of future demand, where 300,000 units are to be delivered by the MOH, 
250,000 units through the REDF and 700,000 units through the private sector (MEP, 2015). 
Although the state continues to investigate different strategies to alleviate the problems, it 
seems that the housing system continues to face several challenges, and these are presented in 
the next section of this chapter focusing on Riyadh’s housing system. 
2.4 Housing market and regulatory frameworks in Riyadh 
This section examines issues that are specifically related to housing in Riyadh. The aim is to 
describe the context and identify issues in the housing system that hamper the contribution of 
market actors in delivering affordable housing. It commences by providing a brief background 
of Riyadh and its development followed by a description of Riyadh’s land and housing market 
including market conditions, housing characteristics and legal and finance frameworks. The 
                                                     
7 Estimated housing demand in the 9th development plan 2010-2014 was 1.25 million units. Interestingly, the 
same figure of 1.25 million units was the estimated housing demand in the 10th development plan 2015-2019. 
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planning system framework is discussed to illustrate the issues and trends in the planning 
process and policies and the implications of the regulatory framework on housing. The last 
section highlights the main challenges faced in Riyadh’s housing system.  
2.4.1 Background of Riyadh  
Riyadh is the capital and largest city of Saudi Arabia. The city has witnessed massive 
transformation growing from a small walled city less than 1 square kilometre in 1920 into a 
modern metropolis sprawling over 1500 square kilometres today (Al-Hathloul, 2017). The 
small tribal town had an estimated population of 14,000 in 1910 (Garba, 2004). With the 
unification of the country in 1932, Riyadh came to prominence as the capital of the country. 
The city’s population grew from 27,000 in 1930 to 160,000 in 1960; 350,000 in 1970 to 2.8 
million in 1992; and 4.8 million in 2004 to over 6.5 million in 2016 (Garba, 2004; HCDR, 
2016; Al-Hathloul, 2017). Riyadh is one of the fastest growing cities in the region with a 
population growth rate of 4% from 2010 to 2016 (HCDR, 2016). Riyadh had an average 
household size of 5.7 in 2016 compared to 6.3 in 2004 with a large youth population (26% 
under the age of 15) (ibid). The city is divided into 14 municipal districts and 205 
neighbourhoods (HCDR, 2015a).  
2.4.2 Land and housing market  
2.4.2.1 Market conditions  
The national statistics for housing demand in Saudi Arabia shows that 250,000 units per year 
are required until 2020 (MEP, 2015). According to Alshaikh and Alwazir (2012): “The Saudi 
housing market is already experiencing a supply/demand imbalance and this trend is expected 
to continue as the supply of houses will lag behind demand” (p. 2). Many studies pointed out 
that the main reasons behind the imbalance between housing supply and demand in the 
Kingdom stems from the rapid population growth in urban areas fuelled by a young population, 
decreasing household size and rising purchasing power driven by increases in wages (Opoku 
& Abdul-Muhmin, 2010; Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011; Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012; Khan, 
2013; Aleid, 2017). However, the dynamics of housing supply and demand varies between 
cities as different submarkets have different conditions. This section focuses on Riyadh’s 
housing market conditions.  
  32 
According to recent data published by the Ministry of Housing (2017b), the number of new 
housing units delivered in 2016 was 402,627 nationwide8. The report indicates that Riyadh 
recorded the greatest shortage of housing in the country, where new housing supply accounted 
for 67,755 units; whereas the number of housing demand based on the MOH statistics was 
128,901 showing a shortfall of 61,146 housing units (47%). Another report by the MOH 
(2017e) revealed that despite the shortage of housing supply in Riyadh, data from the real estate 
registry showed that the first half of 2017 witnessed 29,147 housing units offered for sale in 
the market but only 2,309 units were sold at the end of this period. This indicates that 92% of 
housing offered in the market did not sell within the first half of 2017 suggesting an issue in 
the housing market related to the affordability of these units9.  
In contrast to the MOH statistics, a report by the High Commission for Riyadh Development 
(2016) revealed that Riyadh does not have a housing supply shortage as housing stock was 1.2 
million and the number of households was about 1.1 million with a vacancy rate of 8%. This 
demonstrates a contradiction of the published data by government agencies (one of the 
challenges in undertaking this study). Despite stating that there was no shortage of housing 
supply in Riyadh, the HCRD conceded in another report (2015a) that Riyadh’s housing market 
suffered from a shortage of affordable housing.  
Land and housing prices 
According to HCDR (2010), the cost of housing construction in Riyadh was about USD300 
per sq. meter whereas the average land cost per sq. metre was about USD275. Based on these 
numbers and adding 20% for finishing, the study illustrated that a modest villa of 320 sq. metres 
in Riyadh costs USD218,660. However, a recent study by the World Bank (2016) indicated 
that real estate prices have witnessed a substantial increase in recent years pointing out that the 
price of land in the northern suburbs of Riyadh was about USD800 per sq. metre in 2016 which 
shows a stark difference from the HCDR study. The construction cost has also significantly 
increased according to a report by Colliers International (2016) such that, for example, a 
medium specification villa construction cost ranged between USD715 to 868 per sq. metre. 
The Ministry of Housing (2017d) has published the average prices of housing units in Riyadh 
in 2016 showing that a modest apartment costs around USD150,000, while the cost of a small 
villa is more than double at around USD347,000. These prices may vary depending on the 
                                                     
8 This number was based on statistics of new electricity connections as an indication of new housing supply. 
9 The study demonstrated that the Absorption Rate in the market based on these statistics is about 69 months.  
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location and other factors. Several studies have shown that the affordability level for Saudi 
households is within the range of USD130,000-190,000 (Savard, Reeve, Gilmour & Ahmed, 
2010; Ghosheh, 2012; Alshaik & Alwazir, 2012). 
Khan (2013) conducted a study of housing affordability in Riyadh and Jeddah based on average 
salary levels, housing prices and the ability of households to afford the mortgage payment10. 
In Riyadh, the study indicated that an apartment with a size of 190 sq. metre costs about 
USD142,000 and the minimum household’s income must be USD2,640 to afford the mortgage 
payments. This suggests that the majority of households can afford this type of dwelling as the 
average household’s income in Riyadh is USD2,997 per month (HCRD, 2016). However, a 
villa of 300 sq. metre size that costs USD336,000 requires a household monthly income of no 
less than USD6,213 which is a little more than double the average household’s income. This 
then suggests that many households in Riyadh cannot afford single family housing (villas) and 
would only be able to afford apartments which is the least preferred housing option (Khan, 
2013). The NHS report (Ghosheh, 2012) stated that:  
Many developers currently do not take the risk to develop houses for lower income 
segment because the targeted households cannot afford it without a mortgage. 
Developers prefer the high-end market with customers being able to pay cash. (p. 47) 
Several studies have argued that the most significant factor affecting housing affordability in 
Saudi Arabia is high land prices (HCDR, 2010; Ghosheh, 2012; Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012; 
Chaoul, 2013; Alzamil, 2014; Aleid, 2017). Alshaikh and Alwazir (2012) argued that: 
“developers tend to cater to the affluent segment of the population to make up for high land 
costs” (p. 3). A piece of land inside the urban fabric in many cities could cost more than half 
of the total development cost (Ghosheh, 2012). A survey by the HCDR (2010) of a number of 
housing developers in Riyadh showed that developers perceive land prices as the most 
impeding factor from investing in the housing sector11. While land price is one of the 
determining factors in housing affordability, the World Bank (2016) believes that the declining 
affordability in Riyadh is exacerbated by the government regulatory framework, not land 
prices. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) (2014) has indicated that the share of land costs 
                                                     
10 The housing prices used in this study were close to the average prices suggested by the MOH data. The mortgage 
was calculated based on 25% down payment, an interest rate of 3.5% and loan tenure of 20 years. The monthly 
mortgage payment was assumed as 30% of the total income 
11 Other factors in the survey included weak purchasing power of households, increase of building material prices 
and inflexibility of planning regulations 
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to the unit price in Riyadh is between 25-50% placing it in the mid-low range when compared 
internationally (Figure 2.9). 
 
Figure 2.9: Comparison of Average Share of Land Costs in Unit Price  
Source: MGI, 2014 
 
It has been argued that the recent inflation in land prices in most Saudi cities is caused by the 
absence of a property tax, which consequently affects the availability of land (Ghosheh, 2011). 
Land hoarding and speculation is a widespread practice in Saudi Arabia (ibid). Wealthy 
landowners and influential individuals prefer to keep the land undeveloped, where its value 
keeps rising; while some speculative small investors trade land for profit (Khan, 2013; Aleid, 
2017). According to MGI (2014) Riyadh has approximately 40 square kilometres of idle land 
(zoned residential) located inside the urban boundaries with connection to infrastructure 
(Figure 2.10).  Such land has not been utilised for almost two decades. The absence of a 
property taxation system encourages (or certainly does not deter) land hoarding and speculation 
and restricts the availability of land in urban areas (Du & Peiser, 2014). This widespread 
practice of land hoarding and speculation demanded government action so in 2015 the Ministry 
of Housing introduced taxes on undeveloped land (with an area of 10,000 sq. metres and more) 
inside urban areas (known as white land fees). So far, however, the effects of this newly 
introduced regulation have remained unclear. 
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Figure 2.10: Undeveloped Land within Riyadh’s Urban Boundaries  
Source: MGI, 2014 
 
2.4.2.2 Housing characteristics  
(i) Type of delivery 
Housing delivery in Saudi Arabia predominantly happens through the household’s self-
organised home construction arrangements (owner builder). The process starts with purchasing 
a residential plot that is ready to build on, obtaining the home design plans through an architect, 
and finally hiring a small contractor to build the house. The World Bank in its 2006 report 
estimated that owner builder housing in Saudi Arabia accounted for about 90% of the total 
housing delivery, which has decreased in more recent years to about 74% (Siry, 2011). Another 
method of housing delivery is the key-ready homes built by private development companies. 
The key-ready home construction option is still minor in Saudi Arabia (only popular in major 
cities) and only shares about 26% of the residential construction market but has been gaining 
popularity in recent years (ibid). In Riyadh, the number of private development companies 
involved in the residential market and registered in Riyadh’s Chamber of Commerce is about 
  36 
one hundred (Alharbi, 2012). The existing number of such development companies is relatively 
small compared to many small contractors that are mostly involved in owner builder housing 
construction activities. The performance of private housing providers in the housing market 
varies significantly. There are a limited number of large-medium private development 
companies that meet international standards compared to a much larger number of small 
contractors with moderate to poor performance. Small contractors usually lack the necessary 
financial resources to improve their performance (Siry, 2011). 
(ii) Type of housing  
The type of housing in Saudi Arabia includes villas, duplexes and apartments (see Appendix 
B for photos and floor plans). Until recently, the villa was the most popular housing type in the 
country and the largest category of dwelling (Siry, 2011). However, with the increase in 
housing demand and declining affordability, a new trend has emerged where the demand for a 
small house (duplex) or apartment is increasing. In a study of housing preferences among low-
income Saudi households, Opoku and Abdul-Muhmin (2010) indicated that the majority of 
households prefer owning a small house (duplex) pointing out that there is: 
… a very strong relationship between tenure preferences and dwelling type, with 
respondents who prefer the small house or duplex overwhelmingly opting for the 
buying option, whilst respondents who choose apartments prefer the rental option. (p. 
224) 
This new trend is accounted for by the tendency of young households and smaller families who 
are willing to buy smaller and more affordable types of housing. According to the General 
Authority for Statistics (GAS) (2016), one third of Saudi households live in apartments (about 
39%), about 30% live in villas (including attached duplexes) and the remaining 31% live in 
traditional housing or occupy a floor in a villa. The survey also showed that Riyadh has 47% 
of households occupying villas, which is the highest in the country, whilst households living 
in apartments constitute 27%. In a recent study by the Ministry of Housing (2016), the Riyadh 
housing market has supplied 52% of apartments, 37% of duplexes and about 10% of detached 
villas out of the total housing supply in 2016. This shows a trend towards smaller housing units, 
such as apartments and duplexes. Another aspect of housing construction in Saudi Arabia is 
that most housing (about 84%) is built from concrete materials (GAS, 2016). Traditional 
housing in the past was built from mud and in some regions from stones. With modernisation 
of the country, imported western design models using concrete materials have been 
incorporated into the building industry.   
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One of the main concerns that the residential construction market suffers from is the inadequate 
quality of housing construction (Sfakianakis, Merzaban & Al-Hugail, 2011), which is caused 
by several reasons, including the insufficient experience of non-professional labourers, and the 
absence of technical building guidelines in the past (Siry, 2011).  In 2007, the Saudi Building 
Code (SBC) was developed and proposed to provide a unified legal and technical guide for the 
construction sector. However, the SBC enforcement was planned in phases where the 
obligatory phase was to be executed in 2015 (ibid). The other reason for poor construction 
quality is the lack of skilled human labour in the field. The Saudi construction industry is 
dominated by unskilled foreign construction workers with very low wages making it difficult 
to attract skilled domestic labourers. As reported by Sfakianakis et al (2011), the inferior 
quality of housing construction creates an obstacle with banks who are not willing to grant 
housing loans to purchase housing units that are older than 15 years. This practically eliminates 
the growth of a secondary market with the report confirming that, “Most Saudi homes do not 
survive past 30 years, which has constrained the growth of a vibrant secondary market” (p. 5). 
This creates further challenges for the housing sector to meet the urgent demand for housing 
in the Kingdom.    
(iii) Housing tenure 
Housing tenure in Saudi Arabia is mainly divided into three types: owner occupied, rented, or 
provided by an employer (Alzamil, 2014). It is important to mention that there is inconsistency 
in the available data as different government and private agencies have published different 
statistics12. Nevertheless, Saudi Vision 2030 in its NTP (KSA, 2016a) stated that the home 
ownership rate in Saudi Arabia was 47% in 2016 with a government target to increase it to 
52% by 2020. Despite being the largest economy in the Middle East and a high-income country, 
Saudi Arabia’s home ownership rate is considered low in comparison to many other countries 
(the NTP report indicated that the international home ownership benchmark is 64%). The home 
ownership rate in Riyadh at 56% sits above the national rate according to the High Commission 
for the Development of Riyadh (2016).  
 
                                                     
12 The General Authority for Statistics indicated that the home ownership rate in Saudi Arabia (2016) is 63% and 
after excluding unsuitable housing (i.e. old houses built with clay) the rate is 49.8%. Other studies, such as the 
National Commercial Bank (2012) suggested that the rate is 36%. 
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2.4.2.3 Land title system 
Proof of land ownership using an appropriate land registration system is crucial to a 
competitive housing system. Land title registration in Saudi Arabia is linked to two government 
bodies. The first body is the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) through its 
cadastre system. The cadastre system uses maps that provide details of land plots, such as 
boundaries and dimensions using a GPS system. However, the electronic cadastre system by 
MOMRA using modern geo-coding technology was only established as recently as 2004 and 
has still not been completed. Land mapping and surveying in the Kingdom was introduced in 
the seventies to regulate land title registration. In 1985, a non-standardised cadastral 
registration was implemented where municipalities and courts took action without accurate 
geo-reference information (Siry, 2011). Several issues emerged with the old land registration 
system that still persist today. Disputes concerning physical boundaries of properties due to the 
unclear cadastral mapping is an example of such issues (ibid).  
The second government body responsible for land registration in the Kingdom is the Ministry 
of Justice via its real estate registration system (also known as the land ownership register). 
The land register provides a recorded proof of ownership, possession or other rights in land 
through a property title that can be used to facilitate transactions or prevent unlawful disposal 
(Siry, 2011). The Saudi Arabian land registry system is similar to the British system where the 
conveyance of real estate can be defined as a transfer of real estate from one person to another 
using an official instrument called a ‘deed’. The deed includes documents that show 
information about the property, such as location, area, boundaries, and all ownership rights and 
obligations. The Ministry of Justice has about 140 ‘public notaries’ in the Kingdom where 
registering and transferring ownership rights can be recorded.  
There are two systems of transferring property in Saudi Arabia. The traditional/old system and 
the electronic deed system. The traditional system follows a manual procedure of checking the 
accuracy of deeds based on archived records that verifies information and checks for 
encumbrances. The second system of property transfer was established in 2002 under the royal 
decree on the Registration of Real Estate Property. The main objective of the new regulations 
was to create a public land registry that includes all ownership data and all changes of 
encumbrance (Siry, 2011). The electronic system aims to use a database that allows for faster 
and efficient land registration and transfer. The public registry is jointly administered by the 
Ministry of Justice (MJ) and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). The 
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Department of Real Estate Registration in the Ministry of Justice maintains the new register in 
corporation with the MOMRA through its cadastral information. It is important to note that the 
electronic property registration system has only been implemented recently in new 
development areas in the cities and the old paper deeds issued through the old system are still 
used.  
The traditional land registration system was archaic and even failed sometimes to provide 
proper title deeds and registration for proof of land ownership. The ambiguity and lengthy 
process of the traditional land registration in the past has created land ownership abuse and 
disputes which in turn impedes market activity. The GIZ (2011) report found that multiple land 
deeds for the same property are not uncommon, free land settlement without a legal deed is 
widespread, and the boundaries of a property are often subject to dispute. This lack of clear 
ownership rights provides inadequate security for investing in the property market. The old 
land registration system is riddled with serious legal and policy issues, many of which are taken 
for granted in mature economies (ibid). Despite the efforts of the Ministry of Justice to update 
its land registration system by transferring old deeds into the new electronic system, many 
issues still exist today. Until the land titling issues are resolved through a clear and sound 
registration system, the situation will continue to frustrate the housing sector from moving 
towards an effective and secure land and housing market. 
2.4.2.4 Housing finance  
Traditionally, housing finance in Saudi Arabia has mostly come from personal savings, loans 
from family and friends, or through government support from the Real Estate Development 
Fund (REDF). Another source of housing finance comes from private channels including 
commercial banks and financing companies. However, access to finance from private lending 
institutions, such as commercial banks, has not been easy for low and moderate-class earners 
(Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012). For example, commercial banks try to avoid default problems by 
targeting higher income groups and imposing a minimum salary requirement as security before 
lending. According to Alshaikh and Alwazir (2012): 
The lack of a mortgage law in the Kingdom has hindered the potential growth of the 
housing sector, thus causing many financial institutions and developers to maintain 
low-risk portfolios. (p. 6)  
Prior to the introduction of mortgage laws in recent years, private mortgage lending accounted 
for only 2% of gross domestic product in Saudi Arabia (excluding government housing loans) 
compared to about 17% in the United Arab Emirates and 72% in the United Kingdom (Chaoul, 
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2013). In 2016, mortgage lending had increased to 8.7% of the total banking system loans 
(MOH, 2017c), yet this was still well below most other G-20 countries. Despite low mortgage 
interest rates (around 4%), government REDF interest-free loans are still the most favourable 
options for the majority of households (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2013; Aleid, 2017). As a 
popular avenue for obtaining housing finance in the Kingdom, the REDF has provided finance 
for over 1 million housing units with about USD72 billion loans since its establishment in 1974 
until 2016 (MOH, 2017a). However, with the higher demand in recent years and the limited 
capacity of the REDF to respond to this demand, the waiting period for finance can take more 
than 15 years from the time of applying (Mahrad, 2010). 
Despite the recent government injection of funds to the REDF to improve its performance, 
collecting the due instalments from default borrowers is the primary challenge and this 
obstructs its capacity to issue new loans. Half of the REDF capital at USD21.3 billion is 
classified as delinquent (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2013); and the default rate is very high. 
According to a recent report by the MOH (2017f), REDF net lending between 2006 and 2016 
was USD25 billion; and by the end of 2017, USD8 billion was classified as in default. By 
maximising its capacity through receiving continuous government support, the REDF is seen 
to be unsustainable (exhausting public funds) and having an adverse impact on private financial 
channels (Ghosheh, 2011). Aleid (2017) argued that granting interest-free loans has impacted 
the culture of borrowing in Saudi Arabia where the banking sector could not compete with the 
generous government lending policy, stating:  
… the REDF’s policies played a crucial role in undermining the effectiveness of the 
Saudi real estate finance market … the housing finance market does not represent a 
healthy environment for the banking sector, which seeks warranties and protection for 
their interests. The modest role played by the banking sector in the housing finance 
market may be a reflection of the belief that this sector needs reform and [needs to] 
develop in order to attract investment from the banking sector. (pp. 36-38)   
The government’s inability in recent years to satisfy the huge demand for housing loan 
assistance has necessitated increasing banking sector involvement. New finance laws in the 
form of a mortgage law package were enacted in mid-2012. The new laws under the authority 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) provide regulations for all aspects of the 
property finance market in Saudi Arabia. According to Chaoul (2013), the new law aims to 
“set up a Shariah compliant framework that encourages transparency, enables enforcement of 
judicial decisions and facilitates the creation of mortgage providers for securitisation of 
mortgages” (p.16). The lengthy wait for the passage of the new mortgage law was partly due 
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to the complexity of creating a law that fully complies with the distinctive feature of the Islamic 
code of conduct for financing (known as Shariah). This Islamic system basically prohibits the 
taking or receiving of interest in borrowing or lending and the prohibition of usury (Sidawi & 
Meeran, 2011). Five separate finance laws were issued to include dealing with financial 
institution licensing, registration of real estate mortgages, regulating financing leases and, most 
importantly, an enforcement law that provides a legal framework for pursuing insolvency 
action, which creates security for lenders.  
As these new laws provide an administrative and legal framework for the property finance 
market in the Kingdom, key challenges still exist. One main concern for lenders is the legal 
uncertainty of the foreclosure process where the interference of the religious court can create 
significant risk (Williamson & Stark, 2013). Another challenge is the creation of a sound 
secondary mortgage market that will take time to accomplish. However, a significant challenge 
revolves around cultural attitudes towards borrowing. The cultural and religious background 
of Saudis encompasses negative inherited attitudes towards borrowing (Sidawi, 2009), with a 
strong preference for cash payments for home purchase by saving money or seeking help from 
family before having to rely on banks (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2013). Sidawi and Meeran 
(2011) posit that “there is a general aversion towards accumulating debt” (p. 138). Also, Saudi 
society has a high expectation of the government to historically meet the housing need of its 
citizens through its various housing subsidies including providing interest free loans, 
consequently Saudis continue to expect that housing should be subsidised by their government 
(Sidawi, 2009). Aleid (2017) illustrates this point in his research where he found that: 
… many Saudis are highly averse to borrowing because they rely on the interest-free 
loans provided by the REDF, despite the potential to have to wait twenty years for a 
loan. (p. 38)  
Such entrenched attitudes could pose further challenges for the successful development and 
implementation of the new mortgage law.   
2.4.3 Planning system and housing 
2.4.3.1 Planning system framework  
The broader planning context in Saudi Arabia is entrusted with two government ministries at 
the national level: the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) and the Ministry of Municipal 
and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). The MEP is in charge of the core economic development plan 
for the Saudi economy, which outlines national development targets, financial plans and 
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budgetary considerations. The MOMRA, on the other hand, represents the organisational 
framework that is responsible for spatial planning at the national, regional and local levels. 
This ministry acts as the highest central planning authority in Saudi Arabia and plays an 
important role in urban and regional management and development. MOMRA has many roles 
in the planning and development process, among these are the preparation of a national spatial 
strategic plan, preparation of regional plans, setting standards and specifications for local plans, 
and monitoring and coordination with responsible bodies at all levels in the planning process. 
It is represented by 16 main regional branches and 241 local municipalities serving over 5000 
towns and villages across the country. There are also other government ministries that are 
interconnected with MOMRA at the national planning level including the Ministry of Housing 
(MOH), which is responsible for the preparation of housing strategies; and the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ), which coordinates the land titling process. In addition, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) has the responsibility of assigning budgets for the municipality system. This section is 
focused on the spatial planning system framework in Saudi Arabia, in general, and in Riyadh 
in particular.  
The planning system in Saudi Arabia is a product of the political system where it follows a top-
down centralised approach (Future Saudi Cities [FSC], 2017a). As noted above, MOMRA, as 
the highest authority of planning, formulates and coordinates planning polices at all levels. 
Unlike planning in developed countries, the planning system in Saudi Arabia lacks autonomy 
of local government as the central government intervenes in local planning through the power 
of budgeting tools (Alkhedheiri, 1998). Municipal governments at the local level receive their 
funding from the central MOMRA to manage and provide services. Municipalities at the local 
level have no power to levy taxes but only collect limited revenues in the form of fees and 
charges, such as permit fees and business registration fees (Al-Hathloul & Mughal, 2004; 
Mubarak, 2004). Municipalities are mainly responsible for issuing building permits, protecting 
public health, maintaining public space and waste management.  
Under the supervision of MOMRA, the Saudi planning system is governed and organised into 
several tiers. In this section, the description of these planning levels is limited to Riyadh. First, 
at both the regional and local level, the Municipality of Riyadh (or what is called Amanah) is 
an executive service body under the supervision of MOMRA that is responsible for the 
management and implementation of the planning and development control process in Riyadh. 
Riyadh Municipality (Amanah) has several sub-municipalities, called Baladyah, that function 
under its authority. Amanah, as a supervising authority, represents Riyadh city metropolitan 
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area whereas sub-municipalities, or Baldyah, represent planning at the local district level. The 
most important roles of Amanah relate to the implementation of the city strategic plan and 
granting planning permissions for development projects.  
Another important planning authority in the city of Riyadh is the High Commission for the 
Development of Riyadh (HCDR), which is considered a quasi-planning authority with a special 
nature (FSC, 2016). The HCDR is responsible for strategic urban planning through its 
comprehensive Structure Plan of the city. This strategic plan is used as a reference governing 
the future development of the city and controlling all the factors affecting its growth through 
regulatory reference, several sub-structure plans and urban policies (ibid). Other key features 
of the HCDR include conducting metropolitan studies and coordinating the development of the 
city through its representative members from both public and private sector stakeholders 
involved in the development process. In short, the levels and agencies involved in Riyadh’s 
urban planning system are as follows:  
• Ministry of Municipal and Rural affairs (national level)  
• Riyadh Municipality ‘Amanah’ (regional/city level)  
• High Commission for the Development of Riyadh (city level) 
• Sub-municipalities ‘Baladyah’, such as municipalities of east, west, north and south of 
Riyadh (local/district level).  
The current planning system framework in Saudi Arabia follows several overarching plans that 
guide its development. At the national level, the National Spatial Strategy (NSS) plan was 
established by MOMRA in 2001 in order to tackle issues of spatial development in the country. 
The main objective of the NSS is to achieve long-term development balance in resource and 
service distribution among regions and cities through a set of measures aiming to open up new 
growth opportunities throughout the country (MOMRA, 2016). The planning system at the 
regional level consists of Regional Strategic Plans (RSP) that provide general guidelines for 
the future urban development in various regions of the country. However, these plans are 
usually focused on the development of core cities rather than the whole region and there is 
discontinuity between the NSS and the regional plans (FSC, 2017a). Planning at the city/local 
level consists of several plans on a variety of scales. The most important plan is the Structure 
Plan which defines the long-term future vision for the city’s development. In 1996, the HCDR, 
in cooperation with other planning agencies, prepared the Metropolitan Development Strategy 
of Riyadh (MEDSTAR) as a comprehensive long-term strategic plan for the city to 2028 
(Figure 2.11). MEDSTAR is a strategic plan that aims to identify existing issues and 
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opportunities and to develop dynamic strategies for the city including “economy, ecology, 
transportation, facilities, housing, public services, land use, and their development systems” 
(HCDR, 2015b, p. 52). MEDSTAR is the overarching plan for other types of plans, such as the 
land use plan, urban growth boundaries plan and the more detailed residential land subdivision 
plans.  
 
Figure 2.11: Riyadh MEDSTAR Structure Plan 2028  
Source: HCDR, 2013a 
 
2.4.3.2 Planning and housing in Riyadh  
Along with the government vision to establish a modern state, modern urban planning in 
Riyadh commenced in 1968 when the government first commissioned the Greek firm Doxiadis 
International to prepare a master plan guiding the future growth of the city (Garba, 2004). The 
city’s first comprehensive plan was implemented in 1973 providing a linear growth concept 
with a principal gridiron plan containing super blocks of 2 x 2 kilometre of land separated by 
arterial road networks (Mubarak, 2004, p. 580). Riyadh witnessed rapid population growth that 
the first master plan did not adequately anticipate (Al-Hathloul, 2017). This required an urgent 
update resulting in a second master plan in 1982 and finally the creation of the strategic 
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comprehensive plan in the late 1990s. However, the gridiron pattern originated in the first plan 
has continued to be the main form of the city’s planning (Figure 2.12). The gridiron plan was 
exploited by influential real estate owners laying out roads in what became a land subdivision 
frenzy resulting in a sprawling city, as Mubarak (2004) observed: 
Such sprawl resulted partly from the privatization of Saudi life and the increasing 
tendency to live in detached homes, but mostly from the real estate mania of the 
booming decade … it becomes possible for land owners to sub-divide the larger tracts 
abutting these roads which then makes it easier to sell the land to smaller land 
speculators. Consequently, such a process predetermines the urban form of the city for 
decades to come. (p. 582) 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Scattered Land Subdivision on the Periphery of Riyadh Desert Landscape  
Source: Mubarak, 2004 
 
This leap-frog development through a random expansion of land subdivisions fuelled massive 
spatial enlargement of Riyadh (Garba, 2004). The city’s continuous uncontrolled urban sprawl 
placed huge pressure on the provision of infrastructure and services causing an increase in cost 
and resulting inefficiency. In order to address urban growth management issues, MOMRA 
introduced the Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) policy in 1989 to curtail urban sprawl and 
define cities’ urban boundary perimeters as well as to accommodate urban activities through 
phases within a planned time span (Al-Hathloul & Mughal, 2004). The main objectives were 
to encourage infill development, reduce the cost of infrastructure and preserve the natural 
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environment around the city (ibid). The HCDR adopted the UGB policies in Riyadh, dividing 
them into phases that were recently reformed to become: Phase I until 2014; Phase II until 
2028; and Phase III as a designated environmental protection zone (Figure 2.13).  
 
 
Figure 2.13: Riyadh Urban Growth Boundaries 2028  
Source: HCDR, 2013a 
 
The UGB policy plays a key role in the development process as it sets several urban control 
regulations, such as land allocation for development and the requirements for infrastructure 
delivery. For instance, developers are responsible for installing utilities in their sites as well as 
connecting them to the nearest network if their developments are within Phase II (MOMRA, 
2016). As the UGB was an important policy in managing the growth of the city, their adoption 
may be considered “too little, too late” (Mubarak, 2004, p. 588). Such boundaries that are 
meant to cater for future land based on needs were in fact designed according to the large 
amount of sprawling land subdivisions that were created in the 1970s and 1980s. Al-Hathloul 
(2017) notes: 
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… as there existed plenty of subdivided land in Riyadh, the boundary delineation was 
not based on future requirement of land alone but the judicious use of subdivided land 
become a crucial factor. (p. 111) 
Mubarak (2004) argued that the UGB was an anticlimactic policy functioning under two major 
political pressure factors: 
The first has to do with pressure from land developers, most of whom acquired 
suburban land free from the government and then put it on the market through 
intermediate land speculators. The second is the fact that the central government in its 
efforts to avoid popular dissent, allowed peripheral land to be added to the market in 
order to stave off rising land prices under a stringent UGB. (p. 588) 
Besides the lack of urban growth management in the past, Riyadh’s substantial spatial 
expansion was also a result of the zoning regulations adapted by its planning agencies where 
minimum lot sizes and height restrictions are key characteristics. Interestingly, Riyadh city’s 
strategic plan encourages the integration of medium to high density to support housing 
development (HCDR, 2013a), yet the residential density measures in the majority of the city’s 
area are set at no more than 50 persons per hectare based on the city master plan13. According 
to a review of Riyadh’s planning regulations by Future Saudi Cities (FSC, 2017b), the average 
net density in Riyadh is only 15 housing units per hectare representing a low density trend. 
Residential zoning regulations currently impose a minimum lot size of not less than 200 sq. 
metres and height restrictions of 2.5 floors which hampers the economic use of land (Siry, 
2011). Medium density in the form of multifamily buildings are only permitted on major streets 
(30 metres or more in width). As a result, the city continues to suffer from its horizontal 
expansion: 
The physical extent of the urban area creates a major burden for the local government 
and utility companies to provide extensive infrastructure and service networks to reach 
a small number of households. Low density development also undermines the urban 
agglomeration for successful economic development, and lowers workers’ productivity 
with long commutes … sprawl in Riyadh disproportionately impacts lower-income and 
more vulnerable Saudi households when land for housing is allocated in remote 
locations without adequate infrastructure, social services or job opportunities. (World 
Bank, 2016, p. 6) 
The satellite images in Figure 2.14 exemplify the extensive urban expansion of Riyadh in the 
past 50 years. 
                                                     
13 Riyadh population density in 2013 was 43 persons per hectare according to Atlas of Urban Expansion 
http://atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/Riyadh  
  48 
 
Figure 2.14: Growth of the City of Riyadh, 1972-2016   
Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
 
The residential land development process in Riyadh is predominately performed through land 
subdivision planning (Al-Saif, 1994; Alskait, 2003), which is a technical process that follows 
a regulation document published by MOMRA titled: Guide for Residential Land Subdivision 
Procedures (MOMRA, 2013), and implemented by the Riyadh Municipality. Property 
developers or owners of raw land who are planning to subdivide land must apply for municipal 
planning approval. According to the municipal code, the technical criteria stated in the guide 
for land subdivision must be applied before securing the approval for development. Some of 
these criteria, for example, include building coverage of no more than 60%, height limit of two 
and a half stories and minimum two metres setback from neighbours. Another important 
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requirement is the on-site development contribution that is standardised in most cities as 33% 
of new land subdivision to be allocated for public usage, such as roads and open spaces as well 
as for facilities, such as schools and mosques.  
The residential land development process represented by land subdivision suffers from several 
problems that impact the provision of housing. First, the land subdivision process is 
fragmented, incomplete and usually driven by market pressure (Alskait & Almohaimeed, 2005; 
Siry, 2011; Ghosheh, 2012; Abdulaal, 2012), where: “The majority of land subdivisions were 
legally prepared for market deals, but not necessarily practically prepared to be physically fit 
for development” (Abdulaal, 2012, p. 38). As indicated earlier, developers in the past used 
asphalt to pave the roads in the subdivided land and their task ended with the sale of parcels. 
This has resulted in many subdivisions lacking connectivity to public utilities (such as water, 
electricity, and sewerage) as they were located on the fringes of the city creating a limited 
supply of ready to build land.  
Second, land subdivision planning also has an impact on the physical and social environment 
of the city. Alskait (2003) argued that land subdivision planning in Riyadh has encouraged a 
fragmented housing development that is characterised by an individualistic owner-builder 
nature with each parcel in the subdivision being built at different time intervals. He indicated 
that land subdivisions in Riyadh could take up to 30 years to be built thus lacking a sense of 
community in its development, and asserts: “Due to the length of development the subdivision 
becomes a factory for building houses. The final outcome is a residential area which lacks the 
true sense of a community” (p. 44). The lack of property taxation in the past may have 
contributed to this fragmented housing development on subdivisions. Individual landowners 
often take time to finance construction and are unhindered by extra costs such as taxes, thus, 
land subdivisions usually take a considerable length of time to be fully built.   
Despite the adoption of several urban policies and regulations in recent years, the planning 
system in Riyadh does not reflect the actual population’s need for housing and hinders the 
efficient delivery of affordable housing (Alskait, 2003; Mubarak, 2004; Siry, 2011; World 
Bank, 2016). One of the main obstacles is embedded in Riyadh’s urban management where 
there is a lack of coordination in policy formation and implementation (Graba, 2004; World 
Bank, 2016). Garba (2004) further argued that “The institutional framework for managing 
growth in Riyadh suffers from the lack of a clear definition of the roles of agencies involved 
in management” (p. 605). The planning agency that oversees policy formulation is independent 
from the agency that implements it and such isolation in the procedures and processes are not 
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always defined (ibid). The ambiguity of roles and responsibilities is exemplified in the 
coordination of the infrastructure provision. According to the World Bank (2016) the UGB 
policy was implemented with no regard to the capacity of utility companies to deliver their 
services, which impacts on housing providers: 
Decisions to approve new subdivisions are not coordinated with provision of off-site 
infrastructure, with the result being that many subdivision approvals significantly 
predate the eventual provision of infrastructure and basic services … The utility service 
lag is also a challenge for developers, since uncertainty about service provision is a 
source of high risk for their projects. (p. 24) 
Similarly, the planning process suffers from bureaucracy and red tape that negatively affect the 
delivery of housing (Mubarak, 2004). The planning permission process for new land 
subdivisions, for instance, is lengthy, vague, inefficient, and lacks objectivity, which can be a 
discouraging factor for private developers (Alskait, 2003; MGI, 2015). The planning system 
framework is lagging in providing systematic and systemic solutions to address current issues 
including the increasing demand for affordable housing. As described so far, these issues and 
challenges inherent in the Riyadh planning system present difficulties in enabling the effective 
production of housing. 
2.4.4 Challenges in the housing system  
Housing demand has risen tremendously in recent years. Despite government efforts to control 
this swelling demand, a growing gap between supply and demand continues to cause increase 
in prices and a decline in affordability. The inconsistency and ineffectiveness of government 
housing policy over the past two decades has contributed to the many difficulties now evident 
in the Saudi housing system. Aside from the emerging demographic and socio-economic 
factors that contribute to the explosive housing demand, the state regulatory framework is 
blamed for much of the housing problems (as illustrated in Figure 2.15). According to Rabenau 
(2011): 
Saudi Arabia has both plentiful financial resources and plentiful land. But these 
resources are not organized effectively, in terms of an overall policy framework or the 
institutions needed to sustain these policies. (p. 129) 
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Figure 2.15: Issues and Challenges in the Housing System   
Source: Adapted from Ernst and Young, 2013 
 
Ghosheh and Rabenau (2011) assert that the problems inherent in the housing system constrain 
the private sector’s ability to deliver the high volume of housing required to meet demand and 
thus needs to be strengthened. This point was emphasised in the National Housing Strategy 
report, stating that: 
A central issue to the housing sector stems from the fact that the public sector has not 
enabled the private sector and develops policies that do not encourage efficient use of 
resources. (Ghosheh, 2012, p. 48)  
Market actors in the Saudi housing market have been challenged by counterproductive 
government housing policies, weakness of the land ownership law and the ineffective planning 
process and policies. In terms of housing subsidy, homebuyers are not interested in private 
housing finance when they can seek government REDF interest free loans (Aleid, 2017). As 
the REDF cannot serve all loan applications, the result is long waiting times for subsidised 
loans, while private sector lending capacity remains underutilised. The same holds true for 
buying housing in the free market where people prefer to wait for a government housing 
subsidy whether a loan, land or ready built unit (ibid). The result is that private development 
firms concentrate on the high-end market niche while housing production for low to middle 
income purchasers, which constitute a large segment of the market, remains inactive.  
Private developers in Saudi Arabia provide virtually no low-cost housing in the market 
(Rabenau, 2011). The focus on building luxury housing units is one of the factors attributed to 
the declining affordability in recent years (Alshaikh & Alwazir, 2012; Opoku & Abdul-
Muhamin, 2013). The planning system is unsupportive for the efficient production of housing 
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as adopted planning policies and processes have not encouraged investment in the housing 
sector through incentives and regulatory mechanisms but, instead, have contributed to urban 
sprawl and the decline of inner city residential areas. The land subdivision procedure has 
encouraged land speculation and contributed to land accessibility and affordability issues.   
Saudi Arabia’s housing problems lie in improving its institutional framework to better manage 
resources and enable the provision of an efficient housing market. The current institutional 
framework governing housing in Saudi Arabia is fragmented and significantly constrains 
efficient housing delivery. The housing system has seen several government policies and 
reforms in the past decades yet, as Ghosheh (2011) points out, it still suffers from the 
overlapping of tasks within and between housing stakeholders. Government bodies responsible 
for housing, such as the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 
do not have a clear system in place to function in harmony with each other and also with other 
housing service providers. Ghosheh (2011) finds that the vast amount of confusion within and 
between housing institutions has resulted in tremendous inefficiencies and the waste of 
resources. 
2.5 Conclusion   
This chapter offered a review of the housing system in Saudi Arabia and Riyadh by 
commencing with a description of the broader contextual economic, social, demographic and 
political conditions that influence the different components of the system. The economic 
growth and development gained from the country’s oil wealth has led to a shift in demographic, 
social and cultural lifestyle. The chapter also provided a brief history of housing policy 
development in Saudi Arabia (2.3), where three distinguishable eras have shaped the current 
state of the housing system. The third era (2010-2017) has emerged as an important transition 
in the development of the housing system in Saudi Arabia where rising pressure on the housing 
sector in recent years called for action by the government to mediate the swelling housing 
demand. Riyadh’s housing market and regulatory framework was discussed in Section 2.4, 
illustrating issues and trends that affect housing provision. This discussion included housing 
market conditions, housing characteristics, land title and housing finance. The planning system 
framework and its relationship with housing in Riyadh was also described in this section. The 
review showed that housing in Riyadh suffers from several issues originating from the early 
planning of the city coupled with adopted inefficient zoning regulations and growth 
management measures. Finally, the main challenges in the housing system are summarised 
  53 
revealing that the major issue with the system lies in its institutional framework. It exhibited 
how the inconsistencies and ineffectiveness of government housing policy in the past has 
contributed to the many difficulties now evident in the housing system. Major reforms have 
been recently introduced, however, few tangible results are yet to be seen. Although the Saudi 
government continues to investigate possible strategies to alleviate the problems, the housing 
system in Riyadh continues to face several real and difficult challenges. This case study 
investigates these challenges in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework of Research 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses and synthesises relevant literature on housing research and drills deeply 
into existing theoretical frameworks. The purpose of this literature review is to build a platform 
to effectively and efficiently investigate the state-market roles and relations in housing systems 
and develop a theoretical framework most appropriate for investigating the research questions 
framing this study. The available literature on housing systems is extensive, complicated and 
includes a large number of contributors from around the world. The diversity and depth of 
topics, concepts, theories and contexts, along with the particular uniqueness of the Saudi 
context, necessitated the adoption of a systematic approach to identifying, managing, analysing 
and synthesising the literature relevant to this study. The sections included in this chapter frame 
and focus this review and allowed this writer to better manage and utilise the information.  
The chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the development of housing research in developing 
countries in which the theoretical debate has evolved from a ‘state centred’ provider approach 
to a more ‘market oriented’ enabling approach. The next section (3.3) discusses the new 
paradigm shift in the global housing policy debate which highlights a move towards greater 
state involvement and the importance of placing housing at the heart of urban planning and 
policies. The role of the planning system in housing is reviewed in section 3.4, focusing on the 
empirical literature on the impact of planning regulations on housing production. Section 3.5 
presents the theoretical approaches related to this study where institutional analysis of state-
market relations is found to be the most appropriate to this study’s aims. Ball’s (1983, 1986, 
1998) Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) is selected as the main institutional framework in 
investigating the state-market roles and relations in the Saudi housing system. A synthesis of 
other relevant theoretical concepts is also combined to provide a suitable conceptual framework 
for this study. Finally, section 3.6 provides a review of the relevant literature of housing in 
Saudi Arabia in order to identify the current research gaps in the literature in which this study 
is aiming to be placed.  
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3.2 A review of the evolution of housing policy in developing countries 
The discussion in housing system research in developing countries has revolved around the 
different roles of the state, market and society in delivering housing (Jenkins & Smith, 2001). 
The early theoretical debate started with the move towards abandoning the direct housing 
delivery by government to the notion that “society houses itself” (Angel, 2000). The issue of 
self-help housing became the central point for providing shelter for low-income groups. The 
realities of unwanted squatter settlements and the efforts of international organisations in 
supporting self-help housing ignited the reaction of academics and researchers to respond to 
such problems in developing countries (Pugh, 2001). The inappropriate housing conditions 
caused by rapid urbanisation and the challenges faced by governments in developing countries 
led organisations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations to intervene in providing 
financial and consultancy aid in the form of loans and policies to scale up housing production. 
This started with providing individual sites and services projects in the 1970s and moved to a 
much broader method that integrated the whole aspect of housing provision in early 1990, as 
Pugh (2001) explained:  
International housing policy for the developing countries has been influenced by 
changing theory and ideas. The evolution has run a course from a focus upon special 
projects for low-income groups to a more comprehensive approach to securing whole 
sector housing development within a framework of economic and institutional 
modernisation (p. 401).  
Housing system development in developing countries differs greatly from the developed world 
due to several factors that influence its shape. The rapid economic growth of cities in the 
developing world and the focus on service sector provision in urban areas creates the 
motivation for rural to urban migration as citizens search for better living standards and 
consequently add further pressure on urbanisation. This massive urbanisation in developing 
countries occurred in a relatively small timeframe causing implications for urban management, 
as Okpala (1992) observed: 
The history of urban growth in most of the developed countries was spread over many 
centuries, accelerating in the late 19th or early 20th century. In contrast, most of the 
process of urbanization in the developing countries has been compressed into the last 
40 years with important implications for the provision of shelter, infrastructure and 
services for the urbanized population (p.10).  
The migration of low-income groups to urban areas led to the establishment of a new pattern 
of squatter settlements and urban poverty in the cities. The stronger economies and the well-
established housing policies of developed countries have been successful to some extent in 
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alleviating such problems (Pugh, 2001). Other factors causing the high demographic growth 
are attributed to cultural and social values (such as early marriage, bigger households, and 
generations living in the same space) that are different from the housing system conditions in 
developed countries. However, the failure of conventional urban housing policy in developing 
countries to respond and keep up with the speedy and chaotic economic, social and 
demographic growth placed huge pressure on governments to maintain political legitimacy and 
avoid social instability. At the time, housing provision required a new conceptualisation, 
resulting in different policy approaches to deal with the housing issue.  
3.2.1 Provider approach (State centred) 
The dramatic demographic changes and the immense pressure on housing demand in the 1960s 
and 1970s confronted governments in developing countries with the responsibility of housing 
their urban population. Such governments sought the solution of adopting the shelter policy 
used in industrialised countries; where subsidised public housing with high construction 
standards, planning and building regulations was used to accommodate low-income residents 
(Blitzer, Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1981; Mayo & Gross, 1987; Sumka, 1987). The direct 
housing delivery that was undertaken by central governments included the full processes of 
planning, design, finance, construction and allocation of housing. At that time, direct housing 
production by the state was thought to be an effective way to deal with the housing shortage 
due to a belief that state authority, with its vast resources and power, would be capable of 
producing sufficient quantity and quality of housing (Okpala, 1992). The adoption of this 
shelter solution in order to fill the housing gap was accompanied by another aim of 
discouraging the formation of slums. Governments in developing countries viewed squatter 
settlements as illegal and a “sign of failed economic and social policy” (Sumka, 1987, p. 172). 
Public housing was built to replace squatter settlements and slum areas in an attempt to improve 
living standards in the name of urban renewal (Mayo, Malpezzi & Gross, 1986).  
Several issues evolved with the introduction of public housing and the clearance of squatter 
settlements in developing countries. Public housing did not reach many of the urban poor 
because such subsidised rent programs were unaffordable by the low-income segments (Mayo 
& Gross, 1987). Public housing units that were originally built to target the shortage of housing 
for low-income households were subsequently taken by middle-income households who could 
not afford to buy similar standard units in the free market (Okpala, 1992). In addition, some 
public housing was unoccupied in some places for reasons such as poor location or inadequate 
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infrastructure (Mayo et al., 1986). Another difficulty with direct housing delivery by 
governments was insufficient cost recovery and the limitation of financial resources. Units sold 
or rented may not provide adequate financial resources for the government to maintain the 
construction of new public housing projects (Mukhija, 2004). Despite extensive public housing 
subsidies in many developing countries, these programs have provided insignificant levels of 
access to housing units by the low-income population (Okpala, 1992; Keivani & Werna, 2001; 
Bredenoord & van Lindert, 2010).  
By the 1970s, it was clear that governments could not maintain their role as a direct housing 
provider. The failure of the direct housing provision in delivering sufficient quantities of 
housing at costs affordable to the low-income groups required a shift from the provider-based 
approach in housing delivery by the state to explore new shelter solutions. The World Bank 
report, 1993 indicated that: “Governments have retreated from ambitious public housing 
programs that demanded heavy yet unsustainable subsidies and have increasingly opted for 
programs focusing on assistance rather than direct production” (p. 29). Consequently, a shift 
in housing policy was taken toward public assistance in the informal sector through the practice 
of self-help housing allowing low-income households to be supported in building housing for 
themselves.  
3.2.2 Self-help housing approach (Society centred) 
The failure of the provider approach accentuated the need to reach the lower income population 
by providing improved housing conditions. There was a recognition that bulldozing slums and 
squatter settlements did not solve the housing issue but contributed to the shortage of housing 
supply for low-income households (Blitzer et al., 1981). Self-help or self-built housing is 
described in general terms as a process involving the arrangement of an individual household 
to build their house by themselves or through paid labour thus providing more efficient use of 
housing value (Jenkins & Smith, 2001). This method of housing production in developing 
countries was utilised by the poor due to their inability to access affordable housing produced 
by the private sector or government (World Bank, 1993). Aided self-help housing, as an 
approach to achieving the housing needs of low-income groups, was advocated by several 
academics of the 1960s and 1970s, most prominently by John Turner (1972, 1976, 1978, 1983). 
The core argument proposed by Turner is that disadvantaged people are capable of providing 
their own shelters if they can be supported, not hindered, by state regulations. Turner (1972, 
1976) illustrated self-help housing as a process of self-fulfilment by allowing households to 
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create their own living space. Turner’s idea of ‘aided self-help’ housing was criticised by 
writers such as Burgess (1978) who termed it ‘petty commodity’ and argued that low-income 
housing issues can only be resolved within a socialism paradigm and not by exploiting the 
disadvantaged social classes.  
As a theory for policy evolved around ‘aided self-help’ housing for low-income groups, 
advocated by Turner (ibid) through his research in Latin America, a new shift in shelter policies 
emerged from direct housing by the public sector in supporting the acquisition of housing. This 
shift in policy was supported by international organisations, such as the World Bank, whose 
initial involvement in housing in developing countries (1972-1983) was characterised by the 
idea of self-help housing in the form of sites and services and settlement upgrading schemes 
(Pugh, 2001, p. 404). The World Bank adopted and developed Turner’s idea of aided self-help 
housing based on the three principles of affordability, cost recovery and replicability (ibid). 
This way projects could have been affordable to the poor as they would be responsible for 
paying back the loans in order to guarantee the ‘replicability’ of the schemes. The World Bank 
funded the upgrading of sites, services and settlement projects in many cities in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. Government plots of land with basic infrastructure were distributed to low-
income households who were then responsible for building their own housing units at their 
own pace and ability. Similarly, households in settlement upgrading schemes were provided 
with basic services and given legal tenure security which eliminated any threat from removal. 
Bredenoord and van Lindert (2010) explained that the government role in these schemes in the 
1970’s and early 1980’s was to:  
… create a favourable environment for development of the self-build initiatives of the 
urban poor… This represented a major turning point from the earlier period, when state 
intervention with spontaneous settlements had basically meant the eviction of the 
inhabitants and the clearing of their provisional shacks. (p.280) 
The World Bank sites, services and slum upgrading projects, however, did not win much 
acclaim and, as Rothenberg (1981) critiques, did not extend further than the notion of ‘symbolic 
schemes’. The self-help approach with its bottom-up development did not provide a solution 
for the enormous housing demand in developing countries (UN-Habitat, 2011). This lack of 
success was due to several factors including: (i) the limited scope in addressing the whole 
housing system problems and the exclusion of issues, such as the malfunction in land 
development processes and finance systems (Pugh, 2001); (ii) the focus on the low-income 
groups when there was a mass shortage of supply for medium income groups, creating unfair 
competition and conflict (ibid); and (iii) the overwhelming disparity between the small, 
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localised and underfunded nature of these projects and the scale of the urban challenge, 
including vast population and poverty growth (Bredenoord & van Lindert, 2010). Thereafter, 
international donor agencies, such as the World Bank, had to reform their policy for housing 
in developing countries, as it was evident that the small-scale self-help housing projects were 
no longer a viable option.  
The concept of self-help housing, however, still continues its evolution as a housing solution 
for developing countries. Harms (1992) draws attention to the “very different social and 
economic significances” (p. 33) of self-help housing between the Third World and highly 
industrialised developed countries. Fiori and Ramirez (1992) describe the “very old challenge” 
(p. 23) of providing housing solutions to the urgent needs of the impoverished while, ideally, 
creating improvements to the social situation from which such needs originated. While more 
recently, Bredenoord and van Lindert (2010) assert that “self-help housing is still a widespread 
phenomenon, although mostly unattended or ignored by governments”; and still urgently 
requires a “revaluation of ‘assisted self-help’ as part of national and local housing policies” (p. 
278).  
3.2.3 Enabling approach (Market centred) 
After the mid-1980s, the development of the housing sector in developing countries witnessed 
a shift from its early focus on sites, services and settlement upgrading schemes for low-income 
segments to “a more comprehensive approach to securing whole sector housing development 
within a framework of economic and institutional modernisation” (Pugh, 2001, p. 401). This 
shift in direction and scope was led by the United Nations and the World Bank where a new 
strategy of ‘enablement’ became the “guiding principle for the theory and practice of housing 
in developing countries” (Pugh, 1994, p. 357). The concept of enablement is derived from the 
new political economy of neo-liberalism based on efficient market dynamism, which was 
envisioned to set a new understanding of housing polices in developing countries (ibid).  
Neo-liberalism has altered the political economy landscape in western developed nations, 
resulting in housing provision that limits direct government provision in housing and 
introduces market actors to take over state management of housing. Forrest and Hirayama 
(2009) defined neo-liberalism as “a political project involving reduced state intervention in 
social and economic affairs and the assertion of the superiority of market processes” (p. 998). 
The neo-liberal transition in housing policy that originated in developed countries has 
transformed state-market roles and relations in housing provision and this soon spread to other 
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developing countries under the conditions of economic globalisation (Rogers, 2012). In general 
terms, reforms were introduced to improve state capacity and governance by reducing its role 
in production and service delivery, encouraging deregulation of public enterprises, and 
enhancing public sector efficiency. These were attained through the introduction of cost cutting 
measures, such as “privatisation, deregulation, and the introduction of a market-like 
mechanism in the public sector” (Shuid, 2011, p. 22).  
In the context of housing in developing countries, the version of a neo-liberal ‘enabling 
approach’ places an emphasis on economic issues in the housing system development by 
focusing on market operations through state enabling strategies that “permit limited, but 
critical, public interventions in housing markets to leverage the activities of the private sector” 
(World Bank, 1993, p. 38). This enablement strategy stresses government participation in 
ensuring the functionality and operation of the private housing market: 
Eliminating or mitigating the effects of market failure is a key feature of government’s 
enabling role in the housing sector, a role that deals with the causes of many urban 
housing problems. At the same time, governments have an obligation to avoid 
intervening in ways that disrupt markets and deal only with the symptoms. (World 
Bank, 1993, pp. 38-39) 
A widespread acceptance of shifting the focus of provision from government to the private 
sector was taking hold during the 1980s (Keivani & Werna, 2001). The enablement approach 
in developing countries was first initiated by the United Nations in the late 1980s and 
elaborated later by the World Bank (1993) in its report ‘Enabling the Market to Work’. This 
document published seven recommendations for the whole housing development process to 
facilitate the demand and supply sides as well as manage the housing sector. These 
recommendations were: (i) developing property rights; (ii) developing mortgage finance; (iii) 
rationalising subsidies; (iv) providing infrastructure; (v) regulating land and housing 
development; (vi) organising the building industry; and (vii) developing an institutional 
framework for managing the housing sector (pp. 39-42). Emphasising the development of the 
whole system aimed to improve economic productivity through private sector participation and 
institutional reforms to enhance market efficiency. This housing policy paper indicated that 
“the enablement of private housing markets has become the main focus of World Bank housing 
policy in developing countries as a basis for scaling up housing production and developing the 
housing sector as a whole” (Keivani & Werna, 2001, p. 66). Links were now being formed 
between housing and the wider urban economies and embedded in national economic 
development (Pugh, 1994).   
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The market-based approach of enablement was criticised by various writers (such as Baken & 
van der Linden, 1993; Jones & Ward, 1995; Keivani & Werna 2001; Mukhija, 2004). Their 
main criticism of the approach was on its overemphasis on the formal market and negligence 
of other housing delivery modes, such as the informal market. These writers believed that 
increasing the efficiency of the formal market would not benefit the disadvantaged population. 
They argued that the informal sector in developing countries is the key provider of housing for 
low-income residents and therefore should be supported: 
If the Bank wants to engage the private sector in land and housing delivery, it would 
make sense to concentrate on the sector which has proved to be both willing and capable 
of catering for the housing needs of low-income groups: the informal/illegal sector. 
(Baken & van der Linden, 1993, p. 17)  
Malpezzi (1994) responded to the above criticism arguing that the dichotomy of formal and 
informal market is “de-emphasised in the market-wide approach” for the reason that the 
informal or illegal sector is not affordable (p. 460). He explained that informality in its essence 
drives up the costs at the lower end of the market as there is a lack of infrastructure and finance 
and the disadvantaged are forced to pay rent to well-connected individuals. Malpezzi (1994) 
illustrates this point: “So-called 'affordable' slums are often very expensive, once one looks at 
prices rather than expenditures. That is why even poor households are often willing to pay 
significant premia for secure tenure” (p. 460). 
Pugh (1994) claimed that ‘enablement’ in housing raised real dilemmas in developing countries 
that are attributable to the ‘overoptimism of liberalism’ and its reliance on reforming the 
complex institutional conditions. He described the challenges in the complexities of 
reconceptualising the welfare systems and the degree of state intervention in housing, which is 
already set at minimal to medium levels of state participation in liberalism. Yet, Pugh also 
believed that ‘enablement’ could have a positive impact on housing development in developing 
countries, as he explained: 
‘Enablement’ is hard won, being itself multi-institutional in its requirements, not just a 
matter of harnessing markets. The enablement liberalism in housing will not be a 
panacea, but some useful progress can be made in specific conditions for housing-
related improvement. (p. 369)  
Pugh took a more favoured position on enablement in his later paper (2001) when he disagreed 
with Marxist scholars who criticised the enablement strategy describing it as ‘rolling back of 
the state’; and that the state has a key role in housing sector development. He posits, 
“[enablement] is not confined to economic neoliberalism and the possible reduction of state 
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roles, but rather the reconfiguration of state roles in policy-making, institutional reform, and 
for instrumental social and economic purposes in housing” (Pugh, 2001, p. 416). He adds: 
“Enablement has varied policy targets and evolves to adjust to the dialectic between the 
economic, the social, and the political in housing-related and general development agendas” 
(p. 417). He also asserts that an enablement strategy that favours institutional reform could 
benefit all the actors in the housing system including the state, market and society in the 
development process in developing countries. This shift in housing policy represented as the 
‘enablement strategy’ by the World Bank and United Nations had dominated the policy 
discourse in developing countries until recently (see next section). The involvement of these 
and other international agencies in aiding and promoting their housing policies changed the 
practice of housing development in developing countries. 
In terms of this writer’s research, Saudi Arabia did not receive any form of financial assistance 
from the World Bank or any other international organisations due to its stabilised and robust 
economy. Therefore, the presence of the enabling approach in housing policies in Saudi Arabia 
did not exist until recently (see Chapter 2 – Recent changes in housing policy framework). The 
9th and 10th Economic Development Plans as well as Saudi Vision 2030 have clearly stated that 
the Saudi Government favours market-oriented policies prescribed in the enabling approach, 
as endorsed by the World Bank and the United Nations, and that the market should be the main 
supplier of housing. However, problematic issues in the Saudi housing system (as discussed in 
Chapter 2) create discord between this policy for housing provision and the reality of a market 
unable to provide adequate housing for all society segments. The prevalent issues in the 
institutional framework in the Saudi housing system may have contributed to the unsuccessful 
realisation of an ‘enabling approach’, as stipulated in recent government policies. Perhaps this 
exemplifies the importance of contextualising an approach fitted to local social, economic and 
political conditions before attempting to adopt it as housing policy.   
3.3 New paradigm shift in global housing policies  
Despite domination of the enabling approach in housing policy discourse over the past two 
decades, housing affordability persists as a global issue impacting many cities around the 
world. The neo-liberal policy trend has caused new housing issues to emerge and evoke the 
debate in housing research in both developed and developing countries. One of the resultant 
issues is the weakened state role in tackling housing problems. Forrest (2008) argued that: “the 
reduction of direct housing provision has arguably diminished state capacity to respond as 
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effectively as in the past to shifting housing needs and demand of population” (p. 174). 
Government withdrawal from its direct role in housing delivery by assuming an enabler role 
has not achieved positive outcomes regarding access to affordable housing as the World Cities 
Report, UN-Habitat (2016) reports: 
… the housing policies put in place over the last 20 years through the enabling approach 
have not succeeded in promoting adequate and affordable housing. Governments have 
backed away from direct supply without giving sufficient consideration to the markets 
and regulatory framework to enable other actors in the process to step forward and 
provide adequate and affordable housing. (p. 65) 
The report described a range of issues with the implementation of the enabling approach in 
different countries. One of the main shortcomings is the increased reliance of governments on 
the private sector with minimal intervention and in some cases total retreat from housing 
provision. Governments had an optimistic assumption that deregulating markets would in itself 
respond to the growing housing demand (UN-Habitat, 2013). This has resulted in supply for 
the solvent upper-middle and high-income groups and an exclusion for the need of lower 
income households. The UN-Habitat’s Global Housing Strategy (GHS) (2013), which was 
introduced to set out a framework responding to urbanisation, housing and sustainability 
challenges, indicated that many of the drawbacks of the enabling approach relate to the 
inappropriate regulatory framework used by governments. For instance, the increasing 
inequality for access to adequate and affordable housing was exacerbated by inefficient zoning 
regulations that favour single-family home ownership over other types of tenure. This has 
created mismatch between the supply and demand for affordable housing further contributing 
to divisions in cities and social exclusion. According to the GHS of the UN-Habitat (2013): 
The “enabling approach” has often been guided by inadequate understanding of the 
breadth of policies and areas affecting the supply of affordable housing. This has 
limited the areas of reforms of the regulatory framework to those directly implicated 
in housing production, with insufficient inclusion of urban planning, urban 
economy, land markets and fiscal mechanisms that would encourage efficient use 
of urban land. (p. 4) 
The GHS framework further emphasises the importance of urban planning to affordable 
housing by arguing:  
Absence of effective urban planning has a profound effect on the availability of 
affordable housing. The lack of an organizational framework integrating land use 
and infrastructure planning, including mobility and transportation, has resulted in 
chaotic urban sprawl, penalizing the poor … Lack of planning and of enabling 
zoning regulations, which would allow and support mixed land uses, is detrimental 
to local economic development. (p. 4) 
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3.3.1 Housing at the centre of the urban agenda    
With the world witnessing massive population growth from 2.6 billion in 1995 to 3.9 billion 
in 2014, six out of every ten people are predicted to live in urban areas by 2030 (UN-
Habitat, 2015b). The unprecedented challenges of rapid urbanisation, the rise of inequality 
for adequate and affordable housing and the ineffective application of the enabling 
approach have called for the integration of housing as a main pillar of national and local 
urban agendas. This shift in the global housing policy debate was led by the UN-Habitat’s 
framework, Global Housing Strategy, with the goal of achieving adequate housing for all 
by relying on the “principle of inclusive cities as the foundation for sustainable urban 
development” (UN-Habitat, 2013, p. 2).  
This paradigm shift was further accentuated in a position paper released by the UN-Habitat 
prior to the 2016 Global Habitat III Conference (held every 20 years) titled Housing at the 
Centre of the New Urban Agenda. This paper proposed placing ‘housing at the centre’ by 
aiming “to shift the focus from simply building houses to a holistic framework for housing 
development, orchestrated with urban planning practice and placing people and human 
rights at the forefront of urban sustainable development” (UN-Habitat, 2015b, p. 5). The 
absence of effective government policies and the ineffective and weak performance of 
market forces had created a chasm which had not been given enough attention in the 
international agenda despite the rising urgency of providing adequate and affordable 
housing for millions of households around the globe. An important aim of ‘Housing at the 
Centre’ is to re-establish the conceptualisation of housing as a social function, which was 
previously altered under the neoliberalism agenda of minimal state intervention by the 
commoditisation of housing. Therefore, the proposed paradigm shift in the thinking and 
practice of housing provision repositioned housing as a priority in the urban agenda 
through: 
… utilising national urban polices, urban planning and urban design as well as urban 
economy and legislation as the essential entry points. The aim is to integrate housing 
in the urban fabric with other uses, to integrate different economic groups, at 
appropriate densities to achieve better mobility and to reduce the urban footprint to 
ensure environmental sustainability as well as taking social and cultural needs into 
account through participatory approaches. (UN-Habitat, 2013, p. 5) 
The new strategy stipulated the general principles to achieve its goals. At the national level, 
governments need to establish a long-term vision for the housing development sector through 
a framework of national urban policy. The objective is to plan and coordinate urban growth by 
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considering the inputs needed for housing, land and infrastructure. The ‘Housing at the Centre’ 
approach: “promotes housing policy and national urban policy blended in a context of 
increased importance on housing as an imperative for socioeconomic development and the 
sustainable future of cities” (UN-Habitat, 2015b, p. 11). The approach emphasises that housing 
should be paramount in both economic and social policies of a country, and governments 
should not only provide an enabling environment for market actors but also directly intervene 
if necessary to ensure access to housing for all. This should be implemented under the national 
urban policies through an effective coordination between the different government tiers at 
national and local levels as well as with other stakeholders including the private sector.  
At the local level, the new paradigm asserts that housing should be at the epicentre of urban 
planning as residential land use in most cities accounts for more than 70% of total land use. 
The UN-Habitat report (2015b) argued that: “Housing has not been appropriately integrated 
into urban planning practice”, resulting in several urban issues arising particularly in 
developing countries, such as informal settlements, urban sprawl and class segregation (p. 15). 
The rise of spatial inequalities and social exclusion are products of the inappropriate planning 
mechanisms and regulations (ibid). The ‘Housing at the Centre’ approach aims at integrating 
housing provision to be at the core of city development and urban planning to promote 
sustainable social and economic practice. Some of the important guiding principles include 
encouraging mixed urban land uses, appropriate high urban densities, a social mix of 
population and integration of land use and infrastructure planning for better mobility.  
It is essential to note that this new paradigm shift does not eliminate the legitimacy of the 
enabling approach as it remains “a valid approach and a step in the right direction” but comes 
to address its shortcomings in a more holistic framework that strengthens government 
engagement towards a leadership role for the right to adequate housing for all (UN-Habitat, 
2013, p. 4). The new paradigm shift is not only exclusive to the rapidly urbanised developing 
world but also includes developed countries where inequality and inadequacy of access to 
housing has been rising. This shift is expected to prevail in the contemporary global housing 
policy debate for the coming years as the UN-Habitat has been a major player in the field since 
its Habitat Agenda I in 1976. Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of UN theories and practices 
of housing development policy since the 1970s.  
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Figure 3.1: Housing Development Policy Since 1970 
Source: UN-Habitat (2015b) 
3.4 Planning system and housing  
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the empirical literature on the relationship 
between planning and housing. As emphasised in the previous section, planning plays a key 
role in housing and is thus becoming the focus in the new global housing strategy. In a recent 
book by Gurran and Bramley (2017) on the role of urban policy and the planning system in the 
housing market, the authors illuminate the economic, social and environmental importance of 
housing to urbanisation processes using international case studies to highlight the different 
approaches of planning system intervention in housing. Gurran and Bramley’s (2017) work 
runs parallel with the new paradigm shift in the global housing debate which emphasises the 
importance of integrating housing to the centre of urban policy and planning, as they argued: 
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… housing should occupy a central focus of contemporary urban governance and 
planning. Yet in many nations, housing has failed to sustain this focus. Under the wider 
influence of neoliberalism, government intervention—through the delivery of public 
housing or the regulation of private development—has been seen to inhibit the housing 
market. (p. 15) 
Gurran and Bramley (2017) indicated that housing challenges such as the rise of inequality, 
demographic pressures, environmental risks and poverty have worsened in many developed 
countries in the new millennium due to the weakening power of urban planning intervention in 
housing. There are numerous ways in which the planning system can affect housing provision 
in the literature so, before discussing the impact and implications of the planning system in 
housing, a brief explanation of the relationship between the two is outlined.  
In the context of this research, the term ‘planning’ refers to a set of formal rules and regulations 
representing “a particular form of public policy intervention in the arena of private decisions 
with regard to the use of land, governed by particular legislation” (Bramley, Bartlett & 
Lambert, 1995, p. 38). Planning is often used to encompass general terms, such as urban 
planning and planning systems as well as more specific terms, such as land-use planning. These 
terms are used interchangeably throughout this study. According to Parker and Doak (2012), 
the basic objective of planning is to predict need, risk and priorities in social, economic and 
environmental terms and to assess different policies that correspond to stated aims and targets.  
In order to understand the relationship between urban planning and the housing market, it is 
vital to understand the planning process and how decisions are made by planning authorities 
(Gurran & Bramley, 2017). In many countries, the planning process follows two main stages: 
forward planning and development control. Forward planning, or what is also called strategic 
planning, involves the preparation of plans (land allocation) for future development based on 
projections of population growth, infrastructure needs, natural resources and economic 
activities to meet the future needs of community. These spatial plans are usually prepared in 
line with national policy frameworks set by central governments to meet strategic visions and 
objectives (ibid). Regional, city, and local plans are produced as a regulatory guideline to 
achieve desired future goals by “establishing a legally enforceable basis for guiding future 
decisions and actions consistent with these objectives” (Gurran, 2011, p. 44). Strategic 
planning provides a context for controlling development whereas planning authorities set a 
framework for the land market which helps developers and investors to decide what would be 
permitted or not on their land and the potential effect on its surroundings (Adams, 1994).  
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Development control, on the other hand, involves an assessment by local planning authorities 
of development proposals lodged by private developers or landowners to undertake 
development in a certain location. The assessment is carried out based on development 
standards usually referred to as zoning which is ‘an operational mechanism’ that defines uses 
and activities within a zone as well as “specific standards and controls to govern the 
configuration, appearance and design of particular development types” (Gurran, 2011, p. 53). 
The planning authority has the power to grant planning permission based on specific planning 
requirements and standards that allow it to control the form of the proposed development. 
Compliance with strategic plans and development control standards (as well as other 
requirements, such as public hearings) are expected for the granting of planning permissions. 
However, in some planning systems, such as in the United Kingdom, a degree of discretion by 
local planning authorities is widely practised where negotiations can take place between local 
planning authorities and developers that do not necessarily conform to local development plans 
in return for developer contribution towards specified community benefits such as affordable 
housing. In general, planning authorities in most countries impose conditions on planning 
approvals for a variety of reasons including limiting the externalities of development and 
coordinating the provision of infrastructure and services. Development proposals may also be 
subject to other conditions, such as a contribution towards affordable housing.  
As explained above, planning authorities have the power to determine the type and intensity of 
development. Therefore, land-use planning plays a crucial role in the housing market as it can 
decide the allocation of available land for housing development, the specification of type, size, 
design and locations of housing as well as the required provision of infrastructure, services and 
amenities through the use of planning obligations. This provides the state with several 
important levers that can influence housing development with reference to both conditions in 
the housing market and the overarching central government policy objectives (Adams & 
Watkins, 2002). Thus, the role of planning intervention in housing can be a significant factor 
influencing the behaviour of market actors involved in housing production (Bramley et al., 
1995; Monk & Whitehead, 1999; Rowley & Phibbs, 2012).  
3.4.1 The debate of ‘good planning’ versus ‘expensive housing’ 
The debate about the role of planning and its impact on the housing market occupies a growing 
body in the literature. Gurran and Bramley (2017) argued that the debate is mainly centred 
around competing ideological or political views about state intervention in the market and 
  69 
becomes more heated during times of pressure over housing production and affordability. The 
authors describe the contested views of the market, state and society in regard to planning 
intervention. First is the view of a free market advocate (the private development industry) 
which claims that a regulatory planning system can impact the production of new housing by 
imposing constraints on private developers through the slow, expensive or uncertain planning 
process and the highly restrictive development controls contributing to less housing supply and 
higher housing prices. The second view depicts planners who advocate the importance of 
legislative planning power in protecting the built environment and preserving the public 
interest. The rationale for planning intervention is described as a way of mitigating potential 
negative externalities that might eradicate from private development in the land market 
(Bramley et al., 1995). In turn, planners argue that: “good planning makes housing better and 
therefore more valuable” (Gurran & Bramley, 2017, p. 85). The third view is that of 
homeowners, which usually supports planning to protect vested interests in living in well 
planned neighbourhoods with good amenities and services that enhance the value of properties.   
In the context of this study, the focus is on the perspectives of planners and private developers. 
The conflict in interests between the private development industry, which perceives planning 
regulation as an impediment, and the position of planners to protect the environment presents 
many challenges and implications for housing development in any context. Healey (1992b) 
indicated that planning has always been viewed as a barrier to the market but there has been a 
change to promote market awareness among planners. She argued that: 
… the challenge is to develop a ‘market-sensitive’ style of planning, to understand 
precisely which trade-offs are being made as market considerations are being 
‘balanced’ with those relating to environmental quality and community needs. (p. 19)  
Finding the balance between economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection 
can be a challenging task that is attempted to be addressed through sustainable planning. 
Sustainable planning has been criticised by writers, such as Campbell (1996) where he 
expressed doubts about the effectiveness of it, suggesting that the holistic framework of the 
sustainability concept, ‘the triangle model’, is too vague and hard to achieve in the real world. 
Planning, however, is still seen as a more accepted option for intervening in regulating the 
market (Jones & Watkins, 2009).    
The argument that urban planning restrains economic growth has been rejected by Gurran and 
Bramley (2017). They argue instead that, even in markets with no planning, there will always 
be other factors (i.e. the varying motivations of market actors, such as developers and 
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landlords) that constrain the supply of new housing. Furthermore, they point out the importance 
of examining the costs and benefits associated with planning intervention and the vested 
interests of different actors, who take advantage of the rules:   
… planning regulation is generally accepted as the most efficient mechanism for managing 
the problem of externalities and public goods …  However, as illuminated here, the 
differential costs and benefits of regulation—ranging from the procedural burden through 
to the impact of stringent development controls—as well as the differential beneficiaries of 
particular regulatory settings—remain important considerations in analysing outcomes of 
planning intervention. (Gurran & Bramley, 2017, p. 97) 
It is worth mentioning that planning is only one factor affecting the production of housing as 
the dynamics of the housing system has several other driving powers influencing the supply 
and demand in the market (ibid). Another important consideration is that housing systems face 
different constraints in the production of housing due to their geographical unevenness (ibid). 
The same applies to planning as a procedure for land allocation and approaches of development 
controls as they differ between countries (Hincks, Leishman & Watkins, 2013; Gurran & 
Bramley, 2017). These contextual differences result in varying effects of planning on housing 
outcomes (Cheshire & Sheppard, 2004). While it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all 
the various aspects of the relationship between planning and housing and the degree of its 
impact on local housing markets, the aim is to draw broad ideas from different contexts that 
help explain the nature and effectiveness of planning systems in dealing with and enabling 
better housing outcomes. A selected review of the debate about the impact of planning on 
housing is provided below. 
3.4.2 Selected review of the impact of planning on housing  
Much of the literature on the impact of planning systems on housing markets comes from 
interpretations of mainstream economics. According to Gurran and Phibbs (2016), most of 
these studies have struggled to grasp the comprehensive nature of the planning system as it is 
usually perceived as a ‘regulatory burden’ imposed on private development, neglecting other 
important dimensions of planning that include promoting objectives and managing risks. The 
continuous attack by mainstream economics on land-use planning and the outcomes of 
development control is mainly driven by the idea that planning objectives are too broad, 
making it an easy target for criticism (Jones & Watkins, 2009). However, this section of the 
literature review does not intend to examine the economic and planning disciplinary disputes 
but rather it seeks to review and sample contributions from both fields that are relevant to this 
study. It is worth mentioning that most empirical studies on the impact of land-use planning on 
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housing are based on deductive quantitative models of housing economic analysis that try to 
measure market outcomes (i.e. the relationship between regulations and house prices). Findings 
of some of these studies are reviewed even though this study is more concerned with processes 
rather than market outcomes. It has been suggested that there is a need for future research to 
incorporate insights from a more qualitative institutional approach (Bramley, 2003).     
Adams and Tiesdell (2010) classified the impact of planning on the housing market into three 
themes. The first is concerned with the macroeconomic impact of spatial planning on a country 
in terms of its economic growth, wealth creation and distribution between regions and areas. 
The second is focused on the impact of planning on local land value patterns. The third theme 
relates to the impact of planning on constraining developments through increasing production 
costs and delaying the process of delivering housing. This study disregards the first theme due 
to its limited relevance to the research questions and focuses on the remaining two themes. 
Hence, the impact of land allocation, the planning process and development control on the 
quantity and cost of housing production is reviewed.   
There are numerous empirical studies that have attempted to measure the impact of planning 
on housing, most of which have been conducted in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Gurran and Bramley (2017) suggest that the variety of different approaches used in these 
studies to measure the impact of planning can be broadly grouped together into three measures 
of impact: (i) restrictiveness; (ii) uncertainty and delay; and (iii) cost. As this classification is 
useful in distinguishing the different type of impacts, the distinction between them can be 
somewhat blurry as there is often an interrelationship between these broad classifications. For 
instance, the restrictiveness of land-use regulations as well as the uncertainty and delay of the 
planning process can have a collective impact on the cost of production. Nevertheless, this 
classification is used to provide guidance and structure in sorting the literature in this field. The 
review of the literature presented under these three broad measures is selective and unable to 
cover the full breadth of topics and issues in detail (due to the extensive volume of literature 
extending beyond the scope of this research) but rather aims to synthesise relevant literature 
into a useful reference that can assist in analysing and interpreting this study’s findings.  
3.4.2.1 Restrictiveness of planning 
The restrictiveness impact of planning is characterised by the relationship between land-use 
planning regulation, housing supply and housing price. According to Whitehead (2016) 
planning affects development in at least four ways, by restricting: (i) the quantity of housing 
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land available for development; (ii) the location of land; (iii) the way land is developed; and 
(iv) by altering the timing of development (p. 27). As land-use planning is envisioned to prevent 
externalities and provide communities with better amenities and services contributing to an 
increase in housing value, it also restricts urban sprawl and controls densities viewed as supply 
constraints. The question that attracted the attention of many researchers is whether land-use 
planning restrictions on housing supply contribute to higher housing prices. Or are prices 
determined by market demand? According to Bramley (2003), there is broad consent in theory 
among economic researchers that land-use planning regulations restrict significantly the supply 
of new housing thus contributing to increases in housing prices. However, there are 
contradicting points of view arguing that housing prices are mainly demand determined and 
planning restraints on land supply have a minor impact on prices in the short term as it can take 
time to be adjusted in the market (Gurran & Phibbs, 2015; 2016; Gurran & Ruming, 2016).  
In the Australian context, for instance, Gurran and Phibbs (2016) argued that it is the demand 
that drives prices up in that “demand side pressures – particularly financial deregulation, tax 
changes and reductions in interest rates – offer more plausible explanations for price inflation 
than assumed planning system constraints on new housing supply” (p. 67). This stance is 
voiced in response to a political narrative that has been calling for planning reforms in Australia 
in order to increase housing supply and solve the housing affordability issue. Beer, Kearins and 
Pieters (2007) suggest: 
… neo-liberalism has clearly both influenced the direction of housing affordability 
debates in Australia and played a determining part in the ‘roll out’ of planning policies 
as a mechanism for boosting the supply of affordable housing. In many ways, planning 
solutions are seen to be the low cost ‘technical fix’ to the challenge of providing 
affordable housing in high cost metropolitan housing markets. (p. 20) 
The debate about the restrictiveness of the planning system and its relation to housing supply 
and prices has evoked several government inquiries in Australia. A prominent investigation 
was undertaken by the Australian Productivity Commission in 2004 to evaluate housing 
affordability for first homebuyers and was published in a report titled First Home Ownership. 
One of the key findings in this report was that even an efficient planning system would have 
made little difference to high housing prices suggesting that higher housing prices are more 
likely to be demand driven: 
In the Commission’s judgment, given the small size of net additions to housing in any 
year relative to the size of the stock, improvements to land release or planning approval 
procedures, while desirable, could not have greatly alleviated the price pressures of the 
past few years. Nonetheless, removing unnecessary impediments on the supply side is 
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clearly important to affordability in the long run, particularly in the context of the focus 
on planning to contain ‘urban sprawl’. (p. 154) 
Several studies in other contexts, such as in the United Kingdom and the United States, have 
focused on the restrictiveness or ‘negative impact of planning’ on housing supply and its 
relation to housing prices (Monk, Pearce & Whitehead, 1996; Monk & Whitehead, 1999; 
Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002; White & Allmendinger, 2003; Bramley 2003; Hui & Ho, 2003; 
Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Glaeser & Ward, 2009; Gyorko & Molloy, 2015). 
These studies share an agreement that planning regulations do have an impact on land supply 
that contribute to increasing housing prices. Some of these studies focused on examining the 
impact of planning controls on supply and prices in several housing submarkets within a 
country (including Monk et al., 1996; Monk & Whitehead, 1999; Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002; 
Ihlanfeldt, 2007). Others made comparisons between countries (White & Allmendinger, 2003); 
or investigated the impact of planning regulations on the housing market (Dawkins & Nelson, 
2002; Mills, 2005; Anthony, 2006). In the context of this body of literature, urban containment 
policies and density control measures are considered to be among the most restrictive planning 
regulations affecting housing and are thus of particular interest to this study.  
The shift in the past three decades towards sustainability and preserving the environment, led 
by the desire for a more compact urban form that aims to prevent cities from urban sprawl 
issues, has been encapsulated by the spread of growth management programs. Urban 
containment, or urban growth boundaries (UGBs), have become a central focus of urban 
planning polices in many nations around the world (Gurran & Bramley, 2017). The effects of 
urban containment policies on the supply of land for housing and their impact on prices have 
drawn researchers’ attention (Elliott, 1981; Levine, 1999; Dawkins & Nelson, 2002; Nelson et 
al., 2004; Anthony, 2006; Brueckner, 2009). Dawkins and Nelson (2002) provided an 
international comparison of the effect of different urban containment policies. In this study, the 
authors argued that urban containment policies do affect land prices as they limit the supply of 
greenfield land and increase the desirability of owning land within containment boundaries. 
The results of containment policies might be reflected in better amenities and services within 
their boundary, which then increases the demand for land (Anthony, 2006). Yet, the impact of 
urban containment policies on housing prices can vary depending on the nature of the urban 
containment policies and how they are implemented. However, Dawkins and Nelson (2002) 
suggest that local market demand forces could more significantly affect housing prices than 
the restrictiveness of urban containment policies. Gurran (2007) argued that studies that tried 
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to examine urban containment polices and links to the shortage of housing supply, particularly 
affordable housing, have not been able to ascertain a clear link between the price impact of 
these policies and housing.        
Another important restrictive form of planning control that has been examined in several 
studies is the impact of density measures on housing supply and prices (Monk et al., 1996; 
Mills, 2005; Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002; Glaeser & Ward, 2009; Dunse, Thanos & Bramley, 
2013). Density restrictions can be expressed in many ways, such as height restrictions, 
minimum lot size or building coverage. The move toward compact cities and global 
sustainability has been encouraging the promotion of higher densities in many countries to 
avoid the externalities associated with low density (Jenks & Burgess, 2000). In the United 
Kingdom, it has been argued that a strong planning stance towards sustainability in the form 
of high densities has significantly impacted the type of housing development by limiting the 
choices available to consumers and resulting in a shortage in certain segments of demand in 
the housing market (Monk et al., 1996; Monk & Whitehead, 1999; White & Allmendinger, 
2003; Jones & Watkins, 2009; Dunse et al., 2013). Jones and Watkins (2009) pointed out: 
The focus on the development of flats exacerbates a long-standing housing shortage by 
meeting only one segment of demand … the relationship between sustainable planning 
policy and the housing market reveals that policies cannot focus entirely on high-
density living or ignore short-term housing market dynamics. (pp. 159-160) 
In contrary to the United Kingdom’s high-density policies, low density control measures, 
prevail most of the United States’ metropolitan areas (Mills, 2005). The restrictiveness of land-
use regulation in the United States, particularly density control measures, such as height 
restriction and minimum lot size, is believed to have an impact on housing affordability. 
Ihlanfeldt (2007) has examined the effects of land-use regulation restrictiveness on prices in 
100 cities in the state of Florida. His study found that restrictive land-use regulation (such as 
minimum lot size zoning) has contributed to housing unaffordability by limiting the choice of 
homebuyers to a specific type of housing (large single-family homes). The study also indicated 
that the restrictiveness of other land-use regulation measures resulted in an increase of 
development costs that are passed onto end-users. Mills (2005) demonstrated that restrictive 
density control measures in the United States have engendered social exclusion, where low-
income and minority groups cannot afford housing in good neighbourhoods as such control 
restrictions limit developers from providing low cost housing choices in desired locations.   
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There are varying views about the relationship between density and housing prices. Some 
studies suggest that density control does increase housing prices (Mills, 2005), whereas others 
indicate that there is an indirect relationship between density and housing prices (Dunse et al., 
2013); and others suggest that there is a little or modest relationship between price and density 
(Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002; Glaeser & Ward, 2009). However, there has not been substantial 
evidence of clear links between high housing prices and densities. The hypothesis suggesting 
that higher land prices might translate into permitting higher densities in order to maximise 
land value and provide affordable housing is controversial. Dawkins and Nelson (2002) argued 
that “housing producers do not always respond to higher land prices by increasing the density 
of development” (p. 10). They pointed out that private developers are more concerned with the 
relative market demand so, for example, if the demand is weak for apartment units, developers 
might not economise on the value of land by building high density housing. Similarly, Rowley 
and Phibbs (2012) claimed that allowing higher density (i.e. density bonuses) for developers 
in infill development to deliver affordable housing may not be utilised by developers as it could 
cause land value uplift if it is pre-identified prior to land purchase (i.e. stated in strategic 
planning documents). They explained that landowners would increase the price of their land – 
if they know that higher density is allowed –  making it difficult for developers to use the value 
of increased density to replace the revenue lost from the affordable housing requirement.  
The literature shows that there is wide agreement that the restrictiveness of land-use planning 
regulations can constrain housing supply and therefore contribute to housing price increases. 
However, measuring the effects of such restrictions and their relationship to housing prices 
poses a major difficulty as there are considerable variations between contexts because of 
differences in planning processes, the complexity of regulations and the way they are enforced. 
Gyourko and Molloy (2015) asserted that: “due to the difficulty of measuring regulation, theory 
on this topic tends to be much more advanced than empirical work” (p. 1331). Quigley and 
Rosenthal (2005) noted that most of the empirical evidence had methodological shortcomings 
in addressing the impact of land-use regulations on housing prices. They argued that these 
empirical studies have failed to provide definitive evidence of the regulation effects on prices. 
The unsystematic data used, and the variation of regulation and enforcement make findings 
very difficult to apply in other contexts:  
The literature fails, however, to establish a strong, direct causal effect, if only because 
variations in both observed regulation and methodological precision frustrate sweeping 
generalizations. (p. 69) 
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They conclude that it is impossible to draw a firm general conclusion about the relationships 
between the restrictiveness of land-use regulation and housing prices.     
3.4.2.2 Uncertainty and delay 
The second broad measure discusses the impact of planning control in the decision-making 
process. As the planning system is established to set regulatory norms, planning control is used 
as a means of implementing land-use plans through the planning permission process. The need 
for planning consent to perform changes to the built environment is the trigger for the 
legislative power of planning systems in controlling private land development as development 
proposals are required to be submitted for assessment by local planning authorities for approval 
(Gurran, 2011). Planning and development control differs between nations, however, there are 
two distinct types of planning systems in regard to monitoring the planning process – 
discretionary and regulatory (Booth, 1996). The discretionary planning process, such as that 
used in the United Kingdom is based on case merits where planning applications are assessed 
for approval in line with an indicative local plan but a decision is not necessarily binding to it. 
This suggests that other factors are considered, such as ‘material considerations’, and if the 
proposal is deviating from the plan there is still a possibility for approval (Adams & Tiesdell, 
2013). On the other hand, a regulatory planning process requires all planning applications to 
conform to predefined and legally binding plans where criteria and standards are set out in 
advance stating what is permissible (Booth, 1996). This approach is widely applied in the 
United States and in most western European countries.  
These two planning processes share the common theme of providing a balance between the 
concepts of certainty and flexibility in decision making (Allmendinger & Ball, 2006; Gurran, 
2011; Steele & Ruming, 2012; Gurran & Bramley, 2017). Furthermore, according to Gurran 
(2011): 
There is a considerable tension between providing certainty about what may and may 
not occur on a parcel of land, and enabling sufficient flexibility to accommodate 
unanticipated proposals that may still represent good design or a positive contribution 
to the community. (p. 65)  
Future uncertainty is an unwanted concept by both the public and private developers (Booth, 
1996). Developers strive for certainty as it provides clearer investment decisions and minimises 
risk (Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; Ruming, Gurran & Radolph, 2011; Rowley & Phibbs, 2012). 
Certainty is also important to the members of the public as it stipulates permissible 
development activities within a community providing assurance and safeguarding the public 
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interest. However, the certainty concept associated with the regulatory planning process has a 
number of issues (Gurran, 2011). First, it is almost impossible for planning authorities to 
anticipate all the parameters of future development activities related to a particular location. 
Second, preparing strategic plans requires significant resources and inputs to ensure 
comprehensiveness and such resources might not be available to local planning authorities. 
Third, maximum certainty that strictly adheres to predefined criteria can lead to rigidity in the 
planning process which has consequences, such as supressing innovation and deterring 
development. Gurran and Bramley (2017) pointed out that: “Rigid regulatory frameworks can 
have house price effects by reducing the amount of development permitted within an area” (p. 
110).    
On the other hand, the concept of flexibility, which is promoted through the discretionary 
approach, is brought about in response to unforeseen future events (Booth, 1996). According 
to Booth (1996), the discretionary approach was based on a pragmatic tradition that accepts 
that it is impossible to predict future circumstances, yet retaining manoeuvrability is important 
for addressing future uncertainty in the decision-making process. Thus, the discretionary 
approach is praised for its flexibility in dealing with the complex and unexpected issues 
surrounding a specific project (ibid). However, discretion also comes with a range of problems 
and challenges that have been discussed in several studies in the British planning context 
(Healey, 1992c; Booth, 1995; 1996; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999; Allmendinger & Ball, 2006). One 
problematic argument with the discretionary system is that it allocates dominant power of 
control to one side (the planning authority) in the decision-making process (Healey, 1992c). 
Another issue with discretionary flexibility is accountability (Booth, 1995). Tewdwr-Jones 
(1999) stated: 
… the problem with discretionary planning systems is that they are not particularly 
accountable … It is extremely problematical for individuals other than the policy or 
decision makers themselves to identify how decisions are likely to be made. (p. 249)  
Finally, flexibility can be highly unpredictable. Mayo and Sheppard (2001) argued that 
developers face uncertainty with flexible planning that increases their risks because of the 
randomness and variance of planning authority behaviour in the decision-making process, 
which in turn contributes to decreases in housing supply. Market actors, such as developers 
and landowners, are conflicted about the concept of flexibility. Adams and Tiesdell (2013) 
explained:  
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Flexibility is a doubled-edged sword for market actors. While many owners may wish 
to retain maximum flexibility on their own land, they would often wish to see maximum 
certainty on adjoining land, so as to reduce the likelihood of negative externalities. (p. 
215) 
There has been a tendency of convergence in some western planning systems toward a hybrid 
planning model where the pursuit of both regulatory ‘certainty’ and discretionary ‘flexibility’ 
is the holy grail of planning (Steele & Ruming, 2012). Gurran (2011) claimed that a more 
performance-based approach that combines aspects from both the regulatory and discretionary 
approaches may provide a better solution for the tension between certainty and flexibility. She 
explained that developers in the dual approach will have the options of sticking to the 
predetermined criteria and be assured of certainty, or can propose alternative solutions 
demonstrating that the established performance criteria are met in which room for flexibility is 
allowed. However, Booth (1995) suggested that bridging the gap between flexibility and 
certainty might not be realised simply by mixing the two approaches or transferring instruments 
from one type of planning to another. The context specific understanding of institutional 
arrangements and specifying desired outcomes is paramount to account for decisions (Steele 
& Ruming, 2012). It is believed that the ongoing debate about the balance between certainty 
and flexibility is over emphasised, as Steele and Ruming (2012) posited: 
… the flexibility/certainty dilemma is something of an artifice that serves to distract 
professional and scholarly attention away from the substantive issues around how urban 
planning institutions can better engender sustainability in a period of global complexity. (p. 
173) 
The second planning constraint under this broad impact measure relates to planning delays in 
obtaining planning permission. The time taken in assessing planning applications has been used 
to measure the responsiveness of the planning system to housing supply as well as its effect on 
housing prices (Mayer & Somerville, 2000; Mayo & Sheppard, 2001; Ball, Allmendinger & 
Hughes, 2009; Ball, 2011). In his study measuring the time taken to obtain planning approval 
in southern England, Ball (2011) found that:  
… planning delays play an important role in generating poor housing supply 
responsiveness, because it takes a long and uncertain time to gain approval for building, 
even when projects conform to planning guidelines. (p. 360) 
He explains that the scale of planning delay is attributed to the overall nature of uncertainty in 
the British planning system, which is a major factor in a slow and unresponsive process in 
increasing housing supply. The uncertainty associated with discretionary planning processes 
in the form of planning agreement negotiations, such as in the United Kingdom, have been 
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blamed for much of the planning delays (Gallent & Carmona, 2004). The certainty and 
consistency of the planning process is vital for developers to account for potential costs (Ong 
et al, 2017). Mayo and Sheppard (2001) argued that lengthy planning delays are more 
problematic when there is variability in delays (uncertainty). They explain that random 
fluctuations in the cost of development cannot be forecast in advance by developers, resulting 
in an increased risk and impacts on housing supply: 
The analysis suggests that it is not simply the expected length of delay in considering 
development proposals that is important. Indeed, changes can occur which increase 
expected delay and yet increase current period housing supply. The variance in the delay 
which might be imposed is critical. Any increase in this variance will adversely affect the 
current supply of housing. (p. 126) 
In the American context, Mayer and Somerville (2000) argued that explicit costs added to 
developments, such as impact fees, have less influence on new housing construction than 
regulations that cause delay and lengthen the development process, which in turn decreases the 
responsiveness of producers to housing supply. However, the cost of holding land during the 
planning assessment process (i.e. interest payments and taxes) that are claimed to impact the 
development cost through delays (as the previous authors indicate) may not necessarily reduce 
the development revenues14. Gurran and Bramley (2017) suggested that these holding costs 
could be “passed back to the landholder, when they are accounted for in feasibility analysis” 
(p. 109). Keogh and Evans (1992) believed that identifying and measuring the cost of planning 
delay is a complicated task. They argued that the cost of delay should not only be addressed 
from the private cost point of view (cost of delay to developers) but also against the social 
benefits of planning control. Additionally, Ball (2011) argued that one of the main constraints 
in measuring planning delay is the difficulty in obtaining data.  
Developers often argue that delay is caused by the inefficiency of local planning authorities; 
whereas planners believe that the delay is commonly caused by the failure of developers to 
satisfy planning requirements (Keogh & Evans, 1992). Planning approval and refusal rates are 
used to measure the efficiency of local authorities in facilitating housing supply. Gurran and 
Bramley (2017), however, argued that a faster approvals rate, “might not necessarily translate 
into housing completions or to net additions to the overall dwelling supply, due to other market 
                                                     
14 Some of the research about the cost of planning delays was conducted when interest rates were much higher. 
Currently, these economies mentioned have low interest rates compared to 15-20 years ago. In contrast, house 
price inflation in several cities around the world has increased. This implies that developers may benefit from 
such delays in buoyant housing markets. For instance, house price inflation in Sydney in 2017 was 9.4% 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017) where the holding cost was estimated at 6-7% indicating that the price of 
proposed housing units is increasing every year more than the holding cost incurred on waiting for the approval.  
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factors” (p. 111). According to Monk and Whitehead (1999), the delay caused by the 
administrative and bureaucratic planning process is possibly not always the only factor for the 
sluggish housing supply responsiveness but it is also a product of the behaviour of market 
actors. They pointed out that “landowners can exploit any oligopolistic certainty created by the 
planning system to delay the release of their land until prices have risen in the face of rising 
demand for housing” (p. 79). Gurran and Bramley (2017) explained that not only do all 
planning decisions take time, but housing also takes a long time to produce, and this is one of 
the key factors affecting the inelasticity or ‘stickiness’ of housing supply making it slow to 
respond to demand changes. 
3.4.2.3 Development cost 
The third broad planning impact measure on housing is the cost associated with the 
development process. As mentioned earlier, planning control and policies, such as urban 
containment and density measures as well as the delay in the planning process, can all impose 
indirect costs on housing development. Nonetheless, the focus here is on the impact of the cost 
directly charged to developers, which does not arise from the restrictiveness of planning 
regulations nor by the lengthy planning process. There is a range of direct costs imposed on 
development by local planning authorities (i.e. processing fees for planning applications) but 
the most significant is the cost of development deducted for community benefits (known as a 
development contribution in Australia; impact fees in the United States; or planning obligations 
in the United Kingdom). Development contribution is the term mainly referred to in this study. 
The purpose of imposing development contributions varies between countries, but it is mainly 
required to provide infrastructure, amenities and/or affordable housing and can be compulsory 
or negotiated depending on the legislative nature of the planning system (Gurran, 2011).  
The impact of development contributions on housing construction has been examined in 
several studies, such as Huffman, Nelson, Smith and Stegman (1988), Evans-Cowley and 
Lawhon (2003), Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004), Been (2005), Ruming et al (2011), Crook 
and Monk (2011), Crook, Henneberry and Whitehead (2016) and Murray (2017). The premise 
of much of the literature on the impact of development contributions on housing – particularly 
in relation to infrastructure charges – is often based on who bears the cost (Bryant & Eves, 
2014). Nonetheless, examining development contribution effects on housing can take many 
forms including its impact on new housing prices, existing housing prices and land value 
(Crook et al. 2016). The delivery of new infrastructure to a community may have a degree of 
  81 
impact on existing housing and vacant land in that area by increasing its value (Been, 2005). 
This study, however, is more concerned with the impact of development contributions on new 
housing production as opposed to the possible windfall gain on existing housing and land value.  
Development contributions can take several forms. In the United States, for instance, impact 
fees are imposed on developers to provide infrastructure and services, such as roads, water and 
sewer lines and schools, among other community services needed in a new development site. 
These development impact fees were initially intended to transfer the burden of infrastructure 
cost from the public to the developer (Evans-Cowley & Lawhon, 2003). This transfer of cost 
has triggered a long debate over who really bears the burden of development charges. The 
literature suggests that one of three parties often incurs the cost: developers, land seller, or the 
end-user (Huffman et al. 1988). Early theoretical studies, such as Huffman et al. (1988) argued 
that despite the original aim of transferring the burden of connecting infrastructure and services 
to developers, the cost is actually neither borne by developers nor landowners but is ultimately 
passed onto homebuyers in the form of higher purchase prices.  
Research in the United States (such as Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy, 2004; Evans-Cowley 
Lockwood, Rutherford & Springer, 2009; Mathur, 2013) has mainly maintained this theoretical 
assumption that impact fees affect housing by increasing prices, particularly in fast growing 
markets, thus potentially affecting housing affordability. Yet, it seems that many of these 
studies have limitations in their findings. For example, Mathur (2013) concluded that impact 
fees increase new housing prices that are likely to reduce housing affordability, however, he 
concedes in his study’s notes that: “The estimation of the effect of impact fees on housing 
affordability would require a general equilibrium framework. The empirical model used in this 
study is insufficient for such estimation” (p. 455). Murray (2017) argued that quantitative 
empirical literature is usually disregarded due to the shortcomings in the analytical models used 
stating that: “Overall, the lack of clean identifying assumptions in the empirical literature 
means that the more common result of higher DCs [developer charges] being related to, or 
causing, higher prices cannot be relied upon” (p. 3). 
Theoretically, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon (2003) posited that developers might be able to pass 
the cost of impact fees charged on development to homebuyers in a strong housing market, 
however, in markets where there is availability of reasonable substitutes (housing choices), 
developers cannot sell their housing with an increased price indicating that the price is pushed 
back to the land seller (selling land at a reduced price). This assumption suggests that 
development contribution effects on housing prices depend on the nature and conditions of 
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local housing markets. In line with this, several scholars, such as Ruming et al, (2011); Walls 
and Magliocca (2011); and Murray (2017), disagreed with the theoretical debate about the 
possibility that developers’ contributions increase housing prices and result in costs being 
passed on to homebuyers. In a recent empirical study on the effect of development charges on 
housing prices in Queensland, Australia, Murray (2017) commenced by hypothesising that if a 
developer buys a piece of land for 1 million dollars and subdivides it into ten plots for detached 
housing at a further cost of 200,000 dollars then sold these serviced plots at the time for 140,000 
dollars each, his profit would be 17% of the total costs in this scenario. He further explains, 
however, that there are other possibilities that indicate passing on charges to buyers is not 
possible:  
Now imagine that the market price falls to $110,000 per lot. This is perfectly plausible, 
and yet, if costs can be passed on to prices, this should be impossible, since the total 
costs paid by this developer are $120,000 per lot. Or imagine that the market price rises 
to $160,000 per lot. Again, since there have been no costs incurred, this should not be 
possible. Clearly, there is no link between the costs incurred to develop new housing, 
and the price set by the total demand and supply in the market for housing. (p. 3) 
This indicates that developers have no control over market prices and that they primarily 
depend on market conditions to sell their product15. Developers may raise the price of housing 
to the maximum the market will tolerate regardless of the development contribution costs 
(Evans-Cowley & Lawhon, 2003). Using an empirical model to measure the effects of 
development charges (DC) on housing prices based on the variation of DCs (i.e. the amount of 
the DCs and the size of the property) and its correlation with price and quantity, Murray (2017) 
concluded that development charges have no economic impact on housing prices, which 
supports the view of planning practitioners that charges are economically benign. In another 
qualitative study of the relationship between housing affordability and development 
contribution in Australia, Ruming et al. (2011) found that: 
The majority of developers engaged in this research recognised that the final sales price 
of their product was largely driven by the market; indeed their inability to pass forward 
developer contributions under flat market conditions is a major explanation for their 
resistance to these charges. While some developers reported having attempted to add 
specific charges directly to their market price, most admitted that a direct transfer of 
costs or charges was unworkable due to market dynamics. (p. 271)  
The authors stressed that developers are ‘price takers’ as opposed to ‘price setters’. Ong et al. 
(2107) noted that reducing the production cost of new housing will not result in lower housing 
                                                     
15 If developers could pass development charges onto home purchasers, then they may avoid bankruptcy which is 
not the case in the real world.  
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prices as the prices are already set in the established market. Development contributions are 
usually perceived by developers as a tax on development that increases the cost of production 
(Gurran, 2011). Nonetheless, Been (2005) argued that impact fees provide certainty to 
developers contrary to other planning regulatory constraints that may increase their risk. He 
explained that impact fees are readily known to developers and can be factored into the 
feasibility studies before committing to the development. Therefore, the certainty provided can 
be used either for pushing back the cost of development contributions to land sellers or allowing 
for positive capitalisation of home values in strong markets (Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010; 
Rowley & Phibbs, 2012; Gurran & Bramley, 2017). 
Gurran and Bramley (2017), however, noted that development contributions might affect the 
nature of housing production depending on how they are imposed; whereas the viability of the 
development plays a major role. They explained that levies that are calculated as a proportion 
of the total development value would have less impact on the type and quantity of housing. 
Yet, if a high flat rate levy is imposed on each individual dwelling rather than on the whole 
development, housing production might be deterred or production of fewer and larger homes 
will take place to avoid paying the extra cost for more units. Thus, the authors believed that 
development contributions are one of the factors that influence the behaviour of market actors 
as it can affect the design and quantity of housing as well as the willingness of landholders to 
sell if such contributions reduce the value of land.  
Been (2005) stressed that in examining the effects of impact fees on housing prices, the 
promoted social benefits, such as providing better amenities and infrastructure for the 
community, must be taken into account. Regarding the effect of impact fees on housing 
affordability, he argued that the social benefit generated by impact fees may be used to offset 
effects (if there are any) by encouraging efficient use of land in the form of higher density 
development. He suggested that: “research should focus on the relationship between impact 
fees and programs explicitly designed to increase the efficiency of the land development 
process as well as programs designed to increase the supply of affordable housing” (p. 165). 
In the United Kingdom, development contributions or ‘planning obligations’ have not only 
been used as a means of providing infrastructure and services, but also to secure affordable 
housing through negotiation with private developers. Obligations are secured through a 
negotiated planning agreement (known as Section 106), which can be delivered as a financial 
contribution to the local planning authority or as a physical delivery of infrastructure and 
affordable housing on site (Burgess & Monk, 2016). The use of planning gain in the United 
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Kingdom for affordable housing has been controversial, as opposed to the provision of 
infrastructure and services that seem to be acceptable by the development industry (Crook & 
Monk, 2011). Campbell, Ellis and Henneberry (2000) argued that the scope of planning 
obligations in the UK has shifted towards marketisation causing a dilemma for planning 
practice where planning decisions have been influenced by short-term planning gains: 
… planning obligations have, by default, become a financial and hence a market-
oriented mechanism through which the social and environmental consequences of 
development can be determined and costed. This marketisation of the planning process 
represents a significant shift in the underlying rationale for planning; a decision-making 
process which has long been assumed to be justified and legitimised by the capacity to 
judge the appropriateness of development on nonfinancial grounds. (pp. 773-774) 
Crook et al. (2016) noted that the controversy surrounding the legality and ethical practice of 
planning obligations in terms of negotiations between planners and developers to reach 
financial outcomes has not limited its use. Crook (2016) claimed that planning obligations in 
the United Kingdom have been successful in compensating low-income groups as well as 
contributing to the provision of infrastructure. Planning obligations have been able to deliver 
more than 60% of the affordable housing supply between 1999-2009 (Crook & Monk, 2011). 
Notwithstanding, the success of planning obligations has relied on a buoyant housing market 
and the viability of such policies has come to the fore in recent market downturns as developers 
have become less inclined to agree with obligation terms (Rowley & Crook, 2016, p. 172). 
Crook and Monk (2011) suggested that: “This raises serious questions about whether planning 
agreements are the most effective policy intervention to address affordability” (p. 1013).  
Summary  
The literature on the impact of planning on housing shows that planning plays a role in 
constraining housing supply and increasing housing prices. Most of the empirical evidence 
presented followed mainstream economic traditions in which econometric models were 
employed to measure the planning impact. Such models demonstrate that housing price 
inflation and supply constraints are caused either by regulation restrictiveness, delay and 
uncertainty, or the cost of production showing an unfavourable perspective of regulation.  
However, several writers have argued that measuring the scale of these impacts is very difficult 
(Keogh & Evans, 1992; Hincks et al., 2013; Gyourko & Molloy, 2015; Gurran & Bramley, 
2017). The difficulty lies in balancing the negative constraints caused by planning policies and 
processes against their social and environmental benefits (Koegh & Evans, 1992; Mayo & 
Sheppard, 2001; Cheshire & Sheppard, 2002; Been, 2005; Adams; 2008). Furthermore, the 
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variation and extensiveness of planning regulations between countries and even between 
jurisdictions within a country adds to such difficulty. Thus, this review of the literature has 
reinforced the notion that significant importance is attributed to the unique characteristics of 
the context in which housing and planning systems operate and function. 
There is still an unresolved debate about the impact caused by planning on housing supply and 
prices. The argument that planning is to be blamed for inadequate housing supply and 
affordability problems has called for planning reforms in several countries (Gurran, Gallent & 
Chiu, 2016). However, it is important to note that planning is only one factor among many 
others that contribute to supply constraints and price inflation. In the Australian context, for 
example, it has been argued that planning is not the chief cause of housing affordability issues 
suggesting that other factors, such as market relation powers that are driven by political and 
ideological motives and interests, are a more likely cause of unaffordability (Gurran & Phibbs, 
2013; 2015; 2016). Gurran and Phibbs (2016) proposed that: “the narrative of planning as a 
constraint on housing supply has been overstated” (p. 67). Nonetheless, the recent shift in the 
global housing debate has emphasised the greater and more important role of urban planning 
in promoting affordable housing and sustainable development (UN-Habitat, 2015b). 
Positioning the implications of the positive benefits generated from planning against the 
negative constraints on housing supply and prices that contribute to housing unaffordability, 
generates the important proposition posed by Gurran and Bramley (2017): “how to create value 
through good planning and infrastructure investment, without displacing affordable housing 
opportunities” (p. 120). This is by no means an easy task, further exacerbated by Jones and 
Watkins (2009), who remind us of the importance of acknowledging that regulatory planning 
controls, as well as the operation of housing markets, are complex and therefore any solutions 
will also require a level of complexity that excludes the notion of any such thing as an easy fix.  
3.5 Theoretical and conceptual framework of research  
Studying the characteristics of any housing system requires setting out a conceptual framework 
that helps guide the research (the purpose of this section). Housing studies are connected to 
several disciplines with vast and rich theoretical perspectives emerging across the social 
sciences, including neo-classical economics, behavioural and humanist perspectives, and 
institutionalist approaches (Milligan, 2003). Several approaches have been taken by various 
housing scholars to investigate particular housing problems, compare different housing system 
outcomes, or to follow a more comprehensive approach by studying the whole system.  
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Since housing is a complex and multifaceted discipline that combines policy and practice 
(Oxley, 2001), there are a number of theoretical approaches and practices that can be used 
when studying housing systems. The role of the state and market in providing housing is of 
particular interest to this study, setting the stage for a focus on the interactions and relationships 
between actors in the housing system and the institutional arrangements that mediate and 
govern these interactions. After an extensive exploration of the literature, the most relevant 
theoretical framework for this study’s aims comes from an institutional approach. Hence, the 
Structure of Housing Provision developed by Ball (1983, 1986, 1998) was chosen to explore, 
examine and uncover the state and market interactions and interrelationships in the institutional 
context of the Saudi housing system. 
3.5.1 Dynamics of state-market relations in the housing system 
As mentioned earlier, most of the theoretical assumptions underpinning state-market relations 
in housing and property research come mainly from mainstream economics. The debate is 
concentrated on the effectiveness of state intervention in the market to enhance efficiency, 
sustainability and equity (Adams, 2008). Within this domain, Adams (2008) examined the 
diverse perspectives in which policy intervention in the market is probed, including: the impact 
of policy on the overall quantity of market supply and demand (neo-classical perspective); the 
extent of policy to overcome market failure (welfare perspective); and the policy effects on 
increasing or decreasing market transaction cost (new institutional perspective). Ball (1998) 
indicated that much of the literature is concerned with the effectiveness of public policy in 
either overriding markets or steering forces towards desired political objectives, placing more 
emphasis on policies rather than on markets. As the debate is often established in a binary form, 
this suggests that there is a separation between state and market. However, Zhang (2001) 
argued that a conceptualisation of contrast or separation between state and market is 
problematic as it can be difficult to draw clear boundaries or distinctions between the two. For 
example, free markets are encountered with distinct types of state policy interventions (i.e. 
planning control, taxation, etc.), where such inter-penetration results in different forms of 
institutions (ibid). Ball (1998) argued rather convincingly that: “To an extent, the perceived 
dichotomy between the economics of property markets and institutions is a false one … there 
is a continuum of issues rather than an opposition” (p. 1502).   
Several scholars (Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999; Oxley 2004; Lawson, 2006; Adams & Tiesdell, 
2010) have argued that the property market in itself is a form of institution that is socially 
  87 
constructed. Oxley (2004) illustrated that the decision of buying or selling in a free market may 
be undertaken by individuals, yet the action is governed by the wider society as property rights 
are enforced by the state on behalf of society to protect the public interest and allow the market 
to operate within the rules. He asserted that: “Housing markets and land markets, like any 
markets, are not mystical happenings that are separate from the activities of the state … They 
are social constructs that rely on the state” (p. 60). Keogh and D’Arcy (1999) explained that 
the perception of a property market as a socially constructed institution does not suggest a 
cohesive entity, such as a government organisation, but rather implies “a network of rules, 
conventions and relationships which collectively represent the system through which property 
is used and traded” (p. 2408). They also argued that, since the market is a human construct 
where society interest is reflected in its scope and structure, the market structure can be altered 
with time depending on the needs and preferences of society. Adams and Tiesdell (2010) 
indicated that the social construction of markets makes them contested terrains for different 
powers of relations, and that: “… social interactions are thus conditioned by humanly devised 
rules, norms and regulations, with markets thus reflecting dominant powers and interests” (p. 
193). Healey (1999) maintained that: “this active work of social construction is not neutral as 
far as power relations are concerned” (p. 113). Finally, Adams (2008) considered the interplay 
of power and interest in the market construct creating both winners and losers.  
According to Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005), the classification of state versus market has 
failed to provide a transformative action and calls for a state-market dialectic that is informed 
by “the dynamics and motivations of the various actors … and of how the decisions that are 
made and actions taken, in aggregate form, become market outcomes” (p. 57). This argument 
emphasises how a particular policy intervention in the housing market can affect the decision 
of market actors, which results in certain market outcomes. Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) 
also provided an expanded conceptualisation of four broad types of state policy intervention in 
the housing market (specifically the broad impact of planning intervention in the market). 
These policy interventions are variously formulated in order to: (i) shape markets; (ii) regulate 
markets; (iii) stimulate markets; and/or (iv) develop the capacity of market actors. The authors 
argued that this “typology of planning tools” or state policy interventions can determine the 
possible interactions with the distinct characteristics of the market including demand, supply 
and risk (p. 63). This suggests that each type of policy intervention can affect the decision of 
market actors in separate ways resulting in different housing outcomes. For instance, Healey 
(1998) argued that the focus of state policy intervention in the United Kingdom on either 
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controlling or facilitating development activities by paying less attention to building the 
capacity of the industry has had unintended and adverse effects on the economy. Adams (2008) 
believed that Tiesdell and Allmendinger’s broad type of policy classification is important in 
achieving successful state intervention in the market, arguing that it is essential to have an 
appropriate mixture of policies: 
It would be mistaken to concentrate too narrowly on immediate market regulation and 
neglect the ways in which policies which seek to shape or stimulate the market have 
important and sometimes unexpected consequences on markets structures and cultures 
… effective intervention in land and property markets requires the creation of a broad 
range of policy tools and their appropriate deployment to suit particular market 
circumstances, rather than reliance on a single policy tool. (p. 4573)  
Understanding state policy intervention and market operations goes beyond considering the 
policy effects on supply and demand. Nevertheless, the role of policy in shaping the context 
for social relations within the development process should be recognised (Tiesdell & 
Allmendinger, 2005). Generally, econometric deductive modelling that has been employed in 
mainstream economics to measure state intervention effects on markets has certain limitations. 
As indicated in the previous section, such models, for example, have not been able to measure 
the social cost and benefits of planning and “results are perceived in generally negative terms” 
(Adams, 2008, p. 4571). Another significant drawback is its limited focus on market outcomes 
rather than the processes that led to such outcomes (Jones & Watkins, 2009; Adams et al., 
2005). Whitehead and Yates (2009) explain:  
The fundamentals behind economic thinking are about simplification and abstraction. 
These make it possible to identify significant relationships, to clarify the 
interdependences between determinants and to measure their importance in particular 
contexts. The cost of such simplification is that generally it is not possible to describe 
processes in detail. Instead, relationships and outcomes are analysed under well-defined 
assumptions (p. 2).  
The simplified assumptions of mainstream economics have been challenged in housing and 
property research by emphasising the process in which development occurs and highlighting 
the importance of the impact of institutions (Ball, 1998; Oxley, 2004). D’Arcy and Keogh 
(2002) argued that in order to understand market outcomes, an exploration and explanation of 
market processes through their institutional form must be undertaken. Healey (1992a) stressed 
the importance of examining the social relations process indicating that there is a need to: 
“address both the processes which organise the relations of economic activity within the 
development process and point to the complexity of the event-sequences, agency interests, 
strategies and relations involved” (p. 34). The negligence of mainstream economics in 
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addressing the importance of institutions and their social relations called for the emergence of 
the institutional approach in examining the property market (Ball, 1998). 
Adams et al. (2005) suggested that the relationship between state and market in land and 
property research is better understood and interpreted by utilising an appropriate institutional 
framework. Therefore, this study is framed by an institutional theoretical perspective in an 
attempt to uncover the complexity of state-market interactions in the Saudi housing system. 
The next section provides a review of institutionalism in housing and property research 
followed by an explanation of an institutional approach entitled ‘Structure of Housing 
Provision’ as an analytical and theoretical framework employed in this study.  
3.5.2 Institutionalism in housing and property research 
Institutionalism as a theoretical approach has been used in many social science disciplines 
including economics, sociology, law and public policy with often different approaches to the 
analysis of institutions (Oxley, 2004). Ball (1998) pointed out that there is no common 
definition to what constitutes an institution due to the variation in the ontological and 
methodological perspectives. He suggested that much variation exists in theorising the 
definition of an institution, which may range from the recognisable public bodies and agencies 
related to property development, to a more formalised method of determining property rights 
as the fundamental framework for defining institutions. Ball (1998) indicated that the majority 
of institutionalist literature has often made a formal distinction “between organisations (the 
players) and institutions (the rules)” (p. 1502). 
From a new institutional economic perspective, a well-used definition is established by North 
(1991) where he defines institutions as: “…the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)” (as cited in Ball, 2006, p. 23). This definition encapsulates a more intangible 
understanding of institutions as “the rules of the game”, as opposed to the more tangible players 
or organisations (Adams et al., 2005, p. 39). In the land and property market, which is more 
relevant to the context of this study, Keogh and D’Arcy (1999) define institutions as:  
… the rules, norms and regulations by which a society functions. They impart certainty 
and stability to social interaction, but they also change and develop over time as 
circumstances and experience dictate. (p. 2407) 
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They argued that since rules, norms and regulations were established by society to allow the 
market to operate, institutions reflect power and interest that may benefit some actors more 
than others. Payne (2009) outlined that the majority of institutionalism theory in the literature 
and the application of institutional analysis are largely but not exclusively derived from either 
an economic perspective (in which the emphasis is on the market role); or a policy perspective 
(focusing on the roles of public policy and state-market relations, mainly from urban 
development research). In the context of this study on the Saudi housing system, the focus is 
on the latter as it is clearly more relevant and adds value to this research. The institutional 
approach from a policy perspective can provide an examination of how the state could ‘allow’ 
or ‘constrain’ the market in delivering housing by exploring the various forms of interactions, 
relationships and negotiations.   
The ontological grounding of this study is derived from the Political Economy of 
Institutionalism (PEI), which provides a theoretical framework to understand the roles, 
relationships and interactions of state and market in the Saudi housing system. PEI is drawn 
from the work of Adams et al. (2005) and provides a perspective for understanding the role of 
public policy in transforming market cultures and practices (relationships between planning, 
public policy and property markets). Adams et al. (2005) explained that unlike new institutional 
economic perspectives that focus on how public policy alters market transaction cost 
(theoretically grounded in mainstream economics), PEI perceives institutions as a social 
construct focusing on ‘context’, ‘process’ and ‘social relations’. The social construct of 
institutions is a result of political, legal, social, economic and cultural factors where continuous 
interactions between strategies, interest and actions of market actors is shaped by the wider 
institutional context. The primary focus is on examining the process that leads to certain market 
outcomes by providing explanatory variables, such as cultural influences and institutional 
context, rather than by only considering economic relations to understand action. In terms of 
context, PEI takes a strong view of market structures as disaggregated and not unitary with 
each submarket reflecting: 
… distinctive routines, cultures, procedures and institutions [suggesting that] the notion 
of a single policy response to land and property market operations is inappropriate and 
that a more sophisticated and varied set of responses is needed that reflects the 
institutional context of each submarket. (Adams et al., 2005, p. 53)  
In their political economy of institutionalism, Adams et al. (2005) proposed three institutional 
carriers in which public policy impacts the land and property market: (i) formal rules (i.e. the 
planning system and legal framework); (ii) informal conventions/unwritten rules of the game 
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(i.e. social norms, values, customs and cultures); and (iii) actor-network relationships (the 
relationship between public and private sector actors/agents).  
It is important to note here that this study focuses on state-market relations by considering the 
holistic dynamics of the housing system. Karn and Wolman (1992) argued that housing systems 
are anchored in a specific structural environment in each country based on the institutional 
context and the roles of the market and state in producing and managing housing. The 
institutional context factors are attributable to the differences between housing outcomes in 
different countries. The embedment of the whole housing system in a broader institutional 
context (i.e. economic, social, demographic and political processes) influences its different 
parts and outcomes (Burke & Hulse, 2010). Kemeny (1995) has supported the importance of 
the embeddedness concept by arguing that the structure of a housing system is impacted over 
time by the institutional arrangements, and conversely, housing outcomes can have an impact 
on the broader context. Milligan (2003) argued that in political economy traditions, where 
institutions are considered as a social construct, the concept of housing embeddedness in 
broader social, political and economic contexts can help in synthesising the analysis, stating 
that: 
… the notion that housing policies (and the housing market) are social and economic 
constructs embedded in all layers of society and social processes offers a non-
deterministic starting concept for grappling with the complexity of the issues. (p. 54) 
She explained that such an approach acknowledges that housing policies and their outcomes 
are products of dynamic interactions of institutions’ structures, patterns, ideologies, and 
behaviours together with the external influences of the wider economic, political, demographic 
and cultural forces. In the context of this research, it is more appropriate to analyse the state-
market relations taking into account the embedded institutional factors influencing the whole 
housing system. Many researchers, such as Ball (1986), Oxley (1991), Ambrose (1992), 
Kemeny (1995), Jenkins and Smith (2001), Pugh (2001), Burke and Hulse (2010), Stephens 
(2011) and Burke (2012) have drawn attention to the importance of the interrelationships 
between the actors within the housing system and the role of the system in the wider economic, 
social, cultural and demographic context. In order to delve deeper when studying a specific 
part of a housing system, it is vital to examine the interactions of actors within the broad 
housing system and the wider institutional context to gain a better understanding of how they 
functions. According to Oxley (1991): 
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Examine the operation of some sort of system in a wide context to simply understand 
the system better or to find ways of making the system work better … The 
interrelationships of the parts of such a system might be investigated …to better 
understand how markets, governments and societies function. (p. 74) 
Pugh (2001) asserted that “the study of whole sector housing development is more significant 
than attention to parts of a housing system” (p. 399). He argued that it is vital that housing 
policy and research in developing countries should consider the “developmental dialectic” (p. 
399) between the broader economic, social and political context. He also claimed that research 
has not progressed in studying whole housing system elements especially in developing 
countries due to its complexities and limitations. He added that most developing countries have 
malfunctions in their housing systems due to failure in one major element of the housing system 
such as underdeveloped housing finance institutions or land policies, which cause restrictions 
in housing supply. Stephen (2011) affirmed the importance of studying the whole housing 
system within its institutional context: 
Establishing firm empirical foundations entails moving beyond individual housing 
policy instruments considered in isolation, to having a firm grasp of housing systems, 
by which we mean the way in which housing policies inter-act with public and private 
institutions that form the housing system in which policy operates. (p. 338) 
Pugh (2001) argued that adopting a comprehensive approach in studying the whole system can 
facilitate policy reform. The success of any housing system depends on the acceptance of whole 
system development and the relationships between its different institutional elements. 
Moreover, Ambrose (1992) rejected the notion of seeing housing policy as “an entity in itself” 
(p. 172), without considering the housing system as a whole. He argued that a housing problem 
can be identified not only based on an individual housing user’s needs, but by acknowledging 
“that broader questions of economic efficiency, social equity and the cost-effective use of 
resources are involved” (p. 164). 
Institutional analysis can provide a fruitful insight for examining the housing system dynamics 
by unpacking the ‘black box’ of processes and interactions that lead to an understanding of 
housing outcomes, thus overcoming the limitations of deductive mainstream economic 
approaches. However, it can also be a controversial approach (Adams & Watkins, 2002). 
Adams et al. (2005) stated that: “Institutional analysis faces a particular challenge in translating 
theoretical understanding into a consistent basis for empirical work” (p. 53). They argued that 
the qualitative nature of institutional analysis can tend to be descriptive or more like story-
telling. Adams et al. (2005) suggested that the adaption of an institutional approach will require 
rigorous research methods to be able to validate any claims. On the other hand, Hodgson (1998) 
  93 
pointed out that institutionalism may need further theoretical and methodological development, 
however, “institutionalism does not seek a general theory of everything but it does require a 
coherent framework of analysis and a workable methodology” (p. 174). He explained that the 
fundamental concept of institutionalism concerns “institutions, habits, rules, and their 
evolution”; further adding that it “does not attempt to build an all-embracing, general theory 
… instead, complex phenomena are approached with a limited number of common concepts 
and specific theoretical tools” (p. 168).      
Jenkins and Smith (2001) believed that an institutional analysis approach can enhance the links 
between theoretical analysis and practical diagnosis of housing systems. In their comparative 
study of the housing systems in South Africa and Costa Rica, they justified their choice of 
‘substantive theorising’ as it turns away from ‘grand theories’ that do not consider real life 
practice and have instead applied an institutionalist analysis which, “accepts that knowledge is 
socially constructed and different theoretical approaches can have value in different contexts” 
(p. 504). They pay particular attention to the relationships between actors in the system and the 
consideration of the wider context in their analysis, explaining this as: 
… the acceptance that the major actors all have roles in housing leads to an analytical 
focus on the relationships between these actors as much as, if not more than, on the 
relative roles they play ... an institutional approach allows the juxtaposition of social 
and economic as well as cultural and political values and uses these as a means to 
analyse context and action … one of the potential strengths of the approach is that it 
allows both theoretical analysis and also practical diagnosis, in fact it requires both. (p. 
504)  
As there are several types of institutional analysis in property research (Ball, 1998), two 
institutional frameworks were closely considered and found to be most relevant to the context 
of this research. These are the ‘Structure and Agency’ (Healey & Barrett, 1990; Healey, 1991, 
1992c) and the ‘Structure of Housing Provision’ or ‘Structure of Provision’ (Ball, 1983, 1986, 
1998). Building on structuration theory, the ‘structure and agency’ framework is linked to the 
modes of the development process where it focuses on “the relation between structure, in terms 
of what drives the development process and produces distinctive patterns in particular periods, 
and agency, in terms of the way individual agents develop and pursue their strategies” (Healey 
& Barrett, 1990, p. 90). The authors explained that the structure represents the framework for 
agents to make their choices, where structure is viewed as resources that agents can access, 
rules that govern their behaviour and ideas that they use to build their strategies.  In a later 
work, Healey (1992a) further developed an institutional model for analysing the property 
development process aiming to “combine the understanding of structuring forces within the 
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tradition of political economy with an appreciation of the detail of the social relations 
surrounding events in the development process” (p. 36). This model focuses on four different 
levels of analysis. The first three levels are empiricist in nature while the fourth is theoretical: 
(i) mapping the development process by focusing on events and agencies; (ii) analysing 
agencies by identifying roles and power relations; (iii) assessing strategies and interests of 
actors (roles and relationships related to resources, rules and ideas); and (iv) theorising the 
social relations in modes of production, regulation and ideology within which development is 
undertaken (pp. 36-37).  
Healey’s structure and agency approach seems enticing for this study as it could provide an 
organised framework for empirical examinations. However, the framework has several 
shortcomings that led to its dismissal. Hooper (1992) provided a detailed criticism of Healey’s 
model, with some of the key issues briefly pointed out here. One problematic area with the 
model is it calls for a general applicability by attempting to cover all the aspects of the 
development process under one model. Hooper (1992) suggested that Healy’s assertion of the 
general applicability of the model is a call for the construction of a ‘grand theory’ and that 
ambiguity is a concern. Furthermore, the development process is a general term with no 
conceptual device, which led Healy to employ “the notion of institutional analysis as a device 
to move between the different levels of analysis involved in theorizing the production of the 
built environment. Although this notion remains underdeveloped” (p. 45). Basically, Healey’s 
model fell short in providing adequate explanations in terms of defining and locating 
institutions in the analysis. Hopper (1992) continued his critique with: 
There is an equal danger that ‘institutions’ may be conceived simply as the mediating 
link between structure and agency, requiring theorizing only in terms of social relations 
and then reconnected with the material world through a link with production. (p. 48)  
Ball (1998) also criticised the model by outlining that there is difficulty in understanding the 
approach conceptually: 
… no precise definition is given of what constitutes a `structure’, an `agency’ or an 
`institution’. Structure seems to be aspects of the broad context in which agents operate. 
Agents seem to be key people working in institutions, in which case institutions become 
wrongly personified as people, although it may be the case that institutions refer to 
broader social rules and regulations. The reason for all the confusion may be that the 
approach is concerned with practical research questions rather than theoretical niceties. 
(p. 1512) 
Subsequently, this writer was urged to more carefully consider the second approach, the 
‘Structure of Housing Provision’ (SHP). The SHP, with its focus on the interrelationships of 
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the processes of production, consumption and exchange, showed real potential for 
incorporation in this study as there is no dichotomy between structure and agency. In a critical 
review of land development process models, Gore and Nicholson (1991) made the following 
useful suggestion:  
… the search for a generally applicable model is, in fact, a futile one, and that energy 
would be more usefully expended in applying the principles of the ‘structures-of-
provision’ approach to the full range of land-development activity, thus producing a 
specific model for each development sector. (p. 705)  
As finding the perfect model is virtually impossible, this writer chose the ‘Structure of Housing 
Provision’ approach by Ball (1983, 1986, 1988, 1998) as the most suitable analytical 
framework to use in examining the state-market relations in the Saudi housing system. This 
approach is outlined in the next section.  
3.5.3 Structure of Housing Provision 
The Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) approach by Ball (1983, 1986, 1998) was developed 
to analyse owner-occupied housing and council housing in the United Kingdom. The SHP has 
evolved from the recognition of limitations in earlier housing research approaches that 
narrowed their focus on a more consumption-oriented analysis in the context of housing 
policies’ effects with little or no attention given to the role of the state in influencing the 
production and exchange of housing (Ball, 1986). The SHP approach is concerned equally with 
the aspects of production, consumption and exchange processes of housing provision and their 
societal and contextual relationships in the housing system. Ball (1986) defines the SHP as: “a 
historically given process of providing and reproducing the physical entity, housing; focusing 
on the social agents essential to that process and the relations between them” (p. 158). The 
nature of a structure of housing provision is determined by the intervention of the various social 
agents in the physical processes of production, consumption and exchange (ibid). Ball and 
Harloe (1992) asserted that analysing the social relations in the SHP is paramount as it provides 
a better understanding of the issues entailed in the housing provision. Ball (1986) expressed 
that the structures of housing provision are dependent on the historical evolution of social 
relations that are subject to internal and external pressure changes. Gore and Nicholson (1991) 
explained: 
Such structures of provision are intrinsically dynamic, mainly because of the pressures 
brought about by the way in which the social relations within them operate. Thus, both 
conflict and collaboration between agents may lead to the imposition of new legal 
controls or to the provision of new forms of finance, and so on. As well as this internal 
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change, external forces in the wider economy and in society as a whole may also bring 
about further adjustments in a structure of provision. (p. 726) 
Hence, social relations are part of the structure of provision in which interactions occur in the 
physical processes of the provision (Ball, 1986) providing “the immediate context within which 
differences in housing systems and their outcomes can be understood” (Milligan, 2003, p. 46). 
The SHP framework is strongly focused on the roles of institutions and the social interrelations 
of actors within them. Ball and Harloe (1992) stressed that the SHP:  
… gives research primacy to the institutions and agencies active in a particular way of 
providing housing and the dynamic inter-relationships between them by asserting that 
unless research is aware of their interrelation false conclusions may easily be reached. 
(p. 7)  
Ball (1986) considers that state intervention may take place in all the physical processes of the 
housing provision, yet the form of intervention varies such that the state can be part of the 
structure of provision (direct) or instead be an external influence (indirect). Often, the role of 
the state is discussed as a form of political/legal intervention in the structure of provision (ibid). 
In his later work, Ball (1998) presented his framework as the ‘Structure of Provision’ to include 
all types of building provisions (not only specific to housing), describing it as:  
The contemporary network of relationships associated with the provision of particular 
types of building at specific points in time. These relationships are embodied within the 
organisations associated with that type of building provision, and they may take a 
market or a non-market form. (p. 1513)  
He explained that the ‘provision’ includes the whole range of development, construction, 
ownership and use, while the wide range of the organisational network (actors) and markets 
involved in the provision are part of the ‘structure’ of that provision. Therefore, no dichotomy 
is evident between agency and structure. In addition, organisation and market function under 
rules and constraints in which all create the channel of market relations.   
The SHP approach faced several critiques from housing scholars including from Kemeny 
(1987) who claimed that the SHP is under-theorised and tends to place more emphasis on 
conventional economic supply and demand concepts by concentrating on housing market 
issues and giving little weight to the role of the state in housing provision. Ball and Harloe 
(1992) refuted the criticism arguing that the SHP is “not a theory of housing … Rather, SHP is 
a meta-theoretical concept or analytical framework which, together with other theories, may 
be of use in the examination of particular aspects of housing development” (p. 3). It was 
claimed that the SHP is ‘theoretical in nature’ and provided a productive framework that 
allowed the examination of related housing issues since it encompassed the observed wider 
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context as a simple organised framework. Moreover, Ball and Harloe (1992) claimed that the 
SHP gave equality to production, consumption and exchange with no priority given to one or 
the other and took into account state intervention in all stages of housing provision. Ball (as 
cited in Lawson 2006) also defended his approach by criticising other housing research for 
being merely descriptive and unable to analyse housing in terms of the broader economic and 
social structures. Yet, Ball (1998) admitted himself that there were difficulties associated with 
the historical contingency of the approach in that they can be hard to define. The SHP, 
nonetheless, continues to receive the attention of housing researchers who are in search of a 
comprehensive housing analysis approach that considers the relationships of various parts of a 
housing system within the wider context. The study of SHP emphasises the whole domain of 
housing provision as a “unified, continuous and dynamic entity” (Milligan, 2003, p. 46).  
The SHP approach is a useful analytical tool for examining the Saudi housing system as a 
‘conceptual device’ that can provide this research with a practical instrument to examine the 
roles and relationships of the actors and agencies in the structure of provision and how they 
interact in providing housing. Ball and Harloe (1992) noted that the concept of SHP “is based 
on the recognition that there are combinations of social agents involved in housing provision 
that relate to each other in empirically observable ways” (p. 3). It is important to mention that 
while the central focus of this study is on the production side, this does not imply that the other 
two physical processes (consumption and exchange) are ignored. In fact, the examination of 
consumption and exchange are deemed essential in order to uncover how these two processes 
impact the production of housing. For instance, cultural factors leading to certain ways of 
consuming housing might have an impact on the type of housing produced (more discussion is 
found in Chapter 7). Ball (1986) argued that: “contradiction between the spheres of 
consumption, exchange, and production were important causes of change in structures of 
housing provision” (p. 162).  
The examination of the Saudi housing system issues, by bringing together the critical spheres 
of production, consumption and exchange and connecting them to the big picture of complex 
social relations, offers a comprehensive analysis that avoids the isolation of related housing 
issues. In addition, the focus on explaining the different relations between actors in the system 
and their links to the broader social, economic, cultural and political context could provide 
powerful explanatory factors for the aim of identifying how the Saudi housing system functions 
and performs. The SHP has been developed as “a tool for explanation…of housing systems” 
(Lawson, 2006, p. 27), which is a key objective of this study of the Saudi housing system. 
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Milligan (2003) suggested that the empirical examination of the social relations (processes) in 
production, consumption and exchange spheres between public and private actors is a useful 
way of evaluating housing systems. She stated that employing the SHP is beneficial because: 
It provides an established methodology for linking policy to a broader exposition of the 
detailed social relations and physical forms of the system of housing production, 
financing and consumption. It necessitates an empirical and historical focus on the 
relation between the actors and agencies operating in the housing system and on the 
social, economic and political factors influencing them. Accordingly, it draws into the 
analysis factors other than policy (and politics) that may have influenced specific 
outcomes. (p. 47)   
Another asset for this study is that the SHP is considered as a methodological procedure or 
framework that can be useful in combination with other theoretical perspectives in guiding the 
empirical research and providing answers to the research questions. Ball (1998) made clear 
that the SHP is: 
… a conceptual device for incorporating institutions into analyses of the development 
process. It does not constitute a complete theory in itself, rather it is a methodological 
theory – a series of statements about how to examine institutions and their roles rather 
than an explanation in itself. (p. 1514) 
Thus, the SHP is a tool that can be incorporated with a variety of theoretical explanations. Ball 
and Harloe (1992) indicated that: “housing involves many diverse social processes whose 
explanation cannot be encompassed within one grand theory” (p. 6). They suggested that: “the 
usefulness of SHP is contingent on the questions being asked” (p. 5); and that researcher 
judgement plays an integral role in what institutions and relations should be considered in the 
analysis (Ball, 1998). Finally, the SHP approach can be applied in many contexts, including 
Saudi Arabia, where historical, social and economic influences can be reflected in the particular 
context. Ball and Harloe (1992) claimed that: “[the] SHP can accurately summarise the main 
forms of housing provision in countries at particular points in time” (p. 4). Thus, the framework 
work is not limited to developed countries, as Hooko (1999) illustrated: 
Another issue pointing to the strength of the approach is the recognition of the context-
bound nature of housing provision …This is very important in the context of developing 
countries where the forms of housing provision are often very different from, and 
diverse in comparison with, the advanced capitalist countries. Hence, the usefulness of 
the SHP is that it is neither fixed nor static. (p. 113) 
Despite the fact that it was first devised for the analysis of housing in the United Kingdom, the 
SHP approach has been widely utilised by housing researchers in different contexts as an 
analytical framework due to its principles of general application. The SHP has been used in 
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comparative housing system studies (Harloe, 1995; Milligan, 2003); in the United Kingdom 
context (Payne, 2009); in other countries, such as Australia (Burke & Hulse, 2010); New 
Zealand (Murphy, 2011); Canada (Moore, 2005) and Malaysia (Shuid, 2011; Hamzah, 2012). 
An example of the SHP adding further insight to this study is the work of Burke and Hulse 
(2010) who adopted an institutional framework based on the SHP to understand the features 
and resilience of the Australian housing market during the global economic financial crisis. 
These authors classified any housing system’s ‘structure’ into four sub-systems: production, 
consumption, exchange and management (adding management as a fourth sub-system to the 
previous three of the SHP). In their description of the four sub-systems, Burke and Hulse (2010) 
explained the different sub-systems and their “distinctive institutional arrangements” (p. 828) 
that could make or prevent changes for the whole system’s progress. Each of the sub-systems 
possesses a unique dynamic of institutional structures and arrangements and a set of actors that 
interrelate with each other in ways that could allow or constrain the progress of housing 
provision. Burke and Hulse (2010) emphasised “the linkages between production, 
consumption, exchange and management which underpin the performance of housing systems” 
(p. 836); as well as their linkages to the wider institutional context that includes cultural, 
economic, political and social processes.  
Burke and Hulse (2010) defined management as “the term used to capture the diverse range of 
government instruments, practices, policies and plans that structure and direct the housing 
system” (p. 833) and suggested that housing systems evolve over time at different rates and 
directions with no unity across the system, often leading to problems in the system. They 
argued that in the past three decades the evolution of the Australian housing system, in 
particular “the suite of management instruments” (p. 833) has been lagging behind the faster 
demographic, economic and social changes taking place in the country. Similarly, the many 
changes in Saudi society (explained earlier in Chapter 2) have completely outpaced the slow 
and less adaptive management of the housing system. Management in the form of a regulatory 
environment, including housing policies and the planning system, is a particularly problematic 
area in the Saudi housing system (see Chapter 6) demanding analysis and reform. Thus, the 
Structure of Housing Provision framework in this study was modified (as illustrated in the next 
section) with management integrated within the SHP framework in order to fully explore the 
research questions and examine the state-market relations in the Saudi housing system. 
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3.5.4 The research conceptual framework  
Due to the unique nature of the housing system in Saudi Arabia, it is appropriate for this 
researcher to modify and synthesise multiple theoretical concepts in order to come up with the 
most suitable formula for this investigation. This synthesis of approaches is described below 
and illustrated as a conceptual framework in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework 
Source: adapted from Ball (1983, 1986, 1998); Burke and Hulse (2010); Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005); and 
Adams et al (2005) 
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A convincing case has been made for the importance of studying the social interactions 
between actors in the housing system, therefore the ‘Structure of Housing Provision’ by Ball 
(1983, 1986, 1998), which has been shown to be a comprehensive analytical approach for 
exploratory research, is used as the main framework to examine the interactions and 
interrelationships of the state and market that occur in the production, consumption and 
exchange processes of the Saudi housing system. The production process encompasses land 
assembly, finance, construction and the necessary planning permission. The process of 
consumption is concerned with the ways households consume housing depending on their 
access and preferences. The exchange process involves organisations that link producers with 
consumers, such as financial institutions and real estate agencies. In this conceptual framework, 
an overarching process of management is incorporated from the work of Burke and Hulse 
(2010) to embody the formal rules that control and guide the previous three processes. 
Management in this context represents the planning system and housing policy at the various 
levels of government.  
These processes are performed by a myriad of actors in both the public and private sectors. 
These actors engage in each process with a variety of goals and a certain degree of control over 
the available resources. In this study, private sector actors comprise private residential 
developers, financiers (investors) and real estate agents; whereas public sector agents are 
represented by planners and housing officials. The thick arrows in the model represent the 
network of relations and interactions between the different actors/agents in these processes. 
These interactions and relationships are formulated and shaped by the internal institutional 
arrangements in the structure of provision that allow or constrain actors in carrying out their 
roles. The involvement of several actors in the housing system creates a contested housing 
environment. As various actors participate in the housing process to achieve their own goals, 
their interaction with each other in a competitive environment is likely to generate a conflict of 
interests and this can impact the housing outcomes. The broader institutional environment 
including social, economic, political, and legal institutions is also illustrated in the model to 
represent the external forces affecting the structure of the provision. It should be noted that the 
market is not represented in a particular box as it is part of the structure of the provision 
functioning under the rules and network of relationships. Figure 3.2 conceptualises the 
positioning of the institutions (structure/rules) and organisations (actors/agents) with 
production, consumption and exchange as the main processes of interactions as well as the 
impact of the broader external forces on them. 
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In line with Milligan’s (2003) assertion that, instead of selecting a singular theoretical 
framework: “A range of theoretical viewpoints can also be brought to bear to guide, strengthen 
and validate the interpretation of the empirical results or to pose new hypotheses about the way 
in which particular housing outcomes are shaped” (p. 54) this researcher combines the SHP 
framework with other institutional concepts that are drawn from the work of Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger (2005) and Adams et al (2005). These theoretical concepts are integrated in the 
conceptual framework in order to: (i) provide a lens to view the role of the state (public policy) 
in how it can shape processes and steer the action of the market; and (ii) provide explanatory 
factors that were not necessarily highlighted in the SHP framework. The conceptualisation by 
Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) of state policy tools in shaping, regulating, stimulating the 
market and/or building the market actors’ capacity represent the broad range of the state’s 
external forces in the structure of provision. This provides “a heuristic device to help develop 
a fuller conceptualisation” of assessing the type and scale of state intervention and to identify 
how these tools impact housing outcomes in different forms (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005, 
p. 73). The purpose of including these tools in the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2) is to 
focus the criterion on the state’s role in ‘allowing’ (i.e. supporting, non-constraining) the 
delivery of housing.  
Additionally, the three institutional features by Adams et al. (2005) were also incorporated to 
enhance the model by adding an explanatory theoretical viewpoint of factors, such as the 
informal rules of cultural norms and values of society that was not accounted for in the SHP 
framework. Moore (2005) pointed out that while the SHP provides important explanations of 
the social agents’ interactions with institutions, the market and structures, “… it does not in 
practice appear to emphasise an equally weighted investigation of cultural ‘structures’ that may 
influence and constrain the developmental strategies and practices of relevant actors” (p. 63). 
Moore (2005) further argues that the SHP conceptualisation of cultural forces is only seen as 
“unnecessary factors of reality” (p. 63). Therefore, integrating the three institutional features 
of Adams et al. (2005) adds value to the framework in which cultural forces of ‘informal rules 
and conventions’ are given attention in the analysis along with the formal rules (planning and 
housing policies) and the network relations between the key actors in the system.  
The conceptual framework in this study is an integrated model that aims to unpack the 
processes of institutional dynamics in the housing system that lead to certain housing outcomes 
through examining the contemporary network of state-market roles and relations. This would 
facilitate an insight into how housing outcomes are produced and what mechanisms/solutions 
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are needed to better improve them. By synthesising a variety of theoretical viewpoints in the 
conceptual framework, uncovering meaningful information about the housing problems in 
Saudi Arabia is now made possible. 
3.6 The current state of housing research in Saudi Arabia  
A review of the academic literature in Saudi Arabia has been undertaken to examine studies 
relevant to this research and identify further gaps in the literature16. This review indicates that 
there is insufficient literature dealing with the Saudi housing system issues in general, and 
state-market relations in particular. This section presents the empirical housing research that 
has been conducted in Saudi Arabia to date.  
The most relevant studies for this research were those that examined the roles and relationships 
between the planning system and the residential development process (Mubarak, 1999, 2004; 
Alskait, 2003). These studies were discussed in length in Chapter 2 and are briefly summarised 
in this section.  Mubarak (1999) conducted an evaluative study of the state housing policy in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, taking into account socio-economic characteristics and cultural factors. 
The paper discussed the ways that the housing market has adapted to changes in public policy 
to meet housing demand. It concluded with several suggestions for housing policy 
improvements, such as encouraging higher densities in land subdivisions, abandoning the 
construction of subsidised detached single dwellings and recommending the establishment of 
social rental housing programs. The author also pointed out that government agencies involved 
in the production of housing must coordinate with the city municipality to ensure efficient use 
of undeveloped land.  Alskait (2003) examined the issues of the planning process in governing 
the criteria and requirements for residential land subdivision in Riyadh. This study analysed 
the procedures of land subdivision planning and its different stages and was based on surveys 
of a number of private consultancy firms engaged in land subdivision planning. The findings 
showed that the planning approval process was vague, lengthy, inefficient and subjective. The 
study suggested that there is a need for improving the existing planning process to meet 
residential requirements by proposing a model for residential planning requirements. 
Another study that investigated the relationships between the planning system and housing was 
by Mubarak (2004), where he examined the urban growth boundary policy and residential 
suburbanisation in Riyadh. The author argued that inefficiencies in urban planning practices 
and government policies have amounted to dysfunctional residential urban sprawl patterns with 
                                                     
16 Grey literature was examined in the previous chapter 
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minimum appreciation for social, economic and environmental factors. Mubarak (2004) 
concluded that centralised planning policy, weak municipal power, lack of public participation 
as well as other socio-political and cultural factors were some of the reasons behind the poor 
urban planning practices in Riyadh. Apart from these three studies, the remaining literature on 
the role of state planning policy research in Saudi Arabia has little relevance to this study. For 
example, there are several studies that have examined urban growth policies (Al-Hathloul & 
Mughal, 2004; Gabra, 2004; Mandeli, 2008; Abdulaal, 2012), however, they have very limited 
or no focus on the positive or negative impacts of these policies on housing.  
Another group of housing research literature has focused on examining the state’s subsidised 
housing programs including public housing. Alzamil (2014), for example, conducted a national 
evaluation of the state affordable housing subsidy programs to uncover the challenges faced by 
housing agencies in keeping up with the rising demand for such programs. The study found 
that subsidy programs in Saudi Arabia suffered from several issues including delays in 
implementing housing projects, problematic eligibility criteria where all citizens were entitled 
to join the program resulting in long waiting periods. Alzamil (2014) suggested that subsidy 
programs should be reformed and structured by considering several factors including 
diversification of subsidy methods to include more options, such as rental assistance instead of 
the focus on ownership, as well as prioritising the most vulnerable groups in the eligibility 
criteria. Another study by Al-Mayouf and Al-Khayyal (2011) reviewed the different phases of 
public/social housing policies in Saudi Arabia highlighting the changes in the policy 
approaches of subsidies from direct delivery of public housing to other forms of assistance 
subsidy programs. The study suggested that the lack of a comprehensive framework for 
housing provision has resulted in many challenges, most importantly, the inability of the 
government to keep pace with the high demand for subsidised housing. It concluded that the 
state role should be focused on enabling the private sector to deliver low-cost housing by 
facilitating its role through an efficient framework.   
Other literature has investigated factors contributing to the cost of housing production. Alskait 
and Almohaimeed (2005) examined the relationship between development cost and land prices 
in Riyadh. The study explained that residential land development in the city is limited to land 
subdivision (develop raw land and sell it to the public as plots not dwellings). They argued 
such methods encouraged these developed land plots to go through a phase of speculation 
before dwellings get built, which increases land prices. The authors proposed that the planning 
approval process should stipulate a minimum of 20% of the approved land subdivision be used 
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for housing before any land sale commenced the purpose being to limit land speculation. On 
the other hand, Assaf, Bushait and Al-Muwasheer (2010) investigated the main factors 
affecting the construction cost of affordable housing in Saudi Arabia using surveys distributed 
to private sector stakeholders involved in housing delivery. The survey encompassed 34 
different factors impacting the cost of housing construction. The study found that inadequate 
labour availability, lack of coordination and cost of materials were among the top factors 
severely affecting the cost of affordable housing construction.   
In analysing housing supply and demand, Struyk (2005) used a ‘Housing Needs Model’ to 
estimate the quantity of housing required in Riyadh over a 20-year period from 2004-2024. 
Struyk’s model showed “a highly responsive housing development sector” (p. 157) at the time 
suggesting that the pattern is expected to continue into the future. Nevertheless, housing 
demand has risen rapidly (as discussed in Chapter 2) proving the opposite to Struyk’s 
projections. Other housing literature has examined several specific topics including: housing 
preferences of low-income groups and factors influencing housing decisions (Salama, 2006; 
Opaku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2010); residents’ satisfaction in subsidised public housing (Al-Saati, 
1987; Al-Saif, 1994; Soliman, Alzamil, Alsharqawi, Hegazy & Almeshaal, 2015); access to 
housing finance options for affordable housing and its challenges (Tuncalp & Al-Ibrahim, 
1990; Sidawi, 2009, 2014; Sidawi & Meeran, 2011; Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2013); and  the 
use of smart construction technology to improve housing sustainability (Al-Surf, Trigunarsyah 
& Susilawati, 2013). 
The above review of the literature shows that there is a lacuna in the Saudi literature in terms 
of examining the role of the state’s institutional/regulatory framework in the housing system 
and its relations with the market in addressing the demand for housing. Despite the existence 
of a few studies that are relevant to this research, these have been published more than 10 years 
ago. There have since been several significant changes in the regulatory environment in Saudi 
Arabia. Clearly there is a lack of academic research in the area of state-market relations in the 
housing system. Despite this area being under-researched in Saudi Arabia, the importance of 
this subject has drawn much attention in other countries, where the body of literature is 
immense and rich as demonstrated in this chapter. Thus, there is still much to be investigated 
in the Saudi housing context and this study aims to shine some light on the issues and provide 
a pathway for future research.   
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3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a lens for viewing housing policy research in developed and 
developing countries, which became necessary to allow this writer to delve deeply into the 
theoretical frameworks relevant to the Saudi context. The evolution of housing policy since the 
1970s has shown the development of theory and practice in the housing field where global 
challenges required a more holistic approach to cope with housing issues. As urban populations 
are rising globally, the role of urban planning and policy in housing provision is growing in 
importance. This chapter focused on literature pertaining to the relationship between the 
planning system and housing market. As most of the literature delves on the extent to which 
planning impacts housing through its restrictions, uncertainty or cost of production (which 
results in land housing supply constraints leading to higher housing prices) the research has 
still not been able to measure the less tangible social cost and benefits of planning.  
The main objective of this thesis is to uncover the state-market relations in the housing system 
in order to understand the process that leads to housing outcomes. As housing research is a 
multifaceted discipline, Milligan (2003) posited that there is still no well-developed theory with 
“only some broad ideas and directions” (p. 55), thus, a more open research approach is needed. 
Accordingly, a combination of institutional theoretical perspectives, which proved to be most 
suitable to this research, were integrated into a conceptual framework to examine the processes 
of interactions and interrelationships between key public and private actors in the Saudi 
housing system. This synthesis of institutional approaches can offer invaluable insights into 
identifying the institutional constraints in order to gain a more informed understanding of the 
type of state policy needed to encourage and enable better delivery of housing by the market. 
Finally, this chapter reviewed relevant housing literature in the Saudi Arabian context where a 
deficiency in academic research in state-market relations in the housing system is evident.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Research Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodological approaches used to collect and analyse data 
in order to explore answers to the research questions. This chapter is structured into six main 
sections. Following this introduction is Section 4.2, which explains the research approach and 
the rationale for choosing a qualitative research inquiry methodology. Section 4.3 sets out the 
research design of the study including the selection of the case study, the use of various sources 
of primary and secondary data and an illustration of the research stages. Section 4.4 provides 
details about the data collection process during the fieldwork for Stages 1 and 2; while the 
techniques employed in analysing the collected data are described in the following section. In 
Section 4.6 issues surrounding the study rigour and the quality of the research are explored. 
Finally, Section 4.7 highlights the ethical dimension of this study.   
4.2 Research approach   
This study is grounded in the context of the housing system in Saudi Arabia using the capital 
city of Riyadh as a case study. The central focus is to examine the state’s regulatory framework 
in enabling the market to meet the rapid increase in demand for affordable housing. An 
institutional approach is utilised to investigate the state-market roles and relationships in the 
housing system. In order to provide structure and inform the methodology for this study, a 
conceptual framework was devised that synthesised several theoretical approaches drawn from 
the current housing and property development literature (see Chapter 3). The Structure of 
Housing Provision (SHP) by Ball (1983, 1986, 1998), which has been established as a 
comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework for exploratory research, was chosen as 
the principal framework to guide this research.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the SHP focuses on the social relations between actors 
that are important in understanding constraints, influences, power relations and conflicts in the 
housing system by taking into consideration the broader institutional context in which 
actors/agents interact and operate. Institutional arrangements in the housing system influence 
the interactions and relationships of actors that allow or constrain them in carrying out their 
roles. These social interactions are performed by several actors in both the public and private 
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sectors that engage in each process of the SHP with a variety of goals and a certain degree of 
control over the available resources. Lawson (2006) states that: “markets are not free but 
socially constructed, emerging from important power relations and contingent conditions and 
enacted by agents with different and conflicting (not always rational) interests” (p. 48). As 
various actors participate in the housing process to achieve their own goals, their interaction 
with each other in a competitive environment is likely to generate a conflict of interests and 
this can impact the overall housing outcomes. 
In order to understand the institutional arrangements that shape the actual operation of these 
actors and the influence they have on the housing outcomes, an exploratory/explanatory 
qualitative research approach has been taken. Qualitative research, as an interpretive and 
naturalistic approach, allows a more detailed and flexible way of understanding “how social 
experience is created and given meaning” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8). The interaction and 
interrelationships between actors in the Saudi housing system and the issue of affordable 
housing delivery, therefore, can be more clearly understood from a qualitative epistemological 
position. Bryman (2001) describes qualitative epistemology in social research as 
‘interpretivist’ where the emphasis is on “the understanding of the social world through an 
examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants” (p. 264). The use of in-depth 
qualitative interviews as a primary source of data collection for this research provided deeper 
understanding of the participants’ experiences, perspectives, interpretations and thoughts about 
their roles and relations in the housing system and the issues they face. This cannot be captured 
by quantifiable methods. 
The flexibility given by using in-depth interviewing allowed this study to drill deep into the 
complexities of the housing system and its institutional context. Patton (2002) states: 
“Approaching fieldwork without being constrained by predetermined categories of analysis 
contributes to the depth, openness, and detail of qualitative inquiry” (p. 14). Qualitative 
methods aim at capturing the points of view of participants without delimiting their responses 
by a predetermined set of questions. This was of significant value to this study as it allowed 
for the emergence of new data that had not been anticipated, thus enriching the data and the 
process. In contrast, quantitative methods, such as standardised questions, limit the scope of 
flexibility by investigating a limited set of questions that are designed beforehand seeking an 
aggregation of statistical data that can be generalised to a broader segment of the population. 
This study is more concerned with the depth of the data and the contextual understanding in 
addressing the research problem rather than the breadth of generalising the findings to the 
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relevant population. The issue of generalisability, that is ‘transferability’, is discussed below 
in Section 4.6. Hence, the use of quantitative methods was considered not conducive to this 
research and was disregarded.  
4.3 Research design 
This research utilised multiple methods of qualitative inquiry, in the context of a single case 
study design, in order to address the research questions. Yin (2003) considered this the 
preferred strategy for investigating the central research question given the nature of the 
question (a ‘how’ question); for achieving the combined goals of exploration and explanation; 
and as appropriate, “when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is 
on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.” (p. 1). The context of this study 
is the capital city of Riyadh, selected as a case study to analyse the state-market relations in the 
housing system, and as an example of a real-life and contemporary situation that this researcher 
has no control over.  
4.3.1 Case study selection 
Case studies have several types of variations in the literature and are often characterised by 
their size (bounded case), an activity, or the intention of the case analysis (Creswell, 2013). 
Stake (2000) classifies case studies into three types in terms of analysis intent. The first type is 
the intrinsic case study where a researcher is interested in the case itself for “its particularity 
and ordinariness” (p. 437) with no intention of making generalisations. An example of this is 
an evaluation of an individual, a program or an organisation. Second, an instrumental case 
study is where a researcher is using an in-depth case study to understand an issue to shed more 
light onto it or develop generalisations. This type of case study is used as a way of 
understanding something else, such as an existing or emerging issue, not the case itself. The 
third type according to Stake (2000), is the collective case study where multiples of 
instrumental cases are used. The collection of multiple cases may lead the researcher to a better 
understanding of an issue.  
Stake’s (2000) first classification, the intrinsic case study, was rejected for this research as it 
restricts the scope of this study. Giving merely a descriptive account of the Riyadh housing 
system conditions would not adequately address the central research question. The intended 
institutional analysis of the state-market relations in the Riyadh housing system aimed to 
identify mechanisms that would enable better housing delivery, particularly for low- and 
moderate-income segments. Performing a case study only for the “description’s sake [the 
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intrinsic case study] is a weak position” (Silverman, 2010, p.140). Stake’s third type, the 
collective case study, is also disregarded due to the time limitation of this study and the 
complexity of housing research on such a large scale. Stake’s second type, the instrumental 
case study, best serves the objective of this research design so is therefore used as the preferred 
case study type. The main purpose of using Riyadh as a case study in examining the roles and 
relationships of key actors in the housing system is to provide deep insights into the issue of 
the institutional and regulatory framework and its impact on the production of affordable 
housing. This is not only specific to the capital city of Riyadh but also of value to other growing 
metropolitan areas in Saudi Arabia and possibly in the wider region where similar 
demographics, housing challenges and institutional conditions are evident.  
Riyadh was selected for the case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, for its prominence as 
the capital and most populated city in Saudi Arabia, with a population of 6.5 million in 2016 
(HCDR, 2016). Secondly, a stark imbalance between supply and demand in Riyadh’s housing 
market has been documented by a recent study by the Ministry of Housing (2017b). Chapter 2 
– Market conditions –  discusses this issue in detail. Thirdly, this researcher’s familiarity with 
the city provided insights and connections to relevant and important sources of data. 
Furthermore, all key government stakeholders in housing are based in Riyadh, which allowed 
the researcher to access and collect the primary and secondary data within a reasonable 
timeframe. The final reason for this case study selection was the lack of academic literature on 
state-market relations in delivering affordable housing in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, since this 
study was conducted within a limited timeframe, only Riyadh was selected as a single case 
study to facilitate the manageable collection of data.  
4.3.2 Methods of data collection  
Due to the complexity of investigating the roles and relationships of state and market actors in 
the housing system, this study adopts a multiple methods approach of data collection to 
construct answers to the research questions. The adoption of multiple methods is also utilised 
to enhance the quality of collected data through triangulating different data sources (The use 
of triangulation is discussed in more detail in 4.6 Research Rigour below). Several types of 
qualitative data were gathered for this study through primary and secondary sources including: 
(i) semi-structured interviews; (ii) document analysis; and (iii) researcher observation. 
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(i) Semi-structured Interviews 
 The primary method of data collection for this research relied heavily on semi-structured 
interviews targeted towards knowledgeable informants in the private and government sectors. 
The interviews used topics and questions to provide guidance on issues and events identified 
in the literature to be investigated and were also flexible enough to allow informants to talk 
freely about their own experiences. Kvale (2007) describes a semi-structured interview as “an 
interview with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena” (p. 8). Using face-to-face 
qualitative interviewing for both stages of the investigation provided in-depth understanding 
of the participants’ experiences, perspectives, and thoughts. It also allowed points of view 
about the existing issues in the institutional and regulatory framework to be conveyed as well 
as perceptions of the way these issues impact on the housing outcomes.  
The purpose of choosing semi-structured interviews as a primary method of data collection 
was to draw out explanations of the ways government and private market actors in the housing 
system influence or, in turn, are influenced by the rules and regulations within the context of 
the broader social, economic and political conditions. This cannot be captured by fixed, 
standardised and non-interactive quantitative data collection methods such as questionnaires. 
Robson (2002) explains: “Face-to-face interviews offer the possibility of modifying one’s line 
of enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating underlying motives in a way 
that postal and other self-administered questionnaires cannot.” (pp. 272-273). Probing and 
follow up questions were important to this study as it allowed the researcher to further 
investigate unexpected emerging issues and clarify points raised by participants. According to 
Patton (2002): “Probes are used to deepen the response to a question, increase the richness and 
depth of responses, and give cues to the interviewee about the level of response that is desired” 
(p. 372). Field notes were taken during and after each interview to highlight important issues 
and provide more focused topics or questions to be probed in subsequent interviews. 
(ii) Document Analysis 
The secondary data collection method used was in the form of document analysis. According 
to Marshall and Rossman (2006): “Knowledge of the history and context surrounding a specific 
setting comes, in part, from reviewing documents” (p. 107). The documents obtained for this 
study were mainly drawn from published and unpublished materials, such as government and 
private sector reports, policy documents, academic studies and newspaper articles. The review 
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of these documents assisted in shaping the background and context for interviewing 
participants in both stages of this study. For instance, data obtained from the National Housing 
Strategy project (2010-2012) and other official Saudi government reports were used before 
conducting Stage 1 to identify issues facing the private sector in the housing system. 
Accordingly, the interview topics and questions were shaped to further investigate these issues, 
targeting different participants based on their expertise. The purpose was to uncover, explore 
and interpret the most significant issues affecting the performance of market actors in 
delivering affordable housing. Newly obtained documents during the Stage 1 fieldwork were 
also used for further examination of key issues revealed in this stage before conducting the 
Stage 2 fieldwork.  
Another reason for using document analysis in this research was to “explore multiple and 
conflicting voices, differing and interacting interpretations” (Hodder, 2000, p. 705). Written 
information provided in some of the reports and documents was used to verify and validate 
data collected from other sources. Yin (2003) indicates that: “For case studies, the most 
important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (p. 
87).  
(iii) Researcher Observation  
Observation was another useful method utilised in this study. It was employed as both a tool 
for data collection and for validating information obtained through interviews and document 
analysis. Observation takes many forms in qualitative inquiry ranging from “a highly 
structured, detailed notation of behavior structured by checklists to a more holistic description 
of events and behavior” (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 98). This study mainly followed a non-
participatory or what is also called ‘unobtrusive observation’. This observation technique is 
usually unstructured where the researcher records spontaneously what he/she saw and/or heard 
“in the interest of being non-reactive” (Robson, 2002. p. 310). The non-
participant/unstructured observation took place during and after the first fieldwork trip was 
conducted.  
This type of observation was important in keeping track of the constant changes in the housing 
system in Riyadh while this researcher was residing in Australia. This researcher had to adopt 
a flexible method in order to be updated and remain informed with his research context. Payne 
and Payne (2004) suggest that: “As a method [unobtrusive observation] allows researchers a 
degree of flexibility to ‘follow the action’” (p. 159). Non-participant observation was an 
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ongoing process as the housing policy framework in Saudi Arabia was undergoing continuous 
major changes during and after the first field trip for Stage 1 (May – June, 2015). Emerging 
analytical information obtained through observing housing officials’ press announcements, 
website updates and video interviews in social media was also included. Besides the interviews 
and documentary analysis for Stage 1, new information about government housing initiatives 
and reforms, such as the National Transformation Program (NTP), contributed to focusing the 
interview topics and questions for the Stage 2 investigation.  
4.3.3 Research stages  
The research design for this study was developed as part of the research proposal presented to 
the Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Design at the University of Sydney on 18 June 2014. 
The proposed design followed two stages of data collection and analysis. The first stage of data 
collection was undertaken to assess the functionality and operation of the housing market in 
Riyadh. This first stage focused on key private sector stakeholders who were professionally 
engaged in Riyadh’s housing market in order to obtain multiple perspectives and explanations 
of the housing issues they face and how they interact and function in the housing system. 
During this process, the institutional rules and regulations (both explicit and implied) that 
provided the ‘stage’ for these interactions were also uncovered.  
The analysis of the functionality and operation of market actors in the first stage provided an 
in-depth understanding of the regulatory environment enforced by the state and identified 
pressing issues that claimed to be constraining the production of affordable housing from the 
market actors’ perspective. The central research question was being addressed by answering 
the descriptive sub-questions: (i) What are the existing roles and relationships of key actors?; 
and (ii) What are the key issues in the housing system? This process also provided interpretive 
answers from the private sector actors’ perspective to the remaining sub-questions: (iii) How 
do these housing issues affect them?; and (iv) What mechanisms can be provided by the state 
to enable better housing outcomes? (i.e. facilitating the production of affordable housing). The 
descriptive/interpretive analysis gained from this exploratory/explanatory stage was used to 
guide the deeper institutional analysis of the state’s regulatory framework in Stage 2. This 
assisted in informing and focusing the procedures for Stage 2 by documenting the processes, 
features and constraints evident in the housing system in Riyadh and exposing the most 
significant issues to be investigated.  
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The emerging results from the analysis of Stage 1 highlighted that state management in the 
domains of the planning system and government housing policy and intervention were the most 
problematic issues requiring further investigation (see Chapter 5 – Theme Four: Management). 
Hence, the second stage of data collection was conducted to address the central research 
question by examining the state’s planning regulatory framework and housing policy in 
Riyadh. The purpose of this stage was to investigate the role of the state in allowing or 
constraining the market in delivering affordable housing. This was approached by examining 
the impact of planning and development controls on the production of housing in general and 
affordable housing in particular. Additionally, state housing policy intervention in the form of 
market stimulation was also investigated. This stage provided answers from planners and 
housing officials perspectives to both descriptive and interpretive sub-questions: (i) What are 
the existing roles and relationships between planners, developers and housing officials?; (ii) 
What are the key issues in the planning and housing regulatory framework?; (iii) How do the 
issues identified in Stage 1 affect developers in producing affordable housing?; and (iv) What 
enabling mechanisms can be provided by the planning system and/or the state-housing agency 
to enable better affordable housing delivery?  
Data collection from both primary and secondary sources for Stage 2 focused on national and 
local level institutions that were involved in planning and housing. That is, information related 
to the rules and regulations governing the planning process, development controls, housing 
policy and the housing partnership program was collected. The field research for this stage 
focused largely on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with planners and housing officials 
from several government bodies. The detailed topics and questions for these interviews were 
developed and finalised after consideration of the results that emerged from Stage 1.  
Following these two stages of examining the functionality and operation of the housing market 
in Riyadh and analysing the state’s planning and housing regulatory frameworks in the housing 
system, the results further informed the theoretical framework of this research and provided 
answers to the central research question and sub-questions. Table 4.1 presents a summary of 
the research process.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Research Process  
Research Questions Required Data Data Sources 
Methods of 
Analysis 
Central question: 
How can the state’s 
institutional framework 
in the housing system 
be improved to better 
enable the market to 
meet the demand for 
housing, particularly 
affordable housing, in 
Riyadh? 
 
Sub-questions: 
1. What are the existing 
roles and relationships 
of key actors within the 
housing system? 
2. What are the key 
issues in the housing 
system that influence 
the private sector in 
delivering affordable 
housing? 
3. How do these issues 
affect the private 
sector’s ability to 
deliver affordable 
housing? 
4. What mechanisms 
can be provided by 
state institutions to 
enable better affordable 
housing delivery? 
Descriptive and 
interpretive data of the 
functionality and 
operation of private 
market actors to 
unveil processes, 
features and 
constraints. 
 
Most problematic 
issues in the state’s 
institutional/regulatory 
framework identified 
by market actors.  
 
Examination of state-
market roles and 
relationships in the 
housing system 
through the processes 
of social relations that 
shape housing 
outcomes and its 
implications. 
 
 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews: 
Issues related to 
the research 
questions as well 
as emerging 
insights were 
explored through 
participants’ 
experiences, 
perceptions and 
opinions. 
 
Documents: 
Broad range of 
written materials 
such as 
government and 
private sector 
reports, statistics 
and policy 
documents. 
 
Observations: 
Unobtrusive 
observations that 
followed constant 
changes in the 
research context. 
 
Thematic analysis 
as a progressive 
and on-going 
process, guided 
by the study’s 
conceptual 
framework as 
described in 
sections 5.2 & 
6.2. 
 
Coded and 
categorised data 
to reconstruct 
realities. 
 
Data identified 
within interviews, 
documents and 
observations were 
chosen for 
relevance in 
addressing the 
research 
questions.  
 
Followed cycles 
of data collection 
and analysis. 
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4.4 Data collection process  
As the research is designed in two stages, the fieldwork data collection process was held in two 
different periods in the city of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The first stage was conducted between 
May and June 2015, and the second stage took place in December 2016. The process of 
collecting data through semi-structured interviews in Stage 1 and 2 of this study resulted in a 
total of 30 interviews with key informants from the public and private sector in Riyadh (Table 
4.2 provides a summary of participants selection, process and origin). These interviews 
provided data for Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. Access to the data and the methods of 
sampling and selecting participants for each stage are described below.   
Stage 1: Private sector semi-structured interviews 
Twenty face-to-face semi-structured interviews, at an average length of an hour, were 
conducted with a range of small, medium and large private sector stakeholders that were 
professionally involved in Riyadh’s housing market. This included ten private development 
companies, two commercial banks, two real estate financing companies, one property 
investment company, one property financial consultant and four real estate agents. The process 
of selecting and recruiting participants was not an easy task at the start of the fieldwork for this 
stage. Private sector participants were difficult to reach due to the busy nature of their work. 
The beginning of the field trip was planned to be concurrent with the Riyadh Real Estate and 
Housing Expo and Forum 2015 in order to attend and initiate the recruitment process of 
participants. However, the majority of private sector attendees were busy and did not agree to 
participate in the study except for one private development company that was interviewed later. 
Nevertheless, other ways of recruiting participants had already been planned. The Real Estate 
Commission (REC) at the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce was another option for seeking 
participants for the study. The REC was established to improve the property development 
industry in Riyadh through reviewing regulations and proposing amendments to relevant 
authorities as well as arranging meetings and seminars for industry stakeholders.  
The REC has several representative members from the private property development and 
financing industries who are directly involved in Riyadh’s housing market. Ten such 
individuals were contacted directly by an email invitation to participate in the research project 
through their contact details on the REC website. At first, this method of recruiting did not 
work very well as the majority of the intended participants did not respond. However, one of 
the REC members that was contacted agreed to participate. In addition, he assisted in recruiting 
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more participants through his personal contact with members of the REC and other developers 
in the housing market. Passive snowballing of recruitment was possible as the first interviewee 
contacted his colleagues at the REC to seek their participation in this study. Fortunately, out of 
ten REC members, a total of eight members consented to participate and were interviewed, 
including five private developers and three financers.  In order to avoid bias in snowball 
recruitment through the REC, dual passive snowball recruitment was integrated and used 
through the researcher’s personal and professional contacts to seek potential participants. The 
total number of participants interviewed through the researcher’s professional contacts was 
eleven, including four private developers, three financiers, and four real estate agents.  
The strategy used in selecting private sector participants was informed by the SHP as the main 
conceptual framework to examine their interactions. Private developers, financiers and real 
estate agents were chosen as housing market actors to represent the SHP’s dimensions of 
production, consumption and exchange of housing. As this study pays attention to the 
production of affordable housing, half of the interviewees were private developers representing 
the production dimension. These came from ten firms including two small firms, five medium 
firms and three major private development firms. Two of these private development firms were 
involved with the Ministry of Housing Public Private Partnership program (PPP) to build low 
cost housing units in Riyadh. The exchange dimension of the SHP was represented by six 
financier interviewees who were selected based on their involvement in providing housing 
finance for private developers (producers) as well as mortgage financing for individual 
consumers (users). Finally, four real estate agents were interviewed from different parts of the 
city for their knowledge and experience in the local residential market reflecting the household 
consumption dimension of the SHP. All the private sector participants were licensed and 
registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry confirming involvement in Riyadh’s 
housing market. 
The majority of the participants held senior positions at their organisation and have a deep 
working knowledge of the housing market. A total of eight out of twenty participants held chief 
executive officer positions. The remaining participants held various positions ranging from 
junior executives to general managers. The various levels of participants’ seniority provided a 
diversity of insights as each engaged in different levels of interaction in the housing market 
and with other stakeholders.  
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Participants in this stage were asked to contribute expertise and experience by answering 
questions pertaining to five main topics with each topic starting from general to specific 
questions. These five topics of inquiry were: land, planning regulations, property finance, 
residential construction, and the legal framework for housing in Riyadh. These private sector 
interviews focused on the interviewee’s personal perceptions of the housing issues, the 
residential land development process, state intervention in housing and the regulatory 
environment of the housing market in Riyadh. Depending on the relevance of each topic to the 
participants’ area of expertise, interviewees generally showed willingness to openly talk about 
the issues and obstacles faced with no hesitation in providing information. New topics, issues 
and factors affecting the performance of the housing market emerged during the interviewee’s 
discussion and these were utilised in the analysis process. (See Appendix C for topics and 
questions that were used in the semi-structured interviews for Stage1). Recruiting further 
participants was deemed unnecessary after the twenty interviews were conducted as the 
researcher acknowledged that an evident level of thematic saturation from the obtained data 
had been reached.  
Stage 2: Government semi-structured interviews 
Addressing the whole housing system issues identified in the Stage 1 analysis in any greater 
detail was considered to be an enormous task and beyond this researcher’s scope due to the 
limited timeframe and resources available. Therefore, bounded by time and resource 
limitations, it was decided to further investigate the most pressing and complicated issues 
revealed in the Stage 1 analysis. The planning system and the government’s intervention in 
housing in the form of the Public Private Partnership program were found to be areas of 
significance requiring further investigation. Consequently, the Stage 2 fieldwork data 
collection was conducted with key government stakeholders involved professionally in 
planning and housing in Riyadh. A total of 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
six planners and four housing officials to obtain perspectives and views on the issues raised by 
interviewees in the first stage.  
The selection of participants for this stage was based on two main objectives: (i) assessing the 
impact of planning and development controls on housing production; and (ii) examining the 
government intervention in housing through its public private partnership program. Thus, two 
categories of participants were targeted for the interviews – planners and housing officials. 
Issues in the planning system, such as planning permission delays and strict development 
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control measures, were taken into account in the recruitment process as knowledgeable 
planners working in these areas at both national and local levels were sought. On the other 
hand, since the government intervention in housing is carried out by the Ministry of Housing, 
key housing official participants were identified during a preliminary visit to the MOH in the 
first fieldwork trip.  
The recruitment process for planners was commenced using chain sampling through the 
researcher’s professional contacts to identify key participants. Employed as a lecturer in the 
Department of Urban Planning at King Saud University in Riyadh, this researcher had 
connections with the urban planning community in Riyadh, which helped in facilitating access 
to knowledgeable informants. This process was started by asking these colleagues questions 
such as, who should I be talking to in regards to..? Who knows a lot about..? The referral chain 
of recommended informants was confirmed when repeated names were mentioned through the 
researcher’s personal and professional contacts. Gaining access to informants would have been 
difficult without this researcher’s professional referrals due to the fact that most of these 
participants held managerial positions with busy schedules and multiple responsibilities. These 
participants were firstly contacted by this researcher’s colleagues asking for willingness to take 
part in the research. Once initial consent was confirmed, this researcher contacted the 
participants by phone to briefly explain the study and the expectations followed by emailing 
official letters of invitation and the Participants Information Statements, which included a full 
description of the research and the timeframe for the interviews. Six planners were interviewed 
comprising three national level planners from the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
(Planners 2, 3 and 4); three state and city level planners from the Riyadh Municipality (Planners 
5 and 6); and one from the High Commission for Development of Riyadh (Planner 1). 
The recruitment process for housing officials was arranged before the fieldwork trip. As 
mentioned earlier the Ministry of Housing was visited in the first trip (mid 2015) and a meeting 
with a manager working in the PPP program was arranged and consent obtained for an 
interview for the second stage. The interview was confirmed by emails before the field trip and 
was conducted upon arrival in Riyadh. Based on the interview discussion, this housing official 
assisted in the selection and recruitment of three other key informants working at the Ministry 
of Housing. As issues arose in the discussion, he suggested meeting certain people who had 
greater knowledge about these topics and issues. These informants were involved in the PPP 
program and had essential understanding of the connection between housing policy and its 
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outcomes in the market. The four housing official participants from the Ministry of Housing 
included three participants who were involved in the PPP program (Housing Officials 1, 3 and 
4) and a housing official responsible for coordination with government agencies and private 
developers (Housing Official 2).  
Almost all the participants recruited through professional chain sampling/referrals agreed to 
take part in the study except for one planner who initially agreed to participate but had an 
emergency on the interview day and referred the researcher to his colleague instead. It is worth 
mentioning that the interview length was an important factor for some participants in deciding 
whether to participate or not. For example, one planner interviewee agreed to participate in the 
study if the interview had a time limit of no more than 30 minutes. This particular interview 
was adjusted to include the most important topics to be investigated. The rest of the interviews 
ranged between 45 minutes and one and a half hours depending on the interviewee’s 
availability. This proved beneficial as it allowed the researcher to cover various topics in more 
detail.  
The interviews for this second stage were designed based on two sets of topics and 
accompanying questions; one targeting planners and the other housing officials. Planners’ 
interviews consisted mainly of topics relating to the planning process, planning policies and 
strategies and their relation to housing, with each including issues identified in the system. On 
the other hand, housing official interviews focused on examining the issues of PPP models and 
their requirements as well as the new planning exemptions that were recently being used as 
incentives by the MOH to stimulate the housing market. Both sets of interview topics and 
questions were devised to explore and examine participants’ views on the issues raised taking 
into account the past, present and future. (See Appendix D for the semi-structured interview 
topics/questions for this stage). Probing and follow-up questions were used during the 
interview process. Additionally, the interview questions were constantly revisited throughout 
the fieldwork process to add or edit questions about particular issues that emerged and required 
clarification from other participants.  
Interviews for both stages were recorded using a portable audio device followed by the digital 
files transferred onto a laptop computer. The audio recordings of these interviews were 
transcribed using Microsoft Word and processed manually using coding techniques in order to 
identify and analyse emergent themes. Since the interviews were conducted in Arabic (as 
participants’ preferred), transcribing the interviews maintained the original language to avoid 
  121 
the loss of meaning during the translation process. However, extracted quotes from the original 
transcripts used in this thesis were carefully and accurately translated. 
Table 4.2: Summary of Participant Selection, Process and Origin  
Research 
Stage 
Criteria of 
Selection* 
Selected 
Participants  
Participants Description  
Stage 1 
Production 
 
10 private 
development 
companies  
 
Large-scale development firms: 
• Developer 1 (MOH-PPP) 
• Developer 7 
• Developer 9 (MOH-PPP) 
Medium-scale development firms:  
• Developers 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 
Small-scale development firms: 
• Developers 8 & 10 
Consumption  
4 real estate 
agents 
• Real Estate Agent 4 (City North) 
• Real Estate Agent 2 (City South) 
• Real Estate Agent 3 (City East) 
• Real Estate Agent 1 (City West) 
Exchange 6 financiers  
Commercial banks: 
• Financiers 1 & 3 
Mortgage financing companies: 
• Financiers 2, 4 & 6 
Property financial consultant: 
• Financier 5 
Stage 2 
Management:  
Planning System 
6 planners 
National level (MOMRA): 
• Planners 2, 3 & 4 
State level (Riyadh Municipality): 
• Planners 5 & 6 
City level (HCDR): 
• Planner 1 
Management:  
Housing Policy 
4 housing 
officials  
National level (MOH-PPP): 
• Housing Officials 1, 2, 3 
National level (MOH-Developer 
Services Centre): 
• Housing Official 2 
* Based on the study’s conceptual framework (Figure 3.2) 
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4.5 Data Analysis 
Analysing qualitative data suggests ‘transforming’ the collected data through analytical 
processes “into a clear, understandable, insightful, trustworthy and even original analysis” 
(Gibbs, 2007, p. 1). These analytical processes are usually iterative in nature as the researcher 
interprets and reflects on the meaning of voluminous data. The qualitative data analysis 
process, according to Creswell (2013), “involves organising the data, conducting a preliminary 
read-through of the database, coding and organising themes, representing the data, and forming 
an interpretation of them” (p. 179). In order to provide a deep and critical analysis impartiality 
was maintained throughout this process.    
The data analysis used in both stages of this research followed thematic analysis through a 
detailed account of iterative processes. Gibson and Brown (2009) describe the term ‘thematic 
analysis’ as “the process of analyzing data according to commonalities, relationships and 
differences across a data set” (p. 127). Hence, a systematic procedure of coding was undertaken 
to analyse the interview transcripts by identifying repeated ideas and examining the 
relationships between various elements in the analysis leading up to the creation of patterns in 
the data. The analysis aimed at creating a step-by-step process to facilitate and manage the 
lengthy and complicated transcripts. Adopting the method of data analysis as suggested by 
Green et al (2007), involved following these four key steps: (i) immersion in the data; (ii) 
coding; (iii) creating categories; and (iv) identifying themes (p. 546).  
After transcribing the audio recording, participants’ interviews were first organised into 
separate Microsoft Word files based on identification codes given to each participant. The first 
step of the analysis involved focused reading of the text of each participant’s interview multiple 
times to ‘immerse’ this researcher in the data. Green et al (2007) describes the significant 
benefits of engaging in this process: “Data immersion brings about clarity of the part played 
by both the interviewer and the research participant, and lays the foundation for connecting 
disjointed elements into a clearer picture of the issue being investigated” (p. 574). Immersing 
in the data also allowed this researcher to select the relevant text in each interview transcript. 
Cutting down on irrelevant text was used to reduce the mass amount of the raw text into a 
manageable set of transcripts. Text considered irrelevant was filed separately and kept in case 
it was needed at a later stage.  
The second step of the thematic analysis process was coding the transcripts. Important and 
repeating ideas were annotated and highlighted in colours. Descriptive codes (short phrases) 
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were then added to the margin of the original word file of the transcripts as labels that identified 
key points made by a participant. These codes summarised a participant’s response, whether 
expressed in one sentence or a whole paragraph. Generated codes could easily be referred back 
to as they were sequentially numbered based on each participant’s transcript. This coding 
process was an important step in the analysis and required a clear understanding of the context 
and what was recorded (Green et al, 2007). As the interviewer, this researcher had the 
advantage of observing the participants’ responses and reactions towards the questions asked. 
These observations were also used where applicable to inform the coding process. In analysing 
Stage 2, for instance, new codes emerged from planners’ negative reactions when asked about 
the high cost of development because of certain planning control measures.  
The third step of the thematic analysis was the task of creating categories. In this step, 
relationships were identified by making links between the generated codes in order to organise 
them into compatible groups or categories. This process started with creating preliminary 
categories based on predetermined topics in the interview questions. New emerging codes in 
the interview transcripts were also examined and sorted separately into new categories. 
Creating categories was a time-consuming process as it involved repeated grouping and 
regrouping of codes into different major and minor categories. As suggested by Green et al 
(2007), the aim of this constant process of testing a ‘good fit’ by moving backward and forward 
between codes was undertaken to assess relevance and reach compatibility and coherence.  
The final step of the thematic analysis was designed to create more abstract ideas to guide the 
development of a theoretical analysis. According to Green et al (2007): “The generation of 
themes requires moving beyond a description of a range of categories; it involves shifting to 
an explanation or, even better, an interpretation of the issue under investigation” (p. 549). 
Thus, major categories and their codes were organised into larger groups that depicted a 
common theme. Linking the generated data from the third step in the analysis to a relevant 
analytical and theoretical concept also assisted in identifying the most pressing issues in the 
Stage 1 analysis that were further examined in the second stage.  
The above four steps were employed separately in both stages of the data analysis. The process 
of identifying recurring patterns in the categories and the identification of themes for each stage 
is described in Chapters 5 and 6.   
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4.6 Research rigour  
In quantitative research, validity and reliability are the most common criteria used in assessing 
the quality of the research. The criterion validity is mainly concerned with the integrity of the 
research findings, “it’s accuracy, correctness and truthfulness” (Robson, 2002, p. 170). Validity 
in fixed design includes variants, such as internal and external validity. Reliability, on the other 
hand, is concerned with replicability and whether the findings of a study can be repeatable by 
following the same measures and procedures described by the investigator (Silverman, 2006). 
In assessing the quality of qualitative research, scholars hold various positions in regard to 
using assessment criteria. Applying validity and reliability concepts to qualitative research 
have been disputed because there is no general agreement on which assessment criteria to apply 
(Bryman, 2001; Robson, 2002; King & Horrocks, 2010). According to Bryman (2001), some 
scholars are proponents for using the concepts of validity and reliability in qualitative research 
while others propose alternative criteria for assessment that are more relevant for such research.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that qualitative research should be assessed based on 
different criteria than the validity and reliability methods used in quantitative research. They 
propose a trustworthiness assessment that encompasses four criteria: credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. According to Bryman (2001), the alternative criteria of 
trustworthiness proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) has “… a parallel with the previous 
quantitative research criteria” (p. 32). He stipulates that credibility parallels with internal 
validity; transferability parallels with external validity; dependability parallels with reliability; 
and confirmability parallels with objectivity (p. 272). Despite its parallels with the conventional 
quantitative criteria, trustworthiness is distinguished based on its criticism of the simple 
application of validity and reliability, which presumes that “… a single absolute account of 
social reality is feasible”; or, in other words, “… there are absolute truths about the social 
world” (Bryman, 2001, p. 272). The trustworthiness assessment approach argues that there can 
be several accounts. Gibson and Brown (2009) explain: 
Validity refers to the aim of ‘measuring what you claim to be measuring’. This analytic 
aim can fit uneasily with the idea of the constructed nature of accounts to which much 
qualitative research is committed. Since meaning is constructed and open to a 
multiplicity of interpretation, the notion of ‘truth’ becomes something of a difficult 
concept to pin down. In contrast to validity, trustworthiness focuses on the context of 
data collection and the methods of the generation of data rather than on its inherent 
‘truthfulness’. (p. 59) 
This research endorses the notion of assessing qualitative research by following the 
trustworthiness criteria. As knowledge comes from different perspectives and cannot be 
  125 
merged into a single truth in social reality, credibility of the findings should be established. In 
order to achieve credibility, multiple methods of data ‘triangulation’ were used to ensure 
accuracy, comprehensiveness, and objectivity. Triangulation is important in establishing the 
credibility of the data obtained by comparing different methods (i.e. interviews and documents) 
or even different sources in one method (i.e. interviewing informants from public and private 
sectors) to achieve corroboration of the data (Bryman, 2001; Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2006; 
Gibson & Brown, 2009). Using a single data collection method is considered too restrictive 
when conducting research in such a complex and multifaceted context as a housing system. 
Semi-structured interviews, researcher observation, and documentary analysis were used to 
allow for greater triangulation and a richer description of the data by providing multiple 
perspectives from which to investigate the research questions (Figure 4.1).  
The use of triangulation aids in overcoming the bias that may occur from a single data source. 
The aim of this triangulation design was “… to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of 
an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2000, p. 443). The use of multiple sources of enquiry 
was important, “… to best understand the research problem” (Creswell & Clark, 2007, p.62), 
which was investigating the state institutional and regulatory framework in enabling the private 
sector to provide affordable housing in Riyadh. This research was designed to facilitate the 
researcher in exploring the institutionalised power interrelationships of the key actors in the 
housing system to gain more insight in improving the resulting outcomes of these interactions. 
Triangulation provided significant value to this research as it revealed details of the public and 
private housing issues from multiple sources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 
Analysis  
Researcher 
Observation 
Semi-Structured 
Interviews 
Institutional Analysis in the 
Saudi Housing System: The 
State-Market Relations 
Figure 4.1: Triangulation of Multiple Sources of Inquiry  
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Criteria transferability refers to the generalisability of the study’s findings beyond the case 
study setting. The issue of generalisation, or external validity, “… has been a major barrier in 
doing case studies” (Yin, 2003, p.37). Critics argue that qualitative research in general, and a 
single case study in particular, offers a weak base for generalising the findings beyond the 
specific context. Nevertheless, Yin (2003) explains that the findings of qualitative case studies 
can be generalised to other contexts through the use of ‘analytical generalisation’. This is 
achieved by generalising the results to a broader theory instead of a population (ibid). Bryman 
(2001) asserts that: “People who are interviewed in qualitative research are not meant to be 
representative of a population … it is the quality of the theoretical inferences that are made out 
of qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment of generalization” (p. 283). Thus, this study’s 
synthesised analysis of the two stage findings, guided by the conceptual framework, provided 
theoretical explanations of issues in the Saudi housing context. Such theoretical insights allow 
generalisations to be made to other contexts facing similar housing challenges (see Chapter 7). 
In terms of dependability, which parallels with reliability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that 
the researcher should adopt an audit approach. This requires documenting the processes of 
conducting the research including the selection of participants, fieldwork notes, interview 
transcripts and decisions on how to analyse the data. The purpose of this audit approach is to 
ensure that future researchers can repeat the procedures used and yield the same findings. Yin 
(2003) explains that in order to overcome the reliability issue, the researcher has to “… make 
as many steps as operational as possible” (p. 38). Hence, the procedures used in conducting 
this study have been thoroughly documented and detailed in this thesis for the reference of 
future researchers. Finally, while it is impossible to have complete objectivity in social 
research, in order to address confirmability this researcher was constantly aware of this issue 
and ensured neutrality while collecting the primary data by allowing the interviewees to speak 
freely about the issues without dictating the directions of the answers and by using non-leading 
probes for clarification when needed.  
4.7 Ethical considerations 
Since this research involved human participants to generate primary data, an application for 
permission to conduct the study was submitted to the University of Sydney Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC). The application included documents, such as the Participant 
Information Statement, Participant Consent Form, and letters of invitation (see Appendix E). 
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This research was granted HREC approval in December 2014 after some minor amendments 
were made to the original application as requested by the committee.  
All documents were prepared in English and those used in the fieldwork process were 
translated into Arabic. The Participant Information Statement, explaining the nature of the 
research and all relevant information regarding how to participate in the study, was provided 
to each participant. In addressing confidentiality, participants were informed verbally and in 
writing that their identity would remain strictly confidential and all information obtained 
through the interviews would only be used for research purposes. Participants were also 
provided with the Consent Form stating their rights and obligations. All participants agreed to 
sign the form indicating their willingness to take part in the study.    
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter outlined the research methodology used in this study. It began by describing the 
chosen research approach, a qualitative design, which was carefully selected as an appropriate 
mode of inquiry for its flexible and emergent design in addressing the research questions. This 
design was based on a single case study using multiple methods of data collection. The 
rationale for selecting the case study and the use of different methods was also explained. Two 
main stages of data collection and analysis were followed in conducting the fieldwork. This 
chapter presented the techniques used in collecting data for each stage, indicating the use of 
snowballing and chain referral sampling. Data was processed and analysed immediately after 
each stage using a thematic analysis procedure to identify patterns. The quality and rigour of 
this study was addressed using a trustworthiness assessment to ensure credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability of the findings. Before conducting the 
fieldwork, research ethics approval was obtained in order to collect primary data for the study.   
The following Chapters 5 and 6 will report on the results of the empirical examination of this 
study and provide a “thick description” (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 359) of state-market relations 
in the housing system in Riyadh thus revealing the multiple realities and perspectives of 
participants.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Private Sector’s Perceptions of the Housing System  
 
5.1. Introduction     
The private sector can play an effective role in delivering housing under an appropriate 
institutional and regulatory environment that ensures conducive and well-balanced conditions 
(UN-Habitat, 2013). The review of the literature in Chapter 2 suggests that the problems 
inherent in the Saudi housing system constrain the private sector’s ability to deliver housing 
where it is most needed – for low- and moderate-income groups – and thus needs to be 
strengthened (Ghosheh & Rabenau, 2011). Therefore, this chapter aims to capture the 
experiences and perceptions of key private sector actors through multiple perspectives and 
explanations of the housing issues they face, how they interact and function in the system and 
how they have been influenced by the existing regulatory framework. Examination of the 
housing system issues will be uncovered from the private sector perspectives. Such 
examinations will provide knowledge about actors’ relationships in the housing system – the 
influence of the institutional and regulatory environment on the functionality and operations of 
market actors – which will provide important insights for answering the research questions.   
This chapter presents results of semi-structured interviews with private sector stakeholders who 
were selected based on this study’s conceptual framework. Twenty interviews were conducted 
overall, including: (i) 10 private developers who are involved in the production of medium to 
high end housing units as well as private developers who entered into Public Private 
Partnership program (PPP) with the state to produce low cost housing in Riyadh; (ii) four real 
estate agents who were chosen to gather their experience about the aspects of society’s housing 
demand and the current supply situation in the city; and (iii) six financiers who provide finance 
to both producers of housing and users including commercial banks and mortgage financing 
companies. The results are exhibited under four main themes as explained below. The analysis 
presented in this chapter is designed to solely convey the interviewees’ perceptions, thus this 
writer remains impartial and does not express any opinion. Critical discussion of this chapter’s 
results are undertaken in Chapter 7. An overall summary of the results is presented at the end 
of this chapter.  
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5.2 Thematic analysis of the private sector’s interviews   
Chapter 2 of this thesis lays the foundation for the empirical examination of the private sector 
issues in Riyadh’s housing system. Five major topics were derived from this study’s 
background to guide the semi-structured interviews and elicit information from participants. 
These five topics of inquiry were: land, planning system, property finance, residential 
construction, and the legal framework for housing in Riyadh. The interviews were transcribed 
and analysed using a thematic coding procedure that follows four general steps as suggested 
by Green et al. (2007) (see Chapter 4 – Section 4.4). This section explains the rationale of the 
coding process particular to Stage 1 analysis of private sectors interviews.  
The coding process followed three development schemes in the creation of categories in order 
to: (i) identify issues and obstacles faced by private sector actors in the housing system; (ii) 
determine how these issues influence the housing outcomes; and (iii) elicit suggested solutions 
to identified issues (Liamputtong, 2009). These were based on the participants’ responses as 
follows:  
(i) Conditions: the causes of actions and factors that restrict the actions. 
(ii) Consequences: types of consequences of the actions or behaviour. 
(iii) Strategies/solutions: ways of accomplishing things; people’s strategies, tactics, methods, 
and techniques for meeting their needs (Liamputtong, 2009). 
The nature of Stage 1 interview topics and questions allowed the private sector participants to 
share their perspectives on the current housing market conditions at the time and the 
consequences of these conditions (effects) on their work, more importantly, on the delivery of 
housing. In addition, most of the participants expressed opinions about how these conditions 
could be dealt with by providing improvement strategies and solutions from their unique 
perspectives. The rationale for using the above schemes to create categories in the coding 
process was to provide a systematic analysis guided by these schemes to reveal patterns in the 
data. Yet, some of the categories did not include the scheme (strategies/solutions) as there was 
no suggested solution from participants in that specific category. The creation of codes and 
classification of categories was where most of the coding procedure took place. Prefigured sets 
of categories (topics discussed in the interviews) were initially used to classify codes followed 
by new emerging categories. The classification of codes into main categories that were pre-
identified and also emerging was based on connections (relationships) of codes with each other. 
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The analysis first shows that there were interlinked categories that were then merged together 
to form major categories. Table 5.1 shows an example of the coding process undertaken to 
analyse the data of this first stage of the fieldwork. 
 
Table 5.1: Example of the Coding Process (Category 8 - Stage 1) 
Category 8: Planning system and housing  
 
Based on participant responses 
 
Condition codes 
 
Consequence codes  Strategy/solution codes 
• Process (time) 
• Unorganised procedure 
• Lack of timeframe  
• Slow correspondence  
• Uncooperative planners 
 
• Process (coordination) 
• Uncoordinated infrastructure 
contribution  
• Manipulative service providers 
 
• Policy (control)  
• High on-site development 
contribution  
• Strict/inefficient density measures  
• Inflexible regulations 
 
• Discourage housing 
investment  
• Increase development cost  
• Increase housing prices 
(affordability) 
 
➢ Process  
• Defined procedure  
• Clear timeframe 
• Integrated system: linked 
title registration  
• Real estate authority  
 
➢ Policy 
• Increase density 
• Provide flexibility 
 
 
The last step of the analysis involved the creation of themes. The analytical themes for this 
analysis emerged from this study’s conceptual framework that utilises an adopted model of the 
Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) as explained in Chapter 3. According to Ball and Harloe 
(1992), the SHP is ‘theoretical in nature’ and provides a productive framework that allows for 
the examination of related housing issues since it encompasses the observed wider context into 
a simple organised framework. Therefore, in order to move away from a merely categorical 
description to a more thematic analytical level, the SHP physical spheres of production, 
consumption, exchange and management were used as analytical themes in this analysis. The 
generated categories in the third steps of the coding procedure exhibited relevance to the SHP 
analytical themes. However, employing these analytical themes into the generated categories 
required regrouping and merging of some the categories to reach recurring patterns in each of 
the themes.  
  131 
This researcher believes that the themes employed assist in providing a clearer understanding 
of the interconnected issues in the housing system. Using the modified and adopted model of 
the SHP as ‘conceptual/analytical themes’ provided the analysis for this stage with a practical 
instrument for examining the roles and relationships of the market actors and how they interact 
in not just the production of housing but also in how housing is consumed, exchanged and 
managed. Bringing together the critical spheres of the SHP as themes and connecting them to 
the big picture of complex social relations, offers a comprehensive analysis that avoids the 
isolation of related housing issues. In addition, the integration of the SHP themes provided 
powerful explanatory factors for the aim of identifying how the private housing market actors 
function and revealing the critical issues that hinder their performance. Such classification of 
the issues identified under the SHP framework of analytical themes also assisted in determining 
the most pressing issues under each theme to be further investigated. 
The analytical thematic process produced nine major categories represented under four main 
themes as shown in Table 5.2. This cyclical, spiralling process explained above was 
drawn/synthesised from the methods of Green et al. (2007) and Liamputtong (2009) and was 
repeated nine times for each category to ensure a thorough and detailed analysis. Results of 
this analysis are uncovered in the next sections of this chapter.  
 
Table 5.2: Themes and Categories for Stage 1 Analysis  
Analytical themes Categories 
Theme 1: Production 1. Land accessibility & affordability  
2. Land title and legal security  
3. Financing for producers 
4. Market characteristics and trends 
Theme 2: Consumption 5. Society and housing  
Theme 3: Exchange 6. New mortgage laws impact 
7. Financing and judiciary system 
Theme 4: Management 8. Planning system and housing   
9. Public private partnership  
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5.3 Theme One: Production    
The production process of housing in Riyadh is a central focus of this study in which examining 
the issues that face housing producers is critical for understanding the processes of social 
relations that impact delivery, particularly for low- and moderate-income groups. In analysing 
the aggregate responses of interviewees, four main categories emerged to represent issues in 
housing production. These categories are primarily concerned with land assembly issues, legal 
issues with land titles, access to finance for new developments and issues in housing production 
trends. 
5.3.1 Land accessibility and affordability 
The main issue discussed by the majority of the interviewees when they were asked about the 
land market was the access to land and land prices. First, developers described land 
accessibility as an obstacle for their business. Most of the developers emphasised that there is 
a huge amount of raw land in the city but with limited access. As noted by Developer 4: 
Riyadh has a big number of land but not all of these land are for sale. This causes an 
implication where land that is offered for development in the market is limited.  
Interviewees provided several reasons behind this limitation on land accessibility. One of the 
main reasons that was mentioned by several developers and real estate agents is the 
unwillingness of landowners to sell. Land has become an investment channel for many 
households where land is bought and kept for hopeful future price rising. Four developers 
argued that the lack of alternative investment channels in the country is the main reason behind 
the shortage of land accessibility. These developers explained that investing in property 
(buying land whether a small piece of land by a household or large raw land by corporations) 
is the most secure, easy and guaranteed type of investment in Saudi Arabia. They argued that 
the other available investment channels are either risky (such as the Saudi stock market which 
collapsed in 2005); or very complicated, such as starting a business where there are difficulties 
in obtaining labour visas or where government employees are prohibited to open a business.  
Land is available, but landlords are not obliged to sell. If the owner is not in need for 
the cash, like he does not have any financial obligations let’s say, he would say, like 
the majority, if I sell the land where do I put the money?! There is no pressure on these 
owners to sell and also there are no other investment channels to give better investment 
chances. Thus, these factors limit land in entering the market. (Developer 8) 
The problem of land inaccessibility was exacerbated by the absence of property taxation as 
described by the majority of interviewees. The Council of Ministers announced in 2014 new 
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tax regulations imposed on undeveloped land which will be studied and finalised for 
implementation in order to unlock more land and provide more housing units. Despite the 
widespread agreement between interviewees that the lack of taxation is part of land 
inaccessibility and unaffordability issues, there was a division in responses between 
interviewees about the impact of this new regulation. Some of the interviewees support this 
new regulation and view it as a development catalyst to build more housing units. Real Estate 
Agent 3 explained that land has been used as an asset for major corporations including 
commercial banks and insurance firms. These corporations invest in buying millions of square 
metres in property as assets due to the absence of property taxation. He stated: 
When the new tax regulation on land is implemented, these assets [major corporation 
land assets] will cost these firms and become undesirable. The new regulation is 
excellent because these firms will now focus on their main activities and stop investing 
in property to build assets.  
On the other hand, some think of this new regulation as part of the solution for accessing land 
but showed concern about its implementation and what will be included. These interviewees 
expressed concern about the implications of the new taxation, one being that the government 
has not provided a clear plan for implementation. This change has created uncertainty which is 
one of the contributing factors affecting the current slowdown in the housing market.   
The second issue in the land market is the high price of land or land affordability as noted by 
most interviewees. High land prices are an issue directly linked to land accessibility as most of 
the interviewees attributed the higher prices of land to the limited supply mainly caused by the 
issue of land hoarding as mentioned above. Some interviewees argued that land hoarding by a 
few real estate investors who control the supply in the market is one of the main reasons for 
higher land prices.  
There is land hoarding. In Riyadh for example, large pieces of raw land that can be 
developed are owned by a group of investors or developers … they develop small 
portions of the land in stages to control the prices. (Developer 2)  
Land hoarding is part of the reason for high land prices where landowners don’t pay 
taxes on land so they don’t have to sell. These land plots ‘don’t eat or drink’ and 
increase in value with time. The new land taxation system is a good idea. (Developer 
6) 
Another reason for land inaccessibility and unaffordability as argued by several interviewees 
is the lack of data transparency in the market. Interviewees claimed that there is a wide spread 
practice of releasing fake or unreal transactions by buyers and sellers that are intended only for 
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increasing the land price. This practice creates inaccuracy in the published data. Developer 5 
stated: 
Fake sales are when land is recorded to be sold at a very high price but in reality the 
land was not sold for the recorded price. This type of sale sabotages the accuracy of 
data issued by the Ministry of Justice.  
In addition, some developers claimed that there is real difficulty in accessing information in 
the property market. For instance, there is a lack of published data on land ownership (who 
owns the land?) which makes it difficult for developers to approach owners to negotiate 
purchase for potential land development. Developer 3 stated: “getting the information we need 
in the development process is complex and difficult”. Most of the interviewees view the new 
system of real estate registration as a solution for more market transparency that will encourage 
more investment in the housing market: 
The cadastre system is the solution for market transparency … The new real estate 
registration is on its way to be implemented, however, the wheel should have been 
moving faster in order for us to be able to work in a market that has clarity and 
transparency that allows easier investment. Having higher market transparency and 
easy deals encourages and stimulates both domestic and international investors in land 
development. (Developer 5)    
5.3.2 Land title and legal security  
Another significant issue described by interviewees that hinders and discourages investments 
in the production of housing is the encumbered legal framework. As noted by several 
interviewees, one of the development constraints is the proof of land ownership. Several 
developers mentioned that they have to go through a lengthy process of investigating the 
ownership for potential property for development to ensure it has a clear title. Many talked 
about the importance of buying land with an ‘intact deed’ to avoid possible future implications. 
This means ensuring that the title of the land is unencumbered with any issue, such as 
overlapping ownership and boundary disputes, forged deeds, or illegal prior deeds. The old 
manual system of property registration at the Ministry of Justice had some defects as some of 
these manually recorded deeds have boundary issues and lack the sequential history of buyers 
and sellers (see Chapter 2). These issues originated when land was granted to citizens by the 
government in the 1970s and 1980s outside of urban areas at the time as explained by some 
interviewees. With the growth of cities, this land became part of urban areas and issues with 
ownership records, such as the inaccuracy of recording boundaries, became evident: 
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Land was granted without clear boundaries where marks, such as trees or rocks were 
used to identify boundaries. Over time, these boundaries had modifications or overlaps 
resulting in deed problems, such as forged deeds, cancelation of deeds or double deeds. 
(Developer 8) 
As described by the majority of developer interviewees, land title transfer issues are mostly 
related to large raw parcels of land for development. Transferring a title of land inside an 
approved land subdivision is not an issue. Developers and financiers explained that the lack of 
a linked electronic cadastre and title registration system between the Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs (represented by municipalities) and the Ministry of Justice (represented by public 
notaries) as the source of the problem. Public notaries check the land title before transferring 
the title and notify the buyer (developer) whether the title is clear or not. In the case that the 
title is clear the buyer can transfer the land title under his name. The main issue that the majority 
of interviewees agreed on is that the transfer of title by the public notaries does not guarantee 
the clarity of land title when dealing with future legal issues. Thus, developers might be 
surprised by issues arising in the future, such as overlapping boundaries or encroachment on 
roads or government land when applying for planning permits from municipalities. Developer 
7 stated: 
The main problem in deeds is usually in the overlapping of boundaries and this is an 
issue in the system. We buy a piece of land and get the title legally notarised from the 
Ministry of Justice and then we get surprised that the deed has an issue with the 
municipality [when conducting land surveying for planning permit]. The Ministry of 
Justices does not completely issue sound deeds. 
The uncertainty and risk involved in the legal process of land registration and ownership poses 
serious implications for the real estate development industry. Several interviewees indicated 
that the reluctance of foreign investors to enter the Saudi property market is mainly due to land 
title issues. Developers pointed out that the Ministry of Justice took a strong action in 2014 by 
cancelling several deeds of large plots of land in several cities including Riyadh. The 
cancelations of land deeds took place due to the discovery of the previous forgery of the 
property titles that actually had nothing to do with the current owner of the land. This created 
mistrust in the property market as explained by Developer 5: 
When ownership of land was transferred by a government agency, such as the Ministry 
of Justice represented by its public notaries, and this government agency approved, 
stamped and transferred the title then later must cancel the buyer’s deed, this creates 
destabilisation and mistrust in the market.  
Many of the interviewees argued that the delay in implementing the proposed electronic 
cadastre and title registration system has maintained the deed issues described above. The title 
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registration system has still not been implemented in many cities including the capital city of 
Riyadh. Thus, future legal issues, such as ownership disputes and deeds forgery that might lead 
to deeds cancelation and jeopardising developers’ projects should be eliminated as Financier 6 
stated: 
The [new] cadastre and title registration system will have a positive impact if 
implemented because currently deeds are not a hundred percent proof of ownership of 
a property where there can be duplication in the title deed. The linked electronic 
cadastre registration system will provide more security.  
5.3.3 Financing for producers   
Developers and financiers were asked to discuss issues in the finance system that support or 
restrict the production of housing. Developers were asked several questions including their 
sources of finance and what constraints they face in accessing finance for their projects. On the 
other hand, financiers were also asked about their contribution to the production of housing by 
discussing the financing options available for housing producers, how they determine granting 
finance and the challenges they face.  
Starting with sources of finance for developers, most developers described their sources of 
finance in one or multiple forms of these financing options: (i) self-funded i.e. the company 
capital; (ii) commercial bank loans; (iii) partnership with other companies; (iv) government or 
private real estate investment funds; and (v) off-plan sales. Some of the developers indicated 
that they use self-funding or a joint venture with other companies as preferred options of 
financing to raise fund for their projects. Developer 8 claimed that these two financing options 
are the most popular types used by developers despite their higher cost. The other types of 
financing sources, such as commercial bank loans and off-plan sales, were also used by some 
of the interviewed developers. 
Generally, most of the developers did not actually have issues accessing finance for their 
projects. However, there was widespread agreement between developers’ responses that there 
are constraints for accessing finance in the development industry. According to Developer 4: 
“As a developer we do not have a problem in accessing finance, but as an industry there is a 
problem”. Another developer interviewee indicated the difficulties faced in accessing finance 
from commercial banks: 
We as a real estate development company faced several problems in obtaining finance 
as some banks rejected us and others agreed to take the risk and finance some of our 
projects. There is an obstacle in accessing finance and the solution is to ensure the rights 
of lenders in the judiciary system. (Developer 10) 
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Most developers indicated that there is reservation and reluctance from banks to finance the 
real estate industry. Several developers argued that the higher risk involved, and the lack of 
protection regulations is behind the hesitancy of lenders (see Section 5.5.2 below). Commercial 
banks and financing companies adopt strict protection security measures to guarantee 
repayment of granted loans. Some developers indicated that lenders require the project’s land 
as collateral where the transfer of property title to the lender is used as a guarantee for funding. 
This may have implications for developers when they do not own the land outright or just share 
part of it. Some of the developers claimed that lenders, especially commercial banks, care more 
about names and the reputation of a developer than their track record and performance in the 
decision of granting finance. They also suggested that personal connections with financial 
institutions facilitate the chance of accessing finance. Nevertheless, most of the developer 
interviewees agreed that lending institutions utilise fair procedures to protect their businesses. 
Developer 10 stated: 
I personally do not blame banks and financing companies in this matter [strict lending 
for developers] because protecting their rights in the case of default from a developer 
is very difficult and may expose them to complex issues. Therefore, they protect 
themselves by asking for guarantees that complicate the lending process.  
Developer 4 added that financial institutions are well developed and sophisticated and despite 
being “very conservative” at the current time they do still provide finance. He claimed that the 
real estate industry is not regulated enough to fit in with the banking system criteria. He also 
claimed that most developers are not sophisticated enough when applying for funds for their 
projects and lack financial expertise. 
It’s not about the size [of a development company] but how sophisticated you are. If 
the bank knows that the developer is aware of the risk involved in funding by providing 
all proper documents, then the bank will review it…As a company we speak their 
language [commercial banks] in terms of understanding the risks and doing proper cash 
flow whereas a lot of real estate developers have problems with that. (Developer 4) 
Financial institution interviewees were asked about their perspectives of lending to developers 
and the challenges they face. Two executive managers of two commercial banks and a CEO of 
a finance company demonstrated similar views about their lending procedures for developers. 
These financiers argued that developers seeking loans with previous experiences, a good 
reputation, sound financial statements and the ability to prove financial solvency by generating 
enough cash flow to pay back loans are usually considered for granting loans. The two bankers 
explained that the use of developer’s land as a collateral in some cases is to control the source 
of repayment as a guarantee. The CEO of the financing company stressed that besides the 
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assessment of the developer’s financial capability and his track record, marketability of the 
project plays a key factor in granting finance. Financiers attributed the reluctance of banks and 
financing companies to fund the real estate industry to the recent market slowdown and their 
preference to minimise risk. As noted by Banker 2: 
We have a huge amount of applications for loans but all depends on the bank’s tendency 
to take risk … Some banks do not prefer real estate lending [loans for developers] 
because the nature of this financing poses difficulties to get out of, especially at the 
current time where banks have to wait for the developer until he sells out his units.  
Several interviewees also discussed the other types of financing sources available for 
developers. A property financial consultant interviewee claimed that financing sources 
available for developers, such as off plan sales and property investment funds, are not preferred 
nor utilised enough by many developers. He argued that these sources are attractive options for 
funding but the financial culture of developers and the real estate development industry do not 
support such options. He explained: 
Real estate investment funds are not popular with developers because they are not used 
to it and these funds have some restrictions that developers do not prefer (i.e. developer 
cannot control the fund as it’s the fund’s management role). Off plan sales is also 
another good option but developers also avoid it because it constitutes restrictions on 
them through the control of the money flow through the escrow account. (Financier 5) 
He also justified the disfavour of these available options to developers due to the risk involved 
with them arguing that the lengthy process of obtaining planning permits creates an obstacle 
for developers to meet the deadlines for these two financing options. He illustrated that the 
unregulated real estate industry and its lack of a dynamic system (where clear rules and 
regulations exist constituting all aspects of property development including planning permits) 
constrain developers to benefits from these available financing options. Furthermore, several 
interviewees claimed that real estate developers face challenges in accessing finance for their 
projects, as banks are not in favour of lending to the real estate industry due to problematic past 
experiences with the industry. Financier 1 explains: 
Over the past four years, banks have become a little conservative in lending for one 
reason that the number of companies that default in payment has increased whether 
they were developers or contractors. There is so much housing offered for sale in the 
market. Banks now are more vigilant about the property market cycles. The market is 
full of developers whose only source of repayment is the sale of developed units, which 
may not be easy nowadays.  
Finally, Financier 5 argued that the majority of developers currently working in the market 
self-fund their projects, as he noted: 
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Banks cannot be relied upon in financing developers and this is one of the biggest 
problems faced by the real estate sector … You find real estate financing here 
representing 3% of the GDP whereas in the other gulf countries it reaches 20%.  
5.3.4 Market characteristics and trends 
This category outlines several issues discussed by interviewees including: market competition, 
construction quality and housing production trends. First, many developers expressed their 
opinion about the competition they face in the market and how it affects their work. The major 
factor these developers talked about is the existence of small, unorganised builders, as some of 
the interviewees called them. These small builders are originally government employees who 
collect money for investment to build housing units by hiring small contractors or in some 
cases illegal labourers. The collected capital usually comes from friends, family and co-
workers.  
The responses of developer interviewees about market competition between organised 
development companies and small builders were divided. Half of the developers claimed that 
there is fierce competition in the market to build housing units caused by these small builders. 
They argued that it is very difficult for well-established development companies to compete 
with small builders as they build relatively inexpensive housing units. These interviewees 
explained that the majority of small builders build poor quality housing units using cheap 
materials and unskilled labourers. They claimed that the end product is low in price and it is 
hard to come up with similar products in price because of the low overhead cost incurred by 
these small builders. Developer 5 reported: 
As a developer, the market competition is very tough because of the presence of small 
developers who build about four to five villas. Their overhead is very low and the 
quality of their products is not at the required level. We as a development company 
cannot compete because we have high overhead cost and the quality is important for us 
because we want to maintain our name and reputation.  
On the other hand, half of the developer interviewees disagreed with the above claim. In their 
view the market is abundant and can accommodate different products with different prices. 
They argued that the variety of products and prices increases market competitiveness and 
results in better quality and prices. It was also argued that these small builders are important in 
the housing market as they produce the majority of the housing units. 
Developers provide different products than these provided by individuals [small 
builders]. For example, when I build 100 units with certain facilities and quality, I am 
selling a community not only housing units. Thus, the comparison is not an apple to 
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apple. The important point that we shouldn’t forget though is that without these 
individuals [small builders] the majority of people wouldn’t be able to buy housing. 
(Developer 3)  
The second issue discussed by interviewees pertains to the delivery of housing and the 
influence of government housing policy on the housing market. Several interviewees argued 
that government housing subsidy policies in the form of granting free land and interest-free 
loans to citizens has negatively contributed to poor quality of housing. It was explained that 
such subsidies promote the notion of ‘do it yourself’, where the majority of households receive 
the subsidy and hire small contractors to build their houses but often the quality is not up to 
standards. Developer interviewees argued that households do not have the knowledge and 
experience to supervise the building of their houses. Therefore, most of these buildings 
depreciate quickly negatively impacting on the growth of the secondary housing market. 
People are used to the idea ‘build your house by yourself’. You find that most houses 
in the city are dilapidated because of the poor quality of building. Since the quality is 
poor it will have negative effects and cost a lot in the future as these houses will have 
to be demolished at some point. (Developer 4) 
All financial institutions require a certain building age to mortgage a housing unit. Usually this 
requirement ranges between 15 to 20 years and this creates an obstacle for buyers looking for 
less expensive housing options. Many financier interviewees believe that this requirement is 
used as protection for both the buyer and the lender; and stated that there are building quality 
problems that present financing constraints for buyers in the secondary housing market. They 
argued that the lack of a unified building code and the absence of owners’ associations are 
among the issues that hinder the development of the secondary housing market. As noted by 
Financier 2: 
There is lack of professional development and a unified building code. Unprofessional 
people [small builders/contractors] are presenting the mass of development, therefore, 
there will always be building quality issues in the housing market. The only solution is 
to support professional real estate developers as they are recognised development 
companies that can grant warranties on housing.   
Lastly, developer interviewees were asked about their housing production trends and the 
obstacles they face in delivering housing, particularly for low and moderate-income segments. 
Eight out of the 10 interviewees stated that they only build housing units for high-income 
earners and mainly in the form of detached and attached villas. These developers argued that 
the high cost of land development coupled with stringent planning control (see Theme Four –  
Management) are the main reasons preventing them from building housing for all sectors.  
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We would like to target in our production all segments, but we cannot. We only target 
the upper middle and high-income classes because the current regulations do not 
provide any motivation for us to build for middle and low-income people. We build a 
certain type of housing, such as villas and row housing and we have not entered into 
the construction of apartments. We sell dwellings from SAR1.2 million (USD320,000) 
to dwellings that reach up to SAR10 million (about USD2.6 million). Our goal in the 
future is to sell housing units between SAR600,000 to 800,000 (USD160,000-213,000) 
because this constitutes the majority of market demand but unfortunately we cannot 
achieve that now. (Developer 6)   
The lack of housing mix choices that are affordable for low- and moderate-income households 
is a challenge in the housing market. Many real estate agent interviewees argued that the actual 
issue in the housing market is not about housing supply but the affordability of produced 
housing: 
There is huge supply of housing in the city but most of these dwellings offered in the 
market are not affordable to the majority of people. The prices are increasingly going 
up and this is what prevents many people from buying. (Real Estate Agent 2) 
Even apartments that could be somehow affordable to people, their prices are 
unrealistic over SAR700,000 (USD186,666) compared to their size, quality and design. 
(Real Estate Agent 1) 
Financier interviewees indicated that the lack of housing choices that meet the need of 
households and their purchasing power constrain their business from thriving. Low and middle-
class segments which make up the majority of demand in the market are under supplied where 
the bulk of supply is out of their reach. 
There is the problem that the purchasing power of citizens is weak … We have a lot of 
applications from people who want to obtain mortgages but there is no supply of 
affordable housing choices for them. (Financier 2) 
This concludes the analysis of issues raised in the first theme of production. The second theme 
will now be explored.  
5.4 Theme Two: Consumption 
This theme closely examines issues in the consumption of housing from the perspective of the 
private sector as formed by their reported experiences in the industry. Developer and real estate 
agent interviewees discussed housing consumption issues from societal and cultural 
perspectives. One category emerged from the analysis to represent this theme as follows.  
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5.4.1 Society and housing 
Interviewees described several housing issues that revolve around the cultural attitudes and the 
way housing is consumed in the city starting with the issue of housing preferences of 
households in the city. Many interviewees explained that households’ purchasing power is 
weak and does not match their housing desires regarding the type of housing and its size.  
The problem is there is no match between the purchasing power and the aspirations and 
desires of households in a large proportion of existing housing demand in the market. 
(Developer 5) 
Developers 4 and 6 argued that land prices in the city are not even high compared to other cities 
in the region. They attributed the problem of housing affordability to the weak purchasing 
power of households and the type and size of housing they are looking for. The culture and 
societal way of thinking in Saudi Arabia promotes different lifestyles that focus on owning 
spacious housing units with a strong preference for villas, as Developer 6 indicated:   
… if you compare land prices here with other neighbouring countries, you find that 
land prices in Saudi Arabia are low, but our lifestyle here is different as everyone wants 
to buy a house with an area of 500, 600, or 700 square metres when they just started 
their careers. I see customers coming to us and wanting to get what is called ‘a lifetime 
home’. Why should there not be first, second and third homes? As a newly married 
couple with a child or two why not start with a flat? This is a cultural issue that people 
want to get large homes. So, the pattern here is horizontal rather than vertical which 
focuses on the space and that is part of the high prices.  
The developer comment above was echoed by the new Minister of Housing in his first public 
appearance at a forum in Riyadh in 2015 where he stated that: 
Housing is not a problem of resources or land, but a problem of thinking. If we cannot 
solve this thinking problem we will go in circles and will not find any current or future 
solutions … One of the thinking problems is the idea of ownership and the dream home. 
Now the dominant culture among young households is to buy a house with an area of 
600 to 800 sq. metres as the dream home instead of gradually buying a small house 
until being able to move to a bigger one. (Asbar Forum, 2015) 
The issue of housing preferences and the weak purchasing power is not limited to average 
income households. Developer 1, who works as one of five main companies that builds low 
cost housing in the city in partnership with the Ministry of Housing (MOH), elaborated on 
housing cultural issues for low-income households. He explained that the MOH requires 
developers to build apartment units of minimum 180 sq. metres, which he thinks is very 
generous for government housing. Nevertheless, his company went through difficulties to sell 
their low-cost units as he explained that the majority of eligible households did not want to live 
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in apartment units for reasons, such as the size of the unit, the communal nature of apartment 
living, the large number of their family members or other cultural issues: 
As a developer 180 sq. metres is high as housing for low-income people but for these 
beneficiaries it is considered as small space … A lot of them asked to remove their 
names from the apartment housing subsidy program list so that they can get a land 
and/or a loan [other types of housing subsidies]. Most of the beneficiaries prefer not to 
live in apartments and this is a cultural problem that has nothing to do with the Ministry 
of Housing. (Developer 1)  
All real estate agent interviewees agreed that the majority of households in the city consider 
the unit space as one of the main factors in buying housing. They explained that consumers 
have a strong preference to buy a villa over an apartment even if the households currently do 
not need the space. Real estate agent interviewees indicated that one of the reasons behind the 
disfavour of living in apartment units is the households’ consideration of a future increase in 
their family size and the desire for a large space. Some interviewees added that the current 
prices for spacious apartments are already expensive and they would prefer to take on an extra 
mortgage to buy a villa. All real estate agent interviewees indicated that there are a large 
number of first time homebuyers who are not just looking for a dwelling to live in but are also 
to invest. This type of dwelling usually contains the ground floor for the family to live in and 
three apartment units on the first and second floor to be rented out to help pay for the mortgage: 
The majority want to get a villa comprising one story and three apartments above it 
even if the family income is not enough they will still try to take out the investment. 
People here do not take what they need but more than they need. (Real Estate Agent 3) 
Real estate agent interviewees were asked about the current apartment buildings in the city that 
are for sale. The majority answered that these are usually bought for investment purposes and 
there is also a number of households who had no choice but to buy or rent apartment units to 
live in.  
Apartments that are offered for sale are constructed for profit maximisation by small 
builders with no consideration for good design, size and quality. Trust me, all the 
apartments that I have for sale now are small 120 sq. m and unsuitable for households 
to buy as a home. Yes, some people have no choice and buy them but mostly the 
majority who buy these apartments are investors who buy and rent. There is rarely 
anyone who buys an apartment in Riyadh to live in. It is supposed that apartments are 
only permitted to be built according to certain conditions and specifications. (Real 
Estate Agent 4)  
The unpopularity of living in apartments as a housing choice (besides the space and price) is 
also attributed to the disfavour of sharing living spaces with others as pointed out by many 
interviewees. Interviewees demonstrated that the lack of proper owner associations to manage 
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residential buildings has resulted in maintenance problems which discourage households from 
buying apartments units.   
Many interviewees suggested that the problem of housing affordability in the city is a result of 
cultural preferences for certain housing production trends, such as detached villas, that is 
supported by government policies and regulations. Developer 4 stated: 
We must change our concept that a house area should be 500 sq. metres because it is 
illogical. Currently the 300 sq. metres [villa] sells in the market for two million Riyals 
[about USD533,000] which is way above the average [household] income. Households 
will have to have an income of more than SAR25,000 [USD6,666] to be able to buy 
this type of housing. Then the Ministry of Housing goes and grants housing units or 
land with this area [500 sq. m] to people with low-income who may not be able to 
maintain the unit … the housing problem will continue if the policies do not change. If 
we assume that the government has the budget to buy land at this time, what about the 
future when there is no enough budget to buy land this way.   
Some interviewees were optimistic, believing that there is a gradual change of cultural thinking 
towards accepting smaller units. Society is adapting to change, and households are becoming 
more aware of the housing problem and some can be open minded to living in apartments and 
denser areas, as explained by the following interviewees: 
In general, the social outlook has been gradually changing over time. Ten years ago, 
the villa of 500 sq. metres was considered small and large villas of 1000 sq. metres 
were more desirable. Now the villa of 500 sq. metres is considered large and the 
standard size has decreased to 300-200 sq. metres. So, there is acceptance of smaller 
units and also apartments. In the past only foreigners lived in apartments but now you 
see Saudis buying apartments. (Financier 6) 
Society is changing and there is a tendency towards living in apartment buildings if 
good design is taken into account [such as space and privacy]. I think that the vertical 
expansion will provide a solution for the housing crisis. There should be consideration 
for rehabilitation of the old city centre that is becoming a slum area and a place for 
crimes. This will provide a good solution as it is connected to utilities and services. 
(Real Estate Agent 4) 
5.5 Theme Three: Exchange  
This theme outlines the regulatory environment that governs housing finance, more particularly 
the effects of new mortgage laws that have been enacted recently. Financier interviewees 
discussed the issues faced in financing and the positive and negative impact that accompanied 
lending and borrowing regulations in the housing finance market. This theme follows two main 
categories. 
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5.5.1 New mortgage laws impact  
Financier interviewees were asked to discuss the recently introduced mortgage finance laws 
package that was issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 2012 in order to 
identify its impact on the exchange of housing. The mortgage package included five laws to 
regulate the real estate financing industry. Interviewees expressed their perspectives on the 
impact and implications of these new laws on the housing market. In general, all financier 
interviewees viewed the issuance of the new mortgage laws package as a positive and very 
important government intervention to regulate the financial sector. Many believed that this new 
regulatory environment would take time to show a positive impact in the market.  
Financier interviewees, on the other hand, discussed the negative impact of the newly 
introduced law on the market and borrowers. One of the requirements that was introduced in 
the new mortgage laws package was a 30% down payment by borrowers in order for them to 
qualify for mortgage financing. Lenders are allowed to finance 70% of the property value. This 
was the biggest obstacle for financial institutions according to most financier interviewees. 
Many claimed that there was a big drop in revenues (about 70% according to two financiers) 
after imposing this new requirement. Financier and real estate agent interviewees argued that 
the majority of households cannot afford to pay 30% as a down payment when applying for a 
mortgage. In turn, this was one of the main reasons causing the recent property slowdown as 
indicated by most of the interviewees. Financier 3 stated: 
The main obstacle in the current mortgage financing is the mandatory 30% down 
payment of the property value imposed by SAMA … Most customers do not have the 
ability to provide 30% of the value of the intended property to buy.    
SAMA’s aim of the 30% requirement was to encourage households to establish a culture of 
saving that helps in owning their future homes. Many interviewees believed that it was a 
reasonable aim but the timing of implementing it concurrently with the new mortgage 
regulation was wrong and problematic, as noted by Financier 5: 
The mortgage law system is new and therefore was not really tested yet … I think that 
applying a 30% down payment was one of the biggest obstacles that significantly 
reduced the volume of mortgage financing. The system needs to be tested first, and then 
restrictions can be applied later.      
Financier interviewees also talked about current obstacles in the market that hinder the 
development of the new mortgage laws. Interviewees agreed that the real estate financing 
market lacks long-term financial resources. The current financing system could lead to a future 
illiquid lending market as many interviewees explained. This is due to the absence of the 
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securitisation process and the lack of a proper secondary mortgage market. Most property 
financing companies in the market are recently established, and most of these companies will 
face growth issues in the future as they have limited capital. Interviewees outlined that banks 
started recently to buy mortgage portfolios from financing companies. However, this practice 
of buying portfolios by banks is not sustainable and banks might not be able to take on long-
term liabilities in the form of mortgage portfolios that are funded by short-term liquidity as 
reported by some interviewees. Financier 6, who owns a mortgage financing company, warns: 
A mortgage securitisation process currently does not exist. Banks nowadays buy 
portfolios but sooner or later banks will face the same issue as they have a limited 
balance sheet. Real estate financing is a huge sector so there must be real mortgage 
securitisation where there is a secondary mortgage market that is structured resulting in 
products that can be resold to the retail market.   
One of the newly issued mortgage laws was to create a government-owned mortgage firm 
similar to the United States model of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to develop a 
secondary mortgage market. The company was announced to be ready by the end of 2016 with 
an approximate capital of USD2.6 billion. Some interviewees believed that the company should 
have been in place with the announcement of the new mortgage laws. Nevertheless, many view 
it as a significant step in the right direction allowing financial institutions to expand their 
activities supported by government investment in real estate.  
Financier interviewees also affirmed that other regulations, such as the implementation of the 
enforcement law and the electronic land title registration system are equally important in the 
successful development of the new mortgage laws regulations. They praised the efficient role 
played by SAMA, the regulatory authority for the financing sector in supervising and enforcing 
these new mortgage laws. Financier 2 pointed out that other government agencies should also 
facilitate the implementation of the new mortgage laws:  
In general, I have no doubt that the new issued regulations are good and supportive and 
the existence of a supervisory government agency, such as the Monetary Agency 
[SAMA] is a strong addition to the sector … We hope that other relevant government 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Municipality accelerate 
the implementation of the full application of the mortgage laws.  
5.5.2 Financing and judiciary system  
The second category of this theme also investigates the exchange side of housing represented 
by lenders. Financier interviewees discussed issues they face with the current legal system 
when lending to users (consumption side) and producers (production side). As mentioned in 
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the first theme, financial institutions utilise strict security measures in lending to producers 
(developers) due to the higher risk they take caused by the lack of protection and securities 
measures. Financing requirements to provide mortgages for users mainly depend on the buyer’s 
income (salary requirements) and the ability to afford a 30% down payment (as discussed in 
the previous section). In this category, financier interviewees revealed their perspective on the 
legal system and the issues of enforcement and protection measures. 
The biggest challenge that all financier interviewees expressed is the lack of legal protection 
and security for lenders. One of the five main laws introduced under the mortgage laws package 
is called the ‘Enforcement Law’. This law was created to ease lenders’ concerns about pursuing 
insolvency actions in cases of a borrower’s default. Interviewees stressed that courts do not 
approve the transfer of a property title under the bank’s name when providing mortgages. This 
issue forced many banks in the past to establish subsidiary real estate companies in order to 
transfer mortgage titles of properties to these companies and not directly to the bank. The 
reason for this is that courts reject any mortgage contract issued in a bank’s name as it assumes 
that banks receive interest in lending and borrowing which goes against fundamental Islamic 
law. According to Financier 5: 
The judiciary system still doesn’t recognise banks. If there is a contract that has the 
bank’s name in it the judge will not recognise it. Therefore, the enforcement law, as 
one of the mortgage laws package, was issued to eliminate this non-recognition of 
banks in the judiciary system.  
Despite the issuance of the ‘Enforcement Law’, all financier interviewees affirmed that the law 
has not been enforced and implemented by courts and judges. Interviewees explained that even 
after the law was issued there was no change in the court system and lending institutions still 
function under the old system. Financier 3 pointed out: 
The inherent risk that we have in the country is caused by the weak implementation of 
the legal system which creates higher risk in lending.  
Many interviewees indicated that the interaction with courts shows bias by judges against 
banks thus providing less security for lenders. Interviewees claimed that in cases of a 
borrower’s default, judges tend to support the borrower by asking the lender to give a chance 
for the borrower to pay. They pointed out that there are delays of verdicts by judges that could 
sometimes take one or two years. Financier 1 illustrates: 
Banks cannot guarantee their rights and this is related to the government legislation and 
not the banks’ fault. The last solution used by judges in case of borrowers default is to 
foreclose the property and payback the bank even though it is supposed to be the first 
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and only solution. Judges base the trials on social perspectives in which evicting 
households of their homes is not acceptable.  
Another issue interviewees talked about was the lack of specialised courts in real estate. Many 
argued that judges are not informed or do not have expertise in issues, such as property finance 
as the current judiciary court system includes all cases under one court. The interviewees 
elaborated on the importance of strongly implementing the new law and the need for creating 
special real estate courts to protect lenders’ rights.  
5.6 Theme Four: Management   
This theme provides an insight into the state’s housing regulatory environment that shapes the 
outcomes of the housing market and how the private sector interviewees perceive it in either 
supporting or restricting them in delivering housing. As state management could include a 
number of broad policy areas that directly or indirectly impact the housing market (Burke, 
2012), the discussion under this theme is limited to two state management domains. First, 
interviewees discussed the impact of the planning system on housing including the planning 
process and development control measures. Second, several developers who are involved in 
the Public Private Partnership (PPP) with the Ministry of Housing expressed their views and 
experiences about the effectiveness of this new government initiative in building low cost 
housing.  
5.6.1 Planning system and housing   
Interviewees were asked to discuss the issues they face in the planning system and how it 
supports or restricts their work. Several issues were raised, especially by developer 
interviewees, that pertain to the planning process and development controls. First, most 
developer interviewees discussed the impact of the planning permission processing time on 
housing. The city-wide municipality is the agency responsible for conducting the planning, 
monitoring and approval process. There are two stages involved when a developer applies for 
a planning permit. The first stage is the initial planning assessment process of the proposed 
development plan that mainly ensures adherence to predefined planning control criteria. The 
second stage commences after obtaining the preliminary approval where conditions of the 
approval must be met in the construction phase, such as design specifications and connectivity 
of infrastructure including electricity, water and sewerage, in order to secure the final planning 
permission. 
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According to developer interviewees, the average time of the development assessment for the 
first stage is usually one to one and a half years and one to two years for the second stage to 
receive the final approval. Developers described the lengthy process of obtaining planning 
permits as the main hurdle in the development process. This was also noted by Property 
Finance Consultant 5 who is the vice chair of the Real Estate Committee at Riyadh Chambers 
of Commerce stating: “the subject of planning permits is considered to be one of the biggest 
obstacles the developers face”. 
Developer interviewees described their experiences and the reasons for delays in getting their 
projects approved. A common problem expressed by the developers is that of inadequate 
communication between the different departments of the municipalities and even from other 
government and non-government agencies involved. The manual use of communication in the 
form of postal correspondence (mailing) and the reliance on paper documents between these 
government departments and service providers could take months and this slow process causes 
delays in the approval process, according to most developers interviewed. When asked about 
the challenges perceived in obtaining planning permits, Developer 8 explained: 
Government procedures, time creates an obstacle for us where the approval of just the 
development master plan takes one and a half years. Two-thirds of this time is wasted 
on correspondence between government departments.  
Some developers claimed that the issue of planning delays is caused by the duplication of work. 
There are many parties involved in the assessment process other than the city municipality. 
The municipality communicates with other government departments, for example, to verify 
property ownership with the Ministry of Justice, where this formal procedure takes time and 
can be repetitive. Developer 2 explained that there is a lack of integration between government 
departments, such as municipalities and the Ministry of Justice. The absence of a linked 
electronic cadastre registration system is part of the permit delay problem where duplication of 
work often happens when proof of property ownership is required: 
… [property] registration is still linked to public notary, province principality and 
municipality of the city, but these [government agencies] are still not linked to one 
system since it depends on the postal correspondence which is impractical and time 
consuming. This causes duplication of work where the same file we presented to the 
municipality needed to be presented again to the public notary after the approval. There 
should be one linked system between the two [government departments] to verify or 
issue the deed based on a unified GIS system.  
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Several developers described the planning permission process as a complex and unorganised 
procedure. They also expressed dissatisfaction with planners and how their indifference to time 
can affect the approval process, as Developer 5 explained: 
There are many challenges with the municipality and the problem is time. Time for a 
public servant is not important or let’s say not a priority. For a real estate developer 
time is money and if the procedure is not done on time there will be higher costs 
incurred by the developer that might lead to losses.  
He emphasised that: 
Work has to be organised and structured within the Amanah [local planning authority] 
and the Ministry [of municipality] so that each procedure has a specific timeframe and 
there is some kind of integrated system … If the procedures are defined and confined 
with an exact timeframe this will positively impact the developer to reduce costs by 
reducing time and helping in providing products in the market leading to higher 
competition and less scarcity. (Developer 5) 
Most of the developers elaborated on their dissatisfaction with the work provided by local 
planning authorities. Some developers argued that planners (or as developers call them, 
‘municipal employees’) complicate the approval process and do not even follow the regulations 
sometimes. Some developers mentioned that municipal employees use unnecessarily rigid and 
formal procedures when reviewing development plans. For instance, there are no immediate 
forms of negotiations with developers to solve minor issues in the plans, instead there is a 
lengthy formal correspondence that can take a long time to ask for modifications. Several 
developers described the local planning authority’s employees as unqualified, uncooperative 
and showing disinterest and negligence in their work. Developer 2 maintained this view as he 
noted: 
Municipal employees complicate the process. There is no high work ethics and I am 
not talking about all of them but the majority of them. They show disinterest in time 
and I don’t know if some of them have a grudge against developers and investors.  
Another significant issue that was highlighted by several developer interviewees was the lack 
of development coordination in the planning process with utility and service providers, which 
significantly increases development costs. This issue involves infrastructure charges or 
development contributions where the local planning authority requires developers to build and 
connect infrastructure and services to their proposed projects. Hence, developers need to 
interact with utility and service providers, such as the Saudi Electricity Company, National 
Water Company and other telecommunication companies. Each of these service providers has 
certain requirements that developers must follow in order to obtain the final planning approval 
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as well as fulfilling the requirements of the local planning authority. According to most 
developers, these utility and service providers pose enormous challenges in the development 
industry as they follow unclear and unsystematic procedures. Many claimed that service 
providers (especially the electricity and water companies) take advantage of developers by 
requiring them to provide work that should in fact be delivered by these providers.  
The municipality is supposed to coordinate the development process but what is 
happening now is that developers are left to deal with service providers by themselves. 
The issue is that there are no clear requirements by services providers used for 
developers to state what he is supposed to pay. They all ask for providing extra work, 
such as building electrical power stations etc. These providers are ruled by monopoly 
[single service provider] such as the electricity and water companies. Therefore, there 
is no competition and developers are forced to comply even if it costs them higher 
prices or engagement in negotiations with these providers that could take years to be 
resolved. (Developer 2) 
Several developers argued that building and connecting infrastructure requires significant 
amounts of money which contribute to higher housing prices that are ultimately passed onto 
homebuyers, as Developer 3 explained:  
The most important issue for a developer in Saudi Arabia is connecting services to the 
development site because it is very expensive, and this cost is added to the final product. 
When we talk about electricity, sewerage and water connection, if there is no main line 
or power station close to the site, the developer will have to pay very high costs to 
deliver such services. Developers are responsible for the cost of main power stations 
and the network, as well as substations inside the subdivision. Similar for the Water 
company, as we build and connect the water and sewerage network to our site. The 
Electricity and Water companies particularly benefit directly from the services that we 
provide free of charge as there is no contribution from them except that they connect 
us to their nearest main lines. Therefore, the excessive cost will be passed onto the end-
user.  
The Saudi Electricity Company and the National Water Company enjoy a complete monopoly 
of services. They are essentially owned by the government (74% of government ownership for 
the electricity company and full government ownership of the water company) and many 
developers described their system as riddled with inherited government bureaucracy. 
Developers added that these companies have an incredible amount of work overload that results 
in an incapacity to deliver and connect services on time. They argued that the poor cooperation 
of service providers with developers is the consequence of a municipal coordination shortfall 
and the absence of other service provider competitors, which ultimately results in delays and 
extra costs for developers.  
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However, two of the developer interviewees stated that service providers have a timetable and 
priorities for connecting their services based on their available resources that many developers 
neglect to consider when buying land in faraway locations. They added that sometimes these 
providers cannot connect the scheduled services on time due to their work overload which costs 
developers more. However, they claimed that some of the developers may choose their project 
locations in areas that they know will not be connected in the near future. 
A developer has to check the location of the land before buying and see what zone of 
services his land is located in which specify the timeline delivery of services … Let me 
be honest, there are many developers who buy land outside the current utility delivery 
zone and think that they will get exemption in connecting the services to their locations 
and if it doesn’t happen they blame the service providers, and this is a problem we have. 
I know my developer friends will not be happy about what I am saying but it is true 
sometimes. (Developer 4) 
The majority of developer interviewees argued that the lack of coordination caused by the 
inadequate role of the city municipality not only impact land and housing prices but also result 
in a fragmented and inefficient real estate development sector. The implications of having to 
deal with many government agencies make it difficult for developers to account for their risks 
as they face lengthy, complicated and unsystematic procedures. 
All government and non-government agencies are planning alone without any 
coordination with each other. Real estate development in Saudi Arabia is outside the 
control of the developer in that it is possible to enter into a minor issue with the 
municipality or the electricity company that can hinder our work for months. In some 
cases, the developer does not have the control over the decision and at the same time 
he is the one to be blamed. (Developer 8) 
Many emphasised that there must be a regulatory authority for the real estate development 
industry to organise and coordinate the work: 
The problem is there is no one authority that developers can deal with that work on 
coordinating with other agencies and assume responsibility for all those who it deals 
with. In fact, this subject has a lot of complexities, overlapping of powers and 
sometimes contradictions between these agencies where developers can get caught in 
the middle. (Developer 5)  
The solution is a real estate regulatory authority to support us as real estate developers 
in dealing with all relevant stakeholders. The real estate developer is treated as a 
criminal when dealing with government agencies especially the municipality which to 
me seems like a way to distract from the corruption they have on their side. (Developer 
3)  
Another related issue highlighted by several developer interviewees was the on-site 
development contribution for community services, such as schools, mosques, streets and open 
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space where the municipality deduct 40% of the developer’s land. Developers described the 
deduction of their land as ‘wrong’ and ‘greedy’. Many explained that the planning law by the 
royal decree of 1992 states that developers are required to contribute 33% of any land for 
development to be assigned for community services. However, the High Commission for the 
Development of Riyadh (HCDR) has recently increased the development contribution for 
services into a 40% deduction of developers’ land in all new developments in Riyadh. 
Developer 8 suggested that this increase in deductions also contributes to housing 
unaffordability: 
The current 40% deduction is very high. This will be at the expense of the final product 
where the end-user is the one who will be paying for it, not the developer.  
Finally, developer interviewees argued that the current planning control regulations are 
unsupportive and impact housing affordability. An important control regulation discussed by 
most developers was the strict control over density. Developers pointed out that medium to 
high residential density measures that are used to support the optimal use of land is not utilised. 
In Riyadh, the majority of residential zoned land is permitted at 2.5 stories in height, with a 
building coverage of 60% (land that is located on major streets, that is streets with 30 metres 
or more in street width, are allowed a maximum of 4 stories in height). Most of the developers 
indicated that the maximum density regulations (height restrictions) make it unfeasible to build 
housing that is affordable for low- and moderate-income segments. Such restrictions on density 
and vertical expansion pose a challenge for developers, as confirmed by Developer 7:  
Land to development ratio is unfair because the price of land is high but a developer is 
not allowed to build higher than two and a half stories. This is one of the implications 
of urban planning used by municipalities.  
There was widespread agreement between developer interviewees that the municipality of 
Riyadh follows inflexible and rigid planning control regulations and shows no sign of 
cooperation with developers. For example, providing flexibility in land subdivision regulations 
by allowing changes to land use or permitting higher density in return for building low-cost 
housing is not utilised. Developers claimed that the current planning controls do not allow such 
flexibility that could be used to encourage more investment in housing. Several argued that 
planning and development control is a significant factor that contributes to the issue of housing 
affordability. Most developers expressed their interest in delivering affordable housing units if 
they are supported by regulations. Developer 10 points out: 
We want to target the middle class and low-income people, but we cannot profit from 
it … Accessing land that allows the construction of small units is difficult. 
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Municipalities also don’t allow building high stories, and this is unfeasible if I pay 
5,000 Riyals per metre [about USD1,300] for land and only get to build two and half 
stories on it. If the vertical expansion system was allowed it would have been possible 
to build something appropriate.  
Most of the interviewees were in favour of increasing building density yet three of the 
developers (3, 4 and 8) were against it. These developers shared the view that the capacity of 
the current infrastructure cannot cope if there is an increase in planning density. Developer 3, 
for example, argued that the current land subdivision does not support vertical expansion where 
small and incompatible plot sizes on major streets of the city will make it difficult to build 
parking for high-density projects where parking is already an existing problem. However, they 
all agree that there should be reconsideration of the current density control. Some of the 
interviewees also pointed out that the current low density measures were a major cause of many 
urban problems, such as urban sprawl, traffic jams and the huge pressure on public expenditure 
to deliver infrastructure and connect services to the fringes of the city.  
5.6.2 Public Private Partnership  
In this category, interviewees were asked to discuss their experiences and perspectives about 
the role of government as represented by the Ministry of Housing (MOH) and its recent PPP 
in supporting the delivery of affordable housing. Interviews were conducted with two private 
developers (Developers 1 and 9) who were involved with the PPP to document their 
experiences. Other developer interviewees also expressed their perspectives on this 
government initiative.   
Interviewees provided descriptions of their past experiences with the MOH since its 
establishment. As described in Chapter 2 (Recent changes in housing policy), the MOH 
resumed a direct housing delivery approach before changing its position to establish a 
partnership with the private sector to build 500,000 housing units. Many developer 
interviewees argued that the MOH was unsuccessful in its early efforts when it assumed the 
role of a builder by hiring contractors to build housing in many parts of the country. The MOH 
offered public competitive bidding to build housing units with contracts of SAR500,000 per 
unit (about USD133,000) as a ceiling amount that could not be exceeded by bidders 
(construction companies). Developer 9 claimed that most of the contractors who won the 
projects could not finish them due to limited budget constraints. He expressed his views about 
the first experience of the MOH: 
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The Ministry [MOH] dealt with this [building 500,000 housing units] like any other 
government project by offering it the traditional way which was public bidding for 
contractors … after four years the Ministry realised that it failed to deliver and couldn’t 
finish any of its projects till this moment. It failed because it wanted to address the 
problem by itself … The Ministry should never be the executor but should be the 
legislator, organiser and facilitator where it gives the private sector the green light and 
supports it to do its role.  
The majority of developer interviewees supported Developer 9’s view that the failure of the 
MOH in solving the housing problem was a result of taking the wrong position as a provider 
instead of facilitator and enabler. They claimed that there was a long exclusion of the private 
sector by the MOH. Many developer interviewees believed that this long exclusion was led by 
the MOH’s minster at the time who was against involving private developers to be part of the 
solution to the housing problem. Developer 8 points out: 
The Ministry of Housing doesn’t build now because of its failure in the building 
experience. We as developers met with the minster more than six times and discussed 
with him that the government cannot build except in communist countries. Why don’t 
we cooperate as private developers with the Ministry of Housing? He responded with 
rejection and described us as vampires.  
However, the MOH shifted its position by initiating a new public private partnership (PPP) 
program in 2014 to cooperate with private developers to build low cost housing for citizens. 
Also, the MOH minister was replaced later that year. The first project of the PPP was planned 
in Riyadh to build 5000 housing units in the northwest side of Riyadh city on an area of five 
million sq. metres. The MOH contracted a major construction company to build the 
infrastructure for the site.  
Developer 9 was one of the five companies that joined this new PPP project with the MOH.  
He explained that the MOH assigned part of the project (about 1300 units) as multi-storey 
residential apartment blocks to be built by developers as a start to test the PPP program’s 
success. Land was provided by the MOH to developers at no cost and developers were required 
to build housing units for an amount of no more than USD133,000 for each unit in their 
proposals. Forty-five development companies were initially interested in competing for these 
contracts, however, 32 withdrew after reviewing the strict proposal requirements. Several 
developers argued that the new PPP is not attractive for them. 
The Ministry of Housing changed its direction but they still have to think out of the 
box. What is the desired type of partnership? We went and saw the current partnership 
requirements. It still doesn’t make sense. This partnership is not feasible for us and if 
it’s unviable for private developers then they wouldn’t enter it. They [MOH] need to 
know how to attract the private sector to help, not to push us away. (Developer 4) 
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Let me put it this way, the partnership with the Ministry of Housing does not make an 
opportunity for us because any partnership depends ultimately on profitability and we 
do not see this one as profitable. The Ministry says we give the land to developers for 
free, but this does not mean that the SAR500,000 [USD133,000] is enough to build and 
make a profit. (Developer 3) 
Only five development companies agreed to enter the PPP with the MOH including Developers 
1 and 9. Both developers elaborated on their experiences working with the MOH for this PPP 
project. The two developers explained similar views that their motivation to enter the PPP with 
the MOH was to participate in solving the housing problem in the city as well as making a 
profit. They stated that after signing with the MOH, the number of units assigned to them was 
sharply reduced due to some dispute in the project’s land allocation between the MOH and a 
third party that affected their potential profitability. Developers 1 and 9 showed both 
similarities and differences in their experiences and perspectives about the PPP with the MOH. 
On one hand, Developer 9 was not happy with the experience he had with the PPP program, as 
he stated:  
We lived the first experience with the Ministry [MOH] and we found that the 
partnership of the private sector with the ministry was not encouraging to attract a lot 
of investors … we as a real estate development company have taken the decision not to 
enter with the ministry again in any future projects as long as things are going the 
current way.  
Developer 9 described the PPP initiative by the MOH as “timid, cold and slow”. He argued 
that the requirements of the proposal were excessive, unrealistic and unattractive to the private 
sector. He stated that the amount of SAR500,000 (USD133,000) for each unit is not feasible to 
build to meet the MOH requirements. He pointed out several of these requirements including: 
(i) design standards, such as the minimum unit area of 180 sq. metres with a certain number of 
rooms; (ii) the strict and tight project timeline of 20 months for implementation and final 
delivery; and (iii) excessive maintenance and security requirements for 10 years after units 
were sold. Further to these already difficult conditions, were issues with the payment schedule 
that forced developers to run into negative cash flow during the construction period resulting 
in the use of the developer’s own capital or seeking additional finance. He also added that the 
MOH excessively intervened with their work during the early construction phase and argued 
that the MOH showed a lack of trust as opposed to engaging in a mutual partnership. Developer 
9 claimed that the MOH did not provide any support for developers in its PPP program: 
The Ministry [MOH] did not facilitate its requirements for developers and did not 
provide support for developers in other matters. The ministry did not provide support 
in coordinating with other agencies to give tax exemptions on imported building 
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materials, by facilitating foreign labour visas processes, or helping in accessing finance 
from banks. The ministry did not provide any support but on the contrary only 
imposition and frustration. 
On the other hand, Developer 1 was less critical of the PPP program and the role of the MOH 
in working with developers. He believed that the PPP had some issues as did any other 
government initiatives. Yet, he found that the work of MOH was “well organised and supported 
by expertise”. When asked about the possibility of future cooperation with the MOH in entering 
new PPP projects he indicated: 
We look forward to working with them again if it is possible to negotiate terms and 
requirements … We are always in a dialogue with them and always welcome their 
invitations because it seems that there are other projects offered on the table.  We would 
look at each project on its own merit. (Developer 1)  
However, Developer 1 admitted that the PPP program needed improvement to serve its 
purpose. He agreed with Developer 9 that some of the MOH’s requirements pose difficulties 
for developers, such as the tight timeline for construction and the added cost of funding 
incurred by the developer. Developer 1 also noted that the MOH’s insufficient contract budget 
assigned per unit and the high building and design specifications made it unfeasible for 
developers to participate in this PPP. He explains:  
Let me be honest with you, we will not make a single penny as profit in the sale. We 
are going into a loss. We didn’t know about this when we entered. It came later, while 
we were finalising. We decided that if we can breakeven that will be great.  
Besides the MOH proposal requirements and the profitability issue, Developer 1 believes that 
there are fundamental issues with the PPP initiative and that one of these is the wrong choice 
of the project location. He argued that the MOH’s plan to build low cost housing in a faraway 
location from the city centre is not economical; and that the significant cost incurred by the 
government to build and connect infrastructure and services to the project location is illogical. 
He explains: 
Let me tell you frankly about my issue with this, Riyadh has a large amount of land but 
they [MOH] chose to build residential apartments that are 50 kilometres from the city 
centre. Isn’t it silly? How much was the potential cost allocated and incurred by the 
government to house each household in that location? It would’ve been much better if 
they built it in a location closer to the city centre where the cost of connecting 
infrastructure is very much less than the cost of the current project location. The cost 
incurred by the government to build one housing unit is between one to one and a half 
million including [500,000 for the PPP’s contract] infrastructure connection and 
running cost. (Developer 1) 
  158 
Developer 1 mentioned other issues of concern with the current PPP program. He argued that 
the MOH was limiting its vision by just focusing on one type of PPP. He believed that they 
should look into other models of partnerships that are used in other countries, such as social 
rental housing for low-income people. He also criticised the MOH’s focus on just delivering 
housing units through its PPP without thinking about the social outcomes. He claimed that this 
PPP would have social problems in the future as it would create a segregated community that 
might result in future problems, such as crimes. 
I think the issue is not about delivering units. It is about the outcomes and how it will 
benefit the community. One of these things is crowding low-income people in a 
contained territory creating ghettos in the middle of the desert. It is not clever to build 
housing units how they did it. The success is in creating proper communities and this 
is what they should look at. It’s not savvy that the minister of housing appears on media 
and says we built one thousand housing units. (Developer 1)   
Developer 9 concluded that the Ministry of Housing must change its current housing policy 
framework in order to achieve better housing delivery. 
There has to be a special path for housing in general in this country that functions 
outside the current government laws and frameworks with its own rules and regulations. 
If housing was put under the umbrella of the existing rules and regulations, it would 
fail before it begins.  
From the perspective of the private developers, the PPP is not achieving the goals as proposed 
by the MOH.  
5.7 Conclusion  
The analysis of the interviews presented in this chapter uncovered critical issues in the social 
interactions of market actors within the context of market operations in the housing system. A 
thematic coding procedure was undertaken to frame the analysis and interpret the collected 
data in meaningful and insightful ways. Following several steps of coding, four analytical 
themes were derived from this study’s conceptual framework to provide a deeper 
understanding and interpretation of the information revealed in the major categories.  
The first theme, production, covered issues with land assembly including access, prices and 
legal issues as well as access to finance for producers and market production issues and trends. 
First, the findings in this theme showed that there are difficulties in accessing land for housing 
development mainly caused by land hoarding in which scarcity of land coupled with high 
demand have contributed to increases in land prices. Second, the results showed that 
weaknesses in the property registration system created high levels of uncertainty which 
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negatively impacted trust in the market. Third, while most developers did not have a problem 
in accessing finance, there was widespread agreement that accessing finance for producers is 
still an issue. Finally, the results revealed that several factors have contributed to the challenge 
of delivering affordable housing, most notably a lack of suitable housing mix choices in the 
market.  
The second theme, consumption, outlined the challenges faced in the culture of housing 
consumption and how it affects the production of housing. The findings suggest that the culture 
of households’ preferences has resulted in a mismatch between desirability and affordability 
that further complicates access to housing. The third theme, exchange, discussed housing 
finance and regulatory issues in lending and borrowing. The results showed that although the 
introduction of mortgage laws have positively contributed to regulating the housing finance 
market, several issues, such as high down payments and the enforcement of lenders’ protection 
laws, may still pose a challenge for the industry.  
Finally, the fourth theme management discussed the impact of the planning system on housing 
supply and prices as well as the efficiency of PPPs from the private sector perspective. In terms 
of planning and housing, the results revealed that several important issues, such as planning 
delays, uncertain infrastructure charges, high on-site development contributions and stringent 
density controls, hinder private developers from delivering affordable housing. In addition, 
developer interviewees perceived the role of the MOH as inadequate in addressing housing 
issues in Riyadh. The results showed that developers view the PPP initiative as financially 
unattractive and consider that it may not provide a viable solution due to a range of issues 
including its strict proposal requirements.    
As private market actors have conveyed their perceptions on the housing system issues faced 
in delivering housing, particularly for low- and moderate-income segments, the findings 
showed that significant claims were made under the theme management. As this is worthy of 
further investigation, the next chapter will present in depth the issues discussed in the planning 
system and housing policies.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Government Actors’ Perceptions of Planning and Housing Regulatory 
Framework  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis of Stage 1 described in the previous chapter paid attention to the broader housing 
system issues and how the market operates in Riyadh from the private sector perspective. The 
interaction between market actors and the existing housing regulatory framework unfolded in 
the analysis helped identify the most problematic issues that hinder housing producers from 
delivering affordable housing in Riyadh. As housing is a complex and multifaceted discipline, 
addressing the whole housing system (as identified in the Stage 1 analysis) in any greater detail 
is an enormous task and beyond the scope of this research due to the limited timeframe and 
resources available. Hence, this researcher, bounded by time and resource limitations, decided 
to further investigate the most pressing and complicated issues revealed in the Stage 1 analysis. 
As most of the issues raised by participants are deemed important, some are straightforward 
and could be dealt with immediately with procedural actions, such as land titling and proof of 
ownership. Other issues found in the analysis are perhaps more complicated and unlikely to be 
resolved with a single change. Such issues are not only limited to the Saudi housing system but 
also still exist in mature housing systems, such as in Australia and the United Kingdom.  
Based on the analysis of the first stage in Chapter 5, the planning system and government 
intervention in housing in the form of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) are two areas of 
significance further investigated in Stage 2 that will be presented in this chapter. First, there is 
tension between developers and the planning regulatory environment, as most developer 
interviewees perceive government regulatory control, namely the planning process and 
development controls, as an obstacle to the production of housing, particularly affordable 
housing. Planning permission delays, strict development control measures and the weak 
coordination between government agencies were some of the main issues raised by developers. 
The second significant problematic area identified in the Stage 1 analysis is the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) program by the Ministry of Housing (MOH). Developer interviewees 
described the government response to the market failure in the form of PPP as an inadequate 
and unattractive response to engage the private sector. They showed discontent with the role 
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played by the MOH as a state agent in enabling the market to function effectively as many 
argued the requirements of the PPP were excessive and unrealistic.  
This chapter examines the impact of planning and development controls on housing as well as 
the role of the state housing agency in enabling private developers to deliver affordable housing 
through direct and indirect intervention. The results presented in this chapter are based on 10 
semi-structured interviews conducted with key government stakeholders who are involved 
professionally in planning and housing in Riyadh. Six planners were interviewed comprising 
three national level planners (Planner 2, Planner 3 and Planner 4) from the Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) and three state and city level planners (Planner 5 and 
Planner 6) from the Riyadh Municipality (Amanah) and one from the High Commission for 
Development of Riyadh (HCDR) (Planner 1). In addition, four housing officials from the 
Ministry of Housing who are involved in the PPP program were also interviewed. The analysis 
follows two main themes derived from this study’s conceptual framework where government 
actors’ perspectives and views on issues raised by the private developers in the previous chapter 
are uncovered.  
6.2 Thematic analysis of planners and housing officials’ interviews    
Interviews of this second stage were designed based on issues in the planning system and the 
PPP identified by private actor participants in the first stage analysis as well as on recent 
reforms in the housing system that took place after Stage 1 was conducted. The interviews were 
divided into two sets of topics and questions, one targeting planners and the second targeting 
housing officials. Planners’ interviews consisted mainly of topics relating to the planning 
process, planning policies and strategies, as well as the newly emerging planning deregulatory 
reforms that were introduced just before the fieldwork for this stage was undertaken. On the 
other hand, housing official interviews focused on probing the issues of the PPP model and its 
requirements in addition to other related interventions used by the MOH to stimulate the 
housing market. Both sets of topics and questions were designed to explore and examine 
participants’ views on the issues raised considering the past, present and future. A thematic 
data analysis was employed in this second stage following the systematic step-by-step data 
coding procedure suggested by Green et al (2007) as described in Chapter 4. The method of 
analysis is briefly described below. 
The data collected and analysed for Stage 2 was based on investigating the issues of the two 
management domains of the state: (i) the planning system’s impact on housing; and (ii) the 
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government’s intervention in the housing market. The coding process of forming categories 
and identifying patterns resulted in, initially, 14 categories containing prefigured categories 
(issues that were raised by private market actors) and new emerging categories (issues that 
relate to recent MOH intervention). These categories were then revisited later in the process to 
form categories that share similarities with each other resulting in four major categories. These 
major categories were: (i) planning process; (ii) planning polices/strategies; (iii) Public Private 
Partnership; and (iv) related government initiatives. The first three major categories contain 
several sub-categories (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Themes and Categories for Stage 2 Analysis  
Analytical Themes Categories 
 
Theme 1: Market Regulation 
 
1. Planning process 
• Time and procedure 
• Coordination 
• Roles and responsibilities  
2. Planning policies/strategies 
• Development control  
• Development contribution  
• Planning incentives  
 
Theme 2: Market Stimulation 
3. Public Private Partnership  
• Direct intervention  
• Indirect intervention 
4. Related government initiatives 
 
Following the formation of categories, the final step in analysing the data was the identification 
of themes. This step entailed moving towards a more analytical and theoretical 
conceptualisation. To be able to do that, this researcher sought a framework that broadly 
examines the state-market relations in housing that can be applicable to the formed categories 
as well as to other contexts. The focus was on the broader perspectives of how the states’ 
regulatory environment could affect market actors in producing affordable housing. Categories 
formulated in the analysis showed comparable patterns with the work of Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger (2005), Adams (2008), and Adams and Tiesdell (2013), which was integrated 
and synthesised in this study’s conceptual framework. The theoretical concept in these 
scholarly works revolves around the broad state’s policy interventions in land and property 
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markets which classifies them into four types: market shaping, market regulation, market 
stimulation and capacity building (Table 6.2). According to Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005): 
“Each type is characterised by how it is intended to affect the decision environment of market 
actors” (p. 63).  
Table 6.2: Broad Types of Policy Intervention in Land and Property Markets  
Policy type  Purpose  Examples 
Market 
‘shaping’ 
To shape the context within 
which market actions and 
transactions occur 
 
Statutory development plans 
Transport investment plans 
Code for sustainable homes 
Market 
‘regulation’ 
To regulate or control market 
actions and transactions, 
ensuring some consideration of 
externalities and the public 
interest 
 
Development control/ 
management 
Building regulations 
Restrictive covenants attached to 
sales of public sector land 
Market 
‘stimulation’ 
To make the market work 
better, by having a direct 
impact on financial appraisals 
 
Land assembly and release 
Grants or tax breaks to 
encourage more desirable 
activity or taxes to discourage 
undesirable activity 
‘Capacity 
building’ 
To build capacity of state 
and/or market operators 
Encouraging public–private 
development partnerships 
Promoting skills for sustainable 
communities 
Source: Adams (2008, p. 4572)  
 
Examining the role of the state in enabling the market to deliver affordable housing is a central 
focus of this thesis, thus two of these state’s policy interventions that share similarities with 
the created categories were utilised in this step of the analysis as broad themes. The chosen 
analytical themes are market regulation and market stimulation. These two themes allow the 
exploration and explanation of the degree and balance used by the state that seek to regulate 
(restrict) and/or stimulate (facilitate) the market. In the context of this study, market regulation 
is utilised as a theme to assess the impact of the planning system on the production of affordable 
housing in Riyadh; whereas market stimulation is adopted to examine the recent shift in the 
state’s role in facilitating and enabling the work of market actors. The other two themes (market 
shaping and capacity building) were not applicable to the data collected in this stage. The 
results of the Stage 2 analysis are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
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6.3 Theme One: Market Regulation  
Market regulations are generally imposed by the state seeking to regulate and control market 
activities. Planning consent processes, development controls and zoning ordinances are types 
of market regulation affecting the decisions of market actors by “restricting the set of choices 
available” to them (Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005, p. 67). The aim of market regulation is to 
supervise the development process and the changes it produces to the built environment acting 
as a form of intervention that protects the public interest. 
The focus of market regulation is on compelling, managing or eradicating certain 
activities or aspects of those activities. It thus limits individual actor scope for 
autonomous action, on the basis that collective gains more than outweigh any individual 
losses. (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 266) 
This theme examines the impact of market regulation namely the planning system, on the 
production of affordable housing in Riyadh. In the first stage of this study, developers argued 
that issues and obstacles in the planning system affect their ability to deliver viable low-cost 
housing. Therefore, the impact of planning actions on housing production is investigated from 
planners’ perspectives. This theme focuses on two main categories: (i) the planning process 
including issues with planning delays and roles and responsibilities; (ii) planning policies and 
strategies which investigate development control issues including the use of density measures 
and the extraction of development contributions from developers. It is important to indicate 
that this theme focuses on the microeconomic impacts of the planning system on the housing 
market in the city of Riyadh and not on the broad impact of spatial planning on the country’s 
overall housing performance.   
6.3.1 Planning process  
This category examines the issues raised by private developers in the planning process. 
Generally, these issues pertain to the process of obtaining planning permission. Planning 
delays; clarity of the planning, monitoring and approval process; coordination between 
planning authorities and other stakeholders involved in housing; and the distinct roles and 
responsibilities of national, state and local planning authorities are discussed. Ball (2011) 
argued that the planning process could greatly affect housing production:  
Developers’ desires to build can be severely dented when faced with slow, expensive 
and uncertain processes involved in a planning authority deciding whether a proposed 
development meets prescribed rules. Such planning delay can deter development as 
effectively as any outright ban. (pp. 349-350) 
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The impact of the planning process on private developers attempting to produce affordable 
housing is investigated in this section from state agents’ perspectives. Planners and housing 
officials were asked to respond and elaborate on their perceptions, experiences and opinions 
about issues and claims raised by developers in the first stage analysis.   
6.3.1.1 Time and procedure 
Private developers asserted that the time taken by the planning authority to grant consent is the 
most problematic issue they face when lodging a development proposal. This claim was 
reinforced by the government in its recent National Transformation Program (NTP) (KSA, 
2016a) document showed that the average time to approve and license new residential 
development projects is 730 days. Taking these government statistics into account, planners 
were asked if they see the planning permission process as slow and, if so, the reasons behind 
it.  
All the six planner interviewees agreed that the time taken for the planning, monitoring and 
approval process was very slow in the past. They provided several reasons based on their 
experiences that attributed to this planning delay. First, the majority claimed that one of the 
main reasons behind this delay is not because of the planning process itself. Many explained 
that the proof of land ownership by government public notaries slows the process of granting 
permission. 
Let’s be clear, there were delays in the past, but the planning procedure was not the 
problem based on my experience as a member of the planning permission committee 
for fifteen years. The delay was to ensure the properness and clarity of the land title, as 
we were not to deal with development proposals until we make sure that the property 
ownership is correct. This has caused implications for us, but again there was no 
planning delay from our side. (Planner 6) 
The first step a development proposal must comply with when applying for permission is to 
prove the correctness of the land title and the time starts to count once the application is 
submitted to the planning authority. The problem mentioned by many planners is the 
involvement of other government bodies in this process. Planning authorities send the deed 
(the land title) to a public notary to examine its correctness. Ensuring the clarity of titles is a 
crucial step to avoid issues, such as forgery, boundary disputes and encumbrances. However, 
according to the planners, this procedure adds considerable time to the planning evaluation 
process.  
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Some planners, on the other hand, explained that there are planning related reasons that 
contribute to the permission delays. The planning authority assigns committees (juries) to 
evaluate development proposals. These usually consist of a mixed panel of professionals and 
academics. Developers must present their proposals and satisfy all the notes and amendments 
made by the panel. In the past, there was no limit to how many times a developer had to present 
and show the amendments to the jury. The process of evaluating planning and design concepts 
can be complex and time consuming as Planner 2 noted: 
Once we finish with the issues of land title and surveying with their legal and technical 
procedures, we begin with the issue of conceptual planning as there was no clear system 
in approving land subdivision. For example, a developer goes back and forth between 
the planner in charge and his manager. There are committees [juries] at Riyadh 
Municipality which are in fact very stubborn and try to impose on developers certain 
planning concepts. Developers present their planning and design ideas to the committee 
to evaluate it. This caused delays in many projects and I agree that there was a large 
defect in the planning process in the past. 
Planners indicated that developers sometimes could take part in the planning delay as well. 
Planners described developers as driven by self-interest seeking maximum marketability and 
profitability of their projects. This sometimes causes planning permit delays as developers seek 
to maximise their profit by trying to manipulate the control requirements. Examples include 
allocating more streets of certain widths (30 metres) to allow more commercial or mixed land 
use in their land subdivision designs (commercial land often has higher selling prices), not 
following certain designs to implement traffic safety, or even rejecting the compulsory 
development contribution. Not only planners commented on this issue, Housing Official 2 
stated:    
When a developer proposes a development idea that he views as financially feasible 
and then the municipality comes and asks him to amend it, the developer sometimes 
rejects the amendments … you find that the developer procrastinates and tries to find a 
personal connection to help him or he returns and tries to convince them [the planning 
authority]. So, the period is extended, the process becomes aimless and no one benefits.  
Another issue related to time raised by private developers is the use of manual communication 
by the planning authority arguing that it contributes to planning delays. Planners were asked to 
provide their views on this issue focusing on time. Some thought it was not a significant factor 
causing delays and others thought it was affecting the permission time to some extent. 
However, during the period of conducting the second stage interviews, the government 
introduced a new electronic fast track licensing system for lodging development proposal 
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applications to accelerate the planning permission process (this is discussed under Theme 
Two).  
When asked about their perspectives of the planning procedure, planners had different points 
of view. Some of the key issues discussed were the clarity and flexibility of the planning 
process. Developers argued that the planning permission process is ‘complex, unorganised and 
inflexible’. The majority of planner interviewees, especially those involved in the planning, 
monitoring and approval process, rejected the developers’ claim. These planners explained that 
the permit process is organised and follow clear development control requirements. 
Each [developer] is entitled to his opinion and we respect that, but the planning process 
has clear standards and controls measures that are linked to the city’s strategic master 
plan which cannot be bypassed. (Planner 6) 
Some planners went further explaining that the problem is not in the planning process but in 
the private development industry that is driven by profit maximisation and financial gain 
objectives, as Planner 4 indicated:  
The process is well defined and follows the city’s master plan. Developers have certain 
powers that they want to change everything according to their interests.  
However, Planner 3 disagreed with the above remarks by planners explaining that there was 
some ambiguity in the planning process mainly caused by the lack of a unified planning act: 
I agree that the current process is unclear. That is why the government now is in the 
process of revising the National Urban Strategy and establishing a new planning act, 
we admit the problem … in Saudi there is no planning act but regulations here and 
there… even these regulations are not clear and open to interpretation. 
Planner 2 provided an elaborate explanation about the issues of clarity and flexibility of the 
planning process. He argued that the issue revolves around the complexity of amending 
planning schemes in the existing development control measures. When asked about his 
agreeing or disagreeing that the current planning requirements for granting development 
approval are inflexible and hinder the production of housing, he stated: 
I partially agree. Usually a developer chooses a certain location in the city and proposes 
changes to its existing building regulations. For example, when a developer proposes 
changes to the grid design [the typical design of land subdivision in Riyadh], building 
heights and size of plots areas in his design to achieve certain ideas he has, then he is 
violating the existing system. Each of these changes has separate regulations and 
changing them is not under the authority of the municipality. He must submit a request 
for amendments to the High Commission for Development of Riyadh for exemption 
consideration.  
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I am talking about the past because the situation has now changed because the Ministry 
of Housing adopted new ideas. But in the past, the process of applying for a planning 
permit was not clear and complex and I am frankly speaking here because we are talking 
about changing building regulations.  
The issue of flexible development control regulations has been recently addressed by the 
Ministry of Housing as indicated by the planner’s commentary above as part of deregulatory 
incentives to stimulate the market. This is discussed in more detail under the theme market 
stimulation.  
Another flexibility issue in the planning process raised by developers relates to the rigidity and 
formality used by planners in reviewing development plans. Developers claimed that planners 
do not use any form of negotiation to resolve minor issues, instead they unnecessarily 
complicate the process. Some planners disagreed with this claim explaining that there is a 
planning procedure put in place that must be followed. Planner 4 indicated that there are 
negotiations that take place between the municipality and the developer to discuss proposed 
designs and solve issues. These negotiations between the planning monitoring unit and 
developers are done under the supervision of the MOMRA. However, Planner 2 argued that 
the rigidity and formality problems stem from the bureaucratic administrative system itself: 
We can’t blame planners; it’s the administrative system that is used not just planners as 
they work within the system. The administrative system doesn’t care about cost where 
time costs money … The system was run by a non-professional mentality that rejects 
the use of emails for example. That mentality was purely bureaucratic… I agree that in 
the past the existing system was bad and we are not talking about a planner or a planning 
unit but the whole system, which didn’t provide flexibility and didn’t serve the 
development process… of course these issues were in the past but now the situation has 
changed for the better.    
Most planner interviewees believe that the planning process had issues in the past but there 
have been many improvements in the past four years and most of these issues are now dealt 
with:  
The situation has changed a lot and there are great improvements. We sought 
development and improvement because we know that in the past there was bureaucracy 
and there was delay and there were weaknesses in the cadres. Now most of these 
problems have been avoided, but to be clear we are not saying everything is a hundred 
percent now. (Planner 6)  
6.3.1.2 Coordination 
One of the issues raised by private developers was the lack of coordination and integration 
between different government agencies involved in the planning and development process. 
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First, developers argued that verifying land ownership is a duplicated procedure that is 
conducted by both public notaries and the municipality causing a slow planning permission 
process. Planners were asked about their perspectives on this issue of coordination and 
integration. Some planners indicated that the procedure of proofing land titles has some issues, 
particularly when the public notaries verify and register the paper deed and check its content 
and then the municipality verifies the deed’s detail on the ground to check for accuracy. This 
process could be problematic as outlined below: 
Yes, there are duplications between government agencies because there is no proper 
data platform to know where the problem is. Land title is a serious issue in Saudi 
Arabia. Strangely, the Ministry of Justice is the agency responsible for issuing deeds 
where in the rest of the world it is managed by a department called Land and Survey. 
That’s why many private land parcels are not linked to a GIS system. The Ministry of 
Municipality has a huge project to register all properties to the system. (Planner 3)  
Planner 2 added: 
We, as a ministry, do not only care about the correctness of the paper deed but we are 
interested in its basis on the ground. That’s why there is a work conflict between these 
government agencies. This existing issue wouldn’t have happened if deeds were not 
issued in the first place until it’s checked if they have locations on the ground (Planner 
2).  
A second issue planners were asked to discuss is related to the off-site infrastructure charges. 
Many developer interviewees indicated that there is a lack of development coordination caused 
by an inadequate role of the city municipality. For example, developers argued that service 
providers sometimes do not have the capacity to connect their services in some locations that 
were already granted planning approval, which causes delays and extra costs incurred by 
developers. However, most planners demonstrated that the recently updated regulation of 
Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB) defines the requirements of connecting infrastructure and 
services. The main goal of this regulation is to “control urban expansion and to prevent urban 
sprawl in outskirts of cities without adequate urban infrastructure instalments” (MOMRA, 
2016. p.23). In regard to infrastructure and services delivery, the UGB classifies the city into 
phases of development each specifying the party responsible for linking services depending on 
the location of the development (i.e. phase 2014, phase 2019 and phase 2028). Some planners 
mentioned that the municipality now does not grant development permission to a location that 
cannot be linked to services. Planner 4 asserted that the responsibility of connecting services 
is clear and stated in the regulation: 
Urban boundaries regulation determines the developer’s location based on its 
development phase. For example, the electricity company is bounded to connect its 
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service to locations in the phase 2019 whereas locations in the phase 2028 the developer 
is required to connect the service to the site according to the executive regulations. It is 
not left to the developer or the municipality or the electricity company to decide but the 
regulation sets the rules.   
Planner 1 suggested that it is the developers’ issue: 
The process is clear but there is some misunderstanding from developers as some say 
why is the service connected to that developer’s location and not mine. They don’t 
know that it is subject to regulations that they are not aware of.  
Planner 2 explained that there was indeed lack of development coordination affecting 
developers in the past, but this issue has been resolved: 
The problem is that there was no coordination between government departments. The 
municipality grants the planning consent but in reality we are not responsible for it. We 
give a preliminary planning approval on paper and the developer must deal with another 
world of coordination. Problems are mainly with service providers. When developers 
are in the construction phase and need to connect electricity, for example, to obtain the 
final planning approval the electricity company requires developers to connect the lines 
to their location from the nearest point, which sometimes can be 5 or 10 kilometres 
away from the location. So who is responsible for this? Sometimes this may cost 
millions and connection for the project is completely disrupted …  This was true in the 
past, but now with the new fast track licensing system in 60 days all of these things of 
electricity, water and sewerage connections are presented and clear before applying for 
the planning permit.  
More detail about the new legislation for fast track licensing is presented under the theme 
market stimulation.  
6.3.1.3 Roles and responsibilities 
The planning system framework in Saudi Arabia involves several layers of roles and 
responsibilities at the national, regional and local levels (see Chapter 2 for more detail). To 
provide a clear understanding of the interviewees’ comments in this section, the levels and 
agencies involved in Riyadh’s urban planning system are briefly described. These are as 
follows: the Ministry of Municipal and Rural affairs (MOMRA) (national level); Riyadh 
Municipality (Amanah) (regional/city level); the High Commission for the Development of 
Riyadh (HCDR) (city level); and the sub-municipalities (Baladyah) (local/district level). 
Planner interviewees were asked to provide their views on the different roles and 
responsibilities of the planning agencies in Riyadh based on issues identified in the first stage 
analysis as well as in the literature. An important issue was the role of local planning authorities 
in the planning process. As outlined in Chapter 2, the planning process in Saudi Arabia can be 
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described as a top-down decision-making process (Mubarak, 1992). “In major Saudi cities, 
municipal decentralisation has amounted to mere peripheral sub municipalities with very 
limited powers, while major decision-making rests with the central municipality” (Mubarak, 
2004, p. 574).  Planners were asked to describe the roles of local planning authorities (sub-
municipalities) in supporting housing production. Planner 6 discussed: 
Planner: Sub-municipalities only have a supervisory role by applying regulations and 
they have nothing to do with planning subjects. 
Interviewer: Do you think this is appropriate?  
Planner: Of course, because it limits the dispersion of decision-making and the 
application of planning regulations.  
Planner 5 argued that sub-municipalities and the Amanah represent one planning authority, 
where the Amanah evaluates and approves planning and development projects; and sub-
municipalities supervise the work and issue building licences. Yet Planner 3, when asked about 
the liaison process of connecting services to approved projects, believes that the roles and 
responsibilities undertaken by the Amanah and its local sub-municipalities in leading the 
development process are limited: 
Municipalities, or what they call local governments in countries such as the U.S. and 
Australia, are responsible for every use and service in their territory, such as water, 
electricity, roads, sewerage, schools and hospitals etc. Whereas here, they are 
responsible for limited services, such as sewerage, water, and cleaning. Therefore, the 
mandate of municipalities needs to be revised again to be in charge of every use.  
(Planner 3) 
Although sub-municipalities have better knowledge in identifying their local needs than the 
city wide Amanah or HCDR, they do not have the authority to utilise planning mechanisms to 
promote these needs, such as the production of affordable housing. Planner 3 explained the 
reason behind this limited role of local planning authorities (sub-municipalities):  
Amanah and sub-municipalities have theoretically full autonomy to the extent that their 
budgets are directly discussed with the Ministry of Finance. But, in the planning 
process, sub-municipalities are required to submit to the Amanah for approval. So far, 
the Ministry [MOMRA] does not feel that there is maturity in the capacities of sub-
municipalities … When I refer to capacity I mean human resources capacity and the 
institutional capacity of these sub-municipalities. Their institutional capacity as well as 
technical capacity is weak.     
He also outlined that MOMRA is aware of the issues relating to the roles and responsibilities 
of planning agencies:      
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The planning system is being developed and has been reviewed. The government has 
realised what the problems are and I think once the roles and powers are clear between 
the different parties there will be no problem … The new Planning Act will address 
these issues of powers.  
Issues of roles, authority and power are not only limited to the local planning level in Riyadh 
but also expand to the higher levels of planning. Coordinating the planning process between 
MOMRA at the national level and Riyadh Municipality at the city level appears to be 
problematic according to some participants. Planner 2 who is representing the national 
planning level illustrated that Riyadh Municipality (Amanah) has gained a special power that 
is politically derived. This power or authority implicates its commitment to follow national 
planning strategies and guidelines:  
Because of the large size of Riyadh city, the previous governor of Riyadh [the current 
King] wanted to reduce the burden on the Ministry of Municipality by giving the 
Amanah independent authority. Although it [Amanah] still functions under the 
umbrella of the Ministry [MOMRA], the Ministry cannot impose on the Amanah 
regulations related to subjects, such as densities. Thus, there are some implications. 
There are many issues between the Ministry and Amanah including the huge urban 
sprawl of the city that is unreasonable for us … We disagree with them in some of their 
existing regulations. (Planner 2) 
Planner 5 from Riyadh Municipality argued that the Municipality (Amanah) works in 
coordination with the High Commission for the Development of Riyadh (HCDR) to promote 
policies and regulations that are suitable for the city’s needs. He explained that Riyadh 
Municipality is an executive body that implements regulations based on the city comprehensive 
master plan (structure plan) produced by the HCDR: 
Planner: The High Commission is the responsible body for preparing the city strategic 
plan including land use regulations and the city’s urban trends and it is a partner with 
Amanah.  
Interviewer: Is there any independence in authority between the Amanah and the 
Ministry of Municipality?  
Planner: There is a linkage with them as a regulatory body, but internally, regulation 
amendments are conducted through the High Commission and then presented to the 
Ministry … Riyadh is largely managed by the Amanah and the High Commission 
follows the Amanah.  
The issues of roles and responsibilities indicated above were also discussed by some housing 
official interviewees. Housing Official 1 asserted that these issues between planning agencies 
have an impact on the housing provision arguing that the limited role in promoting housing 
development played by these agencies in the past called for an intervention.  
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Housing Official 1: There are related political matters. The Deputy Ministry for Town 
Planning at the Ministry of Municipality has no authority on the Amanah. The Amanah 
changes its building regulations then informs the Ministry. There are authority and 
power issues between the two, which has been exacerbated throughout the years. 
Interviewer: Is this why the Ministry of Housing decided to intervene in some planning 
legislations? 
Housing Official 1: Frankly speaking, yes, this is one of the reasons because the 
Ministry of Municipality did not really serve housing. Private developers could take 
one and a half years to get their projects approved at the Amanah ... In the past, Amanah 
was an obstacle to housing if we are to speak openly. There is bureaucracy, delay and 
disinterest ... Amanah does not act as a partner with developers in the development 
process.  
The stance taken by the Ministry of Housing intervening in planning regulation is discussed in 
more detail under the theme market stimulation.  
6.3.2 Planning policies and strategies 
This category discusses the planning policies and strategies used to regulate and control the 
market in Riyadh. It focuses on aspects concerning development control measures, 
development contributions and planning incentives. The use of development controls has a 
corresponding impact on the housing market. Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) point out that 
certain land development rights are obtained by the granting of planning consent. However, 
existing detailed development control measures and zoning ordinances can constrain the 
application of development rights pertaining to the range of land uses, building heights and 
land coverage within the zone. Another market regulation instrument discussed under this 
category is development contributions which are described as an additional benefit used by 
planning authorities as a requirement or an incentive for regulatory approval (Adams & 
Tiesdell, 2013). In the context of this study, certain planning policy issues identified in the 
Stage 1 analysis (Chapter 5) that affect private developers in delivering affordable housing are 
discussed. These include: density measures, development contribution requirements and the 
existing planning incentives to produce housing.  
6.3.2.1 Development control restrictions  
This section focuses particularly on density control restrictions and their impact on housing. 
Riyadh can be described as a low density city (see Chapter 2 – Planning and housing in Riyadh) 
with infrequent tall buildings that were constructed under special exemptions from the FAR 
regulations (Floor to Area Ratio). Planner interviewees were asked about the reasons behind 
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the application of low density development control measures. The majority discussed the 
relationship between low density and the capacities of infrastructure and services. Many 
planners indicated that areas in the city that are already developed could not bear an increase 
in densities because of the limited capacity of the existing infrastructure and services. Planner 
1 stated: 
Service provider companies, such as water and electricity, are not able to expand their 
services in developed areas. They need space to build stations for expansion and this is 
problematic. Other than water and electricity, there is pressure on community services, 
such as schools and health centres. Most developed neighbourhoods cannot afford an 
increase in the density.  
Some planner interviewees were against increasing densities in the city and think the density 
measures that are currently used are suitable. Planner 6 argued that the current residential 
density measures are fair and achieve their goals. When asked if he supports the promotion of 
medium to high-density measures to increase housing production, he answered negatively, and 
explained:  
The city is about to explode. Developers may wish to increase the density of their 
projects but these densities are linked to services and if the density increases, services 
must be increased too. Will developers agree to an increase in density in return for extra 
services? Developers will not agree because the current deduction of a developer’s land 
for services is 40% and if we increase the density the deduction will be higher. (Planner 
6)  
Planner 1 has another justification for the current density measures stating: 
The city is designed to be a car-oriented city. The original trend is based on low 
residential densities of detached houses of two and a half storeys in height. 
Planners 2 and 3, on the other hand, asserted that the low density measures used in Riyadh are 
inefficient and cause several problems. They argued that poor planning and development 
control policies promoted by the High Commission for the Development of Riyadh and Riyadh 
Municipality have resulted in issues, such as urban sprawl, which is unsustainable and costly: 
I think the horizontal expansion implemented by local planning agencies is wrong and 
costly. They argue that Saudi is vast and we have plenty of land so why would we 
smother ourselves in apartment units etc … The global trend in urban planning is 
towards compact cities, but why do we have a horizontal system? Blame it on the 
planning system that allows more horizontal expansion than vertical. (Planner 3) 
Planner 2 explained that, unlike Riyadh other cities in Saudi Arabia allow higher densities 
following national regulations and guidelines provided by the Ministry of Municipal and Rural 
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Affairs (MOMRA). He claimed that the independence of local planning authorities in Riyadh 
coupled with poor policies are causing urban sprawl and other issues: 
There is a gap and many issues between us [MOMRA] and Riyadh Municipality. The 
municipality has a backward way of thinking when it comes to issues of the distribution 
of densities and they still insist on it. Those who live in Riyadh suffer from long 
commutes as the city size is 90 by 70 kilometres and this is illogical with a population 
of 6 million. Riyadh is not affiliated to the Ministry of Municipality but to the High 
Commission for the Development of Riyadh. The High Commission promotes low 
densities and conducts its studies based on that. They have a certain view that says the 
infrastructure cannot bear any increase ... The municipality must control the 
development and the infrastructure which follows according to the municipality’s plans 
but not get restricted by the infrastructure. The infrastructure should be upgraded 
according to the city’s vision. What happened in Riyadh is that they didn’t increase the 
densities because of the incapacities of the infrastructure, which is wrong.   
Planner 2 also indicated that Riyadh Municipality has introduced a problematic regulation for 
building smaller units called ‘Duplex’. This regulation allows large plots in existing land 
subdivisions to be divided into smaller plots (i.e. minimum of 200 sq. metres) to increase 
densities. Planner 2 believes that this new regulation is causing more issues rather than solving 
the problem:  
For example, an existing land subdivision that was planned to have services for plots 
of 600 sq. metres now with this new regulation allows a plot to be divided into three 
plots of 200 sq. metres. Not only that but the calamity is it allows each smaller plot to 
have three separate units. So instead of housing one family on the original 600 sq. 
metres now it has occupied by nine families. They sabotaged planning on the basis of 
their refusal to give higher building heights and the adoption of the duplex system. Now 
look at car parking in most neighbourhoods, there are no parking spaces and it is a 
problem.  
Despite the disagreement of some planners to increasing densities, support for more flexible 
density solutions that are based on research and studies to avoid any future implications and 
support the production of affordable housing was evident. 
I support the increase of densities but with studies that take into account such an 
increase and specify certain zones for higher densities that accord with the city’s master 
plan. (Planner 4)  
It is better to increase densities but that should be done with a full study that pays 
attention to the infrastructure and services ... it is certainly possible to have negative 
impact due to such an increase but it can also be solved. (Planner 5)   
There is a need to increase density when possible to provide a variety of housing 
products. The use of white land in the city [vacant land for infill development] will 
provide solutions if correctly utilised due to the existence of infrastructure. The 
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infrastructure must be upgraded to accommodate higher densities and provide efficient 
allocation of resources. (Planner 3) 
Some planners showed interesting reactions when asked about the relationship between low 
densities and housing affordability. According to developers, land to development ratio 
impacts housing prices as land price is high and density measures restrict building higher than 
two and a half storeys. These planners asserted that development controls must not be linked 
to prices and they be imposed to regulate not to profit the market: 
We will not go into expensive or cheap prices. Whether they sell for one or thousands 
of Riyals this is none of our business and we cannot talk about it. We are talking about 
planning regulations to approve a development proposal. (Planner 6) 
Planner 4 argued that density measures are not contributing to the higher land prices:  
Land prices have nothing to do with densities. The prices are unfair because of the land 
speculation resulting in higher prices. Now developers are demanding an increase in 
densities due to the land prices, but this will lead to planning issues. Some of the land 
are in approved subdivisions with certain allowable densities. They want to convert 
these land into towers and this is considered as a crime against the community and 
public services ... Developers are smart; they want to use density regulation as a tool 
for profit.   
The above remarks by planners indicate contradictory views to those presented by developers 
in Chapter 5. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.  
6.3.2.2 Development contribution 
The city planning authority Riyadh Municipality, requires residential developers to contribute 
a percentage of their subdivided land free of charge towards public areas, such as roads, 
pathways and parking. In addition, a percentage of the subdivision is required for community 
services including schools, mosques, parks, playgrounds and health centres. Developers are 
also responsible for installing required infrastructure within their sites including water, sewer 
and electricity; and may be requested to improve required infrastructure outside their sites and 
connect them to utility networks. The requirements for providing and connecting infrastructure 
depend on the location of the proposed development. As explained in Chapters 2, Urban 
Growth Boundaries are linked to the development control process where it defines 
development standards that developers must comply with. The compulsory development 
contribution requirements for public areas, community services and infrastructure are used as 
conditions for granting planning permission.   
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The national guideline used to set out the requirements for the on-site development contribution 
by MOMRA dictates that a maximum of 33% is deducted for public areas and community 
services. Within the required 33% deduction, a certain percentage is assigned for public areas 
(i.e. roads, parking, parks, etc.) depending on the design of the subdivision; this land is 
contributed free of charge. Developers are also required to allocate land for community 
services, such as schools, health centres and mosques within the 33% depending on the size of 
their development and the number of inhabitants. Certain planning standards set for each of 
these services. In the past, developers could sell the assigned land for schools and mosques 
back to the relevant government bodies to build their services. However, Riyadh Municipality 
has recently amended the contribution requirements setting a compulsory 40% deduction on 
developers’ land. This includes an allocated percentage of land for public areas and community 
services contributed free of charge to relevant government bodies. The new compulsory 
contribution aims to reduce government spending on buying land for providing its services. 
Developers now are not allowed to sell back land assigned for community services that are run 
by the government bodies, such as public schools and mosques.  
Many developers interviewed in the first stage analysis argued that the imposed 40% deduction 
on their land contributes to housing unaffordability as the price paid for such services is passed 
onto homebuyers. Planner interviewees were asked to provide their opinion about the high 
percentage of deduction and the relationship between this development contribution and 
housing affordability. Most planners believe that the 40% developer contribution for 
community services is fair explaining that this contribution is necessary and adds positive 
benefits for the community despite the arguments made by developers that it impacts housing 
affordability.   
The 40% deduction is based on studies and decisions taken by the municipality in 
coordination with the ministry that are not arbitrary. This 40% deduction in Riyadh is 
utilised to provide more needed future services, such as government facilities and open 
spaces. We had requests from government bodies that needed land to build their 
services but we couldn’t provide it under the 33%. I don’t think the deduction impacts 
a developer’s investment in housing because it provides required services. (Planner 5) 
Planner 2 added: 
The municipality doesn’t impose the deduction to keep it for itself but to benefit the 
subdivision either for wider streets, pedestrian walks or parks or services required, such 
as schools and mosques that have been added in Riyadh. Of course, the developer seeks 
his own interest but the municipality believes that it is in the interest of the wider 
community … I think the 40% deduction is fair in my opinion. I understand that the 
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developer doesn’t like to give up 40% of his land that he paid for but we see it as a 
service provided for the subdivision. (Planner 2) 
The second type of compulsory development contribution is the instalment of infrastructure 
and utilities by the developer. As indicated earlier, developers are required to install 
infrastructure in their sites and might also need to connect it to the nearest network outside 
their sites in consultation with respective service providers. Planner 6 indicated that developers 
must comply with service provider requirements, despite the possible excessive cost incurred 
by developers to connect the service: 
Service providers require the developer to connect to the nearest network. I don’t 
consider this as an issue; it could be expensive for developers but it is not an issue.   
Planner 2, on the other hand, mentioned that service providers, such as the electricity company, 
can impose unfair treatment on developers requiring them to release plots free of charge in 
order to build power stations. This is on top of the 40% compulsory planning deduction for 
services. He noted: 
If the electricity company wants to build a station on the site, it is supposed to buy the 
land for the station not requiring the developer to give it up in order to receive the 
service because it’s not within the planning deduction. They take advantage of the 
developer’s need to finish his project.   
The commentaries above side with developers’ claims in the previous chapter that service 
providers have used their power to gain benefits from the imperative of developers to comply 
with their requirements even if such requirements were not clearly stated in the preliminary 
planning permission.     
6.3.2.3 Planning incentives 
The lack of flexible planning and development controls was an issue raised by many developer 
interviewees in the first stage analysis. Many pointed out that the planning system does not 
provide incentives for developers to deliver affordable housing. They argued that there is a lack 
of municipal cooperation with developers as the current planning regulations do not allow 
flexibility that could be used to encourage more investment in housing. For example, providing 
exemptions in zoning and development control regulations by allowing changes to land use, or 
permitting higher density in return for building affordable housing are all not utilised. Planner 
interviewees were asked to explain if there are available planning incentive tools and 
mechanisms used by local planning authorities to support the production of housing, more 
particularly affordable housing. 
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The majority of planner interviewees indicated that there is flexibility in the system where 
special exemptions from development controls standards are available for developers. They 
explained that Riyadh Municipality allows development proposals with a land area of 80,000 
sq. metres or more to apply for special permission through the High Commission for Riyadh 
Development. The HCRD provides exemptions to projects from certain development control 
standards, such as increasing densities and building coverage or changing the use of land in 
return for a 50% land deduction. These voluntary planning exemptions or incentives are usually 
granted by permitting higher building heights or more building coverage for developers. The 
high planning gain of deducting half of the developer’s land is justified, as promoting higher 
densities requires providing more services and open space areas. Planners pointed out that 
exemptions are only given to comprehensive development projects. This means the developer 
is required not only to subdivide the land and provide services and infrastructure but also build 
housing as a comprehensive development. According to Planner 5: 
There are exemptions provided on requests from developers who want an increase in 
building heights even if the proposed location is in a zoning area that only allows two 
and a half storeys. We have a joint committee between the municipality and the High 
Commission to examine developers’ requests and grant the required heights, whether 5 
or 6 storeys for the whole site in return for giving us a 50% deduction for services as a 
requirement by the High Commission. These exemptions are still used and have been 
available for a long time … There are other exemptions, such as the change of land use. 
Any changes to the current zoning regulations must be referred to the High Commission 
to study it.  
Planner 1 indicated that exemption requests are carefully examined by the HCRD and 
sometimes negotiation with the developer is required to reach an agreement about the extent 
of the requested exemptions. 
A developer submits his plans and the requested densities needed. The application is 
then referred to the committee for examination and approval. In cases where a 
developer asks for very high densities he might be asked to modify his request through 
negotiations.  
Some planner interviewees argued that the planning system provides flexibility but developers 
are always eager for more. In responding to the developers’ claims of the lack of planning 
incentives, planners commented: 
In my opinion, no matter how much you give a real estate developer, he will always 
want more incentives. (Planner 1)  
What do they want? Do they want us to give them money! The High Commission grants 
exemptions as a catalyst for comprehensive development projects. Developers here 
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have an understanding of the development as dividing a piece of land to sell for 
speculation. There is no real comprehensive development. (Planner 4) 
Some developers talk based on their views, which can be incorrect. Some of them want 
the procedures and the decisions to be based on their proposed plans. I sit with them 
and I know them. They seek their own personal interest. The municipality follows well-
thought out regulations and there is a lot of flexibility. (Planner 5)  
Despite the existence of such exemptions, local planning authorities in Riyadh do not utilise 
these granted exemptions in exchange for building affordable housing. When asked about the 
reason behind not utilising the flexible exemptions to promote affordable housing, Planner 1 
explained that the planning gain is aimed at encouraging more comprehensive development 
projects with better urban design and providing more green and open urban spaces in the city. 
Housing Official 1 claimed that the HCDR’s exemptions were more targeted towards other 
development sectors to boost the city’s economy. He argued that the planning exemptions used 
by the HCDR did not help the production of affordable housing: 
The High Commission is targeting the commercial and hospitality sectors more than 
the residential in its exemptions. Frankly, you can count the exempted residential 
projects on the fingers. Also, these residential projects of towers and compounds are 
unaffordable. Rafal Tower, for example, is an exempted residential tower by the High 
Commission but it is a luxury housing project targeted towards a specific segment of 
the society. The High Commission did not pay attention to the housing sector but to 
sectors that attract investment and stimulate the city’s economy.  
For this reason, the Ministry of Housing has recently intervened to provide a new set of 
planning incentives for private developers aiming at stimulating the housing market. This is 
discussed in more detail under Theme Two – Deregulatory planning incentives.  
6.4 Theme Two: Market Stimulation 
This theme examines the government intervention in housing to promote an enabling 
environment for market actors to deliver affordable housing. As market regulations limit the 
choices available for market actors, which might result in failure to meet the demand, market 
stimulation tools are used to facilitate the market work. According to Adams and Tiesdell 
(2013), market stimulation instruments “… lubricate markets by making development more 
attractive to market actors” (p. 268). Government intervention to stimulate the market 
comprises mainly two methods. These are: direct intervention, such as providing infrastructure 
in certain locations to promote development that was otherwise unattractive; or indirect 
intervention by implementing incentives that encourage market actors to undertake 
development.  
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In the context of this research, both direct and indirect government intervention attempts to 
stimulate the housing market are investigated. These interventions revolve around the different 
models and mechanisms of the Public Private Partnership in housing. The last section of this 
theme discusses some of the recent government initiatives that were launched to stimulate the 
housing market and the role of government in housing from the participants’ perspectives.  
6.4.1 Public Private Partnership     
Public Private Partnership (PPP) in housing is a relatively new approach utilised by the 
Ministry of Housing to address the shortage of affordable housing in Saudi Arabia. Two models 
of PPP have been introduced, both aiming to stimulate the market in supplying more affordable 
housing through enabling strategies. The first model of the PPP is a direct market stimulation 
approach where government-owned land is released for private development to build low-cost 
housing. The government provides free land that is connected to infrastructure as well as a 
development grant for private developers to build housing and sell it below the market rate 
according to certain requirements set by the Ministry of Housing. Private developers in the first 
stage analysis expressed their views about the dynamics and issues of this model. The second 
model of the PPP is characterised by bypassing current local planning regulations to provide 
incentives that would attract the private sector investment as an indirect market stimulation 
tool. In this model, private developers are exempted from certain development control 
regulations enabling them to achieve more development potential of their own land in return 
for allocating a percentage of their development as affordable housing sold at a lower market 
rate. This model has been recently introduced and did not exist when conducting the first stage 
fieldwork for this research. The direct and indirect types of government intervention to 
stimulate the market are discussed below.   
6.4.1.1 Land release and development grant (Direct intervention)  
As explained in chapter 2, this PPP’s model was a direct government intervention in the form 
of land disposal and development grants where the MOH provided land that is connected to 
infrastructure at no cost to developers as well as an amount of about USD133,000/per unit to 
build low-cost housing. The success of this type of market stimulation relies highly on the 
agreement between the government and developers in undertaking the development. Adams 
and Tiesdell (2013) explain: 
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Although the disposal of public land may serve as an immediate development stimulus, 
the chances of also creating successful and sustainable places are highly dependent on 
the terms and conditions on which any disposal takes place (p. 276). 
Based on the first stage analysis in the previous chapter, many developer interviewees 
expressed dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions set by the MOH to implement this 
model of partnership in Riyadh. The issues raised by developers were discussed in depth with 
housing official interviewees who are involved in the PPP program to obtain their perspectives.   
Several developer interviewees claimed that this model of Public Private Partnership is 
unattractive for the private development industry. They argued that the proposal requirement 
is excessive and the amount of money granted for each unit is not feasible for building 
according to the MOH requirements. Some of these requirements that developers were 
unsatisfied with included the 10 years maintenance and 10 years security and cleaning, some 
design specifications, such as the precast construction material that is expensive, and the 
payment schedule that force developers to run into negative cash flow. Housing officials were 
asked to provide their opinion about the developers’ claims.   
Most of the housing officials rejected the developers’ claims arguing that the PPP model on 
government-owned land was attractive to many private developers. They indicated that several 
developers have signed up to join the partnership program not only in Riyadh but also in other 
cities. Housing official interviewees explained that Riyadh’s partnership program was the first 
phase of this model and there have been constant improvements to the proposal requirements 
in the second and third phases to better utilise the government resources. Some of the 
modifications to the proposal requirements were, for example, reducing the maintenance and 
security period to three years in the latest phase instead of 10 and introducing off-plan sales. 
Additional design specifications and minimum requirements for finishing have been added. 
The amount of the development grant was also modified based on the size of the unit built (i.e. 
three sizes of apartment units were introduced: 120, 180, 220 sq. metres). The USD133,000 
(SAR500,000) is the maximum development grant now assigned to build bigger size units 
whereas smaller units are given a less amount (i.e. 120 sq. metres is granted 
USD80,000/SAR300,000). Housing Official 3 argued that the PPP model in its first phase in 
Riyadh had relaxed requirements and was too generous: 
From my point of view, the first proposal requirements were very beneficial and 
profitable for the developer. If we talk about the construction market prices for building 
a unit with a size of 180 sq. metres for 500,000 Riyals, it is considered highly profitable. 
The average price of constructing one square metre before finishes in the market is 
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about 350 Riyals [USD93] whereas the price paid for developers was about 2700 per 
sq. metre [USD720]. Also, there were no minimum requirements for the finishes. No, 
it was very profitable for them but of course the developer is never satisfied and always 
trying to gain more profit.  
Other housing officials agreed with the above remarks pointing out that the partnership model 
offers great potential for profits. Most interviewees also agreed that there were some issues in 
the first phase of the PPP, such as the payment schedule, and the ambiguity of some of the 
requirements. However, these were avoided in the next two phases according to Housing 
Official 4: 
We have conducted many interviews with developers and bankers to identify the 
existing loopholes in the first proposal requirements and correct them … we introduced 
the off-plan sales, minimum requirements for finishes, and reduced the preliminary 
financial guarantee payments and maintenance period. We also added detail attachment 
to the end of the proposal that included details and clarifications of design, finishes and 
other things that might be required. One of the mistakes in the first phase that made 
developers object sometimes was the lack of clarity of some of the requirements. That 
is why we modified it, improved it and it is clear now. 
Another issue mentioned in the previous chapter was the interference of the MOH with the 
work of developers over small details, such as technical construction operations. Developers 
argued that they should be trusted as partners and their work should be judged based on the 
MOH requirements, without intervention. Housing official interviewees believed that the 
MOH must supervise the work of developers. They explained that the MOH has a significant 
responsibility and cannot jeopardise its reputation, as Housing Official 4 highlights: 
The quality standards we have here in the market are not that good. This makes us wary. 
Therefore, we impose requirements to guarantee that eligible citizens who will buy our 
products will not convey a bad image about the Ministry as it has contracted with 
developers.    
Housing Official 3 elaborated: 
It is not an interference but following up the work. Yes, we imposed strict requirements 
but we as the Ministry [MOH] see that the real estate development industry is not 
mature enough and this is the problem ... We emphasise the quality of the products 
because we have no previous experience with these developers. Housing issues in 
general affect the public’s opinion of us. If we don’t play our role right especially in 
the beginning of the partnership program we will be negatively impacted. Developers 
are right about what they said but we will not give them our trust from the beginning 
of the first project. We need to check their work first.  
Creating successful and sustainable places through this model of partnership was another 
important argument made by a developer interviewee. First, the choice of the project location 
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for the PPP to build low-cost housing was argued to be illogical. It was explained that it 
involves significant costs incurred by the government to build and connect infrastructure and 
services to such a far away location instead of choosing urban locations closer to the city centre 
that are already connected to services. Housing officials were asked about the efficiency of 
allocating public resources to stimulate the housing sector. Most mentioned that the chosen 
location was the only and most suitable location that the MOH own within the city boundaries. 
Housing Official 3 stated: “This land was the only land available and owned by the Ministry 
in Riyadh and the location is not bad”. Housing officials argued that the cost of delivering 
infrastructure to the location was high but it was a necessary and valuable investment in the 
city’s infrastructure. According to Housing Official 1:  
Let’s talk in terms of planning, land in the city centre is privately owned and we do not 
have any authority over it. We want to provide housing products and if you put yourself 
in the Ministry’s shoes where you only have this location, will you leave it 
undeveloped? I’m with you the location is faraway and it is true that it costs a lot but it 
is an investment in infrastructure benefiting the people and the city. Investing in 
infrastructure is the best investment. The role of the state is to inject investment in 
infrastructure regardless of the cost. The bill was expensive but infrastructure lines will 
not only feed the PPP housing project but also other surrounding projects. We have 
opened up opportunities for development in new areas.  
Another issue discussed by Developer 1 was the creation of sustainable communities and the 
allocation of government housing. Developer 1 claimed that crowding low-income people into 
one location could create a segregated community resulting in future problems. In response to 
this claim, housing officials expressed that the housing units are not distributed for free but 
sold to eligible households who can afford to pay based on certain criteria, standards and 
priorities that were determined by the MOH, such as income, age, household size, etc. 
However, in the first phase of the PPP, housing units were allocated and sold to the lowest 
income and biggest household size. According to Housing Official 3: 
The problem with Riyadh’s project is that it was allocated to low-income people with 
the highest priority points. Those with the lowest income and the highest number of 
family members were first in the list according to the old system.   
To avoid this issue, the MOH changed the allocation criteria by creating new lists of 
recommended housing products to be built by developers, such as apartments, town houses, 
and villas (each have 3 different sizes) based on the affordability level and household size, age 
and other criteria to be applied to different segments of the population: 
We have recommended products that cover all housing segments. The eligibility has 
changed from one list to be divided into four or five lists. Each list has a recommended 
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product [i.e. 180 sq. metres apartment] and people are assigned to each list based on 
their affordability level and the size of their family, etc. When we work with developers 
on a new project we ask them to allocate certain proportions of each product, such as 
villas, town houses, and apartments based on the percentage needed of each product in 
that city. Our aim is integrating and diversifying the community. (Housing Official 3) 
Finally, housing official interviewees were asked to respond to some of the developers’ claims 
that the MOH did not provide enough support for them in matters, such as coordinating with 
other agencies to give tax exemptions on imported building materials, facilitating foreign 
labour visa processes, or helping in accessing finance from banks in its first PPP model. 
Housing Official 1 stated: 
Real estate developers need support but this sometimes might be beyond the authority 
of the Ministry. Sometimes we can’t force other government bodies to facilitate 
developers’ work and this is still an obstacle.  
On the other hand, Housing Official 4 argued that it is in the interest of the MOH that 
developers succeed and the ministry is striving to improve its work: 
We still consider the experience of Public Private Partnership on government land as 
an initial step towards better success. It is an injustice of developers to judge it this way 
and want it to be perfect from the beginning … We seek to support developers to 
succeed and increase their profit because that will increase their participation and 
continuity at the same time it will serve the housing sector. It is a mutual benefit … we 
hope that the private sector looks at the size of the future business and the targeted units 
to be built. If they look at it in the long run, it is very profitable.  
6.4.1.2 Deregulatory planning incentives (Indirect intervention)  
This section discusses the indirect government intervention in the housing market as there is 
no immediate cost incurred by the state. The government has recently launched new incentives 
targeted towards unlocking privately owned land. Represented by the MOH, a new set of 
planning deregulations are being adopted and deployed targeting private sector investment to 
foster and stimulate the supply of affordable housing. The MOH in coordination with planning 
agencies has recently provided exemptions from the current land use and development controls 
regulations to encourage landowners and developers to develop vacant land also called ‘white 
land’ within urban boundaries. Examples include granting density bonuses by allowing higher 
Floor-to-Area Ratios (FAR), higher building heights and greater land coverage. These 
exemptions are utilised for infill development on urban vacant land as incentives in return for 
an allocated percentage of affordable housing. According to Adams and Tiesdell (2013): 
“Project bonuses provide a development stimulus by waiving specific regulatory restrictions 
in exchange for higher-quality development or other community benefits” (p. 279). 
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Before discussing the type and nature of the new deregulatory incentives, the reasons for this 
indirect government intervention by the MOH are briefly discussed. As indicated in Theme 
One under planning incentives, the planning system in Riyadh does not provide incentives in 
zoning and development control regulations by allowing changes to land use or permitting 
higher density in return for building affordable housing. The shortage of available public 
owned land in urban areas required the MOH to implement new initiatives to unlock privately 
owned urban vacant land to increase land access for housing development. Land taxes or what 
is called ‘white land fees’ have been introduced to penalise owners of vacant/undeveloped land 
within the urban boundaries with areas of 10,000 sq. metres or more. Seen as a negative type 
of incentive to private landholders, a royal decree was issued to exempt housing related projects 
from planning and building regulations in order to provide positive incentives to those 
penalised: 
The ministry is giving support to private landowners willing to enter into partnership 
with the ministry to develop their land and avoid paying white land fees. The ministry 
believes that participation of the private sector on its land can help solve the problem 
due to the scarcity of land owned by the ministry in some major cities where the demand 
is high. (Housing Official 4) 
The MOH in coordination with MOMRA and other planning authorities introduced new 
regulatory planning tools and incentives for housing projects on privately owned land with an 
area of 10,000 sq. metres or more. These are mainly associated with zoning which allows an 
increase in densities or building coverage to make housing development more profitable and 
attractive to the private landowners. Most of the housing officials claimed that planning 
regulations have not been properly utilised to support the production of affordable housing, 
therefore, the MOH essentially stepped in to address this issue. According to Housing Official 
1: 
Planning regulations in the past did not serve the ministry’s objectives at all ... We have 
problems, such as the enforcement of the maximum 60% of building coverage of the 
land area; the unused 40% of land is considered a waste. Planning controls can be used 
to solve the housing crisis. Our aim for the new exemptions is to increase housing 
supply through a maximum utilisation of land area and reducing land cost. 
The new exemptions are only granted to comprehensive residential projects that deliver 
finished housing units and not subdivided land. The main requirement of granting any 
exemptions is to ensure that it does not affect the security and safety of the surrounding 
environment. For instance, granting higher densities by allowing extra building height must 
not disturb the neighbours’ privacy. In terms of the new density deregulation, the MOH created 
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six classifications of the maximum allowable density based on the land area where the bigger 
the land, the higher the density allowed (i.e. 10,000-100,000 sq. metres is allowed an extra 
density of a maximum 25%; whereas 500,000-1000,000 sq. metres is allowed a maximum 
increase of 100%). The increase of density percentage is added to the current FAR measures 
used, which can be in the form of extra floors or building coverage. 
The MOH established a committee that examines each development proposal on its own merit. 
This can be described as a discretionary planning process where exemptions from the current 
planning controls are granted based on factors decided by the MOH that do not, for example, 
affect the security and safety of the existing surroundings. Approved proposals are then sent to 
the Municipality of Riyadh to obtain the planning permission. According to Housing Official 
2: 
Development proposals submitted to the committee are examined in many ways for 
permission. There are basic requirements that must be followed, such as conforming to 
the stated allowable density percentage based on the land area. Other important things 
include the capacity of infrastructure and services; providing traffic and environmental 
studies, etc. In the case where we approve the proposal, a request from the minister’s 
office [MOH minster] for approval recommendation will be sent to the municipality to 
get the planning approval.  
Many housing officials indicated that the process of granting exemptions to developers involve 
forms of negotiations to reach an agreement between the two parties. Negotiations usually take 
place for developments that are substantial in value and size as opposed to small projects that 
can be approved based on the stated criteria: 
We study each of these requests case by case where we focus on the value of the project 
and what would it gives us in return. The committee summons the developer for 
negotiation and explanation if the project was large and of high value, which would 
benefit the city. But for small projects, such as 30,000 sq. metres there is no need. 
(Housing Official 1) 
The MOH uses the deregulation of planning and development controls as a model of 
partnership with developers in return for an allocated percentage for affordable housing. The 
percentage assigned for affordable housing units depends on the size of the development, the 
number of units to be built and the final agreement between the developer and the ministry. 
The MOH requires developers to provide housing products based on certain types and sizes 
taking into account the type of demands in the city. These products are sold to eligible 
households according to their priority in the eligibility list and at prices set up by the MOH. As 
noted by Housing Official 4: 
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Developers are required to build and sell the assigned percentage of housing based on 
the Saudi Households Specification (SHS) manual, with unit sizes and prices proposed 
by the ministry … The deducted percentage of housing varies from project to project 
based on the area and the number of units in the project as well as the ministry’s need 
in that location ... It is possible that some developers say, I want to assign the whole 
project for the ministry’s beneficiaries. The developer has the right to increase the 
percentage required by the ministry but we have the right to ask for a minimum 
percentage. 100 units is the minimum, but as a percentage of the project it could be 25, 
30 or 50% depending on the agreement with the developer in exchange for granting 
exemptions.   
Planner and housing official interviewees were asked to provide their perspectives on the new 
planning deregulations for housing and the possible implications that might emerge from them. 
Some planner interviewees indicated issues, such as the possible increased pressure on 
infrastructure and services, disturbance to the city skyline and some privacy problems with 
neighbours that could result from these new deregulations. However, most asserted that there 
are coordination issues between the MOH and planning agencies in implementing the new 
incentives. As mentioned earlier, the issuance of the royal decree exempting housing related 
projects from planning and building regulation required the MOH to cooperate with MOMRA 
and other planning agencies. This was to study the status quo and identify suitable ways for 
implementation. Many planner interviewees argued that despite the initial coordination 
attempts between these government agencies there are still some political implications 
regarding roles, responsibilities and authority issues as some planners noted: 
There was an agreement between us [MOMRA] and the Ministry of Housing. The 
Ministry of Housing was trying to implement the royal decree as it is but we were telling 
them that increasing densities had to be studied within the city’s master plan. It is true 
that Riyadh has a problem with densities but other cities do not. You cannot apply a 
unified system of densities to every city in the Kingdom ... We worked together with 
them to make mechanisms of implementation but in the end they refused to sign it. I 
think if the exemptions applied this way without coordination with us it will cause 
future problems. (Planner 2)      
There is no clarity in the executive regulations to implement this supreme order. Any 
decree needs a manual procedure to govern its implementation but in this case, it’s still 
vague. (Planner 3) 
Planner 3 argued that the new planning deregulation reforms to stimulate the supply of housing 
have created a sense of resentment and conflict between the two ministries involved that was 
characterised by a lack of shared vision.  
Another problem is with the institutions; municipalities have been operating planning 
in this rhythm for a century. Extracting their authority has to do with the dignity of 
these institutions … Each ministry works in segregation from each other because each 
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ministry thinks of itself as a kingdom. There is no mutual institutional decision-making 
but now with the new government things are changing towards building links, as you 
heard about the National Transformation Program. I think the enforcement of this can 
be done through harmonious decisions from the senior ministers.  
As this deregulatory reform was ordered by the highest authority of the country, some planner 
interviewees, such as Planner 4, were reluctant to comment on it: 
What has been implemented by the Ministry of Housing has nothing to do with me. It 
is a political issue that I cannot answer because there is tension in this subject. 
Housing officials, on the other hand, had different views about the new deregulation of 
planning and development controls. Many argued that possible negative externalities that might 
result from granting, for instance, density bonuses could be avoided. They explained that 
through their cooperation with planning agencies, potential future issues, such as the increased 
pressure on infrastructure and traffic problems, are identified and the process of granting 
exemptions is carried out by taking these issues into account: 
The royal decree of exempting housing projects from building regulations has many 
positive advantages. The negative disadvantages are avoided in requiring necessary 
studies before granting the approval to ensure that any exempted project is not creating 
future problems. (Housing Official 4) 
Housing official 1 elaborated: 
The exemption approval process has preliminary and final approval. The final approval 
requires developers to obtain approvals from service providers. For example, we grant 
a preliminary approval of a certain increase in density but this is conditional based on 
the capacity of service providers to deliver their services for this increase. Our role here 
is to give potential to developers but there is always a risk. At the end of the day every 
location has certain potential and this of course depends on the developer’s cleverness 
in choosing the best site for his development.  
6.4.2 Related initiatives and the role of government 
Recently, the government has introduced several policies and initiatives in order to stimulate 
the housing market. It is worth mentioning some of these initiatives that are closely relevant to 
this study. One significant initiative that was implemented in 2016 is the introduction of a fast 
track licensing system for residential projects. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
(MOMRA) launched a new online platform that aims to facilitate and accelerate the process of 
applying for planning permission. This new E-government online system used now by 
municipalities links all the parties involved in the decision making of the planning permit 
process, such as public notaries, service providers and other related government agencies. 
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Coupled with its launch, a maximum period of 60 days has been set for assessing development 
proposals and granting the preliminary planning permits. This was part of the National 
Transformation Program (NTP) aimed at improving the performance and the capacities of 
government institutions.   
Planner and housing official interviewees were asked to provide their views on the fast track 
licensing system and the issues that planning agencies might face in implementing it. Most of 
the interviewees believed that the 60 day period is enough for the municipality to assess 
development proposals: 
I think the 60 day period is enough, however, the 60 day period is counted after getting 
the deed approved by the Ministry of Justice. So, when we are sure that there are no 
problems with other government agencies, we do not have problems and the 60 days is 
considered sufficient. (Planner 2) 
Several planner interviewees, however, mentioned that the new fast track online system 
requires quick responses from developers and their planning and design consultants in order to 
be able to achieve the goal of its implementation. For instance, many indicated that the work 
of some consulting firms, hired by developers, in addressing the amendments made on 
development proposals are not meeting the standards because they are rushing or sometimes 
do not respond in time. 
There are some [design] consulting firms that are not properly qualified, which is an 
issue. The online system was developed for the facilitation of work but it faces a lack 
of responsiveness from them, as they are not used to it.  (Planner 6) 
There has to be quick responsiveness from developers and their consulting firms with 
the new system … we send our notes to the developer’s consultant for completion and 
give them a certain period to respond. If they don’t respond on time the 60 day count is 
put on hold. The 60 day period is not considered a stick on the ministry forcing it to 
break the rules and regulations. (Planner 4)   
Despite the new improvements to the planning permit process some housing officials believe 
that there are still some existing issues, as Housing Official 1 noted: 
I think the new timeframe is appropriate to approve a project even it if takes up to four 
months … However, the 60 days for the preliminary approval is a trick used by 
municipalities. Yes, they respond quickly to lodged applications but usually they give 
tonnes of notes and amendments to the developer which might take a long time to be 
addressed. It is a new process of issuing notes quicker.  
Planners indicated that the new fast track system provides clarity in addressing the delay issues 
of the past and distinguishing the source of the problem. Planner 6 explained that: “The 
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situation has changed now, we insisted on implementing an online system so that there will be 
transparency and it becomes clear to know where the delay is”. 
Another important initiative was the establishment of the Developer Services Centre (Etmam) 
at the Ministry of Housing. The centre was launched to facilitate the work of private developers 
for residential projects. Cooperation agreements had been made with 12 government agencies 
involved in the development process, such as the Ministry of Municipality, the Ministry of 
Justice and other stakeholders involved in housing to accelerate the process of obtaining 
required permits. Through this partnership, the centre has permanent representatives of each 
concerned body. The centre works as a liaison between developers and these relevant bodies. 
Described as a ‘one-stop-shop’, several services are provided for developers including: 
submission and follow up of planning permit applications, permission for off-plan sales, 
applications for zoning exemption requests, endorsement for construction labour visas, 
certificates of building completion as well as many other services. The centre follows up the 
application of developers through its coordination with various authorities to ensure that they 
are complete and approved as quickly as possible.  
Most interviewees believe that the Developer Services Centre would participate in solving 
many of the coordination issues mentioned earlier, such as the delay in titles proof and issues 
with connecting infrastructure and services. Housing Official 2 explained the idea behind the 
creation of the centre and the importance of its work. He indicated that the goal is to identify 
the issues that developers face to facilitate their work and attract more investment in the 
housing sector: 
The basic idea of establishing the centre was to reduce the time spent in obtaining the 
necessary permits for residential projects, which will be reflected in attracting local and 
foreign investors. We found that the centre needs to have strategic partners. That’s why 
we signed agreements with several government agencies. The centre is not a legislative 
body but a coordination entity that has two important tools: transparency and time. We 
have done several workshops and meeting with developers and relevant government 
bodies and found that accusations are reciprocal. Therefore, the centre is created to 
coordinate and measure the indicators of the work performance between the two parties.  
Housing Official 2 indicated that the centre currently offers its services to developers for free, 
but there is a future plan for imposing fees in return for the provided services. When asked if 
there are any issues working with developers to provide these services he stated: 
We do not face problems, but we hope that the centre through its continuous work with 
developers and government bodies establishes a new concept of professional work in 
the development industry.  
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Finally, participants were asked to provide their opinions about the roles and efforts played by 
the Ministry of Housing in facilitating the work of developers to deliver affordable housing 
and the balance of an enabling environment without future negative impacts. Planner 
interviewees had a mix of responses. Some indicated that the work of the MOH in enabling 
developers has been adequate to deal with the housing shortage. Yet, many believe that the 
support given by the MOH to the private development industry is excessive and intrusive to 
the city’s planning and development control. Planner 2 explains:  
I think the support given by the ministry [MOH] is excessive. If we speak about 
planning and the new deregulation of densities, it should have been studied by taking 
into account the whole city. They [MOH] will be creating foci of increased densities 
instead of looking at locations of transport hubs like train stations and public transport 
areas. It is not reasonable that if someone merely has a piece of land, he will be given 
exemptions from the current control system. The municipality is responsible for the city 
development control and once others get involved there will be problems.    
Planner 3 argued that enabling private developers is important but the flexibility and support 
provided must be controlled to avoid any future implications:  
There is no excessiveness in supporting the private sector. The development industry 
is a huge investment sector; therefore, it has to be taken into account what developers 
aspire to. However, flexibility has limits. I do not want to attack the private sector but 
there must be limits to this support. The private sector is greedy and flexibility can be 
dangerous. There has to be a strong monitoring process for the new enabling 
legislations but with no complications. 
Most of the housing official interviewees explained that the roles and efforts of the MOH in 
supporting and facilitating the work of the private development industry are significant and 
follow a well thought out procedure. Many argued that supporting the market is an efficient 
method of meeting the demand for housing, as the government by itself cannot deliver the 
required housing. Enabling the private developers to build housing products is an important 
mission taken by the MOH as they indicated. They argued that the given support is balanced 
and controlled by certain procedures and requirements as stated by Housing Official 1: 
The private sector is the solution to the housing shortage as it can provide products in 
a short time and at prices lower than public delivery. Therefore, our role is to support 
the private sector in terms of finance, regulations and technical support for developers. 
We are building a platform for developers to do their work. This platform and support 
is governed by requirements. Our role is to provide the right environment for any 
developer to invest ... The ministry’s role in facilitating the work of the private sector 
is still in its beginning but there are constant improvements and the rules and regulations 
change from time to time. I think the capacity to adjust to changes is important where 
continuous development is sought by the ministry.  
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Housing Official 3 maintained the above remarks, adding that the new management at the 
MOH is better informed about the housing market and the ministry has learned lessons from 
its previous experiences:  
We have to strengthen the real estate development sector because it is the market that 
will build units. Our Minister came from the private development industry and he is 
well aware of how the market works and what needs to be changed. The ministry 
witnessed lots of changes since he took over and the mentality is very different now. 
Many who work here have a great understanding of the development and finance 
industries. The ministry has also improved based on its experiences in the past.  
It is important to note that the recent initiatives discussed under this section, such as the new 
fast track licensing system and the Developer Services Centre, were not discussed with private 
developers in Stage 1 as these initiatives were implemented after the first stage fieldwork had 
been completed. Hence, the developers’ views of the effectiveness of these recent initiatives 
are not covered in this study.  
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the results of the second stage analysis of this research. A focus on more 
problematic and complicated issues revealed in the first stage analysis (in Chapter 5) was 
undertaken. The planning system and the government policy intervention in housing were 
determined to be areas of significance that required further examination. In order to obtain a 
better understanding of the issues raised by private market actors, planners and housing 
officials were given an opportunity to express their experiences and perceptions on several 
claims and issues made by private market actors, as well as on recent emerging reforms in the 
housing system. The analysis of government actors’ interviews was organised into two themes 
that were devised from the study’s conceptual framework. The first theme, market regulation, 
discussed issues in the planning process and planning policies that mainly covered areas related 
to the impact of the planning system on the delivery of affordable housing. The second theme, 
market stimulation, was employed to examine the role of the government in enabling private 
market actors to better engage in the delivery of affordable housing. The discussion of this 
theme included the effectiveness of the PPP model as well as the new planning deregulations 
used by the MOH to stimulate housing supply. This chapter allowed government actors to 
express their opinions about their distinct roles and relationships; and how these roles and 
relations positively or negatively impacted the housing market and the broader urban built 
environment.    
  194 
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter share similarities with other planning systems and 
housing markets. There are competing claims and differences of opinion not only between 
planners and developers but also between different government actors involved in housing, 
such as planners and housing officials. The results of this chapter and the previous chapter will 
be discussed next (Chapter 7) where the conveyed perspectives of the multiple actors in the 
housing system will be critically assessed and policy implications will be presented.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Discussion of Findings and Policy Implications 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is focused on assessing the state-market relations in the delivery of housing, more 
particularly affordable housing, in Riyadh using the results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 and 
merging these with issues identified in the literature. The following section (7.2) forms the core 
of the discussion consisting of two sub-sections. The findings referred to in Section 7.2.1 
revealed that the dynamics of state-market interactions are marked by tensions in the housing 
market which seem to impact the delivery of affordable housing in Riyadh. Five thematic topics 
are presented conveying a contested housing environment where the reflection of different 
powers and interests of various key actors are examined and critically assessed. Several issues 
revealed in state-market relations were found to be linked to a set of power relations that are 
embedded in the broader institutional arrangements of housing, further discussed in Section 
7.2.2. The discussion of the main findings in Section 7.2 shows that three fundamental drivers 
are behind the majority of the issues in the system. These driving forces are synthesised and 
conceptualised in Section 7.3, leading to the development of a model that could be used to 
diagnose housing market issues in other contexts. The significance of these findings culminates 
into a number of policy implications that are aligned with this model (Section 7.4) to provide 
an informed improvement framework that may assist policymakers to better enable the market 
in Riyadh to meet the demand for affordable housing.     
7.2 Summary of the main findings 
7.2.1 State-market relations in the housing system  
This section discusses the study’s findings in terms of the state-market roles and relationships 
in the housing system in order to highlight the key issues that hinder a better delivery of 
affordable housing in Riyadh. Tensions between key actors in the housing system that 
contribute to the issue of housing affordability have emerged in the data. It is argued that such 
dynamics might be reflective of tensions evident in other housing systems in developed and 
developing countries. Although the context of Riyadh housing is unique in its nature with, for 
instance, specific political, economic and social settings, the tensions displayed between key 
housing actors share similarities with those between actors as described in the literature in other 
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contexts. Nonetheless, the parallel of issues in this case study with several other contexts (as 
depicted in Chapters 5 and 6) does not necessarily mean that borrowed policy solutions could 
be applied and implemented to improve affordability outcomes. Institutional and regulatory 
differences must be taken into account, as Gurran and Bramley (2017) remind us: 
… similar issues do not always lead to similar policy approaches and solutions. There 
have been and remain quite large differences between countries in how housing is 
provided, financed, regulated and managed, including most obviously differences in 
tenure structure, but going to a deeper level of subtlety in terms of degrees and types of 
regulation, governance, funding and so on. (p. 73) 
The findings of this study have revealed five explicit key themes that are causing tensions in 
Riyadh’s housing market and will be discussed below. Each comprises competing claims and 
differences of opinion between key actors in the housing system. This writer remains impartial 
in order to provide a deep and critical perspective.   
7.2.1.1 Planning delay, social benefits and private cost 
In the case of planning delay and its effect on development costs, the findings indicate that the 
planning delays increase development cost to such an extent that they are considered to be an 
obstacle to private investment in housing. The findings confirmed that there was a considerable 
delay in granting planning permissions for new housing development and planners themselves 
admitted the existence of such a delay (see Chapter 6 – Time and procedure). However, it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent with which the planning delay deters housing development and 
investment as claimed by the developers. Most likely, developers knew beforehand that the 
planning process could take a long period of time and this might have been factored into the 
development feasibility study to account for the cost of development before committing to a 
project (i.e. passing back cost to the landowner). Previous studies, such as Mayo and Sheppard 
(2001) and Ball (2011) (as discussed in Chapter 3), have shown that planning delays could in 
practice contribute to poor housing supply through the uncertainty of the planning process, 
which is the determining factor, not merely the expected length of delay. The uncertainty 
discussed in most western literature relates to the planning decision of whether a development 
proposal would secure the planning permission or not depending on several factors in relation 
to the proposed development and the nature of the planning system (discretionary vs. 
regulatory). In the Australian context Ong et al. (2017) state: 
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… the most important aspect of the planning system from a developer’s point of view 
is the certainty and consistency of advice provided by planning officers. Planning 
controls may be generally restrictive but if they are applied consistently the developer 
can work more easily with them to deliver housing. (p. 50) 
In terms of decision and certainty, the planning system in Riyadh guarantees certainty of 
approval if the developer adheres to the prefigured control standards. As delays may add cost 
to the development in the form of holding costs, developers in Riyadh do not have to pay taxes 
on land while waiting for planning approval. The major holding cost that developers have to 
bear is the interest payments on debt (assuming that finance is obtained for development) which 
again can be accounted for in the feasibility study. Thus, it seems that the lengthy planning 
process may not be a deterring factor to the private investment in Riyadh’s housing market as 
suggested in the findings. Additionally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a new fast track 
licensing system has been introduced recently to resolve the planning delay issue although its 
effectiveness cannot be confirmed as it was implemented after interviewing private sector 
actors was completed. However, it is important to note that there is uncertainty in the planning 
process in Riyadh that may impact the profitability of new developments, but it is not simply 
caused by the lengthy time of approval (see uncertainty and risk below). 
The tension between planners and developers over planning delays in Riyadh’s housing market 
appears to reflect similar tensions in many other housing markets. Keogh and Evans (1992) 
found that there are always competing claims about the time taken to assess planning 
applications where often developers have a negative view of planning authorities perceiving 
them as “… inefficient, and overburdened with planning applications for minor developments 
which include householder applications … unduly concerned with subjective matters like 
aesthetics and environmental quality”; in addition, “consultations with statutory bodies and 
with the public are seen as slow and sometimes excessive” (p. 689).  On the other hand, these 
authors describe planners’ perspectives of delays as “… frequently caused by the applicants 
changing proposals or failing to undertake satisfactory preparatory work. Where delay results 
from the planning system itself it is generally regarded as being for good reason” (p. 689). The 
perspectives of developers and planners depicted by these authors are shared by the developers 
and planners in this case study.  
To evaluate competing claims between planners and developers, any assessment of planning 
processes and polices (including delay) should take into account the social benefits of planning 
against the private cost incurred (Keogh & Evans, 1992; Cheshire & Sheppard, 2002; Gurran 
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& Bramley, 2017). The findings suggest that the lengthy time required in granting planning 
permission was primarily caused by the planning process itself; and that the ‘good’ reason for 
delay – promoting social benefits and protecting the public interest as just mentioned – do not 
come into play. The evidence showed that most of the planning delays were mainly caused by 
the time taken to check the correctness of land title by the Ministry of Justice and not because 
of the time needed for the actual planning assessment process (based on evidence provided in 
the data from several planners). Also, it was conceded by some planners that the planning 
process is vague, complex and burdened with a bureaucratic system that has no interest in 
minimising time and cost. This suggests that the responsiveness of the planning system in terms 
of decision-making time might not be totally utilised to promote the social benefits of planning. 
Hence, the private cost incurred due to the lengthy delays was likely a result of ineffectiveness 
and lack of coordination between government agencies rather than from ensuring good 
planning practices. 
7.2.1.2 Uncertainty and risk       
The findings revealed that one of the significant tensions in the housing market pertains to 
uncertainty and the associated risk of undertaking a new development. Based on the results, 
uncertainty in Riyadh’s housing market is evident in two forms: (i) the coordination of the 
infrastructure provision; and (ii) the protection of property rights, particularly the issue of land 
titles.  
First, in terms of infrastructure connectivity to new developments, the results showed that there 
was unresolved tension between developers and service providers about the infrastructure 
charges (i.e. electricity, water and sewerage). The findings suggest that there was a lack of 
transparency and accessibility to detailed information about the exact requirements for 
connecting infrastructure to new development sites. The Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB) 
policy, that was argued by most planners to clearly state the requirements for infrastructure 
contribution, tends to only provide a general guideline of the party responsible for connecting 
the services without stating the cost or the scale of the obligations (based on examination of 
the Updated Rules and Regulation of Urban Growth Boundaries until 2028, MOMRA, 2014). 
The UGB manual states that further detail of connecting off-site infrastructure will be 
determined with relevant service providers after the preliminary planning approval is obtained. 
Hence, in this case the developer seems to undergo a high level of uncertainty caused by the 
low amount of information provided in terms of what he is responsible for in connecting the 
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service to the development site, which increases the risk of investment. According to Adams 
et al (2005): “uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge of all possible outcomes and the 
impossibility of specifying their likelihood” (p. 50). Despite the existence of the UGB policies 
in the planning process to reduce such uncertainty by naming the party responsible for 
connecting the service, the evidence showed that developers would still not know in advance 
the possible cost of service connection as the exact requirements remained unclearly stated 
when granting the preliminary planning permission:      
When developers are in the construction phase and need to connect electricity, for 
example, to obtain the final planning approval the electricity company requires 
developers to connect the lines to their location from the nearest point, which 
sometimes can be five or 10 kilometres away from the location. So, who is responsible 
for this? Sometimes this may cost millions and connection for the project is completely 
disrupted. (Planner 2) 
Several studies emphasise that an estimate of infrastructure contribution should be accessible 
to the developer prior to committing to a new development in order to provide some certainty 
and reduce risk. Ruming et al (2011) points out that: “problems arise when developers are 
unable to ascertain costs ahead of land acquisition” (p. 272). Rowley and Phibbs (2012) 
explain: 
… developers need to be certain that positive cash flows will be generated by a certain 
date in order to pay off debt finance and secure returns. Anything that adds to the 
uncertainty of generating the predicted cash flow adds to the risk of the development. 
Infrastructure and other developer contribution requirements imposed at a late stage 
completely alter cash flow projections and predicted returns. Contributions that are 
clear before the DA [development approval] stage and can be factored into the 
feasibility offer far more certainty and are much more likely to be accepted by a 
developer, particularly if they can be passed on to the landowner. (pp. 29-30) 
It can be argued that the local planning agency in Riyadh reinforces the power of service 
providers to control the release of valuable information that might otherwise allow developers 
to account for a more accurate account of risk associated with development. The evidence 
suggests that withholding information from developers might be used to benefit service 
providers to maintain their privileged position (i.e. requiring developers to fund the cost of 
building power stations or release a certain number of plots for free to service providers to 
build their services before developers can obtain full planning permission). Indications suggest 
that there was low-level accountability manifested in poor coordination by the local planning 
agency and a lack of transparency resulting in misuse of power by service providers. Both 
highly impact trust in the market and contribute to increased transaction costs for developers, 
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which may have discouraged housing development from taking place due to a higher risk. 
Gielen and Tasan-Kok (2010) assert that: “there must be a certain level of certainty about 
contributions, in order to improve the involvement of the private sector in the realization of 
public infrastructure” (p. 1129). This does not seem to be the case in Riyadh.  
The second problematic form of uncertainty in the housing market concerns the accuracy of 
the land title system. The evidence confirms results from previous studies (i.e. Siry, 2011, in 
Chapter 2 – Land title) that proof of land ownership and boundary dispute issues still exist in 
Riyadh’s housing market. The findings revealed that inefficiency between government 
agencies concerned with land titles contributed to uncertainty in the housing market, which 
seems to account for the low trust in the legal framework and the elevated risk in the market. 
This could ultimately become a factor in discouraging investment in the housing market. The 
strain of uncertainty and risk caused by the institutional and legal framework needs to be 
resolved. Adams et al (2005) state: “... a prime role for public policy is to reduce or contain 
risk and uncertainty in order to enhance user, developer and investor confidence in new forms 
of development” (p. 38). Thus, land title issues in Riyadh could be resolved to build confidence 
and certainty in the market in order to improve the delivery of new housing development (see 
Section 7.4). 
7.2.1.3 Planning and value capture  
Another key issue in state-market relations demonstrated in this study’s findings was the 
relationships between planning and development in terms of value capture. Public value 
capture in this section refers to capturing part of the increased value of land resulting from 
private development investments. The discussion is specific to: (i) the on-site community 
services, such as schools, roads and open space; and (ii) the promotion of affordable housing 
which is often realised by allowing modifications to the planning rules. The findings showed 
that on-site community services were important to the local planning agency and were ensured 
through development contribution (40% land deduction). As it is important to provide adequate 
amenities and services in new developments, the findings suggest that public value capture of 
planning was limited to a strict, linear, technical planning standard that appears to overlook 
other needed social benefits, such as affordable housing. The results showed that even though 
planning flexibility did exist through voluntary exemptions available for developers (i.e. 
density bonuses in return for 50% deduction of developer’s land for services on land of 80,000 
sq. metres and above), they were not utilised to promote affordable housing in any exempted 
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development. This implies two possible explanations: (i) disinterest of local planning in 
promoting affordable housing in new developments; or (ii) lack of knowledge by local planning 
of the housing affordability problem. In either case, the findings suggested that maximum 
public value capture seems to be inefficiently utilised as it ignored the delivery of affordable 
housing.  
It seems that there is one plausible explanation for giving away such valuable planning 
negotiation tools only in return for more amenities and services. The evidence suggests that the 
planning system in Riyadh has no enthusiasm for growth, where value capture based on 
development viability appears to be non-existent. This argument seems to be concerned with 
the lack of autonomy of local planning agencies and the top-down process in terms of fiscal 
budgetary tools. Local planning agencies in Riyadh, including the city-wide municipality 
(Amanah) and sub-municipalities, lack the fiscal mechanisms, such as tax levies, to collect 
revenues that can be used to promote social and economic benefits in local areas (see Chapter 
2 – Planning system framework). Hence, new development do not generate much revenue for 
municipalities either from property taxes (which do not exist) or from user charges for services. 
The World Bank (2016) has observed that in Saudi Arabia: “The costs of operating and 
maintaining infrastructure are often paid by the government, while user tariffs recover only a 
fraction of operating and maintenance costs” (p. 21)17. This does not suggest that local 
municipalities lack the adequate financial resources to perform their duties as they are funded 
by the central government. However, the implication is that, in practice, new housing 
development do not add benefit to local municipalities in terms of generating revenues but add 
extra work for them (i.e. maintaining streets and public spaces). This may explain why public 
value capture in the form of affordable housing was non-existent as the findings suggested that 
there was disinterest by local planning agencies in new housing development in general:  
The majority of new developments are in the form of subdivided plots that get sold in 
the market with no housing products built that add value to the city. Developers who 
only subdivide land throw their burden on us and leave after getting their money. Even 
sometimes electricity cables and water pipes get stolen and we have to reinstall them 
as well as streets get worn out and we have to maintain them. (Planner 2) 
There is bureaucracy, delay and disinterest. If I approve or reject a project as Amanah, 
what would it add to me? If approved, headache, such as garbage collection and 
maintenance of public space … Amanah does not benefit from new developments and 
                                                     
17 However, according to the World Bank (2016), the full extent of the financial distribution of costs and 
contributions to deliver, operate and maintain public infrastructure remains largely unclear due to the fragmented 
nature of the institutional frameworks as are currently operating in Saudi Arabia. 
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I am speaking frankly. Look at the municipal land that got invested quickly by renting 
them to commercial developers for 20 years. Because this land generates money the 
Amanah brought the developers and kissed their hands to work with them. But 
residential developers giving deductions for schools and mosques really does not mean 
anything to them. (Housing Official 1) 
If local planning authorities have insufficient ‘fiscal incentives’, such as revenue generating 
sources to cover their service responsibilities, the motivation to promote housing development 
is unlikely to be strong and thus development may not take place (Gurran & Bramley, 2017, p. 
252). The disinterest in promoting new housing development also seems to be characterised by 
indifference to cost. This was implied from planners’ attitudes towards the development 
industry as several commentaries conveyed in Chapter 6 suggest that there was disinterest and 
a lack of awareness of market operations and the economic viability of developments (i.e. 
planners’ comments that developers must comply with regulations regardless of the costs and 
that any costs should never be linked to planning).   
Previous research studies (such as Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999; Oxley, 2004) have demonstrated 
that the dichotomy between state and market is a false one as the market is a social construct 
that reflects the society’s needs and interest (see Chapter 3 – Section 2.5.1). Adams and Tiesdell 
(2010) argue that planners are market actors as they shape, regulate and stimulate the market 
even if they do not necessarily perceive themselves as being in such role. The argument to be 
made is that planners in Riyadh need to recognise that they are market actors and their job 
should reflect the needs and interests of society. Protecting the public interest from the profit 
driven development industry is one task; but also being aware of their work to ensure it is 
enhanced to meet the society’s needs (i.e. affordable housing) in line with the society’s interests 
(i.e. preventing negative externalities of development) is another part of their duties. The 
findings suggest that the tension between planners and developers, as displayed in the 
disinterest of planning in new housing development, might not reflect the society’s needs in 
terms of delivering affordable housing. 
In the case of other market actors, more importantly developers, and their perspective on the 
public value capture and housing affordability, the findings suggest that the claim by 
developers that the affordability issue is directly linked to excessive on-site development 
contribution seems to be untrue. For example, developers argued that there was a relationship 
between the high deduction of land for amenities and services and housing affordability as 
higher development costs incurred as a result of deducting 40% of the developers’ land were 
passed onto homebuyers in the form of higher housing prices. Such a claim was not necessarily 
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true for several reasons. Firstly, developers cannot set the prices of housing based on their 
development cost as final sale prices of housing depend on the nature and conditions of the 
local housing market (Ruming et al, 2011, Ong et al, 2017, Murray, 2017). According to Ong 
et al (2017): “… the price of new housing is related to the price of established housing, not 
simply what it costs to produce” (p. 56). Even studies that suggest developers might be able to 
pass development costs onto buyers, such as Evans-Cowley and Lawhon (2003), argue this 
would only be possible in a strong housing market. In the context of this study, recent data of 
housing sales indicates that the housing market in Riyadh is slow in absorbing new housing in 
the market (92% of new housing offered in the market did not sell within the first half of 2017 
– Chapter 2 – Market conditions). Clearly, Riyadh’s housing market is not buoyant and, thus, 
developers would not be able to pass their added costs to end-users.  
Second, the development contribution for community services in Riyadh’s planning system is 
set clearly at 40%, which is known in advance to developers. This provides certainty to 
developers (Been, 2005; Gielen & Tasan-Kok, 2010) so that risks can be accounted for in the 
feasibility studies and the cost of development contribution (40% land deduction) would most 
likely be pushed back to the land seller not the homebuyer.  
It is interesting to observe the behaviour of private market actors in different contexts. It can 
be argued that property developers around the world share the concept that development 
charges are ultimately passed onto homebuyers even though such a concept appears to lack 
logical reasoning. The quotes below reflect commentaries of two developers, one from this 
study’s context and the second from the Australian context: 
The current 40% deduction is very high. This will be at the expense of the final product 
where the end-user is the one who will be paying for it, not the developer. (Developer 
8, Riyadh) 
All we do is gather up all the costs and put a margin on it and then pass it on. It still 
staggers me that politicians stand up and say the developers should pay. We actually 
don’t pay for anything. The end purchaser will ultimately pay for it. (Large Developer 
– QLD). (Ruming et al, 2011, p. 266) 
As most of the literature posits that the development industry is driven by profit maximisation, 
this researcher aligns his view with Murray (2017) regarding passing on the cost of the 
development contribution: 
Developer charges, or impact fees, do not increase the price of new dwellings. The 
economic incidence is purely on the developer (or landowner). Nor do they decrease 
the rate of new construction … This is why the property development industry lobbies 
so hard to remove or reduce DCs. They are the ones paying. If they could genuinely 
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pass on these costs in the price of new dwellings, the industry would lobby for them, 
not against them. (p. 5) 
In this study, the argument made by developers that development contributions were a reason 
for housing unaffordability because they must sell their new housing products for higher prices 
seems illogical. If, as suggested above, developers can profit from higher sale prices they would 
most likely not complain about the cost of development contributions.  
7.2.1.4 Restrictive versus non-restrictive planning  
An important issue expressed in the results was concerned with the restrictiveness of planning 
and development control regulations and their relation to housing supply and prices. The 
literature in Chapter 3 (see Restrictiveness of planning) pointed to an important question of 
whether planning restrictions on housing supply contribute to higher housing prices, or are they 
determined by market demand? The economic literature maintains that restrictive planning 
contributes to higher housing prices as it limits housing supply. In contrast, other scholars (such 
as Dawkins & Nelson, 2002; Gurran & Phibbs, 2016) argue that supply and prices are most 
likely to be demand driven. In the case of the Riyadh housing market, this study’s data supports 
the argument that demand side pressures appear to have an impact on land supply and prices. 
Nonetheless, non-restrictive planning policies that had allocated an excess of land for housing 
development seem to be an original contributor to the higher land and housing prices; as 
opposed to the restricted land allocation argument made in the literature. This may sound 
illogical in an economic sense but the findings of this study support this point as will be 
explained below. Similarly, the results imply that restrictive planning in the form of low density 
control measures might not have been a factor in increasing housing prices in Riyadh but they 
appear to indirectly affect housing affordability.      
In terms of non-restrictive planning and housing supply and prices, the results imply that the 
current demand pressures in the housing market seem to be a product of the early land 
allocation process that still impacts the housing market nowadays. The evidence revealed that 
access to land for new development was limited, which pushed up land prices (see Chapter 5 
– Land accessibility and affordability). Developers argued that the limited land supply was 
mainly caused by private land hoarding –  long-term landowners who acquired land in the past 
and appeared to have no motive to release it for development – leading to higher land prices. 
Reasons given for land hoarding included the belief that land was treated as a secure investment 
and the financial benefit of the absence of property taxes. Therefore, the limited supply of land 
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was not caused solely by restrictive planning in the form of land allocation and it appears to be 
the case that high demand and less supply of land caused increases in land and housing prices.  
It is contended, however, that such increases in land prices seem to originate from the historic 
non-restrictive planning represented by land allocated for housing development. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 (see Mubarak, 2004; World Bank, 2016; Al-Hathloul, 2017), the 
uncontrolled urban expansion of the city of Riyadh caused by the absence of urban containment 
policies coupled with the inefficient implementation of the UGB seem to account for the high 
private land ownership in the city. This implies that non-restrictive land allocation resulted in 
a high supply of land which, on the one hand, was envisioned to reduce land prices at the time 
but, on the other hand, seemingly encouraged land hoarding and speculative practices through 
the excess of land released in the private market. This ultimately resulted in increased land and 
housing prices. The vast amount of private vacant residential land within the urban boundaries 
(Figure 2.10) and the massive urban sprawl of the city (Figure 2.14) provide clear indications 
that land allocation was not restricted. Yet the evidence suggests that privately-owned land was 
hard to access (i.e. Developer 4 comment: “Riyadh has a big number of land but not all of this 
land is for sale”). Hence, non-restrictive planning may indirectly contribute to less supply of 
land leading to higher prices. This implies that a more relaxed planning regime in terms of land 
allocation may not necessarily reduce housing prices in the long run. It seems that Riyadh’s 
case differs from what the economic literature suggests.  
Furthermore, in the case of restrictive planning in the form of low density development control 
measures and their impact on housing supply and prices, the results showed contradictory 
perspectives between developers and planners. For instance, developers argued that low 
density measures were a significant factor preventing them from delivering low-cost housing 
(i.e. height restriction makes it unfeasible to build low-cost housing and make profit especially 
with the high land prices); whereas planners did not prescribe to existing relationships between 
lower densities and higher housing prices. It is difficult to be certain about how low density 
control in practice has contributed to higher housing prices in Riyadh. However, the findings 
suggest that such restrictive control might not have contributed to higher housing prices as 
argued by developers but instead may have supported the production of housing choices 
(dwelling types) that were not necessarily affordable to low and middle-income households. 
This concept of satisfying prevailing consumer preferences and the impact on affordable 
housing will now be examined. 
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First, the findings showed that, strictly speaking, there appears to be enough housing supply 
albeit unaffordable to many households (i.e. Real Estate Agent 2: “there is huge supply of 
housing in the city but most of these dwellings offered in the market are not affordable to the 
majority of people”). This aligns with recent statistics by the High Commission for Riyadh 
Development (HCRD, 2016) that the vacancy rate was 8% in 2016 (housing stock was 1.2 
million units and the number of households was about 1.1 million). Hence, it appears that the 
restricted low density control did not limit the supply of housing implying no direct link to 
higher housing prices.  
Second, in the case of restricted density measures and housing affordability, studies such as 
Ihlanfeldt (2007) suggest that restricted low density contributes to housing unaffordability by 
limiting the choices available to homebuyers. Mills (2005) further demonstrates that such 
limitation of choices results in social exclusion and unaffordability in desired locations. While 
this study cannot confirm that restricted density had contributed to social exclusion, the results 
suggest that restricted density may have indirectly contributed to housing unaffordability 
through supporting production trends of certain dwelling types (i.e. the more expensive 
detached, semi-detached and attached villas) that, while satisfying the aspirations of Riyadh 
homebuyers, did not necessarily meet the budgets of most households. Planner 3 supports this 
notion: 
They [local planning authorities] argue that Saudi is vast and we have plenty of land so 
why would we smother ourselves in apartment units etc. … The global trend in urban 
planning is towards compact cities, but why do we have a horizontal system? Blame it 
on the planning system that allows more horizontal expansion than vertical. 
However, it should be noted that there is still production of multi-family housing in Riyadh as 
52% of housing delivery was in the form of low rise apartments in 2016 (MOH, 2016). Yet, 
the findings indicated that apartment units were not the preferred tenure type for ownership 
and that this delivery appeared to be predominantly for investment purposes. It can be argued 
that planning in Riyadh seems to abstain to some extent from promoting sustainability 
objectives to address both environmental (i.e. urban sprawl) and social (i.e. affordability) 
issues. On the other hand, planning cannot be solely blamed for housing unaffordability as the 
issue is deeply rooted in broader cultural factors (see Section 7.2.2). 
Based on the data provided by developers, it can be argued that the advocated flexibility by 
developers in regard to allowing higher densities may not necessarily deliver affordable 
housing. As indicated earlier, housing prices are more likely to be influenced by demand side 
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pressures suggesting, in this case, that if developers were permitted to build higher density 
housing development in Riyadh, they may not necessarily build affordable housing (as the 
results here showed). It has been indicated (see Chapter 5) that the demand for owning 
apartments seems to be weak for cultural reasons. Therefore, developers might not economise 
on the value of land by building high-density development if unable to sell their units (see 
Dawkins & Nelson, 2002). Allowing flexibility only to make development viable for 
developers might have negative consequences, such as increasing land prices in adjacent areas, 
which could make matters worse (see next section). In addition, private developers are driven 
by profit maximisation and may not voluntarily build affordable housing, as suggested in the 
results, even without density restrictions (for example, exemptions in the form of higher 
densities in return for 50% land deduction were available to developers but no affordable 
housing was built). It is evident that restrictive density measures have contributed to urban 
sprawl issues; furthermore, developers and planners have indicated that low density control in 
Riyadh is inefficient, unsustainable and needs to be reconsidered in order to promote social, 
economic and environmental benefits.     
7.2.1.5 Flexibility and conflict  
Another form of tension shown in the results was exhibited in the Public Private Partnership 
(PPP). First, in the case of the PPP on government-owned land, the findings revealed that there 
was evident discord between the Ministry of Housing (MOH) and private developers on the 
viability of this partnership in its first phase. For example, most developers argued that the PPP 
was not financially feasible for them (i.e. Developer 1: “we will not make a single penny as 
profit”), whereas the MOH affirmed the opposite (i.e. Housing Official 3: “it was very 
profitable for them but of course the developer is never satisfied”). In comparing the two 
opposing views with a benchmark report of the construction costs in Saudi Arabia by Colliers 
International (2016), the average construction price range per sq. metre for low rise apartments 
in 2016 was USD533 – 650; whereas the development grant by the MOH to build 180 sq. metre 
apartments was USD740 per sq. metre. This suggests that the partnership program might not 
have been as enticing to developers as indicated by housing officials especially when adding 
other overhead costs to the above price.  
The partnership they [MOH] initiated with such requirements is merely a headache that 
I am not interested in. Instead of getting 200 million to enter into partnership with the 
Ministry of Housing to build 200 units, for example, I can do without the ministry’s 
complications and build 50 units by myself where I have my own flexibility … Let me 
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put it this way, the partnership with the Ministry of Housing does not make an 
opportunity for us. (Developer 3) 
However, apart from the viability of the partnership in this model, several other issues, such as 
the lack of trust between the MOH and developers and the overall dissatisfaction by developers 
about the level of support provided, implies that the MOH may need to reconsider its strategy 
in engaging private developers and resolve conflicts in order to achieve better outcomes. 
Although improvements have been made to subsequent phases of the above PPP model (see 
Chapter 6 – Land release and development grant), this study cannot confirm their effectiveness 
as they were implemented after the completion of the first stage of fieldwork. However, it can 
be argued that the fundamental objective of this model of partnership in delivering Low-Cost 
Housing Ownership (LCHO) appears to be inefficient in terms of meeting the future needs of 
the wider community as only a few could benefit from such costly partnership arrangements. 
Adams and Tiesdell (2013) note that public stimulus instruments can be socially unjust and/or 
economically ineffective which also seems to be the case in this study: 
… unintended consequences exist with any stimulus instrument, which raise important 
questions about whether such instruments provide value for money or are socially just. 
The first of these is what might be called ‘deadweight loss’, where any real benefits 
produced are outweighed by the cost. (pp. 284-285) 
A second tension in policy related to the PPP pertains to the recurring theme of desired planning 
flexibility that was manifesting differently than the usual planners versus developers’ 
flexibility conflict. The findings revealed that there is tension between planning agencies and 
the Ministry of Housing (MOH) over the introduction of discretionary flexible planning 
incentives which were intended to stimulate the housing market and enhance the delivery of 
affordable housing (see Chapter 6 – Deregulatory planning incentives). The findings suggest 
that recent pro-development attitudes of the MOH portrayed in bypassing local planning 
regulations to stimulate new infill housing development (i.e. granting density bonuses in return 
for a certain percentage of housing to be sold at lower market prices to the MOH beneficiaries) 
appear to be problematic in terms of their potential effects on the city’s planning. The 
intervention of the MOH in the planning system, albeit for the good reason of utilising planning 
regulations to promote the production of affordable housing, seems to be simply for 
quantitative purposes with little consideration for qualitative integration of housing for 
sustainable social, economic and environmental planning objectives that the new global 
paradigm shift in housing is encouraging (see Chapter 3 – Housing at the centre).  
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Certainly, owning a piece of land with an area of 10,000 sq. metres or more within Riyadh’s 
urban boundaries may not be a good enough reason to grant higher densities. It is reasonable 
that the MOH seeks solutions (such as enforcing taxes on vacant land) to unlock the mass of 
private urban land in order to stimulate infill developments and potentially increase the supply 
of affordable housing. Nonetheless, the adopted system of implementing discretionary 
flexibility in the form of granting higher densities as a catalyst for taxed land based on the land 
area appears to be too simplistic and may not achieve its goal. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 
3, incentivising developers by granting density bonuses in infill developments could cause land 
value uplift if such incentives can be pre-identified prior to land purchase (Rowley & Phibbs, 
2012). In the case of Riyadh, the MOH announced the incentives which became known to both 
developers and landowners. Hence, density bonuses for supplying affordable housing units 
may not be captured by the developer but rather the landowner who would increase the land 
value knowing that higher densities are permitted on the land (in the case where the developer 
does not own the land). Therefore, the system adopted by the MOH (granting additional density 
to taxed land) seems to be counterproductive to its original aim because if developers cannot 
benefit from these incentives by having to pay higher prices for land, new development may 
not occur.    
Second, apart from the issue of ensuring that incentives are benefiting producers, the scope of 
these incentives appear to overlook the possible undesirable consequences. The new paradigm 
shift ‘housing at the centre’, affirms that housing should be integrated into sustainable planning 
where mixed urban land-uses and appropriate higher densities are linked with better mobility 
and services (UN-Habitat, 2015b). This does not appear to be the case in Riyadh as all vacant 
land in the city could score a windfall gain from these new exemptions regardless of spatial 
potential. It may well be the case that the planning system in Riyadh lacks the efficiency to 
confer social net benefit and account for the future needs of the population by not effectively 
utilising planning instruments to promote affordable housing. However, the results 
demonstrate that the opposing argument made by planners, such as the negative externalities 
that may arise from this new form of flexibility, also appear to be a valid concern.   
Encouraging densities to achieve efficient and sustainable housing objectives cannot be 
realised only by unlocking private land using land taxes and density bonuses. The key concern 
is diverging from the original aim of planning to improve the built environment in order to 
achieve short-term gains (that is, delivering more housing units for the MOH pre-approved 
beneficiaries). Gurran and Bramley (2017) argue that reducing planning into merely “a set of 
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regulatory barriers that must be cleared to liberate the housing market” would lead to 
“devastating social, environmental and economic effects” (p. 383). In the case of possible 
negative externalities, such as the capacity of infrastructure and services, it can be argued that 
the infrastructure provision may not be as problematic as suggested by some planners. For 
example, current infrastructure especially in the city centre and inner-city areas should be 
upgraded to accommodate more densities and promote sustainable form. The expansion of the 
city through spreading new developments further out is costly and inefficient which will 
require more investment in infrastructure resulting in diminishing the savings on overall city 
infrastructure investment (Brueckner, 2009). However, other negative externalities, including 
traffic congestion and pressure on services (such as schools, hospitals and other community 
services), may arise if exemptions are not properly coordinated with local planning agencies.  
This study’s findings indicate that there seems to be an unresolved tension in terms of policy 
intervention in planning (such as the MOH intervening with the work of planning agencies). 
This intervention is marked by a neo-liberal concept in the form of enablement that was 
mobilised against rigid planning practice that strictly adheres to predefined criteria. It can be 
argued that such tension and conflict (such as the planners’ views of enablement as intrusive 
to planning practices) may not lead to desired housing outcomes. It is demonstrated that 
delivering housing to low- and moderate-income groups in highly pressured urban centres will 
require some form of government intervention (Rowley & Phibbs, 2012; Ong et al, 2017). 
Nevertheless, insights of the appropriate targeted policy interventions to assist affordable 
housing supply should take into account undesirable consequences where issues have to be 
settled through mutual collaboration between the MOH and MOMRA (see Section 7.4).   
Discretionary planning and the issues associated with its flexibility is still an ongoing debate 
in several mature planning systems (see Chapter 3 – Uncertainty and delay). Previous research 
indicates, for example, that the dilemma of achieving balance between flexibility and certainty 
in planning systems is very challenging, complicated and can be unsettling in many contexts 
(see Steele & Ruming, 2012). This seems to be the case in Riyadh’s housing context as the 
findings illuminate issues of power struggles and arbitrary decision-making between the two 
ministries involved in the new discretionary planning process. This may continue to limit 
efficiency, in the form of accountability and uncertainty of decision-making as already seen, 
and lead to other potentially debilitating issues in the future. Gurran (2011) suggests that a 
hybrid system that combines aspects of both certainty and flexibility might provide a solution 
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to the tension between flexibility and certainty, which may be well served in Riyadh’s housing 
context.     
In the context of this study, it is argued that a hybrid planning system has been forced on top 
of the regulatory system as the certainty that existed in the zoning system was combined with 
a new discretionary flexibility. On the positive side, this may provide a voluntary space for 
innovative solutions within predefined criteria to achieve better outcomes. However, the 
involvement of two government agencies –  with different sets of objectives – to create a hybrid 
planning system could make the task even more formidable. The potential for enabling housing 
with better performing planning as argued by Steele and Ruming (2012), “will require a better 
institutional understanding and articulation of what the desired outcomes might be—
particularly within an era defined by economic reform where flexibility appears manifest at the 
higher government and appointed independent body levels” (p. 173). The study’s findings 
suggest that delivering sustainable, affordable housing could be problematic given that a shared 
institutional common vision between the government stakeholders involved appears to be 
lacking.  
7.2.2 Embedded institutional arrangements and power relations  
The literature has affirmed the importance of taking the wider institutional context into account 
when analysing housing systems to understand the broader influences that determine the social 
interactions between actors (see Chapter 3 – Institutionalism in housing). Burke (2012) 
emphasises that housing market behaviours and outcomes are not just about demand and 
supply, “but rather a product of the institutional context in which markets are embedded” (p 
35). Milligan (2003) points out that the concept of housing embeddedness in the broader 
context can provide a way to synthesise the analysis of actors’ relations in the housing market:  
Policy and its effects come about through the complex interaction of longstanding 
structures and patterns of institutions, ideas (and ideologies) and behaviour in national 
housing systems and changing exogenous influences deriving from broad economic, 
demographic, technological, social and political changes. Conceptually aware and 
historically specific analyses of social policies and their outcomes are necessary to 
unravel the relationships and to highlight the particular significance and ongoing social, 
political and economic sustainability of chosen policy paths. (p. 40) 
The discussion in the previous section indicates that there were key issues in the roles and 
relationships between key actors resulting in tensions in Riyadh’s housing market. Many of 
these key issues appear to be more embedded in the broader social, political and economic 
forces of the institutional context. This broader context provides deeper understandings and 
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better explanations of the issues that have emerged out of the discussion above. The main 
objective of this section is to unveil the bigger picture of state-market relations and how and 
why they function in certain ways that shape the housing outcomes. The evolution of urban 
and housing policies in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 2) has already provided a basis for 
uncovering some of the issues that cause tension in the housing market. 
This thesis contends that the long-standing policy of lavish housing subsidies used for decades 
to promote home ownership has resulted in the creation of a unique consumer culture. The 
findings suggest that a culture of entitlement has now been firmly entrenched in Saudi society. 
Consequently, such elevated expectations of the government’s role in providing housing may 
in fact act as a barrier to the implementation of more sustainable housing policies that could be 
used to better promote the efficient use of resources and enhance the quality of urban life. Such 
a ‘culture of entitlement’, fuelled by lofty expectations, may originate from an implicit 
administrative anxiety that seeks to maintain stability in the Kingdom by using housing policies 
as a means to achieving such stability. However, the recent downturn in the economy has 
necessitated a new form of government intervention in housing that may not be compatible 
with the continuous use of such housing policies. This is discussed in more detail below.  
7.2.2.1 Social, political and economic forces 
Firstly, this discussion will revolve around the effects of state housing policies on the efficiency 
of the free market approach and the implications of cultural factors. The findings suggest that 
demand side housing subsidy policies appear to be counterproductive to supporting housing 
supply in the market. The evidence revealed that there was a slowdown in the housing market 
in recent years mainly caused by several government reforms that were intended to regulate 
the housing market and enhance housing supply (these include new mortgage laws and down 
payments, land fees on urban vacant land and the injection of funds to the MOH to support 
housing subsidies). The findings suggest that this slowdown may be related to homebuyer’s 
anticipating that access to suitable housing is to be resolved through extensive support by the 
government. For example, several interviewees indicated that the recent government reforms 
had negatively impacted the housing market, as exemplified by Financier 3:  
… the new 30% down payment requirement of the property value to obtain a mortgage 
and imposing land fees on white land coupled with some rumours that prices will go 
down, led many people to wait assuming that the government will provide them with 
housing. The majority of people have applied to the Ministry of Housing’s website and 
pretty much anyone who doesn’t own a house and applied got approved. Therefore, 
these people consider that with their applications being approved they would soon get 
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subsidised housing from the government and yet are still waiting. These previous 
factors have led to a decline in mortgage financing not only in our bank but in all other 
banks over the past year.     
The recent state intervention in the housing market as described in Chapter 2 and illuminated 
in the findings (Chapters 5 and 6), appear to be positive in terms of, for example, introducing 
new mortgage laws to regulate housing finance and imposing taxes on vacant land to encourage 
infill development. However, these measures also appear to be countered by other policies – 
particularly the housing subsidies – and the citizens’ reluctance to purchase a property while 
they maintain such elevated expectations of the government providing finance for housing.  
This evidence aligns with previous research findings (Aleid, 2017) that show government 
housing subsidy policies contradicting other housing policies that promote the free market 
approach. For instance, despite the introduction of mortgage regulations to ensure access for 
mortgage financing in Saudi Arabia, the findings suggest that buyers were more inclined to 
wait for housing subsidies, whether an interest-free loan, free land or ready built housing. This 
provides a plausible explanation for why housing producers (i.e. developers and small builders) 
have been focusing on the high-end market where buyers are not reliant on subsidies even 
though such housing remains unaffordable for the majority of households.  
It is argued that the weak supply of affordable housing choices in the market is exacerbated by 
the culture of entitlement and high expectations of home seekers in Riyadh. As demonstrated 
above, the slowdown in the housing market, for example, appears to be affected by the 
expectation that the government will step in and assist first homebuyers in obtaining housing 
by providing financial assistance. It is believed that other reasons provided in the data, such as 
the difficulty in accessing mortgage financing, appear to be less problematic. For example, the 
30% down payment that was considered a hindering factor to access housing was soon reduced 
to 15%, implying that access to finance may not be the issue. The findings show that a high 
proportion of housing supplied was unaffordable to most buyers, yet housing producers 
continue to supply such unaffordable housing choices. This implies that housing production 
trends were focused on a narrow segment of society that is not waiting for government support 
in the form of a housing subsidy. Hence, the expectation of buyers to obtain government 
housing support, even if they can access mortgage financing, seems to provide a clearer 
explanation for the limited housing supply for the low- and moderate-income segments. 
Obtaining housing subsidies in any form, whether interest-free loans or free land, means 
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lowering the housing purchase cost providing a much better deal for aspirant homebuyers than 
the free market approach.   
Evidence in this study demonstrates that the above proposition of a culture of entitlement has 
further implications in terms of promoting diverse and affordable housing types. For example, 
the results show that even low-income earners who were prioritised in the MOH subsidy 
program to obtain low-cost ownership housing in the form of apartment units through the PPP 
program were not happy with the government efforts. Developer 1 elaborates that, when 
marketing these units to beneficiaries: “A lot of them asked to remove their names from the 
apartment housing subsidy program list so that they can get land and/or a loan [other types of 
housing subsidies]”. The results confirm previous research findings (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 
2010; Khan, 2013) that households in Riyadh appear to have no preference for owning 
apartments as a housing choice for several reasons, including limited space, sharing facilities 
and privacy issues (see Chapter 5 – Society and housing). This suggests that the issue of 
dwelling preferences is highly linked to expectations and a prevailing perception of entitlement 
that may prevent the market from delivering diverse and cost-effective choices to address 
housing affordability and urban sprawl.  
The aspiration of home ownership supported by government strategies (i.e. raising the rate of 
home ownership through subsidy programs) which is reflected in a particular tenure form (i.e. 
households’ preferences for villas rather than apartments) appear to be embedded in the buyers’ 
minds of what a dream home entails. Whereas home ownership is accepted as a positive 
concept, the dream home culture might have been envisioned by buyers to be more than just a 
comfortable and safe shelter but rather a commodity that can also generate income. The results 
showed that many first time homebuyers usually look for housing that includes separate units 
and can be rented to assist in paying the mortgage (such as a villa with separate top floor unit). 
For example, Real Estate Agent 4 stated that: “most of the houses sold in the market are for 
housing and investment at the same time”. Apartment units appear to be solely bought for 
investment (i.e. private renting) and not as a residence for owners to live in. This suggests that 
the disfavour associated with more affordable housing choices, such as apartment units, is 
closely related to the continuous ambition of wealth creation through property that has been 
historically supported by generous housing subsidies. Subsequently, prospective homebuyers 
can, if patient enough, obtain interest-free loans that allow significant lowering of housing 
costs; and at the same time entice housing choices that can generate an income. Clearly, these 
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options would not be affordable to most households without the extensive government support 
offered.  
Secondly, it is proposed that there are exogenous political factors in the form of implicit power 
relations that positively and negatively impact the housing market in Riyadh. On the positive 
side, the findings suggest that there is a strong commitment by the central government agency 
responsible for housing (MOH) towards attempting to address the housing problem, such as 
establishing the PPP, imposing taxes on vacant land etcetera, (as presented in Chapters 5 and 
6). This commitment can be attributed to a strong political will where facilitating access to 
housing for all citizens appears to be the main objective that is highlighted by direct 
intervention in the housing market (for example, issuance of royal decrees to make new policy 
reforms as laws). Gurran and Bramley (2017) argue that strong central government supervision 
over housing is crucial to overcome local barriers. In the case of this study, the central 
government (MOH) seems to have the capacity to mandate new reforms, backed by 
monarchical consent, to achieve its goals despite any existing obstacles in the local context (i.e. 
bypassing local planning regulations for new housing development that allocate affordable 
housing). The strong role of the Ministry of Housing, supported and promoted by the ultimate 
authority of the King, can be regarded as a positive force in terms of mobilising resources and 
implementing policies.  
On the negative side, attempted solutions made by the central government seem to provide a 
fix for the political problem rather than providing comprehensive solutions for the housing 
problem. This plausible contention is formed from witnessing the apparent motivation of the 
central government to solve the housing problem, as well as from understandings closely drawn 
from the data, literature and observations. It signifies how the MOH’s actions of moving and 
shaking the housing system to expand home ownership have actually been unsuccessful in 
achieving the desired effect. The justification for this contention is described below. 
Even though Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, similar trajectories in terms of achieving 
political objectives are shared. The concept of public counter-intuitive opinion is particularly 
important to this discussion. In democratic societies, politicians often try to appeal to local 
constituencies (voters) by following short-term policy goals that may not necessarily result in 
desirable outcomes. Rakodi (2001) explains:   
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… the time scale of political decision makers is relatively short, giving rise to a need 
for demonstrable results in terms of improved services and visible projects, hindering 
the institutionalisation of new policies and approaches, and inhibiting following 
through on initiative. Short term achievement may lead to re-election. (p. 219) 
The idea of short time horizons for policymakers and the appeal to voters to get re-elected does 
not manifest in the same way in the Saudi Arabian context (see Chapter 2 – Political structure). 
It can be argued that housing policymakers, particularly at the ministerial level, are subject to 
similar scrutiny where delivering fast results may serve the unstated motive of ensuring 
political stability that is absolutely essential for the governing authorities. Hence, 
policymakers, where time sensitivity and demonstrable results are important for them to keep 
their jobs, are under intense pressure to appease the high authorities as well as the public.   
This issue is worthy of further examination to gain a deeper understanding of the implications 
for housing outcomes. In his paper, McConnell (2010) discusses government policy success 
and failure from three different dimensions: (i) process (identifying the problem, examining a 
potential policy and making a decision); (ii) program (new policy/implementation); and (iii) 
politics (political repercussions). He explains that in order to understand the dynamics and 
features of policy processes and programs, politics must be taken into account: 
… if we are to fully grasp the multi-dimensional nature of policy and what governments 
do, we need to recognize that programs have political repercussions. The choices of 
government (including timing of decisions and the symbolism of particular forms of 
action or inaction) have consequences for the reputation and electoral prospects of 
politicians and their capacity to manage political agendas. (p. 350) 
Furthermore, McConnell (2010) argues that policymakers often react to problems through 
certain policies that may not essentially solve the actual problem but give the public the 
impression that such policies are effective:  
… it is often easier for governments to deal with symptoms rather than tackle 
underlying social causes … [such policies] demonstrate that government is trying to 
deal with the problem and responding to popular concerns can become the definition of 
success, whether or not the response effectively engages with a wicked problem. (p. 
385)    
This, in a sense, explains the concept of public counter-intuitive opinion as the government is 
perceived as doing its job to solve the problem but, in reality, the chosen policy is merely a 
reaction to the public concerns. McConnell (2015) further points out that the complexity and 
multiplicity of social issues may provide an explanation for why policymakers often tend to 
react towards solving problems in certain ways: 
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… government may succeed in perpetuating its governance ideas by initiating policy 
with a high placebo content, demonstrating that a policy is in place to tackle a particular 
‘wicked problem’, but which fails to actually deliver on programme goals because of 
the complexity and intractability of problems with multiple individual, institutional and 
societal causes. (p. 238) 
Despite its application in western democratic countries, the argument made here is that there is 
an interplay in the Saudi context where the objectives of policymakers appear to be running a 
parallel course. It is posited that housing policymakers in Saudi Arabia may not pay enough 
attention to the policy processes; rather, the thorough analysis and deep consideration for the 
genuine issues that is needed in housing, is undermined by a focus on politics. That is, the focus 
is on delivering fast and agreeable results designed to ensure political and social stability. For 
example, sustaining the generous housing subsidies, which fundamentally undermine the basic 
relationships in the housing market as demonstrated, appears to serve such unstated motives. 
Alzamil (2014) argues that subsidy programs in Saudi Arabia are not based on affordability 
measures, suggesting that “Subsidy programs should serve the principle of affordability 
through directing financial resources for vulnerable groups with the housing market” (p. 224). 
The short-term gain of achieving fast results by allocating subsidies, without strict 
consideration to financial means, may well be argued to be unsustainable in terms of the 
efficient use of public resources as well as having a negative impact on the free market to 
deliver housing in general, and low-cost housing in particular.  
Other government interventions discussed in the previous section, such as the PPP and the 
deregulation of planning, may also not yield the desired outcomes as hastily produced policies 
could ignore potential implications and create bigger problems. Hence, the inclination of the 
MOH to respond to public concerns by instigating quick policy fixes could be more likely to 
originate from implicit power relations rather than from a concerted effort to build an efficient 
housing policy framework. 
Finally, the significant wealth generated by oil in the past decades has negatively influenced 
the behaviour of local governments where enthusiasm for promoting economic growth 
(described under Planning and value capture) appears to be hindered by a strong central 
government control over resources. It is argued that the centralised municipal system, 
particularly in terms of financial resource allocations, has impacted the appetite of local 
planning authorities to be proactive in encouraging new housing development since new 
growth does not generate revenues and the cost of maintaining infrastructure and public 
services is not recouped. As local municipalities receive most of their budget from the central 
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government, they are often poorly financed and cannot anticipate the level of funding to be 
allocated to them (Helmi, 2015), which makes the delivery and maintenance of needed 
infrastructure and public services burdensome. Mubarak (2004) explains: 
Municipalities are short of financial resources and manpower while local autonomy is 
usurped by national ministries and agencies in the national capital, and so conflicting 
authority and interests are the norm. The contemporary history of urban management 
in Saudi Arabia corroborates such observations … Oil has created an influx of capital 
into cities, but the magnitude of development has placed a great strain on housing and 
the infrastructure of the municipalities. (p. 577) 
The persistence of enforcing a centralised system, in which reliance of local authorities on the 
central government to fund their activities, can be argued to be an unsustainable practice in 
urban management. Mubarak (2004) believes that the lack of local autonomy, which has 
prevented effective urban management, is used to retain political power by the central 
government over localities. However, there seems to be other power relations at play specific 
to the socio-political aspects of this issue. The lack of local revenue generating mechanisms 
and the limited power given to local authorities to realise growth benefits appear to also be for 
the reason of ensuring stability by the central government. As discussed in Chapter 2, public 
services in Saudi Arabia are provided free of charge by the state and this is the general 
expectation of citizens. This hinders the implementation of more effective ways of generating 
local revenue sources. Mandeli (2008) outlines: 
Although the central authorities support the idea of privatization, some institutional and 
organizational constraints still hinder the realization of this policy. One major problem 
is political. Even though the revenue earned from municipal investment through 
privatization would allow the reduction of government expenditure for service delivery, 
many social commentators in academic and private forums view this development 
decision as self-defeating. They believe that service delivery is a means to enhance 
civic responsibility, therefore, it is unrealistic to levy any direct or indirect fees on 
citizens for public services and infrastructure. (p. 530) 
Despite the recent fall in oil prices and the government moves towards privatisation in its Vision 
2030 document, local municipalities are still dependent on the central government for funding 
their activities. According to the NTP (KSA, 2016a), only 11% of municipality budgets are 
financed by internal revenues, which is targeted to increase to 40% by 2020. However, the 
report did not indicate how the new target would be achieved. Utilising local revenue 
mechanisms, such as property taxation (except the newly introduced fees on vacant urban land) 
that are used in most countries appear to have been overlooked for the reasons explained above. 
Thus, the lack of resources allocated by the central government and the absence of local 
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revenues tied to growth have generated impacts in the housing market. Addressing these issues 
may provide more efficient and sustainable housing delivery. 
7.3 The fundamental drivers: A model for diagnosing processes and outcomes in housing 
This section provides a synthesis of the analysis presented in the previous two sections (7.2.1 
and 7.2.2) by revealing three fundamental drivers of the core issues that have significantly 
impacted housing affordability in Riyadh.  
Table 7.1 culminates the key issues discussed in this chapter using an inductive institutional 
analysis to connect the drivers with the issues that are causing the tension in the housing market 
and placing strains on the delivery of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income groups. 
The table presents the non-linear dynamics of social interactions between the key actors in the 
system where the interrelationships between the issues and the multiplicity of their drivers 
shows the complexity of the housing system. Issues in one driver can feed back to impact the 
decisions environment of actors in another driver in an interactive way. For example, the issue 
of the PPP success is politically driven but also interconnected with the economic driver of 
motivation as the decision of developers to join such a partnership may not be aligned with 
their motivation of profitability, which positions the political and economic drivers at odds. A 
further explanation of the drivers follows. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of Key Issues and their Fundamental Drivers 
Issue Evidence 
Driver of the 
issue 
1. Uncoordinated planning process – 
Local planning authority  
Delay caused by land title adding 
unnecessary development cost – 
admitted by planners  
Economic 
 
1. Lack of 
motivation and 
alignment 
 
 
 
 
2. Creation of high uncertainty – 
Local planning authority 
Limited access to information – i.e. 
unknown off-site infrastructure 
contribution  
3. Misuse of power – Utility/service 
providers  
Taking advantage of developers – i.e. 
building power station 
4. Ignoring social planning 
responsibility – Local planning 
authority 
Flexible exemptions but not for 
affordable housing  
5. No enthusiasm for growth – Local 
planning authority 
No revenues generated from new 
housing development  
6. Disinterest of market operations – 
Local planning authority 
Planners indifference to cost and 
economic viability of new developments 
7. High land prices caused by land 
hoarding – Landowners 
Relaxed land allocation in the past: vast 
amount of private ownership/ 
unwillingness to sell 
Interconnected issues from other drivers to driver 1 
Issue number: 8, 11, 12, 13 
8. MOH solution: limited success of 
PPP 
Not financially attractive to 
developers/costly and only benefit few 
Political 
 
2. Driven by 
fast results 
rather than 
comprehensive 
solutions 
 
9. MOH solution: bypassing planning 
regulations for taxed land  
Potential negative externalities to city’s 
planning/density bonuses for taxed land 
may not deliver affordable housing  
10. MOH solution: counterproductive 
subsidy policies to market 
approach  
People waiting for support to purchase 
desired housing/focus of producers on 
high-end segment 
Interconnected issues from other drivers to driver 2 
Issue number: 7 
11. Density control and affordability: 
restrictive density effect on supply 
and prices  
No direct relationship between restrictive 
density and housing prices – enough 
supply but not affordable  
Social 
 
3. Culture of 
consumption 
 
12. Density control and affordability: 
lack of diversity in housing mix 
Indirect relationship between restrictive 
density and affordability – encouraging 
the production of unaffordable dwelling 
(villas) 
13. Density control and affordability: 
demanded flexible density by 
developers 
Flexible density may not deliver 
affordable housing – weak demand for 
apartments 
14. Monetised housing and dream 
home 
Housing that can generate income: high 
expectation for dream home 
Interconnected issues from other drivers to driver 3 
Issue number: 9,10 
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1. Lack of motivation and alignment: The analysis shows that key actors, such as a local 
planning authority, lack the motivation to promote growth due to strains on financial resources 
to deliver and maintain public services. This has ignited tension, particularly between planners 
and developers, where the push to retain financial sustainability of the city organising body 
and the pull towards making profit by developers have caused development friction. Such 
tension is characterised by a high level of uncertainty and a lack of accountability. The 
interrelationship between the different motivations of actors appears to be markedly unaligned 
which further amplifies the tension in the market.  
2. Driven by fast results rather than comprehensive solutions: In terms of housing policies, 
the analysis shows that policymakers lack the understanding of private market actors’ 
operations. Produced policies, such as housing subsidies and the PPP, are working against free 
market fundamentals which further exacerbates the affordability issue rather than actually 
helping to solve the problem. The inadequacy of deeper analysis, a lack of reasonable 
knowledge of the development process combined with a lack of initiating comprehensive 
solutions, appear to be the product of political motives (as explained in the previous section).  
3. Culture of consumption: This is ingrained in the way housing is perceived which, in the 
Saudi context, manifests as a culture of pursuing housing as a wealth generating commodity. 
Consumer ambitions have resulted in production trends that are unaffordable for the majority, 
yet such views are still upheld. An important factor pertaining to many of the issues is the 
financial risk of producers in undertaking certain types of housing development. The analysis 
shows that the delivery of multi-family housing is deemed to be risky due to the consumer 
culture and this has fundamentally hindered the promotion of diverse and affordable housing 
choices.   
Drawing from this synthesis, a conceptual model has been created to present a holistic method 
for diagnosing housing market issues which may be applicable to any housing context (Figure 
7.1). 
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Figure 7.1: The Operations and Processes of Housing Markets: The Fundamental Drivers 
behind Strategies and Outcomes 
The model depicts the social interactions and interrelationships between key actors in the 
housing system which determine the housing outcomes. These interactions and 
interrelationships are conceptualised as a network of processes that are influenced by a set of 
driving forces that fundamentally shape the operations and the outcomes in a housing market. 
The model provides an evolved analysis of this study’s original conceptual framework and 
highlights a new perspective of the complex dynamics of housing systems. In this 
conceptualisation, the legal framework is viewed as the platform that the whole housing market 
is built on. A solid platform of well-defined and enforced property rights in the housing market 
is required for it to properly function. Similarly, the housing market can be realised as the stage 
for the actors to perform within the structural forces of political, social and economic 
institutions that influence and contextualise the actors’ performance. 
  223 
The most important features of this model are the three fundamental driving forces behind 
housing issues which stem from the wider institutional arrangements. Such housing market 
issues are inherently interlinked to these fundamental drivers. As derived from this research, 
Motivation and Alignment, Quick or Extensive Fix, and Consumer Ambition are the significant 
drivers that determine the network of processes that lead to housing outcomes. Each driver 
plays a role in influencing the actions of actors culminating in a unique network of social 
interactions. As this process involves several actors with varying interests, strategies and 
objectives, a synergistic tension is created (as can be seen in any housing market). This model 
illustrates the operation of these drivers in managing this interactive and fluid tension (shown 
in red), which increases or decreases contingent upon how each driver manifests in a particular 
housing context and where equilibrium of the tension is the desired state.  
As illustrated, the drivers in the model are multi-dimensional and indicate the intensity of the 
tension/friction at play at a point in time. For example, a lack or non-alignment of motivation 
amongst actors; a quick policy fix by government officials; or a wealth-centric ambition by 
consumers, can amplify tension in the housing market. More specifically, in the case of 
motivation, individual actors have varying degrees of motivation (considered normal in any 
housing market), but problems may arise when there is a lack of incentive by actors to perform 
sufficiently; or actors’ motivations are not aligned in a cohesive way (i.e. push and pull forces 
such as the motive of promoting sustainable urban form versus the motive of profitability). In 
terms of the driver of consumer ambition, maintaining the status quo and the self-interest of 
affected parties can increase the tension (i.e. opposition to increased density in affluent areas; 
‘Not In My Backyard’). Finally, the tendency for a quick policy fix, such as a push towards 
planning reforms (as an easy technical solution that does not involve government spending) 
can also negatively impact the tension. 
Conversely, the fundamental drivers can be utilised positively to reduce the tension in the 
housing market. This operates, for example, by working on aligning motivations, providing 
comprehensive solutions through extensive action, and shifting consumer ambition to be more 
fundamentally attentive to the greater good. These powerful drivers operate by constantly 
impacting the social relations of the actors either positively (i.e. reducing tension/friction) or 
negatively (i.e. increasing tension/friction) within an adaptive and complex system. This 
synergistic force creates the housing outcomes and to improve these, the drivers, as the source 
of this force, must be the focus of change.  
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7.4 Policy implications for the housing system in Riyadh   
Arising from the research evidence, this section presents several policy implications for the 
current institutional framework in Riyadh’s housing context. From the synthesised analysis in 
the previous section, assisted by the conceptual model (Figure 7.1), five key themes are 
presented with several policy implications drawn from each. These themes are: basic housing 
market infrastructure, price and non-price signals, transparency and information, cultural 
change, and capacity building. The scope of each policy implication is by no means inclusive 
as each is positioned within a realm of complexity and subject to internal/external impacts. A 
representation of the key themes and issues emerging from this research is outlined below.  
Theme 1: Basic housing market infrastructure 
This theme represents the basic legal framework that is required as a foundation for any housing 
market to function and perform. While well-defined and enforced property rights are taken for 
granted in mature housing systems, significant issues remain evident in the Saudi legal 
framework. The findings of this study suggest that legal issues with land titles may still be 
impacting confidence and trust in the housing market. Improvement in this area is likely to 
have a positive impact on the housing market.  
Policy Implication 1: Strengthening property rights through a sound cadastre system 
The current method of how the cadastre system runs seems problematic and could be reformed 
in order to address some of the more challenging issues evident, such as boundary disputes and 
the overlapping of tasks between MOMRA and MOJ. An increase in confidence and trust in 
the market may be achieved as follows: 
o MOMRA, instead of the MOJ, could take full authority over the issuance of land titles. 
A land registration department established under MOMRA could facilitate both legal 
and technical tasks to be merged. This may avoid the problem of issuing any deed 
before a technical land survey is undertaken thus ensuring there are no future issues on 
the ground.  
o Establishing an external tribunal for real estate matters under the MOJ’s authority may 
create an independent channel for resolving any disputes that may arise within the 
MOMRA process.  
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Theme 2: Price and non-price signals  
This theme emerged as a ‘carrot and stick’ mechanism to influence change in market actors’ 
behaviour. It aims for alignment and harmonisation of varying interests and objectives to 
accomplish efficient, sustainable and affordable housing delivery. The theme includes 
monetary and non-monetary policy responses based on the issues in the housing system. The 
policy implications below may not only provide improvements to the economic motivations of 
actors but may also help in triggering change in individual and organisational cultural attitudes.  
Policy Implication 2: Introducing revenue generating mechanisms for local planning agencies 
with a gradual introduction of a property taxation system  
As evident in the research, one of the issues that appears to impact housing production was the 
absence of fiscal revenue mechanisms for local planning agencies to capture the value of new 
developments (see Planning and public value capture above). Introducing property taxes is 
unlikely to be welcomed by citizens, yet a move in this direction has already been made with 
the recent introduction of other taxes in Saudi Arabia. The collection of a Value-Added-Tax 
(VAT) occurred for the first time in Saudi’s history in 2018; and vacant land taxes were 
introduced in 2015. Annual property taxation on both land and structures and capital gains 
taxes on property sales are lucrative sources of revenues that are worthy of consideration. Such 
taxes could be used to enhance the infrastructure and service provision in local areas and as 
levers to encourage affordable housing delivery (i.e. tax breaks). This could potentially align 
Saudi Arabia with the global practice of using taxation tools to generate revenues for local 
planning agencies.  
Policy Implication 3: Re-assessing vacant land taxation and planning deregulatory incentives  
The findings suggest that the MOH deregulatory incentives based on land taxation may not 
deliver affordable housing and could lead to negative consequences (see Flexibility and conflict 
above). Thus, in order to unlock urban private land (to address land hoarding) and provide 
incentives for infill developments the MOH may consider granting density bonuses based only 
on vacant land taxes as follows: 
o Allowing flexible density for taxed land, especially for vacant land that is in certain 
desired locations (near transport hubs or within the city centre and inner-city areas – 
see 5 and 6 below).  
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o Imposing progressive location-based taxes on vacant land. For example, land that is 
closer to the city centre may be taxed at a higher rate rather than the 2.5% flat rate as 
stands on all vacant land (above 10,000 sq. m) within the urban boundaries.  
o Density bonuses incentives could be restructured to be based on merit (case-by-case), 
which may help avoid land value uplift. 
o Solutions to unlock land already served with infrastructure in prime locations may not 
only include higher taxes and flexible planning regulations but compulsory government 
purchases may also be considered (see 7 below).  
Policy Implication 4: Restructuring housing subsidies to better target those in need  
The findings revealed that both demand and supply side housing subsidies appear to be 
counterproductive to a free market approach due to the relatively easy access for first 
homebuyers regardless of financial ability (see Appendix A). Restructuring housing subsidy 
policies may provide more efficient delivery of affordable housing for those most in need: 
o Subsidy target group – the MOH could realign housing subsidies to be specifically 
targeted to low- and moderate-income segments (for example, the threshold could be 
lowered and based on income that is below the city median to facilitate greater access 
for those most in need). 
o Type of subsidy – subsidies could be allocated to include Low-Cost Home Ownership 
(LCHO) as well as social housing rental choices. 
o In terms of demand side housing subsidies, the MOH may consider granting interest-
free loans only for apartment buyers to stimulate high density development (see Theme 
3 below). The free land subsidy could then be abandoned as no subsidies for detached 
homes would be available. 
o To address cultural preferences, households eligible for housing subsidies but who may 
not wish to buy apartment units could apply for social rental housing until they can 
afford their preferred type of dwelling in the free market.  
Restructuring housing subsidies as outlined above has the potential to unlock a huge demand 
for housing. If subsidies are no longer so freely available, households capable of accessing 
housing in the free market would then be encouraged to make a purchase. This may have the 
effect of encouraging housing producers to capitalise on this new demand.  
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Policy Implication 5: Reorganising Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB) policies to promote 
more diverse housing for infill development sites 
While there appears to be enough housing supply, the findings indicated that it may not be 
affordable for the majority of households. The findings also revealed that planning appears to 
contribute indirectly to the housing affordability problem by reinforcing certain types of 
housing produced (i.e. detached and attached villas). The excessive allocation of land coupled 
with low density measures may also present difficulty in accessing land for development. 
Attention to current and future needs for a balance between types of tenures could be achieved 
through the following measures: 
o The HCDR could consider a new UGB boundary limit that puts on hold (for a 
designated period of time, such as 5 years) new housing development in locations that 
cannot be connected on time with infrastructure by service providers even if they are 
located within the current boundaries (most land not connected to services is located on 
the urban fringes).  
o Increasing the current densities in the city centre and inner-city areas based on case 
merit (see 6 below), to a higher density and ‘mixed land use’ (not only 
commercial/offices but also residential) to accommodate more population in such areas 
that are already linked to infrastructure and services.  
o Residential densities may also be increased near transport hubs to better improve 
mobility (Riyadh Metro is scheduled to open in 2019 with six lines and 85 stations 
[HCDR, 2015b]). This may provide positive incentives for new housing development 
near train stations.  
o Any limited capacity of infrastructure in these areas could be increased and upgraded 
to allow for the increase in densities (see 7 below). 
This could shift the focus of new developments into inner city areas to encourage more diverse 
housing delivery. However, to facilitate delivery of affordable housing this shift is better 
accompanied by incentives for developers, such as density bonuses (see 6 and 7 below).  
Policy Implication 6: Introducing mandatory inclusionary zoning on selected locations  
The findings showed that the delivery of affordable housing through planning mechanisms was 
not utilised in Riyadh despite the existence of some flexibility for doing so. Mandatory 
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inclusionary zoning could be implemented in certain areas of the city to produce affordable 
housing: 
o In locations within the city centre and inner-city areas as well as locations near train 
stations that allow higher densities (following on from 5 above).  
o By capturing the value of such prime locations in the form of deducting a certain percent 
of the development for affordable housing in return for the higher densities promoted 
and the existing surrounding infrastructure and amenities. 
o By basing the deducted affordable housing on the economic viability of the 
development (see also Capacity building – implication 18). 
Policy Implication 7: Using land assembly instruments and public investment in infrastructure  
The MOH could reconsider its supply side housing subsidy in the form of PPP for building 
LCHO (serviced land with infrastructure as well as development grants provided to 
developers). Greater efficiency may be obtained if the MOH focuses on: 
o Instead of building housing units via PPP, the MOH could acquire land in strategically 
desired locations (i.e. near transport hubs but not necessarily within the inner-city areas) 
and provide necessary physical infrastructure to make these locations attractive for 
development.   
o Using compulsory land acquisitions to combine private fragmented ownership into 
larger parcels of land ready for development. 
o Achieving connectivity to required physical services through PPP infrastructure 
projects.  
o Cooperating with MOMRA to grant higher densities and allow mixed land uses. 
o Selling to private developers prepared and assembled land to build multi-storey housing 
based on a predetermined number assigned for affordable housing in return for the 
density and infrastructure provided. 
o Allocating the acquired new affordable housing for either LCHO and/or social rental 
housing.  
o Considering the option after selling the land to developers to purchase a sizeable 
number of units in the proposed development (i.e. 50%) at a discounted rate for buying 
in bulk. Half of these units could be sold in the market and the other half retained for 
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social housing. Developer risk may also be minimised as difficulties in obtaining 
finance for the development and guaranteeing cash flow are lessened (adopted from 
Rowley & Phibbs, 2012).   
The aim of the above is to foster conditions that may deliver more sustainable, diverse and 
affordable housing; where the MOH operates in cooperation with MOMRA and private 
developers to participate in delivering enhanced residential communities that may not only 
benefit the few (i.e. the allocation of LCHO through the current PPP), but may also provide 
benefits to the wider community. More delivery options of affordable housing in several 
desired locations is also attractive to both developers and end-users.   
Policy Implication 8: Introducing new utility and service providers to increase 
competitiveness  
One of the issues revealed in this study is the misuse of power by utility and service providers 
as well as their incapacity to deliver services on time. It is therefore worth considering ways to 
diminish the monopoly of utility companies by introducing new competitors into the market. 
Providing competition into the market may encourage utility companies to provide better 
services and greater cooperation.    
Policy Implication 9: Allowing incremental densities in certain built-up areas  
The findings showed that there is a stronger inclination by homebuyers to purchase housing 
inclusive of opportunities for generating income (i.e. housing with separate units that can be 
rented). Incentives for current homeowners to provide affordable rental housing and generate 
income from their properties could be encouraged. This concept is adopted from the Global 
Housing Strategy UN-Habitat (2013) and could be adjusted to suit the Riyadh context as 
follows: 
o In cooperation with the HCDR and Riyadh Municipality, the MOH could identify 
potential existing locations that could be granted an increase of density (i.e. from 2.5 
storeys to 3 storeys or 3.5 depending on the capacity of the infrastructure and services). 
Such locations would have to be agreed upon with local planning agencies. 
o The incremental increase of density in identified locations could be in the form of a 
conditional incentive (voluntary) for willing home owners who would like to add 
structures on their existing property as affordable rental units.   
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o Certain specifications may be imposed for added units besides a rent ceiling (i.e. a 
contract could be signed for a designated period of time).  
o Small loans could also be granted to support building these units. 
This situation could be a win-win approach by providing affordable rental housing units that 
could be managed by the MOH while generating extra income for homeowners.  
 
Theme 3: Transparency and information 
The analysis revealed that housing policies may have been used to address socio-political 
issues rather than the actual housing problem. This theme, however, is not focused on politics 
but rather stresses the importance of transparency and information to better formulate housing 
policies that may provide solutions to the housing problem and maintain efficient use of public 
resources. Thorough analysis of the housing market and access to robust and unbiased 
information is seen as a significant factor in accomplishing desired housing outcomes. Such 
policy implications include:  
Policy Implication 10: Enhancing accountability and building trust 
As discussed earlier, the MOH solutions to the housing problem seem to be driven by the desire 
to achieve fast results which have implications for the housing market. Housing policymakers 
may benefit from distancing themselves from political forces in order to foster more productive 
levels of accountability and trust. Prioritising comprehensive analysis of the housing issues that 
pays attention to market operations may well avoid policies that have negative repercussions 
on private market actors (as outlined in the previous theme, especially implications 3 and 4). 
This may provide a step forward in terms of building trust and reducing tension among market 
actors and may ultimately lead to effective solutions and practices. 
Policy Implication 11: Establishing an independent institution for housing research 
This may be effective to not only hold policymakers to account, but also to enrich housing 
research in Saudi Arabia. Such an independent (non-government) body could provide annual 
housing market reports, recommendations and directions in a clear and neutral voice.  
 
 
  231 
Policy Implication 12: Establishing a national housing data bank to assist stakeholders  
The MOH could consider initiating a data platform that provides market statistics that could be 
utilised in numerous ways by professionals and academic researchers, such as formulating 
feasibility plans and conducting research.  
Policy Implication 13: Compiling information readily available for housing producers 
This pertains to the issue of uncertainty and risk. The findings showed that the lack of 
information provided in development plans in terms of infrastructure provision resulted in high 
levels of uncertainty. Improvements could be made to reduce risk associated with such 
uncertainty by increasing transparency and the availability of information: 
o Service providers, including electricity, water and sewerage, could be required by 
Amanah (Riyadh municipality) to provide, in a timely manner, a full-cost estimate of 
off-site infrastructure (if required) for new proposed developments. This may be done 
through a request by a developer prior to submitting an application for the preliminary 
planning permission in order to assist them in accounting for all possible costs.  
o Amanah and HCDR could consider building a land information system using a GIS 
data base (digital maps) for physical infrastructure in cooperation with service 
providers to clearly indicate coverage of services, capacities and plans for 
connections (see Capacity building – implication 17 below). While this may be a 
costly project, it may also be a worthy investment and have practical uses in other 
areas.  
 
Theme 4: Cultural change 
Emerging from the research analysis, one of the fundamental drivers in the housing market is 
the culture of consumption and how housing is perceived. It is argued that there is a pressing 
need to promote sustainable and affordable housing delivery by encouraging a diverse housing 
mix in infill developments. Higher density in the city centre and inner-city areas may provide 
a viable alternative option to accommodate a growing population rather than maintaining the 
traditional detached housing approach. Changing the cultural perspective towards accepting 
higher density living is certainly a challenging concept but gradual change is possible. Healey 
(1999) makes the critical point that: “… cultural underpinnings are not fixed and given, 
although they may be slow to change. They are actively made, remade, and transformed in the 
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dynamics of the social relations that intersect in localities” (p. 113). With this in mind, the 
policy implications outlined below, coupled with those already mentioned in theme 2 (i.e. 
implications 4 and 5), may initiate a gradual shift into changing the culture of consumption. 
Policy Implication 14: Consulting with the public and applying specifications and standards 
for building dense housing 
Findings implied that consumer ambition in Riyadh, particularly young households aspiring to 
own detached housing as a first home, may be shifted if cultural issues (such as space and 
privacy) and building quality issues are more carefully considered. Therefore, the MOH and 
MOMRA could jointly establish a specialised team of experts to consult with the public 
(particularly young households) to propose new standards for alternative design typologies for 
future dense housing. Furthermore, new building code/regulation for multi-family housing 
could be established to ensure better design and quality. As increasing density does not 
necessarily mean height, this may include differing criteria depending on the type of 
development (i.e. low-rise, medium-rise and residential towers) to allow more suitable choices 
for higher density living.  
Policy Implication 15: Encouraging the return to the old city centre 
City living may provide an enticing option for young households given the advantages of 
access to employment, transport and amenities. Riyadh’s old city centre has untapped potential 
for accommodating new housing development due to its connectivity to physical and social 
infrastructure as well as its proximity to jobs (several government departments and private 
companies are in this area). The MOH, in cooperation with HCRD, may consider using some 
of the measures in theme 2 (such as compulsory purchase of land and inclusionary planning 
mechanisms) to offer affordable housing in this underutilised urban precinct. This concept is 
closely aligned with a recent proposal by the HCRD to regenerate the old city centre (Riyadh 
Central Area Urban Renewal Program, HCDR, 2015b). (See Appendix F).      
Policy Implication 16: Engaging the private development industry with the sustainability 
concept by supporting innovation   
It has been demonstrated that Riyadh clearly suffers from urban sprawl issues. Planning for 
housing in Riyadh could encourage housing producers to be active participants in developing 
a sustainable city of the future by inspiring innovation. Housing producers could then draw 
from new and unconventional perspectives to transform the culture of housing consumption in 
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Riyadh by providing more appealing and innovative housing that are not only environmentally 
friendly but also meet the needs of the population in terms of social, cultural and religious 
dynamics (i.e. space, privacy, separation). As Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005) aptly suggest: 
“Challenging – and perhaps – altering established or conventional cultural perspectives 
involves creativity and encouraging actors to think ‘outside the box’” (p. 71). For instance, 
encouraging creative solutions in building suitable multi-family housing may be found in the 
use of inspiring architectural and engineering design where the traditional Arab house (with an 
internal courtyard that ensures privacy) is adapted in a dense urban setting. 
 
Theme 5: Capacity building  
The necessity of changing the culture of the consumer also extends to a need for cultural and 
behavioural change in market actors interactions to better align affordable housing delivery 
objectives. The issue of market actors pulling in different directions (due to different 
motivations and objectives) could be addressed via capacity building tools aiming to improve 
understandings of each other’s roles. Capacity building tools involve enhancing the ability of 
market actors through various forms, including knowledge, networks and rules of operation 
(Tiesdell & Allmendinger, 2005). The findings suggest that capacity building measures seem 
to some extent to be absent in the state institutional framework in Riyadh, which has led to 
several problematic issues in the housing market (i.e. lack of mutual vision in implementing 
polices caused by institutional fragmentation). Capacity building instruments are important 
tools that could be integrated into Riyadh’s housing system in order to achieve better housing 
outcomes. It could be argued that the success of the previously suggested measures rely on how 
well capacity building is implemented. Tiesdell and Adams (2011) make this clear:  
While capacity-building actions could be regarded simply as further forms of market-
shaping or market- stimulating instruments, they are better seen as means of facilitating 
the operation of these other policy instruments. The effect of future regulation and 
stimulus actions, for example, may depend on an institutional and human capacity that 
does not presently exist – hence, appropriate capacity building is a condition of future 
success. (p. 26)  
Capacity building is a rich and extensive field of research that extends beyond the scope of this 
study. Nonetheless, several policy implications are presented here to address key issues arising 
out of this discussion. These capacity building instruments may be considered by planners and 
housing policymakers as well as private developers in Riyadh. 
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Policy Implication 17: Promoting a collaborative approach 
The findings illustrate a lack of mutual vision between several government and non-
government agencies involved in housing provision that might have hindered decision-making 
processes. Promoting collaboration to resolve entangled and interconnected responsibilities is 
vital, as more efficient knowledge and information exchanges may surely yield improved 
policy outcomes. The following may facilitate this objective: 
o Establishing an inter-agency taskforce that is responsible for more informed decision-
making through policy dialogue may not only co-ordinate responsibilities and tasks 
between stakeholders but also engage actors in policy preparation and formulation.  
o This taskforce may jointly function under the authority of both MOMRA and MOH 
to implement policies. In the case of Riyadh, the HCRD could play a major role as 
outcomes can be integrated into the formulation of strategic planning for housing in 
the city. 
o Stakeholders from both ministries (preferably high-level), the HCDR, Amanah, 
relevant government agencies, service providers, private developers’ representatives 
(through the Real Estate Commission at Riyadh Chamber of Commerce) and local 
council members representing the public may hold regular meetings (i.e. monthly) to 
discuss issues and formulate plans. 
o This body could adopt performance criteria to measure efficiency and progress.  
Prioritising objectives and how they may be accomplished could be the essence of this 
collaborative approach. Government agencies, such as MOMRA and MOH, may benefit from 
devolving power and functions in order to achieve more positive outcomes.  
Policy Implication 18: Improving actors’ knowledge about market viability and the regulatory 
framework 
A culture of unawareness and disinterest in the development market operations, particularly 
among planners, emerged in the findings. Planners are market actors, so in order to achieve the 
aim of improving housing outcomes, need to be aware and knowledgeable about housing 
market cycles and the economic viability of new developments. For instance, ensuring effective 
implementation of inclusionary zoning (number 6 above) may depend on dedicated, 
experienced and well-informed planners. Gurran and Bramley (2017) contextualise this point: 
“… the capacity to understand development feasibility and to accurately determine the value 
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of planning ‘gain’ is critical” (p. 359). Similarly, developers could reciprocate understanding 
by being aware of planners’ work in order to facilitate harmonisation in the planning and 
development process. Measures that may be helpful include:  
o Establishing training programs and workshops to improve the capacity and 
knowledge of municipal employees.   
o Adopting sophisticated feasibility tools to test the viability of planning schemes and 
assist planners and housing policymakers in the negotiation process for potential 
contributions by developers. Such tools have been used by planning agencies in 
several countries. For example, in Australia, the New South Wales Department of 
Planning and Environment has established an interactive GIS software application 
called the Urban Feasibility Model which is used as a development negotiation 
instrument that calculates housing, employment and the economic feasibility of new 
developments at particular locations.  
o Promoting summer internship placements for university students to be exposed to a 
relevant field aligned to their major area of study. For example, planning students 
could be encouraged to join private development companies; similarly, property 
development majors could engage with local planning agencies to gain and exchange 
practical knowledge and increase awareness.     
Policy Implication 19: Engaging and building the capacity of community housing providers 
One of the solutions to delivering affordable housing that has been used in several countries is 
through engaging not-for-profit community-based organisations, but these exist on a very small 
scale in Riyadh. Government agencies, particularly the MOH and MOMRA, could encourage 
not-for-profit developers to participate more actively in the delivery of affordable housing by 
providing incentives, such as land grants, funding and planning exemptions, to expand and 
scale up the work of these organisations.  
7.5 Conclusion  
This discussion highlighted key issues in Riyadh’s housing market where tensions in state-
market relations appeared to hinder the efficient delivery of housing, particularly for low- and 
moderate-income earners. It can be concluded that housing in Riyadh has not been placed at 
the centre of urban planning policies and practices. The uncertainty caused by poor 
coordination and lack of transparency; the planning indifference towards market operations 
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marked by the dismissal of promoting affordable housing; and the enforcement of control 
measures that support unaffordable housing production trends are some of the significant 
revelations that support this conclusion. Such negligence in planning policies forced an 
outsider intervention (the MOH deregulatory planning policies) which may not have 
necessarily resolved the issue.  
The implications of the wider institutional context (social, political and economic) reflected in 
implicit power relations conclude that three fundamental driving forces are behind the many 
issues causing the tension in the housing market. First, the culture of consumption, manifested 
by the dominance of single-family homes evident in preferences, entitlement and expectations 
and cultivated by long-standing urban and housing policies, has fostered a unique consumer 
culture that perceives housing as a wealth generating commodity. Second, the tendency of 
policymakers in solving the housing problem might have been influenced by a powerful 
political factor forcing a desire of achieving fast results rather than ensuring comprehensive 
solutions to the issues. Thirdly, the lack of motivation of actors to efficiently perform in the 
market was evidently marked by the absence of economic incentives and non-alignment of the 
different and often conflicting motivations and objectives. These three fundamental drivers 
have amplified the tension in Riyadh’s housing market leading to undesired housing outcomes. 
The institutional analysis of the complex dynamics of interactions and relationships between 
issues, drivers and actors has culminated in the creation of a conceptual model that presents a 
holistic method for diagnosing housing market operations. Finally, this chapter presented 
several policy implications derived from the synthesis of the empirical findings, the 
conceptualisation of an adaptive and complex system as a newly evolved model, and the 
emergent five key themes. This integrated process ultimately and comprehensively addresses 
the central research question of this study.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This study was grounded in the context of the housing system in Saudi Arabia. The main aim 
was to investigate the research questions by uncovering the state-market roles and relations in 
housing in order to cast light on the unknown processes (the ‘black box’) that affect the way 
actors perform. This ultimately shapes housing outcomes, including the ability of low- and 
moderate-income segments to access housing. The study analysed and synthesised multiple 
institutional theoretical concepts that were drawn from related literature to provide structure 
and focus for this investigation. Insights from relevant scholarly work, including Ball (1983, 
1986, 1998); Adams et al (2005); Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2005); and Burke and Hulse 
(2010), were implemented into a unique conceptual framework to facilitate the examination of 
social interactions between key actors in the housing system, while also taking into account the 
embeddedness of housing in the broader institutional context. By examining this contemporary 
network of state-market roles and relations, new understandings about the processes of 
institutional dynamics in the housing system were realised leading to the creation of a refined 
model that depicts the network of processes that influence housing outcomes. 
This final chapter now presents a conclusion to the overall outcomes of the research and is 
divided into five sections. The next section (8.2) provides answers to the research questions by 
bringing together a summary of the key findings as well as policy implications for improving 
the institutional framework in Riyadh’s housing system. The research aim is addressed by 
uncovering the institutional processes of state-market relations that shape the housing 
outcomes. The following sections outline the research limitations (8.3), identify future areas of 
research (8.4), and lastly a final concluding statement by the researcher is presented (8.5).    
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8.2 Answering the research questions  
Emerging from issues identified in the literature, combined with this researcher’s observations, 
this study focused on the following central research question:  
How can the state’s institutional framework in the housing system be improved to better 
enable the market to meet the demand for housing, particularly affordable housing, in 
Riyadh? 
Taking into account the embeddedness of housing in the broader institutional context and the 
implicit power relations that influence the operation of market actors, answers to the four 
research sub-questions are now presented which ultimately lead to answering this central 
research question.    
8.2.1 Research sub-question 1: Roles and relationships of key actors in the system 
What are the existing roles and relationships of key actors within the housing system? 
The existing roles and relationships of the key actors in Riyadh’s housing system seem to be 
marked by acute tension. Key actors involved in the delivery of housing who have been directly 
or indirectly investigated in this study included planners, developers, housing policymakers, 
service providers and landowners. Five key dynamics were revealed and are summarised here: 
(i) Despite the uniqueness of the Riyadh context, interviews of developers and planners 
described in detail in chapters 5 and 6 highlighted that the interrelationships between these 
actors appear to share distinct similarities with those described in the literature. Essentially, 
developers perceived planning as a regulatory burden that hinders their work; whereas planners 
viewed developers as only being concerned about profit maximisation with little consideration 
for the built environment. The analysis showed that planners’ and developers’ roles and 
relationships in the housing system are significantly non-aligned thus hindering the attainment 
of affordable housing objectives (see Chapter 7 – Planning and value capture).  
(ii) The inherent tension evident between planners and developers has also extended to impact 
the provision of infrastructure where poor planning coordination has resulted in lack of 
transparency and access to information. This situation favours service providers who are then 
inclined to use this unfair advantage to extract extra benefits from developers thus increasing 
development risks (see Chapter 7 – Uncertainty and risk).  
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(iii) An examination of historic land allocation planning combined with the experiences of 
developers as expressed in the interviews, revealed that landowners lack the motivation to 
release their land into the market, which further complicates the delivery of housing for 
developers (see Chapter 7 – Restrictive versus non-restrictive planning).  
(iv) In order to curtail the land hoarding practice, housing policymakers imposed land taxation 
on vacant land and introduced new planning exemptions (bypassing current local planning 
regulations) to incentivise landowners/developers who are penalised by these taxes. However, 
the perception by planners, as expressed in the interviews, is that housing policymakers’ 
intervention can be an intrusion to good planning practices (see Chapter 7 - Flexibility and 
conflict).  
(v) While housing policymakers are trying to reform the housing sector to enable developers 
to be more engaged in the delivery of affordable housing, discord is evident between 
developers and housing policymakers particularly in the public private partnership initiative 
(PPP). Developers perceive the PPP as unattractive and unfeasible for them whereas 
policymakers think the opposite. Such conflicting views are likely to limit the success of such 
an intervention that is specifically directed at improving housing outcomes.  
8.2.2 Research sub-question 2: Key issues in the housing system 
What are the key issues in the housing system that influence the private sector in delivering 
affordable housing? 
According to the evidence derived in this study, there appears to be no problem with the 
provision of adequate housing supply in Riyadh. However, there are indications that the 
housing system still struggles with delivering housing products for low- and moderate-income 
segments. To answer the above question, the analysis of this research leads to the conclusion 
that issues in the housing system are driven by three fundamental factors:  
1. A lack of motivation of the main actors  
2. The tendency for policymakers to reach for the quick policy fix  
3. A prevalent culture of housing consumption  
As the first driver, lack of motivation is a powerful force. While private market actors in Riyadh 
appear uninterested in delivering affordable housing without some form of government 
intervention (i.e. incentives/disincentives for developers), the planning system as a main type 
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of regulatory intervention seems to lack the motivation to promote housing growth due to 
insufficient fiscal incentives. A lack of enthusiasm by the municipality for facilitating and 
promoting new housing development was evident (see Chapter 7 – Planning and value 
capture). This has an impact on the delivery of affordable housing where there is an absence 
of planning intervention mechanisms to address the affordability issue and the diversity of 
housing choices.  
In addressing the housing problem, it was found that housing policymakers are more driven by 
achieving fast, temporary results rather than comprehensive, long-term solutions. The MOH 
interventions display a lack of sufficient analysis to inform necessary reforms that would more 
adequately address the housing affordability problem (see Chapter 7 – Flexibility and conflict). 
For instance, overly generous housing subsidies programs are sustained in spite of their 
contradiction with free market principles and local planning regulations are bypassed with little 
coordination with relevant bodies. 
The third driver, the culture of housing consumption, originates from the historic urban and 
housing policy framework in Riyadh. This framework has been encouraging certain trends of 
housing preferences that has greatly contributed to the housing affordability issue, resulting in 
a culture of consumption amongst Saudi residents that perceives housing predominantly as a 
commodity rather than a shelter. Consumer ambition has been found in this study to be one 
where expectations and preferences do not match affordability, yet a culture of entitlement is 
characterised by a view that the government remains responsible for subsidising housing for 
all citizens. With declining oil revenues and the necessity of the governing authority to appease 
their citizens’ needs, policymakers in Riyadh are still grappling with the affordability problem. 
The tendency to opt for a quick policy fix to a problem that is deeply embedded in a 
complicated institutional context is unsustainable. Deep understanding of the problem to reach 
appropriate solutions followed by affirmative action presents a more viable option.  
8.2.3 Research sub-question 3: Effects of the key issues on affordable housing delivery 
How do these issues affect the private sector’s ability to deliver affordable housing? 
Due to the focus of this question on the private sector, more particularly housing producers, 
the answer is centred around the motivation of producers to take part in the provision of 
affordable housing. The motivation by private developers for financial profitability and 
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minimising development risks was evidently hindered by the three fundamental and 
interconnected drivers, as explained above. 
Firstly, as described earlier, the lack of enthusiasm of local planning agencies to promote new 
housing development seems to affect the financial viability of development or even deter 
housing development from taking place. For example, planning delay was found to be a product 
of inefficiency and poor coordination of the planning process rather than the more respectable 
reason of ensuring quality decision-making, which in turn adds unnecessary cost to 
developments (see Chapter 7 – Planning delay, social benefits and private cost). However, 
while there are several issues in the planning regulatory framework that may reduce the 
potential profitability (i.e. planning delay; density restrictions), or even deter housing 
development altogether (i.e. uncertainty of off-site infrastructure charges), the bigger issue in 
the planning system is manifested in the lack of planning mechanisms that encourage the 
production of affordable housing. The push factor (characterised by little enthusiasm for new 
housing) by the local planning agency in order to maintain financial sustainability, works as a 
barrier to the provision of affordable housing. As they are driven by the motivation of 
profitability, developers will not voluntarily build low-cost housing if there are no regulations 
that force them to do so. Hence, the motivations of planning agencies and developers act against 
the delivery of affordable housing. 
Secondly, a quick policy fix as a fundamental driver has affected the motivation of private 
developers to build affordable housing as existing policies appear to not support an efficient 
free market approach. The findings showed that private developers are not motivated to join 
the PPP as it does not offer enticing financial returns for them. Moreover, housing subsidies 
programs, such as interest-free loans and free land grants, have played a part in influencing the 
housing production trends towards the high-end market where buyers are not reliant on lengthy 
government support. The analysis also shows that planning exemptions in the form of density 
bonuses may cause land value uplift in which the intended benefits for private developers by 
permitting higher density in return for building low-cost housing may instead be captured by 
landowners (see Chapter 7 – Flexibility and conflict).   
Lastly, the third fundamental driver is interconnected with the second driver where a unique 
culture of housing consumption has evolved through the government urban and housing policy 
framework. The findings suggest that first homebuyers are not interested in the market 
approach as they can obtain a government subsidy which lowers their purchasing costs. This 
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has reinforced a concept of buyers’ ambition towards wealth creation depicted in preference 
for a certain type of housing (large family homes) that is not affordable without a subsidy. The 
implication of such a concept is that private developers are not motivated to deliver affordable 
housing products as there is weak demand for multi-family housing (apartments), which 
decreases their appetite to take a risk in building a more diverse and affordable housing mix.  
8.2.4 Research sub-question 4: Policy implications for better affordable housing 
delivery    
What mechanisms can be provided by state institutions to enable better affordable housing 
delivery? 
The analysis of the data revealed that five key thematic areas may need to be addressed in order 
to enable better affordable housing delivery in Riyadh. The first theme is related to the legal 
framework in the housing system where a sound land titling system is required as a basic 
housing market infrastructure. This has been identified as an issue in other developing countries 
(World Bank, 1993; UN-Habitat, 2016) and land titling is clearly an area of deficiency in 
Riyadh’s housing system. A sound cadastre system that is well-defined and enforced may assist 
in building confidence and trust in the housing market. The second theme is price and non-
price signals that function as a provider of incentives and disincentives for private market actors 
to align market behaviour with affordable housing policy objectives, such as revenue sources 
for infrastructure to support housing development. In the case of Riyadh, policy implications 
included the introduction of property taxation, restructuring housing subsidies, and utilising 
land assembly instruments and public investment in infrastructure.  
The third theme that emerged addresses the issue of transparency and information, in which 
analysis of housing issues are better left unhindered by political interests (i.e. producing 
counter market policies to ensure socio-political aims). Implications drawn included the 
establishment of an independent body to provide impartial analysis to the housing market. 
Theme four concerns the issue of housing consumption and culture/consumer ambition through 
long-term policy reforms that aim for a gradual cultural change. Here policy implications 
revolved around encouraging the promotion of a diverse housing mix including the 
enforcement of building specifications for denser housing and challenging the conventional 
multi-family living concept through innovative solutions. Finally, capacity building was 
presented as the fifth and final theme that enhances the social interactions between actors in 
  243 
the system through a set of tools that facilitate greater awareness of each other’s roles. Policy 
implications under this theme included the promotion of a collaborative approach between the 
different housing stakeholders as well as providing measures for knowledge and information 
sharing.  
In conclusion, the sub-questions framing this thesis have been answered in this chapter 
following detailed analysis conducted in the previous chapter. That being so, the central 
research question for this study has been investigated in a holistic manner through the 
examination of these sub-questions. Thus, it is concluded that the state’s institutional 
framework in the housing system can be improved to better enable the market to meet the 
demand for affordable housing in Riyadh.  
8.3 Research limitations 
As is the case for any research, this study acknowledges its limitations. Firstly, the results were 
based on a single case study in which the findings can only provide an explanation for the 
housing problem in Riyadh, thus making generalisations for other settings not applicable. 
Generalising the results was not attempted as differences in institutional contexts makes every 
housing system unique and thus the results could never be generalised. Instead, transferability 
of the findings to other settings was made through “analytical generalization” (Yin, 2003, p. 
37), where the theoretical inferences yielded out of the inductive analysis of the results 
provided a conceptual model that can be applied to other housing contexts. This model could 
be used as a holistic method for diagnosing housing market issues. 
Secondly, due to the complexity of the subject and the time and resource limitations of the PhD 
process, certain elements of the housing system could not be comprehensively investigated. 
While attempting an examination on several grounds, it was beyond the capacity of this 
researcher to investigate issues from the wider perceptions of, for instance, local communities, 
utility companies, and not-for-profit organisations. As a single researcher, multiple realities 
were reconstructed drawing on the perceptions of a small number of actors in the system, which 
limits the results given the extensive range of social interactions in the housing system.  
Thirdly, issues of political sensitivity may have hindered participants from providing frank 
responses as they were apprehensive about possible repercussions. In fact, some preferred not 
to comment on certain topics regarding government policies, such as the MOH intervention in 
bypassing planning regulations. While this may be a common limitation when interviewing 
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government officials in any context, in this case, an adequate number of respondents were 
interviewed and triangulation measures were used to minimise this apparent limitation.   
Finally, it is important to note that this study offers a “slice of life” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 
155) in which its findings reflect a specific period and place. This study was carried out during 
a time of structural change in Saudi Arabia where several reforms in the housing policy 
framework were still taking place. Hence, changes that were undertaken after the second stage 
of the fieldwork (December 2016) were not accounted for in this study.         
Despite these limitations, this study has successfully achieved its aim of uncovering processes 
that hindered efficient delivery of affordable housing in Riyadh. Such revelations can be used 
to inform further areas of research as discussed below.  
8.4 Further areas of research 
The findings of this study point to several areas for further research. While quantifying the 
effect of the planning and housing regulatory environment was not the aim of this study, adding 
insight from quantitative inquiry to the institutional analysis could add value to the examination 
of particular issues revealed in this study’s findings. For example, one of the issues that could 
benefit from adding such an insight is related to the examination of the scale of off-site 
infrastructure charges in order to understand its impact on housing delivery. The size, type and 
cost of relevant infrastructure charges from historical data using economic modelling could 
provide useful data on the extent of the issue and guide strategies to resolve uncertainty and 
risk issues. Another interesting area to be quantitatively examined could be monitoring the 
results of the new fast track licencing system to measure its effectiveness in reducing cost and 
time of new developments and its role in improving housing outcomes.  
Uncovering the processes of social relations in the housing system by acknowledging the 
distinctive features of the local institutional context has cast light on various critical issues that 
may now encourage further research to improve the delivery of affordable housing in Saudi 
Arabia. The following suggestions for future research are drawn directly from this study.  
(i) The culture of housing consumption proved to be crucial as it was one of the fundamental 
drivers behind the housing affordability issue. The complexity of integrating the concept of 
sustainable planning for housing and the issue of consumer ambitions is an interesting area of 
research. Further research to examine housing diversity and social mix in Riyadh is needed. 
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Although the study’s findings revealed that home purchasing attitudes are dominated by 
preferences for detached and semi-detached housing, a mixed method study 
(qualitative/quantitative) to examine the current housing form in the city and the potential for 
integrating housing diversity through planning regulations with quotas of size, design, type and 
location could provide some deep insights into both acceptable and affordable housing choices. 
Such research is advised to consider the social mix requirements in relation to the motivation 
of actors (i.e. the financial viability for developers) as well as consumer ambition (i.e. 
household needs, preferences and perception of the affordability concept).    
(ii) Another important issue is the financial challenges faced by local government in promoting 
economic growth and funding local infrastructure and services in Saudi Arabia. As insufficient 
fiscal incentives appear to indirectly impact housing delivery in Riyadh, further research is 
needed to propose innovative strategies for reforming and restructuring the municipal financing 
system. Such research should consider the underlying drivers of aligned/non-aligned 
motivation and the quick/extensive policy fix for deeper understanding of the issue.  
(iii) Capacity building is another area of interest (and one of the emerging themes) that can be 
further researched in order to address the housing affordability issue in Saudi Arabia. For 
example, investigating capacity building approaches for non-profit community housing 
development organisations is a topic that remains under-researched, but which would add much 
value to Saudi housing literature.    
(iv) This study’s findings highlighted several areas of inefficiency in the institutional 
framework in the housing system (i.e. coordination between key actors in the system) that, 
without a doubt, have contributed to the problematic delivery of affordable housing in Riyadh. 
Many of these issues have been dealt with in several mature housing systems and yet the 
dilemma of housing affordability persists. Thus, the efficiency of the legal and institutional 
framework may not be enough to reach solutions for housing affordability. The institutional 
model developed in this study (Figure 7.1) provides a deep insight into the complexity of 
housing system issues by moving beyond state and market efficiency and providing a clearer 
focus on the root of the problem. Therefore, the potential exists for further application and 
development of this analytical framework by future researchers.       
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8.5 Final statement 
With a purpose to shed light on a phenomenon that has had little attention, this study embarked 
on the complicated and challenging task of examining the institutional processes of state-
market relations in the housing system in Riyadh. A detailed and authentic account of the issues 
that are likely to impact on a more efficient delivery of affordable housing were investigated, 
analysed and discussed to achieve the research aims. While this study is significant for 
researchers and policymakers in Riyadh, hopefully the findings also make a valuable 
contribution to the current body of knowledge on state-market relations in housing systems and 
provide a stimulus for further exploration and action.    
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Housing Subsidy Requirements and Allocation Criteria – MOH 
In 2015, the Ministry of Housing established a new system constituting the requirements of 
eligibility for housing subsidies and the process of allocation. This came after the old system 
that used to grant a subsidy to Saudi nationals given priority to those who applied first. The 
housing subsidy can be in the form of one of the following three types: (i) ready built housing 
(apartment, duplex or villa); (ii) ready to build piece of land; (iii) interest-free loan (maximum 
amount of USD133,333). The information below is taken from the Executive Regulation for 
Organising Housing Support (MOH, 2015).   
General requirements for eligibility:  
1. Applicant must be a Saudi national  
2. Applicant (if husband or father) must be at least 25 years old. This requirement does 
not apply if the applicant is the wife or the mother 
3. Applicant must be resided in Saudi Arabia (excluding nationals who live abroad for the 
purposes of working for the government of Saudi Arabia, studying or seeking health 
treatment) 
4. Applicant or any of his/her household members does not currently own housing  
5. Applicant has not previously obtained government housing subsidy support 
6. Applicant does not have the ability to buy suitable housing. This is determined by the 
applicant and his/her household members owning combined assets with market value 
of no more than SAR2,000,000 (USD533,333). This includes cash and cash 
equivalents, securities, any kind of commercial activities, such as companies, and or 
real estate of any kind.  
 
Allocation of housing subsidy and priority lists: 
1. The MOH created priority lists for each type of housing subsidy support (i.e. ready built 
unit, land or loan). Priority lists for ready built housing and ready to build land are 
organised according to the cities and governorates where the residential projects are 
located (through the PPP projects). Priority lists for housing loans are divided by 
regions of the Kingdom.  
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2. Approved applicants (based on the requirements for obtaining housing subsidy) will be 
listed in one of the priority lists based on his/her selection of the type of housing 
subsidy.  
3. Applicants are listed in the priority lists based on points granted to them in accordance 
with a point system as described below (priority is given to higher accumulated points). 
The ministry regularly evaluates and updates applicants’ points. 
4. The MOH may amend the mechanism of granting points specified below from time to 
time and the amendment shall apply in the event of its approval to all applicants enlisted 
including those listed prior to the date of amendments. 
 
First, the applicant shall be awarded points based on the number of household members up to 
a maximum of 20 points according to the following table: 
 
Number of households (including applicant) Granted points 
6 or more 20 points 
5 or more 15 points 
4 10 points 
3 5 points 
2 0 point 
 
Source: MOH, 2015 
 
Second, the applicant shall be awarded points based on the financial situation of all members 
of the household included in the application. The maximum number of points awarded under 
this criterion is 20 based on the type of subsidy requested by the applicant and the household’s 
monthly income as indicated below:  
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Source: MOH, 2015 
 
 
Total monthly income (applicant & his/her 
household members) 
Granted points based on requested type of 
subsidy 
Loan Units or Land 
SAR 3,000 (USD800) or below 20 points 10 points 
SAR 3,000 – 4,000 (USD800-1,066) 20 points 12 points 
SAR 4,000 – 5,000 (USD1,066-1,333) 20 points 14 points 
SAR 5,000 – 6,000 (USD1,333-1,600) 20 points 16 points 
SAR 6,000 – 7,000 (USD1,600-1,866) 20 points 18 points 
SAR 7,000 – 8,000 (USD1,866-2,133) 20 points 20 points 
SAR 8,000 – 9,000 (USD2,133-2,400) 19 points 19 points 
SAR 9,000 – 10,000 (USD2,400-2,666) 18 points 18 points 
SAR 10,000 – 11,000 (USD2,666-2,933) 17 points 17 points 
SAR 11,000 – 12,000 (USD2,933-3,200) 16 points 16 points 
SAR 12,000 – 13,000 (USD3,200-3,466) 15 points 15 points 
SAR 13,000 – 14,000 (USD3,466-3,733) 14 points 14 points 
SAR 14,000 – 15,000 (USD3,733-4,000) 13 points 13 points 
SAR 15,000 – 16,000 (USD4,000-4,266) 12 points 12 points 
SAR 16,000 – 17,000 (USD4,266-4,533) 11 points 11 points 
SAR 17,000 – 18,000 (USD4,533-4,800) 10 points 10 points 
SAR 18,000 – 19,000 (USD4,800-5,066) 9 points 9 points 
SAR 19,000 – 20,000 (USD5,066-5,333) 8 points 8 points 
SAR 20,000 – 21,000 (USD5,333-5,600) 7 points 7 points 
SAR 21,000 – 22,000 (USD5,600-5,866) 6 points 6 points 
SAR 22,000 – 23,000 (USD5,866-6,133) 5 points 5 points 
SAR 23,000 – 24,000 (USD6,133-6,400) 4 points 4 points 
SAR 24,000 – 25,000 (USD6,400-6,666) 3 points 3 points 
SAR 25,000 – 26,000 (USD6,666-6,933) 2 points 2 points 
SAR 26,000 – 27,000 (USD6,933-7,200) 1 point 1 point 
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Third, the applicant shall be awarded points based on age with 15 as the maximum number of 
points awarded under this criterion: 
 
 
Source: MOH, 2015 
 
Fourth, the applicant shall be awarded points according to the precedence of his/her application 
(time of lodging the application). The maximum points awarded to the applicant according to 
this criterion is 10 where one point is granted for each year passed since the application is 
lodged.  
For example, a household of 4, with a total monthly income of SAR11,000 – 12,000, aged 35-
36, and on the list for 5 years would be calculated as 10+17+1+5 = 33 points for a loan/unit/land 
subsidy.  
 
Applicant age Granted points 
35 and less than 36 1 point 
36 and less than 37 2 points 
37 and less than 38 3 points 
38 and less than 39 4 points 
39 and less than 40 5 points 
40 and less than 41 6 points 
41 and less than 42 7 points 
42 and less than 43 8 points 
43 and less than 44 9 points 
44 and less than 45 10 points 
45 and less than 46 11 points 
46 and less than 47 12 points 
47 and less than 48 13 points 
48 and less than 49 14 points 
49 and above 15 points 
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Appendix B: Types of Housing in Riyadh: Photos and Floor Plans 
1. Examples of different housing types in Riyadh (Photos) 
1.1 Villas (single family) 
 
Detached Villa  
Source: Esimsar (2018d) 
 
 
Attached Villa  
Source: Esimsar (2018c) 
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1.2 Villas containing separate units  
 
Villa (Ground Floor/Half of First Floor) + 1 Apartment First Floor & 1 Apartment Second 
Floor 
Source: Esimsar (2018e) 
 
 
Villa (Ground Floor) + 2 Apartments First Floor & 1 Apartment Second Floor 
Source: Esimsar (2018f) 
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1.3 Apartments  
 
Apartment Building in the City North  
Source: Esimsar (2018b) 
 
 
Apartment Building in the City East  
Source: Esimsar (2018a) 
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2. Examples of different types of housing (Floor plans): 
2.1 Villas (single family) 
 
Large Detached Villa (600 sq. m)  
Source: Arab Arch (2018b) 
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Medium Detached Villa (350 sq. m)  
Source: Arab Arch (2018c) 
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Attached Villa (245 sq. m)  
Source: Arab Arch (2018a) 
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2.1 Apartments  
 
Apartment Prototypes Offered by a Private Development Company  
Source: Alarjan (2018)  
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Appendix C: In-depth Interview Topics and Questions – Stage 1 
 
TOPICS & QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – STAGE 1 
 (Private Developers) 
 
Participants will be asked to inform their experience, perception and recommendations about 
Riyadh’s housing system performance and the role of the state in the housing system and its 
relationship with the private sector. Five main themes structure the interviews. Topics and 
questions for each theme are shown below: 
 
 
Theme one: Land 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current land 
market? 
 
I. Topic: Access to land issues 
 
a. According to government statistics, land supply in Riyadh is considered 
sufficient, so what problems/obstacles are private developers facing regarding 
access to land? 
 
b. Various reports have identified that the absence of property taxation is one 
of the reasons that restrict the availability of land through land hoarding, 
what do you think of the government’s new tax regulation on undeveloped 
land in urban areas? 
 
II. Topic: Land price factors 
 
a. Some private developers prefer to trade land for profit (land speculation) 
instead of developing and be left with small residual value, what is your opinion 
about this? 
 
b. According to various reports, Land prices inside the urban boundaries can 
cost more than half of the total development cost, how can private developers 
deal with this to develop land within the urban boundaries? 
 
 IV. Topic: Role of government in the land market 
 
a. The government has introduced significant reforms in the last 5 years, what 
do you think are the government policies that positively or negatively affect 
residential land development?  
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Theme Two: Finance 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current real estate 
finance system? 
 
I. Topic: Sources of finance 
 
a. What are the main sources of finance available to private developers? 
 
II. Topic: Access to finance 
 
a. What constrains private developers from accessing finance? (i.e. credit 
rating, transparency, financers requirements, cost of finance, etc) 
 III. Topic: Housing investment  
 
a. How viable is housing for profitable investment? (i.e. return on investment, 
cost of capital) 
 
b. How does the Ministry of Housing’s approach of directly building housing 
affect market competitiveness?  
 
c. What do you think of the new Public Private Partnership between the 
Ministry of Housing and private developers?  
 
 IV. Topic: Housing affordability  
  
a. Private developers are known to target the high-income segment in their 
projects (housing priced at more than SR1 million), what are the reasons that 
discourage private developers from providing housing for low and 
moderate-income segments? (i.e. housing units between SR400-600,000) 
 
V. Topic: Government support 
 
a. Regarding finance issues, in what ways does the government support or 
restrict private developers? And how could the government be more supportive? 
 
b. What impact has the new mortgage law had on private developers? 
 
Theme Three: Planning 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current planning 
system? 
 
I. Topic: Initial planning authorization 
 
a. What are the challenges for obtaining development approval? (i.e. time and 
efficiency) 
  
II. Topic: Impact of planning and zoning regulations 
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a. How do the existing planning regulations impact positively and/or 
negatively private developers in delivering housing? (i.e. regulations, such as 
height restrictions, minimum lot size, etc) 
 
b. Would private developers consider higher density and vertical expansion 
regulations as a positive change in the housing market? Will such housing be 
marketable? 
 
III. Topic: Land subdivision  
 
a. What are the main issues or challenges with the current land subdivision 
process? 
 
b. How does coordination (between public/private agencies) affect the process 
and efficiency of land development?  
 
c. How does the delivery of public utilities regulation affect the process and 
efficiency of housing production? How can this be improved in your opinion? 
 
 IV. Topic: Government support 
 
a. How can the government provide planning incentives to encourage more 
housing production? 
 
b. What would be the ideal role for planning agencies to support land 
development? 
 
 
Theme Four: Construction 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current construction 
industry? 
 
I. Topic: Quality standards 
 
a. A main concern when buying a house is the quality of construction, some 
buyers say construction quality of key-ready homes is poor, what would you 
say to them?  
 
 II. Topic: Production trends 
 
a. According to recent studies, about 75% of housing delivery happens through 
construction by individual households, in your opinion why is key-ready 
home construction by private developers still relatively small? Which delivery 
option do you think is ideal? 
 
b. What is this company’s target group? How do consumer preferences and 
demands impact development decisions? (i.e. type of housing to build) 
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III. Topic: Government policy 
 
a. How are government policies affecting construction issues for this private 
developer? 
 
 
Theme Five: Legal 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current legal 
system? 
 
I. Topic: Land acquisition and title registration 
 
a. What problems are faced by private developers in securing land titles?  
 
 II. Topic: Legal framework 
 
a. How does the legal framework support or restrict private developer’s ability 
to deliver new housing developments? 
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TOPICS & QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – STAGE 1 
(Financiers) 
 
Participants will be asked to inform their experience, perception and recommendations about 
Riyadh’s housing system performance and the role of the state in the housing system and its 
relationship with the private sector. Five main themes structure the interviews. Topics and 
questions for each theme are shown below: 
 
 
Theme One: Finance 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles with current housing finance that 
affect financial institutions’ participation in the housing system? 
 
I. Topic: Mortgage financing  
 
a. What are the current mortgage financing options available for users?  
 
b. What are the current requirements for obtaining finance for users? (i.e. 
minimum salary, etc) 
 
c. How high is the demand for mortgage financing? What is the share of 
residential loans? 
 
II. Topic: Impact of new mortgage law 
 
a. What is the impact of the new mortgage law on financial institutions?  
 
b. What are the biggest challenges facing financial institutions in providing 
mortgages according to the new laws? (i.e. development of securitisation 
market) 
 
c. Is the new mortgage reform sufficient to increase private investment in 
housing production? What do you think would make a difference?  
 
 III. Topic: Financing for developers 
 
b. What finance options are available for private developers?  
 
c. What is the share of this type of finance? 
 
c. What are your key factors that determine the security measures for providing 
finance for private developers? (i.e. financial strength, experience, type of 
development, etc) 
 
d. Off-plan sale for developers is subject to restrictions, how does this impact 
providing finance for private developers?  
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IV. Topic: Government support 
 
a. In what ways does the government support or restrict private financial 
institutions with housing finance issues? And how could the government be 
more supportive? 
 
b. The REDF is no longer providing loans as the government is considering 
options to enhance its integration with the banking sector (i.e. long-term funding 
facility, guarantee for lenders), how could this affect financial institutions? 
 
 
Theme Two: Legal 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles with the current legal system that 
affect financial institutions’ participation in the housing system? 
 
I. Topic: Land title registration 
 
a. How does the current land registration system affect financing options? 
 
b. How effective is the new mortgage law in regard to unregistered land or 
unclear land titles?  
 
 II. Topic: Lenders protection  
 
a. How does the new ‘enforcement law’ support or restrict your ability to 
provide mortgages? (i.e. default and foreclosure process) 
 
 
Theme Three: Land 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles with the current land market that 
affect financial institutions’ participation in the housing system? 
  
I. Topic: Land location and price 
 
a. How does development site selection (location) affect the decision of 
granting finance to private developers? 
 
b. According to various reports, land prices inside the urban boundaries can 
cost more than half of the total development cost, how does this affect private 
developers in securing finance for their projects? 
 
 II. Topic: Role of government in the land market 
 
a. What are the government policies regarding residential land that positively or 
negatively affect financial institutions? 
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Theme Four: Planning 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles with the current planning system 
that affect financial institutions’ participation in the housing system? 
 
I. Topic: Planning permission 
 
a. When private developers apply for finance do they have any planning issues 
(i.e. obtaining development approval) that impacts access to finance? 
 
 
 
II. Topic: Impact of planning and zoning regulations 
 
a. What are the impacts of planning and zoning regulations that could hinder 
private developers from obtaining finance for their projects? 
 
 
Theme Five: Construction 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles with the current construction 
industry that affect financial institutions’ participation in the housing system? 
 
I. Topic: Housing quality and financing 
 
a. It is reported that banks usually do not grant housing loans for buyers if the 
housing unit is older than 15 years. This may eliminate the growth of a 
secondary housing market, what are the solutions in your opinion? 
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TOPICS & QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – STAGE 1 
(Real Estate Agents) 
 
Participants will be asked to inform their experience, perception and recommendations about 
Riyadh’s housing system performance and the role of the state in the housing system and its 
relationship with the private sector. Five main themes structure the interviews. Topics and 
questions for each theme are shown below: 
 
 
Theme one: Land 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current land 
market? 
 
I. Topic: Access to land issues 
 
a. According to government statistics, land supply is considered sufficient, so 
what problems/obstacles are buyers facing regarding access to land? 
 
b. Do you think the absence of property taxation restricts the availability of 
land through land hoarding? And do you support the government proposed 
tax on undeveloped land in urban areas? 
 
II. Topic: Land price factors 
 
a. How are buyers affected by the widespread practice of land speculation? 
 
b. What are the other reasons behind the high land prices? 
 
 III. Land market transparency 
  
a. How do real estate agents determine the availability and value of land? 
What valuation process do you use? 
 
b. The land market is said to lack transparency (i.e. no dependable real estate 
transactions data), how does this affect the land market?  
 
 IV. Topic: Role of government in the land market 
 
a. What role does the government play in monitoring land transactions?  And 
what should be done to improve the role of government in such matters? 
 
 
Theme Two: Finance 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current real estate 
finance system? 
 
I. Topic: Sources and access to finance 
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a. What are your experiences regarding availability and accessibility to 
finance for buyers?  
 
b. What is the impact of the new mortgage law on the property market? 
  
II. Topic: Housing market trends  
 
a. How is market trend impacting on the availability of housing to meet 
consumer tenure choice? (i.e. prices and type of tenure)   
 
b. What issues arise regarding household preferences and affordability? 
 
 
Theme Three: Planning 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current planning 
system? 
 
I. Topic: Existing housing stock 
 
a. How are consumers responding to buying or renting in inner-city old 
districts?  
 
b. What is the demographic of households buying or renting in these areas? 
 
II. Topic: Development control  
 
a. What issues regarding access to housing are prevalent? (i.e. preferred 
location, mobility, or available housing choices) 
 
b. Would you consider higher density and vertical expansion regulations as 
a positive change in the housing market?  
 
c. Will dense housing be marketable? 
 
 
Theme Four: Construction 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current construction 
industry? 
 
I. Topic: Quality of available housing 
 
a. A main concern when buying a house is the quality of construction, some 
people say construction quality of key-ready home is poor, what would you say 
to them?  
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II. Topic: Property maintenance 
 
a. Property maintenance plays a minor role in Saudi Arabia which may 
eliminate the growth of secondary market, what are the solutions in your 
opinion? 
 
 III. Topic: Production trends 
 
a. About 75% of housing delivery happens through individual construction 
housing by households, in your opinion why is key-ready home construction 
by private developers still relatively small?  
 
b. Which delivery option do you think is ideal? 
 
 
Theme Five: Legal 
 
In your opinion, what are the main issues or obstacles affecting the current legal system 
for real estate? 
 
I. Topic: Transfer of property 
 
a. From your experience, what issues arise regarding transfer of title and deeds?   
 
II.Topic: Rental market   
  
a. What issues arise regarding the regulation of the rental market and the 
existing tenancy laws?  
 
II.Topic: Multi-family housing   
 
a. According to a report by the Ministry of Housing, less than 20% of the 
apartments are owner-occupied, what are the implications of the lack of owner 
association laws?  
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Appendix D: In-depth Interview Topics and Questions – Stage 2 
 
TOPICS & QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – STAGE 2 
(Planners) 
 
This research process includes two stages of data collection. Stage 1 was conducted with the 
private sector to identify the issues that they face in Riyadh’s housing system. These private 
developers expressed concerns with the planning system that affect the efficiency of their work. 
Therefore, Stage 2 of this research is undertaken to verify and examine these concerns from 
the planners’ perspective. 
 
Several studies in the literature show that private developers have a tendency to hold negative 
views about the planning system. This researcher is aware of this bias and hence maintains a 
neutral position on the information obtained from the developers in Stage 1. When responding 
to comments that will be raised in this interview please keep in mind that these are solely the 
opinions of the private developers participating in this research. 
 
 
Issues based on Stage 1 analysis 
 
Issue 1: Slow process of planning permits  
 
Many developers described the process of obtaining planning and development permits as 
the main hurdle in the development process (Lengthy process 2-3 years on average).  
 
According to the National Transformation Program, 2016, the average time of granting 
planning approval for new residential projects is 2 years  
 
• In your opinion, do you think the planning permit process is too slow? 
 
(i) Manual correspondence  
 
A common problem expressed by some developers is the manual usage of communication 
in the form of postal correspondence (mailing) and the reliance on paper documents 
between government departments. 
 
• Do you think manual correspondence negatively impacts the time of granting the 
approval?  
 
• How do you think the use of an electronic communication system instead of manual 
correspondence with other government departments would help in accelerating the 
planning approval process?  
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(ii) Lack of integration between government departments 
 
Some interviewees mentioned that another issue of delays in receiving planning approval 
is caused by the duplication of work (i.e. verifying property ownership with the MOJ 
where this formal procedure takes time and can be repetitive). 
 
• Does the absence of the linked electronic cadastre system slow down the process 
of granting approvals as developers need to apply separately with new files to 
public notaries to prove land ownership?  
 
• Are there any other reasons that can slow down the process of granting a planning 
approval for private developers? 
 
(iii) Complex and inflexible planning process 
 
Some developers expressed the planning and development approval process as a complex 
and unorganized procedure. Some also believe that the planning regulations are inflexible 
and dated which hinder their projects to be approved. 
 
• Is the process of applying for a planning permit well defined with clear 
requirements for developers to follow? 
 
• To what extent do you agree or disagree that the current planning requirements for 
granting development approval is inflexible and hinder the production of housing?  
 
(iv) Uncooperative planners 
  
Some developers mentioned that planners use unnecessarily rigid and formal procedures 
when reviewing development plans. For instance, there are no immediate forms of 
negotiation with developers to solve minor issues in the plans other than using a lengthy 
formal correspondence that can take a long time to approve modifications. 
 
• As time is very important for developers, do you think planners are uncooperative 
and unnecessarily complicate the approval process for developers?  
 
Issue 2: Stringent development control 
 
(i) Low density measures  
 
An interviewee stated, “Land to development ratio is unfair because the price of land is 
high but a developer is not allowed to build higher than two and a half stories. This is one 
of the implications of urban planning used by municipalities”. 
 
• What are the main reasons behind the application of low-density measures for 
residential zoned areas in the city?  
 
• Is there consideration to increase the density of some residential zoned areas in the 
city? 
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• Do you believe that promoting medium to high-density measures could provide a 
solution for delivering more affordable housing?  
 
• In your opinion, what are the implications, obstacles or impacts of promoting 
medium and high density? (i.e. the capacity of the current infrastructure including 
services such as water, electricity, open spaces, schools, parking, etc.)  
 
• What are the solutions in your opinion to avoid such implications?  
 
• Do you think that increasing density in the city would contribute to solving other 
issues, such as urban sprawl problems? Could this also decrease the pressure on 
public expenditure to deliver infrastructure and connect services to the fringes of 
the city? 
 
(ii) Land subdivision 
 
Some developer interviewees mentioned that most land subdivisions in the city do not 
support the production of affordable housing as plots in these subdivisions were planned 
to have big areas (i.e. 600-900 sq. meters) and obtaining planning approval to change land 
sizes or land use has proven to be difficult. 
 
• Do you agree this is a constraint? What do you think of this issue? 
  
• How can land use regulations be more flexible? 
 
(iii) On-site development contribution for public services  
 
Some developers mentioned that the percentage deducted from their land contribute to 
housing unaffordability as one developer stated, “The current 40 per cent deduction is 
considered very high for us which adds to an increase in price for the final product”. 
 
• Is it true that municipalities deduct more than 33% of land for public services?  
 
• Why do municipalities deduct more than the stipulated 33% of land for public 
services? 
 
• Is the percentage of deductions clearly stated in city plans so developers know about 
it? How does it work?  
 
• Do you think that the increase of the deducted percentage contributes to housing 
unaffordability? 
 
Issue 3: Lack of development coordination 
 
(i) Inadequate role of the city municipality 
 
Many developers believe that there is a lack of development coordination caused by an 
inadequate role of the city municipality resulting in development fragmentation. For 
example, service providers sometimes do not have the capacity to connect their services 
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in some locations that were already granted planning approval which causes delays and 
extra costs incurred by developers 
 
• Do you agree this is an issue? What are the main reasons behind this lack of 
development coordination? 
 
• Do you think that there should be a regulatory authority for real estate 
development that assumes the role of coordination between developers and all 
other agencies involved instead of the municipality role?  
 
Issue 4: The role of local planning authorities (sub-municipalities) in urban development  
 
The planning process in Saudi Arabia can be described as a top-down decision-making 
process (Mubarak, 1992). “In major Saudi cities, municipal decentralization has 
amounted to mere peripheral sub municipalities with very limited powers, while major 
decision-making rests with the central municipality” (Mubarak, 2004,  p. 574). 
 
• What are the roles and responsibilities of LPA to support housing production? 
 
• To what extent centralization in the planning system affect the role of local 
authorities (sub-municipalities) in supporting the production of housing? (i.e. 
levers available to LPAs to promote low cost housing through the planning 
process)  
 
Issue 5: Lack of planning incentives 
 
Many developer interviewees pointed out that the current planning system does not 
provide incentives for developers to deliver affordable housing choices. Many argued 
that there is a lack of municipal cooperation with developers as the current planning 
regulations do not allow flexibility that could be used to encourage more investment in 
housing. For example, providing exemptions in land subdivision regulations by 
allowing changes to land use, plots areas or permitting higher density in return for 
building low cost housing are all not utilized.  
 
• Do you believe that the use of planning incentives in exchange for allocating 
percentage for affordable housing by developers would be an efficient tool to 
promote more production of low cost housing?  
 
• In your opinion, what are the reasons behind the lack of using planning 
regulations to deliver affordable housing? 
 
• In your opinion, what would be the implications of using planning mechanisms 
to encourage more production of affordable housing? 
 
 
Issues from planners’ perspective  
 
• Are there any other main issues in the current planning system that you think hinder 
the production of affordable housing? (Issues other than the ones we raised).  
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Issues in the broader housing system  
 
• From your perspective, are there other main broader issues that affect the production 
of housing other than the planning system that you would like to share?  
 
Planning system improvements/alternatives  
 
• In general, what kind of improvements or changes to the current planning system do 
you think would help increase the efficiency of housing production?  
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TOPICS & QUESTIONS FOR SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – STAGE 2 
(Housing Officials) 
 
This research process includes two stages of data collection. Stage 1 was conducted with the 
private sector to identify the issues that they face in Riyadh’s housing system. These private 
developers expressed concerns with the efficiency of the new Public Private Partnership. 
Therefore, Stage 2 of this research is undertaken to verify and examine these concerns from 
the MOH’s perspective. 
 
Several studies in the literature show that private developers have a tendency to hold negative 
views about the government role in housing. This researcher is aware of this bias and hence 
maintains a neutral position on the information obtained from the developers in Stage 1. When 
responding to comments that will be raised in this interview please keep in mind that these are 
solely the opinions of the private developers participating in this research. 
 
 
Issues based on Stage 1 analysis 
 
1. Unsuccessful pervious delivery by MOH 
 
Developer interviewees believe that the MOH had unsuccessful previous experiences in 
dealing with the housing problems before the PPP program. The majority view that the 
failure of the MOH in solving the housing problem was a result of taking the wrong 
position as a provider instead of facilitator and enabler. They claimed that there was a long 
exclusion of the private sector by the MOH. A developer stated: 
 
The Ministry [MOH] should never be the executor but should be the legislator, organizer 
and facilitator where it gives the private sector the green light and supports it to do its 
role 
 
• To what extent do you agree with the developers’ view?  
 
2. Unattractive partnership for the private developers 
 
Model 1: Public Private Partnership on government owned land  
 
About 45 real estate development companies entered the bidding for Riyadh’s PPP project 
on government land and 32 withdrew after reviewing the proposal requirements as noted 
by some developer interviewees. 
 
• Do you believe that the proposal requirements were unattractive to developers?  
 
Some developers who won the bidding for this PPP project were interviewed. They 
claimed that the proposal requirement is excessive and the amount of 500,000 riyals for 
each unit is not feasible to build according to the MOH requirements as one developer 
stated: 
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Let me be honest with you, we will not make a single penny as profit in the sale. We are 
going into a loss. We didn’t know about this when we entered. It came later, while we 
were finalising. We decided that if we can breakeven that will be great 
 
• Do you believe that the assigned amount for each unit is enough to build according 
to the MOH requirements and allow the developer to make profit? 
 
Some of the main proposal requirements that developers were unsatisfied with included 
the 10 years maintenance and 10 years security and cleaning, some design specifications 
such as the precast construction material that is expensive, and the payment schedule that 
force developers to run into negative cash flow. 
 
• What is your comment about these issues? 
 
Another issue mentioned by a developer is that the MOH did not follow the government 
system of purchase and contracts in its requirements for proposal which asked for 2% of 
preliminary financial guarantee instead of 1% and provides an initial payment of 10% 
instead of 20% if a developer wins and signs the contract.  
 
• Developers view this as discouragement of investment in housing. What is your 
view? 
 
One of the issues that developers mentioned is the coordination with service providers 
and other government agencies (i.e. aviation authority) where developers are responsible 
for dealing with these agencies to connect services or obtain permits which take extra 
time and cost.  
 
• To what extent should the MOH coordinate with these providers/agencies to 
facilitate the developers’ work?   
 
One developer argued that the tight project timeline of 20 months creates an obstacle for 
his company and mentioned that the MOH is not always on time (i.e. granting approval 
for starting construction). 
 
• What is your view on this argument?  
 
Another developer mentioned that the MOH’s consultant company intervenes very much 
with the work of the developer, such as the technical construction details.  
 
• Should developers be trusted as a partner, where their work will be judged based 
on the MOH requirements, without intervention?  
 
One developer believed that the MOH did not provide any support for developers in its 
first PPP model as he stated: 
 
The Ministry [MOH] did not facilitate its requirements for developers and did not 
provide support for developers in other matters. The ministry did not provide support 
in coordinating with other agencies to give tax exemptions on imported building 
materials, facilitating foreign labour visa processes, or helping in accessing finance 
from banks 
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• How do you respond to this statement?  
 
Regarding future partnership with private developers in Model 1, one developer explained:  
 
We found that the partnership of the private sector with the ministry was not 
encouraging to attract a lot of investors … we as a real estate development company 
have taken the decision not to enter with the ministry again in any future projects as 
long as things are going the current way 
 
Whereas another developer stated: 
 
We look forward to working with them again if it is possible to negotiate terms and 
requirements 
 
• Do you believe that the MOH needs to reconsider its requirements for the model 
of the PPP on government owned land beyond the changes already made in the 
RFP 2 to attract more private developers? Note: developers are still not happy 
about the changes made in RFP 2 
 
3. General issues with the PPP model 1  
 
One developer pointed out that the choice of the project location for the PPP to build low 
cost housing is illogical. He explained that it involves significant costs incurred by the 
government to build and connect infrastructure and services to such far away locations 
instead of choosing urban locations within the city that are already connected to services. 
 
• To what extent do you agree with him?  
 
In Riyadh PPP model 1, the planned number of residential units to be built is about 5608 
units, 969 are apartments and the remaining 4639 are villas; whereas in other cities, such 
as Jeddah, with similar land project size the number of total units planned to be built is 
about double (10600) and all of them are apartments.  
 
• On what basis did the MOH decide on the numbers and types of units?  
 
• In Riyadh, why is the number of apartments small compared to villas? 
 
A developer mentioned an important issue when he stated: 
 
I think the issue is not about delivering units. It’s about the outcomes and how it will 
benefit the community. One of these things is crowding low-income people in a 
contained territory creating ghettos in the middle of the desert. It is not clever to build 
housing units how they did it. The success is in creating proper communities and this 
is what they should look at 
 
• The PPP model 1 in Riyadh is creating a segregated low-income community 
which might result in future problems. What is your view on this?  
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• There are several models of PPP used in different countries, why is the MOH 
using this PPP model of building on government owned land? Did they consider 
other models/alternatives?  
(i.e. The use of cheap land and incentives provided by the government to build 
housing units on these land by developers in exchange for being able to sell an 
agreed part of the projects in the open market and offer the rest to low income 
households at agreed prices. This mode is a solution to the crowding problem) 
 
• The PPP is focused on partnering with formal private development companies 
and does not consider the other modes and actors of the housing provision such 
as small builders/developers whereas the majority of housing units is delivered by 
them. How can these small scale developers be supported?  
 
 
Issues from PPP officials’ perspective  
 
• In your opinion, what are the main issues with the PPP on government owned 
land model, other than what we already discussed? 
 
Issues in the PPP model 2 
 
The MOH has recently established a second model of the PPP called incentivized 
construction on developer owned land as the MOH provides incentives to developers to 
encourage the development of housing for low to moderate-income segment. 
 
• What are the reasons behind introducing this model? 
 
• What types of incentives are provided by MOH to attract private developers in 
this model? 
 
• Which of these incentives is not provided in the PPP model 1 government owned 
land? 
 
In the PPP East Gate project, 7000 villas are to be built by the private developer on his 
land in the east fringe of the city. 
 
• Why do you support building villas in such far away locations that would put 
pressure on connecting infrastructure and increase urban sprawl issues instead of 
supporting high density projects inside the city?  
 
PPP improvements/alternatives  
 
• Do you think that the MOH should consider other models of PPP to improve its 
partnership with the private developers?  
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Appendix E: Human Research Ethics Committee Documentation  
1. Participant Information Statement  
 
 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STATE CAPACITY IN THE SAUDI 
ARABIAN HOUSING SYSTME: A CASE STUDY OF RIYADH 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT: INTERVIEW 
 
(1) What is this study about? 
You are invited to take part in a research study about the state’s capacity in the Saudi 
Arabian housing system using a case study of Riyadh. This study focuses on examining and 
evaluating the state’s institutional capacity in housing to better enable the private sector to 
deliver housing, and thus make more homes available in Riyadh. The study will examine 
the roles and relationships between the state and the private sector in order to identify the 
issues that influence the performance of the housing system in Riyadh and how these issues 
affect the private sector’s ability to deliver housing. The aim of this study is to produce an 
informative framework that may assist key stakeholders to improve the housing system to 
perform better in Riyadh. 
You have been invited to participate in this study because of your professional involvement 
in the housing market in Riyadh. This Participant Information Statement tells you about the 
research study. Knowing what is involved will help you decide if you want to take part in 
the research. Please read this sheet carefully and ask questions about anything that you don’t 
understand or want to know more about.  
Participation in this research study is voluntary. So it’s up to you whether you wish to take 
part or not.  
By giving your consent to take part in this study you are telling us that you: 
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✓ Understand what you have read 
✓ Agree to take part in the research study as outlined below 
✓ Agree to the use of your personal information as described. 
You will be given a copy of this Participant Information Statement to keep. 
(2) Who is running the study? 
The study is being carried out by the following researchers: 
• Fawaz Alasmari, PhD candidate, Faculty of Architecture, Design and Planning, 
University of Sydney 
• Professor Peter Phibbs, Chair of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of 
Architecture, Design and Planning, University of Sydney   
   
Fawaz Alasmari is conducting this study as the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at The University of Sydney. This will take place under the supervision of Professor Peter 
Phibbs, Chair of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Design and 
Planning. 
This study is being funded by King Saud University, Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi 
Arabian Cultural Mission in Australia. 
(3) What will the study involve for me? 
 This study will be conducted in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and will involve a number of data 
gathering methods, including interviews. One-on-one interviews will be conducted with a 
number of private sector and government entities related to this research topic. You will be 
asked to contribute your expertise and experience by answering questions pertaining to land 
development processes, the planning system, the property finance system, residential 
construction, and the legal framework for housing and other factors affecting the 
performance of the housing system in Riyadh as relevant to the area in which you work.  
 Interviews can be held in Arabic or English depending on your preference (the interviewer, 
Fawaz Alasmari, speaks both languages) and will be recorded via audio-tape.  
(4) How much of my time will the study take? 
One interview will run for approximately 1 hour at the location of your choice.  
(5) Who can take part in the study? 
Participants from private and government sectors who have knowledge and professional 
expertise in the specific areas that the research is targeting are invited to take part in this 
study. 
(6) Do I have to be in the study? Can I withdraw from the study once I've started? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you do not have to take part. Your decision 
whether to participate will not affect your current or future relationship with the researchers 
or anyone else at the University of Sydney. 
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If you decide to take part in the study and then change your mind later, you are free to 
withdraw at any time. You can do this by emailing Fawaz Alasmari at any time (email 
address can be found below).  
You are free to stop the interview at any time. Unless you say that you want us to keep them, 
any recordings will be erased and the information you have provided will not be included 
in the study results. You may also refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to 
answer during the interview. 
(7) Are there any risks or costs associated with being in the study? 
Aside from giving up your time, we do not expect that there will be any risks or costs 
associated with taking part in this study. 
(8) Are there any benefits associated with being in the study? 
We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any direct benefits from being in the 
study. 
(9) What will happen to information about me that is collected during the study? 
 The type of information that you will be asked to provide includes information about your 
organisation and its involvement in the housing market in Riyadh. The audio recording of 
the interview will be used for research analysis purposes only. A report of the study will be 
provided for the PhD thesis requirement and further publications such as journal articles or 
conference presentations may be submitted, but individual participants and their 
organisations will not be identifiable in any case.  
 The audio recording and transcript of the interview may be accessed by a third party (i.e. 
transcription services) if the interview is held in Arabic. All aspects of the study, including 
results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have access to information 
on participants. All data collected will be stored with the lead investigator at the University 
of Sydney and will be destroyed following the 7 years period of data retention. 
By providing your consent, you are agreeing to us collecting personal information about 
you for the purposes of this research study. Your information will only be used for the 
purposes outlined in this Participant Information Statement, unless you consent otherwise. 
Your information will be stored securely and your identity/information will be kept strictly 
confidential, except as required by law. Study findings may be published, but you will not 
be individually identifiable in these publications. 
(10) Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you are welcome to tell other people about the study. 
 
(11) What if I would like further information about the study? 
When you have read this information, Fawaz Alasmari will be available to discuss it with 
you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any 
stage during the study, please feel free to contact: 
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▪ Professor Peter Phibbs, Chief Investigator, Chair of Urban and Regional Planning, 
Faculty of Architecture, Design and Planning, University of Sydney, Australia  
 Email: peter.phibbs@sydney.edu.au - Telephone: +61 2 9351 3668  
▪ Fawaz Alasmari, Research Investigator, PhD candidate, Faculty of Architecture, 
Design and Planning, University of Sydney, Australia 
 Email: fala1002@uni.sydney.edu.au - Phone: +966 5 0882 2001 (Saudi number) 
(12) Will I be told the results of the study? 
You have a right to receive feedback about the overall results of this study. You can tell us 
that you wish to receive feedback by ticking the relevant box on the consent form. This 
feedback will be in the form of a one page summary of the study result. You will receive 
this feedback after the study is finished. 
(13) What if I have a complaint or any concerns about the study? 
Research involving humans in Australia is reviewed by an independent group of people 
called a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). The ethical aspects of this study have 
been approved by the HREC of the University of Sydney [INSERT protocol number once 
approval is obtained]. As part of this process, we have agreed to carry out the study 
according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This 
statement has been developed to protect people who agree to take part in research studies. 
If you are concerned about the way this study is being conducted or you wish to make a 
complaint to someone independent from the study, please contact the university using the 
details outlined below. Please quote the study title and protocol number.  
 
The Manager, Ethics Administration, University of Sydney: 
Telephone: +61 2 8627 8176 
Email: ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
Fax: +61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) 
 
 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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2. Participant Consent Form  
 
 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STATE CAPACITY IN THE SAUDI 
ARABIAN HOUSING SYSTME: A CASE STUDY OF RIYADH 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEW 
 
I, ................................................................................... [PRINT NAME], agree to take part in 
this research study. 
In giving my consent I state that: 
✓ I understand the purpose of the study, what I will be asked to do, and any risks/benefits 
involved.  
 
✓ I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been able to discuss my 
involvement in the study with the researchers if I wished to do so.  
 
✓ The researchers have answered any questions that I had about the study and I am happy 
with the answers. 
 
✓ I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary and I do not have to take 
part. My decision whether to be in the study will not affect my relationship with the 
researchers or anyone else at the University of Sydney now or in the future. 
 
✓ I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
✓ I understand that I may stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, and 
that unless I indicate otherwise any recordings will then be erased and the information 
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provided will not be included in the study. I also understand that I may refuse to answer 
any questions I don’t wish to answer. 
 
✓ I understand that personal information about me that is collected over the course of 
this project will be stored securely and will only be used for purposes that I have 
agreed to. I understand that information about me will only be told to others with my 
permission, except as required by law. 
 
✓ I understand that the results of this study may be published, and that publications will 
not contain my name or any identifiable information about me. 
 
 
I consent to:  
 
• Audio-recording   YES  NO  
 
Would you like to receive feedback about the overall results of this study?  
    YES  NO  
If you answered YES, please indicate your preferred form of feedback and address: 
 Postal:  ___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
 Email: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
.................................................................. 
Signature  
 
 ............................................................... 
PRINT name 
 
................................................................... 
Date 
 
  304 
3. E-mail invitation  
 
 
Name of participant  
Organisation 
Address 
 
Dear (title and name), 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a research project titled:  
An Institutional Analysis of State Capacity in the Saudi Arabian Housing System: A Case 
Study of Riyadh 
 
I will be investigating the state’s institutional capacity in the housing sector in Riyadh with the 
aim of better enabling private developers in the future to deliver housing in Riyadh. This 
research project is the basis for the PhD degree that I am undertaking at the University of 
Sydney, Australia, and is funded by King Saud University.  
As part of the qualitative component of this research project, I will be interviewing state and 
private sector stakeholders in Riyadh, particularly those involved in land development 
processes, the planning system, the property finance system, residential construction, and the 
legal framework for housing. I have identified you as a potential interviewee. 
While participation in this study is completely voluntary, your input would be greatly 
appreciated. The interview will take between 40-60 minutes and will be arranged to suit your 
convenience. For more information please see the attached Participant Information Statement 
which covers the interview process and how the information collected will be used.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any further information about the study or 
your involvement. 
 
Thank you in advance for your valuable contribution to this project. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Fawaz Alasmari,  
PhD Candidate, Urban and Regional Planning and Policy Program 
Faculty of Architecture, Design and Planning 
Room 523, Wilkinson Building G04  l   The University of Sydney l  NSW 2006. Australia  
M.  +966 508 822 001 (local) l   M. +61 401 328 628  
E.   fala1002@uni.sydney.edu.au      
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4. HREC approval letter 
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Appendix F: Riyadh Central Area Urban Renewal Program – HCDR 
The Urban renewal Program for the old city centre was proposed by the High Commission 
for the Development of Riyadh to transform the city centre into “a historic, administrative, 
economic and cultural center” (HCDR, 2015b, p. 64) with a plan that aims to achieve several 
objectives as follows: 
• Preservation of the cultural and urban heritage 
• Preservation of the current commercial activity and increasing employment 
opportunists 
• Diversification of housing patterns 
• Achieving social and population balance 
• Expansion of open areas 
• Enhancement of urban security 
• Improving the road network and public services in the area (ibid, p. 64).  
 
 
 
The Limits of Riyadh’s Central Area 
Source: HCDR, 2015b 
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Proposed Master Plan 
Source: HCDR, 2013a 
 
Future Development of the City Centre 
Source: HCDR, 2015b 
